








What only heaven hears:  
Citizens and the state in the wake of HIV scale-up in Lesotho 
 









Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
under the Executive Committee  


















Nora J. Kenworthy 





What only heaven hears: Citizens and the state in the wake of HIV scale-up in Lesotho 
Nora J. Kenworthy 
 
 This dissertation poses a set of questions about the political impacts of the rapid 
and large-scale deployment of HIV programs (HIV “scale-up”) in Lesotho. As HIV and 
global health initiatives have expanded over the past decade, they have had sociopolitical, 
as well as epidemiological, impacts. In particular, HIV scale-up elicited and demanded 
new political processes that continue to change how policy is crafted, how citizens are 
represented, and which values drive new health initiatives. More fundamentally, HIV 
initiatives have altered the ways that citizens, patients, and communities perceive 
themselves, the state, and their political worlds. Utilizing multi-sited ethnographic 
methods, this project observes how citizens in Lesotho are coping with these dramatic 
changes in their political worlds. The research reveals HIV scale-up’s considerable and far-
reaching impacts on citizen faith in democracy, perceptions of rights, access to key social 
protections, and feelings of belonging.  
 In contrast to work on the impacts of social movements, activism, and political will 
on HIV policies, this dissertation inverts the causal direction of inquiry regarding health 
and politics. In doing so, it recognizes new global health movements as drivers of political 
change, mobilizing actors and resources in deploying programs in ways that are altering 
political worlds and subjectivities. A rich recent literature on biological and therapeutic 
citizenship in the time of AIDS has begun recognizing these trends and their impacts on 
patient subjectivity. This research expands the frame of inquiry to examine how public 
health interventions can also alter citizen subjectivity, expectations of democracy, and the 
	  
	  
structures of associational life. The dissertation also contributes data towards better 
understandings of recipient populations’ perspectives on accountability, good governance, 
public-private partnerships, transparency, and participation—approaches currently touted 
as solutions to poor project outcomes. For citizens in Lesotho, these initiatives still look 
very much like anti-democratic enterprises.  
 Field research was undertaken in two sites surrounding different clinical care 
models: the first was a government-run primary care clinic, and the second was a factory-
based clinic in the country’s garment industry, where a public-private partnership provided 
HIV services to workers. In both sites, research extended far beyond the clinic. In the 
former site, this meant working with: peri-urban communities served by the clinic; two 
support groups struggling to build partnerships with NGOs; local government institutions 
tasked with managing the HIV response; and traditional healers, community health 
workers, and patients giving and seeking care outside the clinic. In the second site, this 
meant exploring dynamics of discipline, productivity and “ethical” production in a 
transtnationally-linked industry, as well as the social lives of workers outside their work.  
 Though largely unforeseen by most global health actors, HIV policy has become an 
extremely effective delivery mechanism for specific political ideologies and ways of 
practicing politics in poor countries. Research conducted in these sites demonstrates that 
the expansive, far-reaching scale-up of HIV programs has fundamentally changed ideas 
about what citizens deserve, who is deserving, how decisions will be made about services, 
and who takes responsibility for services, and ultimately, the survival of citizens. The 
predominant experience of politics for most citizens in post-scale-up Lesotho is a feeling of 
abandonment, of not being heard. The research thus raises significant normative as well as 
pragmatic questions about the role and responsibility of global health projects in already 
	  
	  
fragile political systems, and the potential impacts of the political changes described here 
on patterns of health seeking and ill health in countries like Lesotho. 
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A note on language and spelling 
 The official languages of Lesotho (pronounced less-oo-too) are Sesotho and English. 
Those who reside in Lesotho, as well as those who claim heritage from Lesotho or speak 
Sesotho in South Africa, refer to themselves as Basotho; an individual is called a Mosotho. 
The multiple meanings of Basotho can cause confusion, particularly in a study of politics. It 
is further complicated by the considerable migration patterns between Lesotho and South 
Africa for work, as well as cross-border familial connections. Here, because I am interested 
in the experiences of those citizens currently living in Lesotho, I use the term Basotho to 
typically refer to political, rather than cultural, linguistic, or familial connections, but this is 
not intended to discount these other aspects of Basotho identity.  
 As in other parts of Southern Africa, titles and terms of respect are extremely 
important in Lesotho, and denote symbolic relations according to age, stature, and 
familiarity. Adult men are typically referred to as Ntate, or father; adult or married women 
as Mme, or mother (an abbreviated spelling is ‘Mè). Older adults or those garnering 
particular respect are referred to as Ntate-moholo (grandfather) or Nkhono (grandmother). 
Teens and unmarried girls and boys are referred to as abuti (brother) and ausi (sister). Here, 
for the sake of simplicity and to assist readers, I typically only use the appellations Ntate 
and Mme. I use them as I would in everyday conversation in Lesotho (which is to say, very 
frequently), though occasionally in the text I will drop them and simply use someone’s first 
name after introducing them in a short section of text.  I do this as a way of showing 
respect for my informants, and for calling them as they would wish to be called, though 
many could also be referred to as Ntate-moholo or nkhono in person.  
 A few brief notes on pronunciation and spelling may assist readers. Th (as in 
Lesotho) is pronounced as an aspirated /t/, as in Thailand (though more aspirated), not 
	  
xvi 
there. An l preceding the vowels i or u is pronounced as a hard /d/, so lumela, meaning 
“hello,” is pronounced doo-may-lah. Readers may note that some words are spelled 
differently in Lesotho and South Africa. In Lesotho, an aspirated /ts/ sound is written as ts`-; 
in South Africa it would be spelled tsh-. A q is pronounced as a sharp click, as it is in Zulu 










 “Illness is the night-side of life, a more onerous citizenship. 
Everyone who is born holds a dual citizenship, 
in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the sick.” 
-Susan Sontag (1990, p. 3) 
 
 
 At the first meeting I attend of the POSWA (People Openly Surviving With AIDS) 
Support Group in the village of Ha Mamello, its 15 or so members attend to the business of 
being a support group in the time of HIV scale-up in Lesotho. They collect monthly dues 
from each member—10 Maloti (M), or about $1.151—to go into a savings account from 
which they assist members who are sick, without food, or dying. They recently received 
training from a national non-governmental organization (NGO) in household gardening 
schemes, and so members earnestly report back to the group the number of trenches and 
round gardens they have built. Though they receive little material assistance from the NGO 
and no financial support, the members spend the bulk of their meeting discussing the 
mundane details of acquiring rocks, tools, and seeds for building and planting their 
gardens. The group does not mention HIV, illness, treatment, prevention, or anything 
related to psychosocial support.  
 And then someone asks the support group’s “president,” an emaciated older man 
whose baseball cap and glasses give him a casual but professorial air, whether he has 
found someone to “type up” their proposal. Over the course of the next half hour, I learn 
that they are attempting to write up a lengthy grant proposal in response to a funding 
announcement from the Global Fund’s in-country coordinating body, which is responsible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




for disbursing the multi-million dollar grants the country receives for HIV and tuberculosis 
(TB) programs.2 The recent funding call is intended to support community-based groups in 
developing grassroots HIV prevention activities. The president has a printout of the online 
application form, which includes a number of prompts for one- to two-paragraph answers 
about intended activities, and measures of impact. But his concern at the moment is how 
they will find someone to type up the form. “It needs to be typed on a computer,” he 
explains, “it needs a flash drive so it can be typed on a computer.” He is confused about 
prompts that ask for paragraphs of information but are followed by small boxes that “can’t 
hold two paragraphs, even if they are typed on a typewriter,” and mentions some prompts 
that even require a specific number of words. As he continues talking it becomes apparent 
that the group has little idea about the content of the answers they are supposed to 
provide. “We would need guidance on how to fill this thing [proposal] up, since I really 
don’t know everything that should be written in there.” He pauses. “It’s a lot of work to 
write up a proposal.” He is priming them for the request that follows: He wants to hire a 
consultant to write the proposal for them, who will charge M20,000 (approx. $2,300). This 
is a staggering amount of money. Given the 10 Maloti these 15 members contribute each 
month, it would take them two and half years to raise such a sum, and that’s assuming 
none of it was spent on funerals, food or transport to the clinic—expenses that continually 
deplete their savings. 	  
 In the strange economy of Lesotho’s HIV programming, this situation is hardly 
outside the bounds of reason. In fact, these sorts of discussions may be familiar to many 
researchers who have worked with community associations and support groups in 
resource-poor contexts, where citizens struggle to gain a meaningful foothold within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




vast conglomerations of money and expertise involved in HIV scale-up. Most citizens in 
places like Lesotho have no way to bridge the vast divide between themselves and the 
monolith of HIV programming. They lack the language, the tools, and the wherewithal to 
be heard as citizens, patients, or even “recipients” of aid—as well as the resources with 
which to hire someone to speak for them.  
 As the group continues talking, there is a great deal of confusion over whether the 
consultant would be crafting a full conceptual project for them and writing it up, or simply 
transcribing their own ideas. One group member argues, “what is more important… is that 
the proposal should be based on the opinions of the people [i.e., not the consultant]—it’s a 
person who is supposed to answer the questions on this form… not a computer (emphasis 
original).” Another woman looks worried: “Whatever the consultant would be writing on 
the proposal, it would be our ideas and opinions, right?” But when the group finally gets 
around to talking about their ideas, they have little to do with prevention activities. They 
are poorly equipped to develop or deploy the kinds of interventions that are of interest to 
the Global Fund and its partners. What they want to do is raise pigs, which would provide 
income, as well as some measure of insurance against the poverty and hunger that 
constantly haunt them.3 The consultant will serve as a translator, taking the group’s desires 
for certain forms of survival that have little to do with HIV (beyond the special vulnerability 
which the disease confers upon already poor families), and turning these into a proposal 
for community-based prevention activities—wrought in the peculiar, technical language of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Pigs can provide for forms of survival that are meaningful to these group members, as I discuss in more 
detail in Chapter 5. Because pigs are a long-term investment and cannot easily be divided or turned into 
cash, they represent an attractive form of savings for support groups in Lesotho, who can easily go into 
debt paying for hospital, transport, or funeral expenses for sick and dying members. When capital is bound 
up in livestock, it is more likely to provide some long-term savings for members—or at least those who 
survive to see the livestock sold. For a much more extended discussion of cattle, wealth, and property in 




HIV experts. This is a bizarre form of translation, however, as it masks rather than reveals 
the desires and intentions of the group. Exasperated by members’ desires to be reassured 
that their own ideas will be in the proposal, the president finally snaps: “Don’t you people 
understand what an expert is?!”  
 What this short-tempered but savvy support group leader means is that they will 
hire a consultant “so that the proposal will be successful,” not in order to faithfully 
document their ideas. The desires of this group, the forms of life and survival that matter to 
them, have no place in the grant-making procedures of HIV scale-up. And though they 
continue to challenge the leader about whether their views will be represented in the 
proposal, they eventually concede, and three months later re-elect him as president of the 
group, though he continues to be dismissive of their concerns. Later, after the first time she 
attended one of the group’s meetings, my research assistant commented to me, “If you are 
rich or educated here people will always elect you. You ‘win’ their trust…. they think you 
know things, even if you don’t.” Indeed, it was likely worth the group tolerating his 
derision to benefit from his connections, knowledge, and education, limited though they 
were. But in the coming months, his skills prove insufficient to help them: After the global 
institutions have set their priorities, and the international experts have weighed in on 
strategies, and the state has ensured that its favored partners and bureaucrats will sit on the 
boards that apply for and disburse the grants, and after the civil society partners that 
purport to represent support groups such as this one have advocated for the strategies they 
want—after all of that and more, this small support group enjoys the paradoxical privilege 
of trying to apply for funding. It will be no surprise when they can’t raise the money for the 
consultant, and don’t finish the grant application; it raises the question of whether the 




 But by other measures, the members of this group are considered lucky. Their 
neighbors whisper that they get special treatment because they have HIV, and accuse them 
behind their backs of hoarding and stealing the money for HIV programs. In contrast to the 
members of POSWA, citizens who have less direct contact with HIV programming look at 
the money pouring into Lesotho; look at the ways in which their lives have not been visibly 
improved; observe that their friends and relatives are still sick, dying, poor, or unemployed; 
and reasonably conclude that the government must be keeping HIV funding all to itself.4  
 Such perceptions are reinforced by the obvious wealth and power of government 
ministers, NGO employees, and expert consultants involved in HIV programming, by the 
plethora of new white Toyota Hilux pick-up trucks emblazoned with ministerial seals and 
NGO logos that transport them, and by the fact that their local clinics remain poorly 
staffed, under-resourced, and over-crowded. “All you see is people misusing money,” one 
patient tells me when she is unable to get her medicine from the clinic:  
It seems like the government doesn’t care about the nation that elected it, we who elected 
them so that we could get better services…. It’s God’s honest truth, there’s nothing that the 
government cares about! –Nothing, in terms of the life and health of this nation. It only 
cares about itself… You hear them [government representatives] on the radio, and the 
words that come from their mouths—you’d think they still have hearts, but they don’t 
(emphasis original).  
Blame of the government for poor services breeds not protests (though of course there is 
anger), but a striking distrust of democracy itself. Between 2005 and 2008, the years of the 
most acute funding surge for HIV programs in Lesotho, the proportion of citizens who 
thought another form of government was necessary rose by nearly 40%, with a third of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The importance of the visibility of HIV program outcomes is essential to understanding how citizens 
assess success, defeat, and corruption. This is echoed in other countries, and even among program 
leadership. As one community leader in Kenya described the efforts of international funders to Edström 
and MacGregor (2010), “no, you can’t be working for seven years and involved with all of the communities 




those surveyed preferring a non-democratic form of government (see chapter 2; Hall & 
Leduka, 2008). It is abundantly clear that Lesotho’s citizens are not just unhappy with their 
leaders; they are unhappy with the entire system of governance that makes decisions on 
their behalf.  
 In places like Lesotho, citizens’ most fundamental experience with HIV 
programming is one of not being heard. From the foreign doctors and nurses hired to staff 
HIV clinics, to the absence of meaningful national dialogues about how HIV grants should 
be spent, citizens are finding that they have no way to speak about matters that shape the 
boundaries of their own survival. Their silence is not just a matter of lacking the skills to 
participate, but of not having a voice; it is the difference between not speaking a language 
and finding yourself to be deaf, blind, and mute. This dissertation asks about the impacts of 
these experiences on how citizens perceive the state, its partners, the democratic process, 
and most importantly, themselves. Interactions like the one above begin to paint a picture 
of how HIV programs—for all of their good intentions, and their considerable strides in 
assessing, treating, and (sometimes) curtailing the epidemic—are altering political worlds, 
citizen subjectivities, and democratic futures.  
 
Democracy in the Time of AIDS 
 The AIDS activist movements that began in the late 1980s indelibly shaped the way 
we view HIV, pushing the world to acknowledge and act on the rights of people to access 
HIV treatment, care, and prevention in countries across the world. Well-documented 
activist movements bravely appropriated and challenged scientific process (Epstein, 1996), 
built dynamic and flexible transnational movements for treatment access (Petchesky, 




societies’ most trenchant prejudices and mitigating racial, sexual, gender, and global 
inequalities (Berkman, Garcia, Munoz Laboy, Paiva, & Parker, 2005; Parker, 2009, 2011). 
In particular, these remarkable forms of collective action challenged the powers of 
governments, international agencies, corporations, and experts to determine who might 
live, who would die, and how the disease would be prevented and treated.  The story of 
how these movements evolved—and the global changes that challenged their very 
identities over time—is a powerful one, and its detailed history is expertly recounted by a 
number of  scholars (Berkman et al., 2005; De Souza, 1994; Epstein, 1996; Heywood & 
Altman, 2000; Parker, 2011; Petchesky, 2003; Robins & von Lieres, 2004; Treichler, 1999). 
By delving into a short history of the evolution of social activism surrounding the HIV 
epidemic, we can begin to understand the markedly different global politics that produced 
the conditions of a more technocratic HIV scale-up in places like Lesotho—conditions that 
were nearly inconceivable even a decade ago.  
 Richard Parker (2011, 2012) identifies four major periods in the “social history” of 
politics and mobilizations in the HIV epidemic, and these are useful for outlining the major 
political dynamics shaping HIV policy over the past three decades. The decade following 
the identification of HIV in 1981 was marked by a crisis, primarily within gay 
communities, that provoked radical mobilizations to raise awareness, to secure access to 
scientific knowledge and products, and to challenge the prejudices inherent in much of the 
discourse and the silence surrounding the epidemic at the time. The second decade of the 
epidemic saw a blossoming of new global institutional actors (The Joint United Nations 
Programme on AIDS [UNAIDS], the World Bank Global HIV/AIDS Program of Action 
[GAP], and umbrella organizations for AIDS activist and service organizations within 




access also blossomed, rooted in human rights language and ideas. It was in the third 
period of the epidemic—largely throughout the 2000s—that HIV organizations, 
movements, institutions, and global actors multiplied to address the global impact of 
HIV/AIDS. This period saw a race to treat, contain, address, and prevent HIV. Yet this vast 
expansion of organizations, resources, initiatives, and funds also created fragmentation, 
duplication, competition among agencies, and an absorption of activists and social 
movements into large—and very powerful—transnational institutions and projects. Finally, 
the fourth period is the one in which we find ourselves now: A global financial crisis has 
challenged notions of “treatment for all” and reinvigorated the emphasis on cost-
effectiveness and short-term gain in developing many new approaches to addressing the 
epidemic. At the same time, HIV initiatives are being folded into broader global health 
initiatives, and global health itself is increasingly professionalized, technocratic, and 
expert-driven.  
 As the global institutional architecture responding to HIV expanded rapidly in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s—and began to acknowledge and incorporate activist 
movements—HIV programming settled, paradoxically, into focusing on “administering the 
epidemic”—a technocratic shuttling of drugs into bodies (Parker, 2000, p. 51).5 This 
tended to divert attention from the social drivers of disease acquisition, suffering and early 
death (Lewis, 2007; Parker, 2000), to neglect the social and economic survival of already 
sick patients (Biehl, 2007; Kalofonos, 2008), and to hoist responsibility for care, disease 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The question of why this occurred is not a simple one. Parker (2000) asserts that AIDS activist movements 
never coalesced into a truly global movement that could adequately challenge global institutions and 
participate in agenda setting. Equally important, perhaps, is the fact that global institutions addressing HIV 
grew with an extraordinary pace, marshaling vast amounts of funding over a short period of time. This 
contributed to the phenomena of what might have been quite oppositional activist organizations becoming 
absorbed into the broader AIDS architecture, serving as service providers and experts within these 




management, and prevention onto the shoulders of patients and communities (Le Marcis, 
2003; Makoae, 2009). Amidst all of this, discourses about a global right to treatment access 
became hollowed out, distilling the very authentic participation of social movements in a 
broad array of initiatives into a notion that accessing and taking pills was somehow itself a 
radically participatory form of health politics. This is not to deny the terribly grave 
consequences of lacking treatment access for the world’s poor, or the importance of 
activists’ achievements in treatment access. But at the very moment that global treatment 
access became a realizable possibility in countries like Lesotho, the social movement 
politics of accessing treatment transformed into the “anti-politics” (discussed below; 
Ferguson, 1994) of a professionalized, hierarchical administration of the epidemic. As 
Parker (1994) had warned, “without a political and conceptual base, technocratic solutions 
to the epidemic have failed in every sense…While technocrats may successfully administer 
the epidemic, they offer no hope of defeating it. Even science offers nothing unless based 
upon critical reflection and political commitment” (in De Souza, 1994). 
 With a few notable exceptions, however, political science was late to engage with 
HIV. A few early works focused on the conditions under which HIV policies emerged, and 
the compelling ethical and advocacy issues driving policy agendas in developed countries 
(Baldwin, 2005; Bayer, 1992; Nathanson, 2007). It was only in about the mid-2000s that a 
small group of works emerged, examining the political factors driving HIV policy choices 
across or within African countries (Bor, 2007; Parkhurst, 2001; Patterson, 2005; Poku & 
Whiteside, 2004). Most analyses tended to compare country responses to the epidemic, 
probing what caused countries like Brazil, Uganda, and Botswana to develop active 
responses while AIDS denialism grew in South Africa, and other countries remained mired 




2004; Swidler, 2009a). Researchers and international organizations tended to hone in on 
the idea of “political commitment” as a possible explanatory variable, but successfully 
operationalizing such a vague phenomenon—let alone extracting policy lessons from it—
proved difficult. Other research attempted to standardize measures of political response to 
the epidemic and analyze these against various variables of HIV spread and impact across 
a larger sample of (usually African) countries (Bor, 2007; Patterson, 2005; USAID, 
UNAIDS, WHO, & The POLICY Project, 2003). Researchers at the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), UNAIDS and other international institutions even 
went so far as to develop a standardized measure of national policy responses to HIV and 
AIDS, called the AIDS Program Effort Index, or API (USAID et al., 2003). This second 
strand of research tended to face difficulties in linking policy outcomes to political process. 
That is, it was hard to tell a compelling story that held true across national political 
contexts about what factors drove countries to develop forward-thinking HIV policies: Was 
it the felt impact of the virus? Levels of stigma and discrimination? International pressure? 
In many cases, the story of how HIV policy emerged as it did was a complex tale, 
influenced by such large-scale factors as religion, history, economics, and political party 
divisions. Finally, a notable but slim literature, primarily originating from African countries, 
posed important but under-recognized questions hypothesizing that the impacts of the HIV 
epidemic (through illness, death, and their impacts on economies and societies) might 
destabilize already fragile states or political systems (Alexander De Waal, 2006; Manning, 
2002; Owusu-Ampomah, Naysmith, & Rubincam, 2009; Poku & Whiteside, 2004). 
 Evan Lieberman’s Boundaries of Contagion (2009) is perhaps the most significant 
offering from a political scientist to the scholarship on HIV policy to date. Recognizing the 




elegant multi-method analysis, developing his own measures of political responses to HIV. 
He proposes that deeply-rooted, institutionalized boundaries between ethnic groups can 
impede political initiative in implementing robust HIV policies—and that these effects hold 
regardless of politicians’ own ethnic affiliations or the patterns of HIV prevalence across 
ethnic groups in the nation. The book draws attention to the pervasive and considerable 
effects of stigma—what Lieberman calls “shaming and blaming”—and the tendency of 
social groups affected by HIV to place blame on vulnerable, poor, minority groups. This 
echoes anthropological accounts that highlight how ethnic politics impact HIV policy, 
especially Hyde’s (2007) considerable contribution on ethnicity and HIV in China. One of 
the most important lessons from Lieberman’s book is that strong HIV policy does not 
necessarily make for smart political decisions: Enacting the sort of HIV policies so 
aggressively promoted by international organizations (what Lieberman [2009] calls the 
“Geneva Consensus”) may actually involve considerable political costs for politicians (see 
also Strand, 2010). Even today, we can observe how galvanizing political issues among 
conservative, or overtly discriminatory, interest groups reshape HIV politics—as in the 
striking shift towards criminalizing homosexuality in Uganda, where HIV policies were 
once considered so progressive. Steven Robins (2008, ch. 7) discusses these tensions at 
some length in reference to South African President Jacob Zuma’s rape trial, during which 
his political supporters drew on neo-traditionalist discourses and public displays of 
masculine privilege to defend his actions, which included strikingly erroneous and sexist 
ideas about HIV risk and sexual practice—views that nonetheless served to galvanize his 
political power base (ch. 7).  
 The research I present here inverts these key questions, asking not how politics 




institutional changes, policy shifts, and influxes of organizations, money, and people) 
impact political functioning. The research chooses to look at variables associated with HIV 
policy and institutions, rather than the direct impacts of the HIV epidemic; it takes stock of 
HIV as a phenomenon of international politics, diplomacy, and governance in addition to 
its epidemiologic trends and effects. It emerges from a realization that the period during 
which national politics in recipient countries or the whims of African political leaders were 
the primary drivers of HIV policy response has rapidly come to a close. As national 
responses are increasingly “streamlined,” and particular policy choices are mandated by 
international institutions or incentivized by funding structures, HIV policies show far less 
variability than they did in the past, and adhere to a fairly rigorous set of “best practices” 
regardless of epidemiologic, social, or political variation (Biesma et al., 2009; Cassidy & 
Leach, 2009; Edström & MacGregor, 2010; Lieberman, 2009; Strand, 2010). 
 The emergence of HIV, and later, of strategies to prevent and treat it, presented 
numerous ethical quandaries that challenged some of the most fundamental political 
values in societies. Crafting HIV policy has consistently meant confronting tensions 
regarding: individual and collective well-being; private and public domains; how and 
when experimental science could be accessed by the public; how to create non-
discriminatory policies for epidemics concentrated in stigmatized groups; and where to 
draw the line between policies that restrict individual rights in the service of public safety, 
and preserving privacy by allowing individuals to take matters of prevention, treatment, 
and partner notification into their own hands. Of course, the ways in which societies dealt 
with these questions reflected core national values as well as the peculiarities of each 
national epidemic (Baldwin, 2005; Bayer, 1992; Nathanson, 2007). But everywhere, as 




somehow exceptional—something to be dealt with differently than, say, syphilis or 
tuberculosis (TB). As HIV programs expanded transnationally, exceptionalism also 
blossomed. Entire agencies were developed to address HIV as an issue somehow separate 
from other health issues (for example, UNAIDS sits outside of the World Health 
Organization [WHO]). Even as the UN called for “multisectoralism” in HIV programs—so 
that HIV would be seen as an issue requiring attention from the health, education, trade, 
labor, social welfare, and other government sectors—strategies reinforced the notion that 
both the disease and its policy responses operated according to a different set of rules.6 
(Exceptionalism also generated a rich and extended debate as to whether or not it was 
justifiable that AIDS be treated as exceptional by global institutions, donors, and states [see 
Piot, 2003, 2008; J. H. Smith & Whiteside, 2010].) 
 In resource-poor contexts, this exceptionalism can be especially striking. Duana 
Fullwiley’s (2004, 2011) research on sickle cell anemia in Senegal demonstrates how a 
vast public health emphasis on HIV (despite Senegal having the single lowest prevalence 
rate of HIV on the continent) created the “socio-political invisibility” of other diseases and 
conditions like sickle cell anemia (2004, p. 159). Even in Lesotho, where HIV’s impacts 
were so acute, the combined effects of rampant HIV stigma, entrenched and generalized 
poverty, a crippled national health system, and considerable primary health problems 
made the singular and resource-intensive scale-up of HIV programs seem like a misguided, 
or simply externally-imposed, prioritization of public goods. Such unfairnesses are not lost 
on citizens: “taking care of your health beyond HIV/AIDS” (emphasis added) a private 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In some respects, this was, of course, true. The scope of the HIV epidemic and its toll on life expectancies 
and population structures across many sub-Saharan African countries is simply shocking. But this sense of 
exceptionalism is also due to the ways in which HIV came to embody a new category of global 
humanitarian emergency, and it was in part the dynamics of HIV as emergency that warranted this kind of 




clinic sign calls out to passerby on one Lesotho’s main roads.  
 In resource-poor contexts, the prioritization of HIV initiatives tends to appear in 
conjunction with projects that fail to address or acknowledge the many social, political, 
and economic conditions which drive HIV infections, make accessing treatment more 
difficult, and speed along death due to AIDS (Altman, 1999; Barnett & Whiteside, 2002; 
Farmer, 2001; Gupta, Parkhurst, Ogden, Aggleton, & Mahal, 2008; Parker & Aggleton, 
2003; Pfeiffer, 2004). Though many global HIV initiatives use language which identifies 
poverty, vulnerability, or gender as important considerations of HIV prevention and 
response, a number of scholars argue that initiatives in practice often ignore the “structural 
determinants” driving HIV risk, stigma, illness, and treatment experiences (Auerbach, 
Parkhurst, & Cáceres, 2011; Gupta, Ogden, & Warner, 2011; Gupta et al., 2008; Ogden, 
Gupta, Fisherc, & Warnerd, 2011; Parker, Easton, & Klein, 2000; Parker, 2000; Pfeiffer, 
2004). In Lesotho, as will be evident throughout these chapters, “administering the 
epidemic” (Parker, 2000) without addressing other social ills provokes acute citizen 
confusion and ire. HIV programming has been so totalizing in places like Lesotho that 
citizens often resort to articulating claims to other social and political rights in the language 
and rationale of HIV programming. Thus, members of the youth wings of Lesotho’s 
opposition parties in May 2011 angrily protested the release of the government’s new 
behavior change communication (BCC) strategy for HIV prevention by citing the economic 
drivers of the epidemic:  
It is useless to fund strategies like these because they don’t directly help uplift the lives of 
youths. We are all aware of what is largely contributing to new HIV infections among 
young people, which is idleness [lack of jobs]. Therefore, promoting behavior-change 
without economic empowerment is like trying to move a mountain from Thaba-Tseka [a 
remote mountainous district] to plant it here in Maseru [the capital city]! (Matope, 2011) 




2011), making it not about prevention, but about political issues of the economy and of 
public participation in HIV policymaking.  
 Of course, any and all HIV policies are in some way political, and failing to 
acknowledge the social drivers of the epidemic represents a form of “anti-politics” 
(Ferguson, 1994) that separates out political causes of suffering and sickness from 
behavioral, individualist attempts to address infections. HIV programs, particularly in 
contexts where they address large, generalized epidemics, have now become a prominent 
force that shapes the ways we see and understand social life, and collective vulnerabilities. 
In this they are a representation of what Foucault (1980a, 2008) referred to as forms of 
governmentality: By shaping discourses about what drives HIV infections, ideas about 
legitimate and illegitimate responses HIV, and the range of possible actions for 
intervention, global institutions, experts, and NGOs have produced new social realities 
through the practice and provision of HIV policy. The anger of those youths in Lesotho 
indicates that the failure to include broader political participation in the crafting of HIV 
policies has also silenced important citizen voices that are attempting to re-link social ills 
with patterns of biological illness, in order to resist the prevailing governmentality of HIV 
approaches. 
 Finally, for countries like Lesotho, HIV treatment programs were late to arrive and 
broadly executed by a global conglomeration of organizations, funders, and experts, 
matched with the willing and flexible participation of the national government. Early 
networks of persons living with HIV and AIDS were absorbed into HIV scale-up as 
implementing agencies and routes for program delivery (c.f. Biehl, 2007; Birdsall & Kelly, 
2007; Cassidy & Leach, 2009; Rau, 2006; Swidler, 2009b). As new government “partners” 




groups had little intention of biting the hands that were feeding them resources. Coming on 
the heels of these civil society movements, and seeming to promise a new means of 
securing survival, efforts to expand HIV treatment and services in places like Lesotho 
created lofty expectations among would-be recipients. The proliferation of HIV treatment 
“success stories”—aided in no small part by the “confessional technologies” encouraging 
narratives of transformative survival among patients (Nguyen, 2010)—fostered the belief 
that HIV programs would change lives. While patients in Lesotho can now access HIV 
treatment with relative ease, few would say their lives are good. The most important effect 
of HIV programming for many is the rare opportunity HIV status provides to receive short-
term food aid, a stipend for attending an HIV workshop, or access to small grant resources 
through a support group (on this, see also Swidler, 2009b; Smith, 2003). The predominant 
changes brought about by HIV scale-up for citizens in Lesotho have been pharmaceutical 
(the effect of a “drugs into bodies” approach), and political. In this dissertation, I will argue 
that the political changes of HIV scale-up are extremely important, but grossly overlooked. 
HIV programs have changed the way governments do business, concentrating power in the 
hands of non-elected bureaucrats, removing many decisions from the public purview, 
allowing the provision of crucial services to be overseen by an array of NGOs with 
competing values and interests, and setting priorities without the broad input of citizens.  
 Thus, the expansive, far-reaching scale-up of HIV programs has fundamentally 
changed ideas about what citizens deserve (pills, rather than social well-being), who is 
deserving (patients, rather than citizens), how decisions will be made about services (by 
technocrats, not elected representatives, and regarding eligibility, rather than rights), and 
who takes responsibility for services and the survival of citizens (patient-consumers 




delivery mechanism for specific political ideologies and ways of practicing politics in poor 
countries.  I argue that this has had an indelible impact on political life and democratic 
functioning in Lesotho, and that HIV and global health programs—however well-meaning 
their efforts—have ignored, failed to notice, or under-recognized these political impacts.  
Before turning to a more comprehensive assessment of some of the driving themes of this 
study, I will first provide a more in-depth analysis of HIV “scale-up” as a social process and 
its trajectory in Lesotho, a discussion that will be expanded considerably in chapter 3. I 
then discuss how the research draws on, and speaks to, literature across the fields of 
African studies, development studies, medical anthropology, political science, and public 
health. In doing so, I highlight a set of recurrent, crucial leitmotifs that repeatedly arise 
from the data in the following chapters.  
 
Confronting Scale-Up: Localizing a Global Campaign to Treat HIV and AIDS  
 Between 2004 and 2010, the small, Southern African country of Lesotho 
experienced a dramatic rewriting of its health systems in the name of HIV treatment. 
Though the first case of HIV was identified in 1986 (Owusu-Ampomah et al., 2009), and 
the country declared its HIV epidemic a national emergency in 2000 (UNGASS, 2008), 
producing the funding and initiative necessary for building a systematic response to HIV 
required the confluence of a number of domestic and international efforts. In a setting like 
Lesotho, mobilizing effective HIV programming requires harnessing and disbursing an 
enormous array of material and human resources. In a number of countries across Africa, 
the scale-up of HIV services happened in roughly the same manner, and with the same 
overarching goals and objectives: large emphases on treatment and behavioral 




broadly externally- and expert-led process, with governments being asked to “align” 
policies with international standards; and, especially in the early years, intense competition 
among donors, NGOs, and research enterprises to claim patient populations, areas of 
expertise, and responsibility for positive outcomes. “The global AIDS funding industry,” 
Cassidy and Leach (2009) write, “is helping put into play an epistemological 
standardization – a standard set of solutions, responding to a standardized set of framings 
of the problem that link biomedical notions to what have become globalised received 
wisdoms about HIV and AIDS” (p. 15). But these were not the only ways in which HIV 
scale-up was a social process. As I will describe in the section that follows, HIV scale-up 
involved dramatic shifts in institutional arrangements, political processes, and the relations 
between citizens, states and transnational actors.  
 In 2003, Lesotho had only 7 doctors and 33 nurses per 100,000 persons (compared 
with 25 physicians and 140 nurses in neighboring South Africa) (Liese & Dussault, 2004); 
fewer still worked in the public sector, which could claim only 89 doctors and 1123 nurses 
and midwives across the entire country (Mwase et al., 2010). Nursing staff was poorly 
equipped to manage the secondary infections and symptoms of HIV, let alone distribute 
and manage more advanced treatment to patients. Those who arrived at clinics sick and 
with signs of AIDS were mostly sent home to die, and family members were given brief 
instructions and few supplies with which to care for them. Though the epidemic went 
relatively unnoticed in Lesotho for the better part of a decade, by 1995 a 31.3% HIV 
prevalence rate was reported among ante-natal clinic attendees at the national referral 
hospital.  The absence of effective treatment in the country for another decade created an 
acute, generalized epidemic whose death toll was terrifying; even today Lesotho claims the 




Botswana (UNAIDS, 2012). Between 1990 and 2009, the life expectancy among women 
dropped from an already low 65 to 50; in men, from 55 to 46 (World Health Organization 
[WHO], 2012). The health system’s already weak capacities had been further damaged by 
years of structural adjustment policies that mandated de-investment in public sector 
services and fee-for-service policies at clinics (Pfeiffer & Chapman, 2010). Lesotho’s 
rugged, rural terrain made providing even the most basic care at far-flung clinics a major 
infrastructural challenge, and few health workers wanted to work in such isolated areas. 
Even today, many clinics remain inaccessible by car or motorcycle, and can only be 
reached on foot, by donkey, or through an aerial transport service maintained by a network 
of NGOs. Even in 2009, HIV clinicians reported to me that the country lacked its own viral 
load machine, which is essential for monitoring the efficacy of drugs in patients, the 
progress of the disease, and signs of drug resistance. (Lesotho paid to send tests to a 
machine in South Africa, but reportedly lost its contract with South Africa after failing to 
keep up on its bill payments. As a result, viral load testing was no longer publicly 
available.)  
 Despite these challenges, by 2010, 93% of clinics were offering Highly-Active 
Antiretroviral Treatment (HAART) across all 10 districts (Mwase et al., 2010; National AIDS 
Commisssion [NAC], 2011). In order to facilitate treatment provision, nurses were 
intensively trained in the management of HIV therapy, and counselors and community 
health workers were recruited to serve as foot soldiers in HIV treatment and testing 
campaigns. Antiretroviral therapy (ART) centers were carved out of already tight clinic 
spaces, sometimes even occupying temporary shelters. Antiretrovirals (ARVs) and blood 
samples—transported on motorcycle and even horseback—began moving to and from 




Patients testing HIV-positive were now shuttled from the testing room to multi-day trainings 
on HIV treatment and prevention. Total HIV/AIDS funding (from domestic and 
international sources) increased more than six-fold between 2006 and 2010, and 
international funding alone increased almost nine-fold over the same five-year period 
(NAC, 2011). Funding from the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 
2011 was 85 times what it was in 2006 (ibid). In 2011, I counted no less than 216 
domestic and international organizations on a national registry that listed HIV/AIDS 
services or interventions as part of their activities; less than a quarter listed dates of 
establishment in Lesotho prior to 2000.7  
 
Table 1.1: Total funding commitments for HIV/AIDS, 2006-2011 from international and domestic 
sources, in millions of Maloti. Source: NAC, 2011.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Even this figure most likely grossly overestimates the number actually involved in HIV activities prior to 
2000. Many organizations established in Lesotho prior to 2000 were general service NGOs, church 
organizations, or other NGOs whose efforts have shifted towards HIV as funding has become available. 
This pattern of task-shifting among civil society organizations is extremely common as a result of the 
increase in HIV funding (Swidler, 2009b; Biesma et al., 2009). A survey of civil society organizations in 
Lesotho found that 69% of those organizations surveyed reported a change in their emphasis and activities 






























Table 1.2: Expansion of ART to patient populations in need in Lesotho, 2006 – 2011. Lines reflect the 
total number of patients enrolled in ART, the total number of people in need of ART (according to clinical 
criteria), and the percentage of people who qualify for ART but have not yet been enrolled. The significant 
increase in the number of patients in need of receiving ART in 2007 – 2008 reflects the efforts of a national 
testing campaign and changes in the ART eligibility criteria, see chapter 3. Sources: NAC, 2010a, 2011; 
UNAIDS & WHO, 2008; UNGASS, 2008. 
 Scale-up had a vast impact on the biological futures of many patients, and 
drastically improved the biomedical efficacy with which we can manage the HIV epidemic 
across contexts whose resource-scarcity presents very significant hurdles. Nevertheless, it is 
naïve to envision scale-up as simply a medical intervention, or a revision of health systems. 
Scale-up in Lesotho required a vast deployment of policies delineating everything from 
behavior to rights to institutional responsibilities; programs for managing not just treatment, 
but patients, activities, money, and resources; grant-making processes and agencies to 
receive and spend those grants; and institutions like the National AIDS Commission (NAC) 
and the Global Fund’s Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM) to manage HIV priorities 
and grant disbursement. It is these latter aspects of scale-up with which I am most 
concerned. My aim is to highlight some of the frequently overlooked dynamics of this 















































these dynamics in more detail, and to understand why they are so powerful, it is essential 
to examine the dimensions of scale-up as a global, political process in further detail.  
 If we could point to a single moment when the idea of a global scale-up of HIV 
treatment began to gather broad social recognition, it would likely be the International 
AIDS Conference hosted in Durban, South Africa, in 2000.8 This conference brought global 
attention to a number of coinciding trends. These included: the now well established 
efficacy of ARVs in combating the disease, and the success of developing countries like 
Brazil in managing large-scale treatment programs; the efficacy of activist groups in 
challenging drug pricing and patents; the acute inequities of treatment—and the particular 
injustice of political barriers to accessing the inexpensive regimens for prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT)—in places like South Africa; the emergent 
discourses about access to treatment as a fundamental human right; and finally, the acute 
failure of South Africa’s leadership to mobilize resources to make ARVs available to its 
own population, and to recognize HIV as the virus that causes AIDS. The flurry of activity 
and activism in Durban seemed to elicit a paradigm shift, allowing the idea of universal 
access to treatment to solidify as a political cause and a feasible project goal. At the same 
time, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGASS) was preparing a special declaration 
of commitment on HIV/AIDS, to be endorsed by all member states. This marked a 
profound shift in support for scale-up, whereby support for comprehensive, well-funded 
HIV programs moved beyond activist, research and NGO communities, and into the realm 
of national governments and international institutions.  By 2001, the UN convened a 
special session dedicated to HIV/AIDS, issuing the Declaration of Commitment on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 In focusing on the advent and development of “scale-up” as a social and political phenomenon, this 
analysis woefully excludes much of the rich history of the early HIV response from within institutional 
structures like the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA), which was formally replaced by UNAIDS in 1996. 




HIV/AIDS. The meeting recognized HIV/AIDS as a “global crisis” requiring “global action”; 
the resulting declaration included language about access to prevention, care, and 
treatment, and solicited global funding commitments for HIV/AIDS programs in developing 
countries (UNAIDS, 2002, p. 4).9 Most importantly, member states committed themselves 
to significantly funding the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), 
which was formally launched in 2002 as an innovative, multilateral funding mechanism 
designed to reduce administrative costs, streamline global funding, and increase 
accountability (Lisk, 2010).  
 Beyond the corridors of the UN, other funding streams were also gaining 
momentum. The World Bank, which had been funding HIV projects since the 1980s, 
launched its sizeable new HIV funding initiative, called the Multi-country HIV/AIDS 
Program, or MAP, in 2000 (Harman, 2010; Lisk, 2010). In 2001, the Gates Foundation 
announced a $60 million grant to support microbicide research, and began to be more 
directly involved in funding HIV research and programming (Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, 2012). In 2002, Botswana became the first African country to provide ARVs 
through its public health system, doing so with support from Merck and the Gates 
Foundation (Carpenter, 2008). In 2003 the WHO announced its “3 by 5 Campaign” 
(WHO, 2003, 2004), which laid out goals for treating 3 million people with HIV/AIDS by 
the end of 2005; this was the first time the global community had set explicit treatment 
targets. Also in 2003, the US Congress set aside $15 billion to be spent on global HIV, TB, 
and Malaria programs – an enormous commitment of funding, but also a direct 
institutional challenge to the Global Fund – which became the President’s Emergency Plan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Transcripts of country statements at the UNGASS meeting are available here: 
http://www.un.org/ga/aids/statements/; Kofi Annan’s initial speech proposing a global fund to fight 





for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR (Dietrich, 2011). In total, global funding for HIV and AIDS 
activities expanded astronomically, from $1.6 billion in 2000 to $8.9 billion in 2006 (Lisk, 
2010, pp. 93–94).  
 The scale of these funding increases and disbursements was exceptional, and often 
so rapid that a primary concern among donors was the “absorption capacity” of recipient 
governments and agencies. For example, Zambia received the most HIV funding from the 
US government in 2000, prior to the major global scale-up of HIV programs, reaping about 
$0.73 per capita from all US government sources (Alagiri, Collins, Summers, Morin, & 
Coates, 2001, p. 5); by 2009, the Obama administration announced a new global health 
initiative that would be giving Zambia $28.20 per capita—amounting to $289 per HIV-
infected individual in the country—for a single program initiative (Michaud & Kates, 2011). 
Dramatic increases in funding could create enormous inequalities between countries, 
between regions within countries, and ultimately, between those with HIV and those with 
other health conditions that were of less interest to global donors. As a case in point, 
Zimbabwe was able to disburse $98.35 per person living with HIV in 2008, while Rwanda 
disbursed $2015.79 per person despite its much smaller HIV epidemic (Cohen, 2008). 
Shiffman and colleagues (2008) reported that between 1998 and 2007, funding for 
HIV/AIDS as a portion of all donor health aid rose from 5.5% to nearly 50%, and during 
the same period, the proportions of funding for health systems strengthening and 
population health were reduced by more than 50%.   
 There are two intertwined aspects of HIV program scale-up essential to its character 
across diverse country contexts. First, scale-up is a global process. From its very 
beginnings, scale-up not only encouraged the participation of diverse global actors, but 




groups, NGOs, international organizations, donor countries, and even transnational 
public-private partnerships all contributed in essential ways to the process of scale-up; as a 
social phenomenon, scale-up represents a convergence and production of these global 
actors’ diverse interests, values, and senses of responsibility. And it orbits around a 
particular, universalizing aim: To achieve “drugs for all” (Biehl, 2008) as well as access to 
care and prevention throughout the developing world. Its benchmarks of success and 
principles for implementation, while varying by country, are guided by international 
agreements, policies, expertise, and advocacy. And because it is embedded within 
transnational networks, scale-up is enabled by movements of policies, values, people, and 
programs through those networks. As a result, its reach is shaped by the gaps, hierarchies, 
and exclusions of such transnational dynamics as well (see Ferguson, 2006). Though scale-
up aims for universal access to treatment, participation in the processes of priority-setting 
or policymaking—which are dominated by powerful agencies, is hardly universal—a 
highly sought after, but rarely granted, priviledge.10 
 Second, since scale-up is embedded in global social fields shaped by relations of 
power, it demands not only shifts in policies, but changes in the ways that nations make 
decisions, and alterations of the very institutions responsible for programming and funding 
disbursement. The scale-up process in many recipient countries can be measured as much 
by policy deployment as by the expansion of access to medicines. Table 1.3 reflects data 
amalgamated from the HIV/AIDS timeline in Lesotho included in Appendix A. In it, I have 
tallied the number of HIV policies created each year, and the number of major grants 
reported by the Government of Lesotho. One can clearly see, particularly in the early years 
of scale-up (2000 – 2006), that efforts in policy creation directly preceded grant funds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




awarded; a massive policy deployment effort in the years directly prior to Lesotho’s scale-
up of HIV treatment (2004 – 2007) is followed by two waves of funding commitments to 
support treatment programs (see Appendix A for more details on policies and grants). 
Global discourses about the importance of “political commitment” and “good governance” 
for obtaining funds convey important messages about the ways in which governments must 
submit themselves to institutional and procedural changes, as well as display evidence of 
conformity to global “best practices,” in order to receive (or continue receiving) funding. 
Decisions about countries’ eligibility for grants are dependent, at least in part, on their 
successes in policy development and their efforts to deploy procedures that are in line with 
global best practices. A primary measure of these efforts are the UNGASS reports regularly 
submitted by all member countries. These outline countries’ policy, procedural, legal, and 
institutional efforts relevant to HIV; in response, key stakeholders rate country progress (see 
NAC, 2010b; UNGASS, 2008; additional reports available at http://www.unaids.org/en/ 
dataanalysis/knowyourresponse/countryprogressreports/2012countries/).  
 
Table 1.3: Patterns of HIV policy creation and donor funding received in Lesotho, 1986 - 2011. See 
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 Some of the most remarkable political legacies of HIV scale-up in recipient 
countries are the changes elicited in institutions and in the power of certain agencies and 
individuals. Funders (with the support of NGOs and activists) have encouraged, and in 
many cases required, the establishment of new institutions—most notably the National 
AIDS Commissions (NACs, set up as independent, national HIV programming bodies 
responsible for coordinating a multisectoral response to HIV) and cooperative councils 
organized by specific granting institutions, like the Global Fund’s CCMs (Country 
Coordinating Mechanisms, responsible for setting funding agendas and coordinating 
applications for Global Fund grants among private, public, and civil society partners). Of 
course, creating entirely new governance structures in recipient countries does not occur 
without considerable tension. National AIDS Commissions, which donors such as the 
World Bank and UNAIDS emphasized should be independent of Ministries of Health 
(MOHs), frequently come into conflict with health ministries and executive branches 
because of tensions over whether or not NACs are politically independent entities, 
questions about how their work intersects with that of the MOH, and conflicts over control 
of grant resources (Cassidy & Leach, 2009; Putzel, 2004). Lesotho’s Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare (MOHSW), with help from others in the ruling political party, effectively 
dissolved the National AIDS Commission in 2011 (discussed in chapter 3). Rumors had 
long circulated that the MOHSW leadership resented NAC’s primary position in 
distributing grant resources, and that there was debilitating confusion over NAC’s purpose 
and role. Observers of CCMs in a number of countries report considerable concerns about 
the extent to which they remain independent of national governments. In a number of 
countries, the principle recipients of Global Fund grants are also the core leadership of the 




organizations will receive grant funds (Akoku, 2009a; Biesma et al., 2009; Cassidy & 
Leach, 2009; Putzel, 2004). In 6 out of 7 of Lesotho’s Global Fund grants, a government 
ministry has been the principal recipient; the remaining grant was disbursed to “civil 
society,” which in fact was the Lesotho Council of NGOs, an umbrella organization for 
NGOs in the country that is closely aligned with the ruling party.  
 It should be emphasized that none of these entities—not NAC, the CCM, nor even 
the national Ministries of Health (which have also gained considerable power throughout 
scale-up)—have directly elected representatives, nor is it quite clear who their constituents 
might be, and how representatives are made accountable to them. A number of scholars 
have argued that, despite the emphasis on civil society partnerships and strategies for the 
greater involvement of people with AIDS (GIPA), institutions like NACs and CCMs (and the 
structure and flow of HIV funding more broadly) tend to promote tokenism in civil society 
representation, encouraging the involvement and funding of large “umbrella” organizations 
at the expense of smaller, community-based entities, and dis-incentivizing civil society 
activism by involving organizations as service providers (Biesma et al., 2009; Cassidy & 
Leach, 2009; Fisher, 1997; Rau, 2006). When umbrella organizations serve as 
representatives for all citizens, or a single person living with HIV is put on a committee to 
represent the interests of all people living with HIV/AIDS, forms of representation and 
political processes are unfair and undemocratic. Few citizens even know who represents 
them on such committees, nor are representatives easily accessible. Structures of 
accountability hardly exist, representatives are not obligated to report back to constituents 
(if they even perceive themselves as having constituents), and there is no systematic means 




constituents such persons or bodies are intended to represent.11  
 Funding flows within countries – which often emanate from entities like NAC and 
the CCM – have the power to elicit paradigmatic changes among community 
organizations, citizen associations, and what is typically termed “civil society” as well. 
This is most noticeable in the devolution of state responsibilities and grant resources to 
NGOs of all kinds. As Ferguson and Gupta (2002) note in their description of what they, 
drawing on Foucault, term “transnational governmentality,” these patterns are foundational 
practices that shape our contemporary world: “The outsourcing of the functions of the state 
to NGOs and other ostensibly nonstate agencies, we argue, is a key feature, not only of the 
operation of national states, but of an emerging system of transnational governmentality” 
(p. 990). The devolution of state functioning to NGOs tends to elevate select organizations 
into positions of considerable power: In 2005, the top 20% of civil society organizations 
(CSOs) in Lesotho controlled and disbursed 80% of the funding, and it is likely that this 
trend was exacerbated as PEPFAR and Global Fund disbursements heavily favored more 
professionalized NGOs (Birdsall & Kelly, 2007, p. 64). Large umbrella organizations – such 
as the Lesotho Network of Persons Living with HIV and AIDS (LENEPWHA) or the Lesotho 
Council of NGOs (LECONGO) – now dominate the political landscape of HIV 
programming in Lesotho, and citizens’ ability to access these organizations or understand 
their representative structures is extremely limited.  
 Despite these vast political shifts—of which I have only given the briefest of 
overviews—global health and HIV programs continue to be portrayed as distinctly 
apolitical, requiring government partnership and support but somehow above the purview 
of citizens and democratic process. They continue to be perceived as biomedical, clinical, 
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or programmatic interventions without distinct political effects or aspects. Nevertheless, the 
ways in which citizens are asked to engage in such programs, and their perceptions of 
them, are deeply political, intimately bound up in ideas about membership, social 
contracts, state power, inequality, recognition, and the disciplinary practices of 
contemporary HIV treatment modalities. It is the ‘felt’ politics of everyday engagements 
with, or abandonments by, HIV programs among citizens (patient and non-patient alike) 
that becomes the primary focus of much of the research here. I have chosen to hone in on 
elements of everyday political life in the context of HIV programming in part because it is a 
story less often told, even as there has been significant focus on political leadership and 
global institutions in HIV response. I also prioritize this aspect of citizen experience and 
perspective because I feel it gives some small measure of voice where more formal 
methods of representation and participation are largely absent. I have no illusions that this 
somehow makes up for much-needed systems of political engagement; but, nevertheless, 
this is perhaps the most that raw empirical research can offer.  
 
Scale-Up’s Disciplinary Logics 
HIV scale-up elicits changes in much more than political institutions and the structures of 
civil society; much recent scholarship has extensively studied its impacts on citizen 
subjectivities. In her compelling overview of research approaches to understanding the 
ways that health regimes and experiences shape identity and subjectivity, Susan Reynolds 
Whyte (2009) lays out two major trajectories of anthropological engagement: research on 
health identities and the politics of identity in health movements; and biopower, along 
with the increasing attention to various biological citizenships and subjectivities. In many 




followed a trajectory from a focus on identity politics (engaging in research on social 
movements, treatment activism, patient identities, and stigma and discrimination) to a 
focus on biopolitics. In recent years, research utilizing a Foucauldian, biopolitical 
framework has grown exponentially, led by a number of scholars whose work examines 
how health systems and services have become a prominent, if not the primary, force 
shaping citizen subjectivities and survival, spawning various theorizations of biological 
citizenship, biosociality, therapeutic citizenship, responsibilized citizenship, and health 
governmentality (Biehl, 2007; Nguyen, 2010; Petryna, 2002, 2004; Rabinow, 1996; 
Redfield, 2005; Robins, 2008; Rose & Novas, 2003).  In many ways, this evolution is not 
surprising; the expansion of scale-up breathed new life into concerns about the disciplinary 
practices of public health agendas, the power of global institutions and governments in 
determining how and under what conditions citizens will survive, and scale-up’s own 
prominent concerns with counting and documenting patients and their infections. It is also 
worth noting that this theoretical evolution—from an emphasis on identity and social 
movement politics to an overriding focus on biopower, discipline, and subjectivity—is not 
solely limited to health studies or medical anthropology, but represents a profound shift 
across the social sciences (Brass, 2000). In many ways, HIV programs encapsulate the most 
defining elements of this new scholarship—from the burgeoning presence of support 
groups and other biosocial associations, to the discursive means by which clinicians and 
counselors shape the ways patients see themselves, behave, and engage with therapeutic 
regimes. Studies of HIV have been central to this theory development (Biehl, 2007; J. 
Comaroff, 2007; Nguyen, 2010).  
 Beginning with The Birth of the Clinic (1973), Foucault’s canon of work displays a 




biomedical practice (1973), in totalizing institutions (1975, 1989, 2003), and perhaps most 
extensively, in diverse and dispersed forms of governmentality in an increasingly neoliberal 
world (2008). This scholarship stems from a simple but extremely potent idea: Whereas the 
enlightened state form was ostensibly established in such a way that it could let citizens 
live, but withhold the potentiality of taking life (making death through execution) as 
emblematic of sovereignty, the modern state could “foster life or disallow it to the point of 
death”—that is, make life, and let die (1980b, p. 138). In doing so, it combines two distinct 
disciplinary practices: the “anatamo-politics” that polices the bodies of citizens, making 
them more efficient, healthy, effective, pure—and, in essence, treated—and the 
“biopolitics” of the population, that counts, specifies, examines, and organizes the 
population’s health in such a way as to “invest life through and through” (ibid., p. 139). 
Strangely, as Foucault points out, this creates a situation in which, despite the many 
diseases and biological risks ravaging the poor of the world, “what might be called a 
society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been reached when the life of the species is wagered 
on its own political strategies…modern man is an animal whose politics place his 
existence as a living being in question” (ibid., p. 143).  Life is now integral to the exercise 
of power, and the preservation of life is the seat of power for the modern state.   
 For Foucault, the exercise of such power over life takes the particular form of 
“governmentality,” a dispersed, insidious set of practices for the “conduct of conduct” that 
is particularly well-suited to the neoliberal world, with its proliferations of civil society, 
NGOs, and humanitarian projects. Governance takes two primary forms: that of 
legitimating discourses, which determine and convey what is right, rational, proper, and 
expected; and that of the structuring of possible forms of intervention—the procedures, 




place. Governmentality creates new political subjectivities, in both senses of the term: It 
demonstrates and reinforces for citizens their subject-positions as forms of power shape 
their possibilities for survival; and it shapes the mindscapes of citizens—their identities, 
their perceptions, and most importantly, their ways of behaving and crafting survival in the 
world. Foucault is particularly interested in how governmentality elicits “technologies of 
the self”—the projects of self-fashioning as healthy, productive, responsible citizens that 
are so strongly incentivized and produced by neoliberalism. Discipline, we can begin to 
see, takes nearly invisible, but far-reaching forms, entering the most private reaches of 
citizen subjectivity. Foucault’s work begins to disabuse us of the faulty notion that there are 
distinct private and public worlds in politics, showing how power seeps into private 
actions, personal behaviors, and individual outlooks (though this dichotomy is thoughtfully 
and thoroughly contested by feminist political scholars as well).  
 If, as Foucault argues, the defining power of the modern state is executed at the 
level of life itself, then surely the scale-up of HIV programs—and following that, the vast 
mobilizations of resources for global health—represents the vanguard of this new power. 
Though surveillance, data, and discipline have long been a feature of public health 
programs within state regimes (Bayer, Fairchild, & Colgrove, 2007), in HIV programs and 
global health initiatives they take on an entirely new scale. HIV education programs and 
treatment regimes explicitly aim to reformulate patients’ ideas about their bodies, the 
nature of infection, appropriate behaviors, respect for therapies, and even the epidemic 
itself. Rhetoric about HIV-positivity, in particular, promotes very specific ideas about how 
HIV patients should conduct themselves, and how engaging in the proper behaviors of self-
care, responsibility, appropriate eating, pharmaceutical adherence, and psycho-therapeutic 




2008). In resource-constrained contexts where access to ARVs has never been guaranteed, 
and was extremely hard to secure prior to scale-up, Nguyen (2010) writes that a politics of 
triage incentivized technologies of the self and projects of self-fashioning in order to access 
much needed treatment. This creates a kind of “therapeutic sovereignty” – a “republic of 
therapy” whose logics are driven not only by scarcity, but also by therapeutic goals and 
rationalities. The forms of governmentality expressed in HIV programming mirror, almost 
exactly, those highlighted by Foucault: the emphases on personal responsibility, the 
delegation of state powers to flexible, shifting non-state entities, the replacement of 
political morality with a governance of rationality and cost-effectiveness, technologies of 
the self to access and secure goods (which reinforces individual responsibility), and the 
obfuscation of real forms of structural injustice and the workings of power in driving 
infections and impeding survival.  
 Nevertheless, as Swidler (2009b) points out, despite these acute extensions of 
governmentality in the form of HIV programs, considerable evidence from within sites of 
the epidemic seems to indicate that programs have much less extensive reach into personal 
behavior than we might initially assume. Infection rates appear to be stubbornly 
entrenched in many areas; sexual practices and patterns of behavior show a robust ability 
to resist influence; and when logics of behavior change are imposed, any decreases in risk 
are slow and hard-won. Rather, “the one area in which global models have penetrated,” 
Swidler writes, “is at the level of rhetoric and ideology” (p. 195). HIV services seem to be 
most successful in communicating to citizens what it means to be a good and deserving 
patient, and eliciting the kinds of labor required for participation in therapeutic regimes—
the training, self-monitoring, disclosing, and acceptance that are essential to accessing 




values about citizens’ moral obligations as public and private individuals, and their place 
in new hierarchies of bureaucratic functioning—change citizens’ outlooks regarding the 
state, and themselves as citizens.  In addition, global health discourses convey powerful 
ideas about what is deserved, and the very nature of what constitutes rights in a changing 
world. For example, even as scale-up legitimized the “right to treatment” discourse, 
patients accessing treatment across Southern Africa complained about debilitating hunger 
that impeded their ability to survive, and the concept of a “right to food” has failed to 
materialize, even as food insecurity appears to inhibit adherence to treatment (Alex de 
Waal & Whiteside, 2003; Jones, 2011; Maclean, 2012; Mangili, Murman, Zampini, & 
Wanke, 2006; Tang et al., 2002). As a result, amidst Lesotho’s debilitating and severe food 
crisis during 2012, a United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) representative confidently 
reported that UNICEF was helping out by providing food packages, but that their 
organizational strategy was to fail to provide enough to nutritionally support each 
household: “It doesn’t even cover 40% of household needs…and it’s on purpose, by the 
way. Because we don’t want to create a welfare state” (Magubane, 2012). Statements such 
as these convey powerful normative discourses about the relationships between citizens, 
NGOs, and the state, and the changing (or even nonexistent) social contracts through 
which such relations are executed. They reveal deep moral sentiments about the value of 
citizens, who primarily fail to qualify as the kind of persons deserving of social protection 
or continued access to the goods necessary for survival.  
 Rabinow and Rose (2006) caution that it is easy to see everything in today’s world 
as imbued with biopower, to perceive it as an all-consuming kind of sovereignty over 
everyday life. They argue that much work extending theories of biopower—including that 




biopower’s scope, and overgeneralize the ways in which biopower controls life, departing 
from detailed genealogies of how power operates in specific institutions, situations, and 
populations. Without discounting the enormous value of these works as tools through 
which we can re-examine and re-think the meanings of state, sovereignty, power, and bare 
life in the contemporary world, it is also important to focus on research efforts that 
endeavor to elaborate specific, ethnographic explorations of power (and resistance), 
discipline (and its limitations), and the multiple forms of subject-belonging and subjectivity 
that emerge from health regimes. In doing so, it is also important to observe the 
inequalities in how biopower and therapeutic sovereignties are applied and executed 
(Nguyen, 2010; Sparke, in press). Within the interstices of everyday life, we can observe 
that HIV programs pick and choose recipients and areas of discipline, and that their reach 
does not always extend far beyond clinic walls, as patients build therapeutic itineraries that 
include a wide variety of services and forms of care and healing (Klein, 2007; Samuelsen, 
2004; D. J. Smith & Mbakwem, 2007; Taylor, 2010).  
 Recent work in medical anthropology has drawn on ethnography to focus on the 
ways in which biopower and governmentality produce new forms of “biological” or 
“therapeutic” citizenship, studying how modern citizens are recognized, attain services, 
and are treated by the state as biological entities. Adriana Petryna’s (2002, 2004) ground-
breaking work on biological citizenship in the wake of the Chernobyl disaster explored the 
treatment of the biologically-damaged status of citizens, and the science of knowing about 
citizens’ exposures as a form of suffering. This was constructed as a lens, through which 
Petryna examined how citizenship, the politics of recognition, and the political economy 
of care were changing during a crucially important sociopolitical shift in eastern Europe: its 




refugee medicine in the US served to socialize subjects of a modern welfare state: 
constructing a particular population, creating the means for governing them, and serving as 
an interface between modes of cultural performance. But Ong’s work also details the many 
ways in which the reach of biopolitics is limited, examining how patients themselves draw 
in the medical gaze, revert it, and ultimately deflect biomedical control. These views of 
biological citizenship highlight its mutability in specific contexts, its situatedness within 
specific regimes of governmentality and political conditions, and its dynamic, relational 
nature.  
 In response to work on biological citizenship that takes root primarily in places 
where access to live-saving therapies can be negotiated, Nguyen proposes that a different 
dynamic of “therapeutic citizenship” holds sway in contexts of acute resource-scarcity. 
Studying the pre-HIV scale-up politics of triage in West Africa, Nguyen (2010) argues that 
therapeutic citizenship is an especially “thin” form of citizenship, where entitlement is 
disease-specific, and where a positive diagnosis can provide access to a means of bleak 
survival that nonetheless is unavailable to sufferers of other diseases (p. 109). In addition, 
Nguyen’s (2008) work highlights the workings of a now global “therapeutic economy” in 
which therapeutic citizenship becomes “a form of stateless citizenship whereby claims are 
made on a global order on the basis of one’s biomedical condition, and responsibilities 
worked out in the context of local moral economies” (p. 142). It is the disjuncture between 
these two worlds, and their moral logics, that places such material and social strain on his 
informants and their experiences of citizenship.  
 Biological citizenship allows us to focus on some dynamics amidst HIV scale-up 
that are particularly important to understanding the powers that shape everyday clinical 




outgrowth of contemporary biopolitics that emphasizes self-monitoring, responsibility and 
good behavior (Correa, Petchesky, & Parker, 2008; Paiva, 2003; Rose, 2007). 
Consumerism is touted as a form of patient empowerment, yet it emanates from, and 
reinforces, strong patterns of anti-politics and capitalism: Rather than recognizing a right to 
health, it creates a right to buy health. In sites of acute resource scarcity, the dynamics of 
patient-citizenship are shaped less by modes of capitalist consumption and more by 
humanitarian gift economies (which nevertheless remain rooted in capitalist logics) 
(Bornstein & Redfield, 2007; Stirrat & Henkel, 1997). Claims become requests, 
‘empowerment’ is often reduced to quiet subversion, and entitlements become handouts. 
Expectations – of what will be given, and what is expected in return – are muddy, difficult 
to navigate, and often contested. In chapter 6, I describe how such dynamics are taken to 
even stranger levels amidst garment factory workers producing Product(RED) t-shirts for 
“humanitarian consumption,” who gain the “gift” of HIV services while offering, in return, 
a silence about labor abuses and occupational health concerns in order to preserve the 
imaginary of an ethical industry.  
 Amidst resource scarcity, struggles to access goods for survival alters how we might 
perceive governmentality. There seemed to be many among my informants who would 
have happily enrolled in ARV training classes or disclosed their status on the radio if it 
could have meant they had consistent access to food. I encountered not one, but many, 
mothers who brought their malnourished children to the fancy, privately funded pediatric 
HIV clinic to be tested over, and over, and over again, always hoping that their children 




of Plumpy’nut® (a nutritive supplement for the treatment of severe acute malnutrition).12 Is 
this evidence of the disciplinary reach of HIV scale-up?  Perhaps, in part. But in a more 
immediate sense it is evidence of the bizarre forms that struggles for survival take in these 
neoliberal, global economies of suffering. I began to think of such forms of engagement as 
a kind of politics of recipiency, rather than a blind, willing subjugation to biologic regimes. 
Recipient politics (among other dynamics I discuss later in this chapter), appears as a 
strategic eking out of survival through mediated engagements with therapeutic regimes and 
state and non-state entities. It involves a careful calculus among patients and citizens about 
what they could offer such therapeutic regimes, and what they might gain in return. In 
chapters 4 and 5, I discuss how such dynamics play an essential part in the way that 
support groups engage with the state and funders, and in the ways that HIV patients 
construct discourses about hunger, food insecurity, and the toxicity of ARVs.  
 What the accounts of Petryna (2002, 2004), Ong (1995), Nyguen (2010) and others 
demonstrate is that experiences of biological forms of citizenship are diverse and context-
specific, and that understanding the parameters of such forms of political subjectivity 
requires a close examination of political context, modes of governing, inequalities of 
access, forms of resistance, and the dynamic engagements of different citizens and 
patients. The term’s expansive applicability may encourage such wide usage that it empties 
out or leaves behind the ethnographic moorings of citizenship in context. In this research, I 
became concerned that the predominant focus on biological citizenship might prematurely 
curtail explorations of other forms of citizenship, political engagement, and nascent 
political movement, particularly as many studies situated inquiry firmly within the bounds 
of the clinic and its gaze. By and large, though my informants could regurgitate all manner 
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of catch-phrases about HIV prevention and proper behavior, such discourses were a means 
to an end, as what really concerned them were broad sociopolitical issues about the power 
of government, its engagement with citizens, their struggles for material and social survival, 
and their fights for meaningful recognition from the state or its partners. In watching my 
informants’ quite exceptional endeavors to establish themselves as fully-fledged citizens 
with a wide set of political and social concerns, I began to wonder if frames of biological 
citizenship might reinforce the partitioning of the modern citizen into biological pieces, 
becoming overly focused on citizenship as biologically- and biomedically-determined. In 
doing so, it could cause us to lose sight of other forms of politics, sites of resistance, and 
expressions of citizenship. In this I do not propose that we ignore the pervasive effects of 
governmentality on modes of political engagement, or that we downplay the pernicious 
ways in which global health programs reduce citizens to biological entities. But it seems 
perhaps premature to then only study forms of biological citizenship, and ignore the other 
forms of political life that our informants, against all odds, are attempting to establish, 
protect, and reinvigorate.  
 
Addressing Scale-Up’s Predecessors 
 In their introduction to the 2001 special issue of the Review of African Political 
Economy—an issue dedicated to taking stock of contemporary political and economic 
developments emerging throughout Africa—Carolyn Baylies and Marcus Power (2001) 
offered the following synopsis of the research included in the issue. It is worth repeating in 
its entirety:  
Among [the themes of this issue] are the complicity between local elites and international 
capital and the use of public office to consolidate positions of privilege. Another [theme] is 
the consequent tendency for those at the bottom to continue to lose out and in some cases 




another rather than in unified opposition to the external forces which constrain them. A 
third [theme] is the scrambling for position and economic security between these 
extremes, with structures ostensibly created to promote community participation and 
collective gain subject to manipulation to augment private incomes or used for 
individualized ends. A fourth [theme] is the difficulty faced by organizations within civil 
society, lauded as crucial to the building of democratic societies, but led by financial 
fragility to dependence on donor purses, in ways which undermine their autonomy and 
displace their aims (p. 5). 
It should come as no surprise that, even prior to the advent of HIV scale-up in African 
states, political society struggled with acute inequities and competition, power was divided 
between local elites and external forces, civil society’s independence was questionable at 
best, and citizens faced major barriers to fair and open participation. I place this text here 
to remind us that HIV scale-up has certainly not occurred in a political vacuum, nor is it 
wholly responsible for the dismantling of democratic structures in Africa. Instead, HIV 
scale-up unfolds amidst already tense and even beleaguered political systems and 
populaces; it is layered on top of the rich, troubled histories of colonialism, post-
colonialism, and development politics—histories that are ubiquitously in attendance in 
everyday life, haunting the politics of the present. HIV initiatives—and global health 
endeavors more broadly—seem to operate with a particularly ahistorical viewpoint, which 
is perhaps fueled by their relentless attention to present emergencies and future goals. 
Thus, it is not that scale-up has happened in a vacuum, and that its effects on politics 
operate singularly and alone; rather it is that scale-up has been undertaken as if in a 
vacuum. This, in turn, has a range of political consequences.   
 The political histories into which contemporary HIV programs have been inserted 
could fill entire libraries, and I make a very limited attempt to elaborate Lesotho’s political 
history in chapter 2. In what follows here, I will highlight a few of the most important 
political dynamics with which HIV scale-up has come into contact, namely: the legacies of 




and the reinvigoration and rewriting of patrimonial dynamics by flows of funding from 
development and health projects. Finally, I will discuss why a study of HIV scale-up’s 
political impacts is essential—even given these earlier legacies, the decidedly imperfect 
democratic forms in many sites of scale-up, and their inevitable impacts on the study 
methodology.  
 
Legacies of Development 
 Perhaps no single phenomenon has had as much impact on post-colonial African 
states, nor taken so many different forms and undergone so many reincarnations, as 
development. The disciplines of anthropology, history, sociology, geography, and African 
studies have produced some of the most important critiques of development (Cooper & 
Packard, 1997; Escobar, 1995; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Ferguson, 1994; Hardt & Negri, 
2000; Igoe & Kelsall, 2005; Mercer, 2002; Watts, 2001); taken together the literature is 
extremely diverse and multi-sited. Many of these works provide a crucial grounding for 
understanding some of the defining dynamics of HIV scale-up. One of the most pivotal 
early accounts of a development project from an anthropologist was Ferguson’s (1994) 
work in Lesotho, The Anti-Politics Machine. In it, Ferguson examines a single development 
project carried out by the Canadian International Development Agency in the district of 
Thaba-Tseka in Lesotho. Taking a Foucauldian frame, this detailed study builds a critical 
understanding of the very project of ‘development’ by examining: the ways in which 
Lesotho is bestowed a status as a “less developed country”; how knowledge about its 
poverty is constructed and disseminated; the disjunctures between perceptions of livestock 
economies among Basotho and the development experts who attempt to ‘modernize’ this 




real drivers of Lesotho’s poverty and inequality.  
 One of Ferguson’s most compelling and central arguments concerns the ability of 
development projects to act as a machinery that obscures the political origins of 
underdevelopment, and therefore mobilizes a kind of “anti-politics” in and of recipient 
countries. This approach brings into stark relief some of the similarities that development 
shares with HIV programming—in particular, the ways in which an expert-driven approach 
and powerful knowledge-production practices obscure more political understandings of 
how and why HIV epidemics persist. In addition to the power to define epidemics, a focus 
on HIV can create an anti-politics that obscures other political and social issues—a 
dynamic I discuss in much further detail in chapter 6. Many other scholars have also 
discussed the preeminence of science and expertise in modernity and efforts at 
modernization. (see, for example, Giddens, 1990). In particular, the search for singular, 
simple, or cheap solutions to complex patterns of social disenfranchisement, 
abandonment, and impoverishment has defined cycles of thinking in both development 
and global health programming (Easterly, 2006; Severino & Ray, 2010; Shiffman, 2006). 
This anti-politics also extends to development agencies’ engagement with democratic 
institutions. Given their interest in outcomes—from structural adjustment policies to HIV 
treatment—they tend to see politics as a means to an end (Bartlett, 2001). Donor aid can 
have the pernicious effect of propping up less than democratic regimes, and even in 
democratic states like Lesotho it seems to give undue power to the ruling party, not only in 
the form of resources with which to execute public programs and also run campaigns, but 
also in the forms of symbolic legitimacy and power over life (Bayart, 2009; Ferguson, 
2006; D. J. Smith, 2008). Thus, even as donors place an increased focus on accountability, 




accountability to donors and global institutions, but less often to citizens and society, for 
whom development still looks very much like an anti-democratic enterprise.  
 Amidst this cyclical, trend-driven thinking, a few tenets have persisted throughout 
the latter decades of development planning, thoroughly influencing approaches to HIV 
scale-up. First among these are tropes like “sustainability,” “accountability,” and 
“participation,” which have been emptied out and co-opted by successive waves of 
planning and programming (Cooper & Packard, 1997; Hintjens, 1999; Peters, 1996; 
Pfeiffer, 2004). Participation, for example, has come to mean something decidedly 
apolitical, such that organizations and initiatives depend on recipient “participation” but 
often mean by this their willing submission to external priorities, and the multiple forms of 
volunteer labor they provide in return for membership or goods. One African minister was 
reported as touting his country’s democratic participatory approach as the following: “We 
decide what is to be done and then we tell the people to do it” (Peters, 1996, p. 22). The 
question, following a Foucauldian approach, is to ask what such discursive efforts 
accomplish, and how ideas like these travel, shape programs, and impact citizen 
subjectivities. In chapter 3, I attempt to explore one such trope—that of a “competent 
citizenship” in the time of HIV/AIDS—which is especially prominent in Lesotho, and 
particularly relevant to the ways that HIV programs are reconstructing citizenship. Even in 
the furthest reaches of programs, citizens understand the importance of, and adhere to, 
such discourses. “We want to be developed—“ one man in a very rural village told me 
during a community meeting, stopping himself midsentence before he provided a more 
correct framing of the community’s desires: “We want to develop ourselves.” In doing so, 
he reflected, and responded to, the prevailing discourses in Lesotho about poverty, rural 




“sustainability” by shouldering the responsibility for their own development, that aid 
should only help them along such a path, and that deserving citizens were those who 
rejected the “lazy,” “dependent,” hand-out seeking practices of their neighbors. At more 
senior levels of bureaucracy, ideas about “best practices,” are grounded in such tropes, 
which take on the weight of core political and social values, written into policy, and 
forming the basis for decisions about resource distribution, priorities, and programs.  
 Finally, it is crucial to note that development projects take on specific endeavors to 
document, understand, capture, and count populations. These documentation practices, of 
course, do more to rewrite perceptions of citizens than to shed light on much of their 
reality, as is noted extensively by Ferguson (1994). Interestingly, such efforts are no less 
apparent in HIV programming, where program documents, policies, and bureaucratic 
discourses can have the effect of stigmatizing populations, “othering” certain already 
second-class citizens, blaming groups for the spread of infections, or associating those 
more likely to be infected with HIV with amoral practices, low intelligence, or exotic 
behaviors (Farmer, 1992; Parker & Aggleton, 2003). Interestingly, in Lesotho, discourses 
about HIV risk and epidemiology frequently categorize rural, poorly-educated populations 
as a reservoir for persistently high HIV infections, though these populations tend to have 
much lower rates of infection and overall prevalence than more urban districts (Bulled, 
2012). But the discursive itself is important here, and development or public health 
“knowledge” serves to delineate different kinds of deserving and undeserving, innocent 
and blameworthy citizens—a phenomenon that Charles Briggs (2004) refers to as “sanitary 
citizenship.” In this sense, programs can reproduce and reinforce inequalities and 
hierarchies, even as they set out to ostensibly address them. This can even be observed in 




intentioned efforts can have the unintended consequence of exacerbating social 
hierarchies (Campbell, Nair, & Maimane, 2007). And at a national level, development and 
health funding elevates local leaders into power and promotes the professionalization of 
experts and service providers, which can exacerbate national power and income 
inequalities (Cooper & Packard, 1997; Swidler, 2009b).  
 
Scale-Up and “Civil Society” 
 Concerns about the definitions, purposes, and uses of civil society have been heard 
repeatedly from Africanist and development scholars in the wake of neoliberalism. These 
critiques include: concerns about the emptiness of the meaning of the term civil society; 
the uses to which CSOs are frequently put by funders and states; the eclipse of state power, 
the emptying out of the social contract, and the privatization of essential state services 
through the deployment of NGOs; the conflation of NGOs with more robust, 
democratically-sound, and politically active forms of civil organization; and the 
embeddedness of NGOs and the very concept of civil society within transnational 
processes of neoliberalization (c.f. Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999; Fisher, 1997; Igoe & 
Kelsall, 2005; Mamdani, 1996; Mercer, 2002). As Ferguson and Gupta (2002) demonstrate 
so forcefully, “civil society” is intimately bound up in patterns of corporate wealth, state 
violence, and Western values:  
“One is never quite sure: Is the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa part of this 
“civil society”? Is John Garang’s army in Sudan part of it? Is Oxfam? What about ethnic 
movements that are not so much opposed to or prior to modern states, but …produced by 
them?  And what of international mission organizations…?” (p. 991).  
As they argue, it is no longer sufficient to view the state as “up above” and civil society as 
“down there,” among the “grassroots,” though these spatializations still hold considerable 




number of scholars note, civil society has become a problematically diverse conceptual 
category. It is productive (in the Foucauldian sense) in that it allows distinctly apolitical 
administrations, representations, and provisions to seem politically safe and meritorious 
simply because they carry this appellation. Civil society can be uncivil, it can be un-
representative, it can be apolitical, and it can be extremely unfair. It is also, almost always, 
under-defined.  
 Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to dispense with the entire notion of civil 
society because of recent misappropriations or abuses. Tocqueville’s (1994) detailed 
exploration of the power of associational life in early America is enjoying a resurgence, as 
is attention paid to the benefits of social capital embedded in much of civic and collective 
life, advanced most notably by Robert Putnam (2001). For many of the grassroots, 
democratizing mobilizations of the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America and Africa, the 
instrumental power of civil society movements was genuine, a crucial beachhead against 
the entrenched powers of dictatorships and autocracies. Civil society may be more in need 
of defense than critique—requiring a reclaiming of its anti-establishment, associational, 
and activist roots. Following this line of thinking, scholars like Arjun Appadurai (2002) 
have defended the emancipatory possibilities of grassroots organizations, entities enacting 
“globalization from below” (see also Edwards & Sen, 2000; Edwards, 2009). 
 In the wake of colonialism in Africa, civil society presents unique theoretical 
challenges. As Mamdani (1996) explains, colonial rule essentially “bifurcated” the state, 
between an urban civil society speaking the language of political rights, and a rural, 
communal society adhering to custom and the leadership of local “traditional” leaders 
(whose power was granted and reinforced by colonial rule). Such bifurcation reached its 




argues impeded democratization, and allowed “decentralized despotism” to survive 
decolonization and destabilize urban civil society movements. Political society is divided 
among tribalized, territorialized zones of belonging: “a tribe for the subject, a nation for 
the citizen” (p. 292). Thus, Mamdani concludes:  
…democratization cannot just be a simple reform of civil society. It also has to be a 
dismantling of the mode of rule organized on the basis of fused power, administrative 
justice, and extra-economic coercion, all legitimized as the customary….Faced with a 
power that fragments an oppressed majority into so many self-enclosed culturally defined 
minorities, the burden of resistance must be both to recognize and to transcend the points 
of difference (p. 296). 
Mamdani’s work highlights the persistent tensions between a liberal, equal rights-bearing, 
enlightenment vision of civil society, and the kinds of “civic-republican” forms of political 
sociality—ethnic, traditionalist, communitarian, patron-clientelist—that continue to 
flourish in many African states (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Ramphele, 2001). In Lesotho, the 
division between those who can claim citizenship in the nation and subjecthood in the 
tribe seems to be traced along the line between those involved in the giving of aid (civil 
servants, NGO workers, consultants, and bureaucrats) and those who are its recipients. A 
view of post-colonial political bifurcations helps us to understand tensions and resentments 
between these groups, as well as common discourses that portray recipients of aid as 
traditional, ill-educated, and diseased.  
 Partha Chatterjee (2004) expands on this notion of a partitioned civic sphere, 
arguing that modernization has created a situation, especially in developing states, where 
the populace is effectively divided between a “civil society” and a “political society.” Civil 
society remains an enclave of the elite, for whom the entitlements of citizenship and 
access to political rights are possible. But for the vast majority of the (poor) population, 




technologically governed, whose participation is reduced to providing numbers for surveys 
and receiving, if they are lucky, occasional benefits as clients. For these subjects, survival 
is eked out through semi-illegal practices as their true political rights go unrecognized by a 
state that cannot afford to appease their demands without infringing on the property rights 
of its elite civil society. Chatterjee is particularly critical of NGOs, who are “likely to reflect 
the locally dominant interests and values…[and can] ignore and even suppress demands of 
locally marginalized interests” (p. 74). In this way, NGOs create a false consensus, and 
dampen the voice of the governed. Though Chatterjee nonetheless sees spaces for 
opportunity and mobilization in political society—amidst its forms of nascent and often 
“illegal” political action (p. 59)—his discussions of the acute separation between civil and 
political society, and the roles of NGOs and governmentality in supporting such a division, 
are especially relevant to examinations political functioning in the time of HIV scale-up.  
 As Ferguson points out in Global Shadows (2006), in the context of neoliberalism, 
NGOs become a kind of “surrogate demos,” as “substantial matters involving the policies 
of external donors have tended to be insulated from processes of representative 
democracy, often via the use of nongovernmental organizations” (pp. 12-13). Similarly, 
Petchesky (2003) writes that the patterns and objectives of many NGO and civil society 
mobilizations have created a situation in which, “with regard to global health crises, rights 
and initiatives, the void in democratic governance is the most serious neglected disease” 
(p. 113). As a result, we are losing sight of values about public obligation, mutual support, 
specific and enforceable social rights, and ultimately, social contracts, that are the 
fundamental building blocks of social democratic politics. Ferguson (2006) proposes,  
It is not that states have disappeared, or even simply that they are, as it is often put, “weak.” 
It is, rather, that they have increasingly gotten out of the business of governing, even as they 




other sorts of business. In this new era, it is not the organizations of “civil society” that are 
“nongovernmental”—it is the state itself (p. 39).  
HIV programming has not fundamentally altered this apolitical architecture; it has simply 
funneled inordinate amounts of money through it, and created new, powerful institutions 
to manage the flow of this money. The net effect, then, is that HIV becomes a distinct and 
extremely fruitful kind of apolitical “business” which reinforces, rather than challenges, the 
disjuncture between citizens and state, between bureaucratic politicians and their 
obligations to the populace, and between the inconstant, unpredictable provision of 
resources and the recognition of meaningful social rights and entitlements.  
 
Power, Democracy, and Patronage 
 The forms of democracy so forcefully promoted throughout Africa and other 
developing regions since the early 1990s represent, themselves, the globalization of a 
particular neoliberal ideology. During the dismantling of state services associated with 
IMF-led structural adjustment programs, the promotion of a particular vision of civil society 
was seen as a strategy for shifting services away from state purview and strengthening 
institutional structures that were independent of governments presumed to be bloated and 
corrupt. This aggressive promotion of “democratization” equated NGOs with civil society, 
and civil society with participatory democracy. As a result, it was a thinly-veiled but wide-
reaching shift towards privatization. As Igoe and Kelsall (2005) describe it, this put well-
meaning but perhaps not always critically-minded NGOs “between a rock and a hard 
place”—stuck at the intersection of donor and global interests and their genuine desires to 
“do good” (see also Fisher, 1997). The “NGO-ification” of the African political sphere may 




Mbembe (2003) has argued that both “civil society” and democratization are concepts 
central to the “authentication” of “subjection” (p. 35), and the process by which both ideas 
became distilled into the promotion of NGOs is certainly central to his claims. In this 
dissertation, however, I begin from a potentially hazardous position, in that I am unwilling 
to dispense with democracy altogether. Rather, I seek a nuanced but hopeful assessment of 
political possibility in Lesotho, attendant to the forces of power and ideologies shaping it, 
but also to the opportunities for citizen participation, collective solidarity, and 
emancipatory structures. 
 A number of scholars of contemporary African politics—including Mamdani 
(1996)—note the predominance of patterns of patrimonialism and patron-client relations, 
and the trajectories of power in African states under colonialism and development schemes 
that favor the power of chiefs and local elites (Bayart, 2009; Bird, Booth, & Pratt, 2003; 
Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Ferguson, 2006; D. J. Smith, 2008). With their emphases on 
developing rural areas, utilizing local elites as power brokers and representatives of the 
community, and doling out goods through hierarchical networks, NGO initiatives and 
development projects can exacerbate state bifurcation and patronage politics. In additional 
ways, however, they also corrupt these patronage systems. Where once a chief might be 
held responsible for providing for his constituents’ long-term well-being, NGO programs 
and development practice disrupt networks of accountability, making responsibility for 
well-being a temporary, fleeting arrangement, and distributing goods in unexpected and 
unsystematic ways. Bayart (2009) and others (c.f. Ferguson, 2006; Smith, 2008) have 
focused on the ways in which metaphors of “eating” are foundational to portrayals of 
politics in Africa, where a “politics of the belly” (Bayart, 2009) dominates political life. 




“bad” patronage politics in contemporary African states:  
It is often possible to discern an underlying contrast between powers that create social 
prosperity versus powers that destroy it….On the one hand, [chiefly power] can provide for 
the people and bring peace and prosperity; on the other, it can destroy the land and feed off 
the blood of the people. Key metaphors appear again and again: the chief as both man and 
lion, rainmaker and witch, feeder of the people and eater of the people. These two 
modalities of power usually correspond to two kinds of wealth—broadly, the kind that feeds 
the people, and the kind that eats them (p. 73).  
 At the level of citizens and the communities in which they are embedded, HIV 
resource flows have the power to remake dynamics of patronage, create jealousy and 
distrust of groups and individuals receiving support, and elevate certain individuals into 
powerful new positions. Swidler (2009b) has shown how funding flows to NGOs—and 
through them, into the hands of individuals and groups in communities—create new 
patterns of patronage, whereby NGOs and lucky community leaders become new patrons. 
Daniel Smith (2008) notes that the “workshop mentality” of global health and family 
planning programs in Nigeria is a primary method for extending and replicating patron-
client relations. While donors prefer workshops for their easy measurability, local 
organizers use them to mete out privilege and “cultivate networks of clients and reward 
patrons” (pp. 712-3). Meanwhile, participants rely on per diems, lunch, and other benefits 
in lieu of salaries, and such benefits become a modern form of resource distribution. In the 
context of such dynamics, we should ask what is exchanged: What are patrons expected to 
“give” to recipients, and perhaps more importantly, what is expected of recipients in 
return? Swidler (2009b) comes to the conclusion that  
Perhaps what really matters is not whether NGOs enter, despite themselves, into patron-
client relationships in which they are cast as patrons. Instead the question is whether NGOs 
institute social practices that make patrons more responsive to their clients. Those who 
administer NGOs should be asking whether the concrete social practices they put into 
effect give clients leverage to keep their patrons aware of their responsibilities to consult, to 
consider their clients’ well being, and to redistribute resources, or whether local NGO staff 
consider themselves the end of the patron-client chain, monopolizing access to those 




In essence, then, we should be assessing to what extent these dynamics allow for any 
semblance of democratic accountability and meaningful participation. And we should 
attend to the ways in which new kinds of social contracts – between citizens and NGOs, 
between NGOs and the state, and between citizens and a fundamentally different sort of 
(neoliberal) state – are executed, called into meaning, and rewritten. This opens up room 
for understanding how NGOs, states, and citizens fit into new sociopolitical logics, a 
question which is central to the ethnographic project I have carried out in Lesotho.  
 
New Patrons, Same Clients? 
 Certainly, development initiatives, earlier health campaigns (like population control 
initiatives), and, even prior, colonialism, were not lacking in acute concerns about citizen 
bodies, the threat of infection from black populations, or reforming the behaviors, beliefs 
and practices driving disease rates (J. Comaroff, 1993; Livingston, 2005; Packard, 1989). If 
HIV scale-up has a historical rooting in earlier colonial and postcolonial health campaigns, 
and the many procedures and anti-politics of the development initiatives that precede it, 
how are we to differentiate the effects of HIV programs on politics from the impacts of 
earlier development and health campaigns? In some ways, we can’t: The historical 
embeddedness of HIV programs allows us to perceive them as part of broader global 
processes, but also muddies the waters in such a way that attributing all effects to a single 
variable is quite impossible. Instead, we should ask how the machinations of HIV scale-up 
are different—in size, scale, values or procedures—than campaigns that precede it. I will 
argue that the effects of HIV scale-up cannot be disaggregated from these broader 
trajectories of globalization, development, and the historical legacies of health campaigns 




an important symbolic apogee of the trends and processes that precede, and in part create, 
its existence. Even as such, scale-up is a foundational pre-cursor to the emergence of 
global health as a contemporary cause, movement, and phenomenon (Crane, 2011; 
Erikson, 2008; Lewis, 2007; Macfarlane, Jacobs, & Kaaya, 2008). Finally, I posit that HIV 
scale-up is perceived by citizens themselves as a paradigmatic shift in the way that it has 
rapidly changed powers, procedures, resource distribution, social contracts, forms of 
representation, and the forms of citizenship valued by the state and its partners. These are 
excessively palpable and apparent changes for citizens: that alone should indicate to us 
that HIV scale-up represents a break with the past, a change in the order of things, and a 
disjuncture between the politics before scale-up and the politics of a post-scale-up world.  
 A number of the trends in globalization, neoliberalism, patrimonialism, civil 
society, and representation that I discuss above are all markedly exacerbated by HIV scale-
up. But in another way HIV scale-up comes to encapsulate the outermost boundaries of 
such movements, symbolizing their most fundamental values. HIV scale-up became the 
perfect conveyance mechanism for neoliberalism, globalization, and celebrations of civil 
society--ideologies that are coming under more and more strident attack. Not only did it 
swiftly carry these ideologies into the heart of state programming across Africa, but it did so 
in such a way that they were normalized, masked by the seemingly value-neutral and quite 
laudable goals of providing treatment access, protecting people from infections, and caring 
for the sick. HIV reified trends and norms that development and neoliberalism had first put 
into practice: the importance of civil society; the reliability of consumerist, individualized, 
responsibilized forms of citizen engagement; the equating of service provision and 
volunteerism with robust forms of political participation; and the broad acceptability of 




ensured a kind of mutual survivability for HIV and development, as they were construed as 
dependent on, and beneficial to, each other. Nor were those who labored to carry out such 
ideology in practice nefarious in their intent; rather, they were quite well-meaning about 
the lofty goals of treatment and prevention programs. But that is the pernicious nature of 
such values, and points to the effectiveness of HIV scale-up as a vehicle for their 
normalization.  
 On another level, however, HIV scale-up provided a template for new ways of 
doing business in African states, legitimated calls for “good governance,” and in doing so, 
seemed to justify the wholesale revision of state institutions and processes of 
representation. It was the feeling of emergency—the sense that HIV was somehow 
extraordinarily exceptional in both its pathological spread and the responses necessary for 
curtailing infections—that legitimated rapid and broad-based changes in political structures 
and processes, with many systems for oversight and representation simply being ignored or 
subverted by early organizational activities. The contemporary political philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben (1998) has reminded us that such states of emergency create “spaces of 
exception” in the normal order of things that allow gross incursions into the rights of 
individuals and citizens, and reduce them to a form of “bare life,” stripped of political 
protections. But he takes this observation much further, noting that the machinations of 
state sovereignty are entirely dependent upon such spaces of exception, and that these are 
foundational to state functioning, even though they are construed as exceptional. “At once 
excluding bare life from and capturing it within the political order, the state of exception 
actually constituted, in its very separateness, the hidden foundation on which the entire 
political system rested,” he argues (p. 9). It is the phenomenon of the simultaneous 




necessity of exceptionality for the execution of state power, that holds essential lessons for 
understanding how HIV scale-up contributes to political sovereignties. Its emphasis on 
emergency, on exceptionalism, on the dire, bare need of the lives it is trying to save, 
perfectly justifies and reifies the power of HIV actors—from states to NGOs to global 
institutions—to administer life.  
 In the chapters that follow, I attempt to document the exhaustive ways in which 
HIV scale-up seems to have taken a great toll on citizens’ lives and opportunities. In doing 
so, it may compound the earlier impacts of health and development campaigns, but any 
observer in Lesotho understands that HIV is a striking social and political phenomenon 
unto itself. Part of this is the way in which (at least in this period) every discourse, every 
initiative, and every dialogue about behavior refers in some capacity to HIV. Scale-up is an 
all-encompassing phenomenon in citizen lives, percolating into everyday life through radio 
programs and clinic speeches, community meetings and the distribution of local resources. 
It becomes embodied in the forms of labor citizens undertake and their understandings and 
interpretations of hunger. I have heard HIV called “the unwanted guest” in Lesotho, from 
families who recount stories of how HIV infection consumes not just family members, but 
household resources and family labor and the childhoods of youngsters.  No one would 
dispute that the availability of HIV treatment has dramatically improved the lives of those 
living with HIV in Lesotho—and decreased the severity of the visits of that “unwanted 
guest.” But we can imagine that some of the political outcomes of HIV programs have 
themselves become a unique kind of unwanted, unasked-for guest—the kind that eats up 






 In doing this research, and later, in writing it up, I came to rely on a few crucial 
ways of thinking about the processes unfolding as part of HIV scale-up and the changes it 
was eliciting in the lives of citizens. These “themes” (for lack of a better word), emerged, in 
many ways, directly from the stories my informants were telling me, what they revealed to 
me about their lives in conversations, actions, and ways of being-in-the-world. They 
provide a thread that can be traced throughout the chapters that follow, and a set of frames 
for thinking about how the data fits with the broader social dynamics and constraints of my 
informants’ lives.  
 
Politics of Recipiency 
 I argue throughout the chapters that follow that HIV scale-up has elicited new 
forms of political engagement and dis-engagement, new patterns of interaction for states, 
citizens, and nonstate entities. These new dynamics include changes in understandings of 
the social contract and departures from traditional state – citizen relations, alterations in 
the expectations of states, citizens, and nonstate actors, and new strategic interactions 
between these entities in order to ensure survival, or prosperity. I came to think of these 
new dynamics as a politics of recipiency, which, at its most fundamental core, is marked 
by the positionality of donors and recipients, the givers and receivers of aid and goods. I 
am sure some of these dynamics existed between donors and communities in Lesotho long 
before HIV arrived, but HIV scale-up has increased the intensity with which nonstate 
entities and funders seek “community partnerships,” request labor from participants, and 
demand accountability from communities. I became increasingly aware that the politics of 




local elites, and recipient-citizens played proscribed roles, though much of the script for 
this play was unspoken, and participants were obliged to act as if there were no play at all. 
This theatrics of giving involves discursive efforts to establish the deserving neediness of 
recipient-citizens, and to ensure the appearance of accountability and transparency on the 
part of donors. Ironically, however, the “dependency” of recipients is mirrored by the 
dependence of donors on the presence and willing participation of recipients.13 Typically, 
this involved obsequious citizens expressing their gratitude while hinting at all of the other 
needs the donor had ignored, while the donor spoke at length about the importance of 
“sustainability” and the evils of “dependence” and citizens nodded eagerly. This was 
almost always followed by jubilant celebrating on the part of citizens and earnest efforts to 
document (in photos or videos) the handing over of resources, donations, gifts—and then, 
of course, once the donors had gone, recipients’ expressions of disappointment, distrust, 
and suspicion. I discuss the parameters of such encounters in more detail in chapters 4 and 
5. What is important to note here is the way in which such an exchange is a gross 
inversion of a political encounter, in which every action is intended to mask true discourse 
while endeavoring to demonstrate values of “accountability,” “transparency,” “community 
partnership,” and “sustainability.”  
 A politics of recipiency shapes citizen subjectivities in other ways as well. It 
impacts the knowledge and information to which citizens have access, what they are able 
to demand of NGOs and institutions, and the forms of citizenship which those institutions 
expect from them in return. The reduction of politics to a set of recipient exchanges 
between “patients” and “providers” (and in this, I mean providers not in the clinical sense, 
but in the sense that they provide goods, resources, and services to the population) is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




emblematic of the broader elimination of politics from health endeavors and HIV 
programs. Most importantly, these recipient exchanges—which are such a residual, broken 
form of political engagement—nevertheless form the basis of citizens’ most visible, 
important, and, to them, emblematic encounters with NGOs, state institutions, and donors. 
Thus, I spend considerable time examining such encounters from the perspective of 
citizens, interrogating what is expected and what is delivered, and how such recipient 
exchanges are interpreted by citizens who are struggling to understand the new logics and 
rules of their political worlds.  
 
Political Geographies and Forms of Membership 
 The preponderance of NGOs, and the rapid political changes at state and local 
levels, prompts me to also pay close attention to the structure and layout of citizens’ 
political worlds. In doing so I make reference to the work of Deleuze and Guattari (2009) 
on the importance of cartography for understanding contemporary social systems, and 
maps as temporal, open articulations of the world. Deleuze (2006, p. 21-38) draws on 
Foucault to demonstrate how diagrams of power can gain new meaning as cartographies, 
or in the hands of Elyachar (2003), “mappings of power.” They are not alone in such an 
endeavor, as geographers like David Harvey (2005) and Manuel Castells (2000) have 
emphasized the importance of geographic, spatial, topographical conceptions of social 
worlds. Ferguson and Gupta (2002) introduce the spatial imaginary of states as “above” 
and “outside” as a predominant mode of thinking about neoliberal state forms, where the 
state is not absent, but takes on new “spatializations” as both “vertical” (up there, not 
down here) and “encompassing” (in a far outer ring of society, but still enclosing and 




invoked by my informants again and again, as they constantly referred to the distant but 
powerful bureaucrats and experts “up there.” When they spoke of the state’s services or its 
attentions as absent—as when services mysteriously disappeared, or the state deliberately 
ignored their calls for assistance—citizens referred to God as a last recourse for provision 
and attention. God is the ultimate entity “up there” and “outside” the citizenry, but is 
sometimes the only power to which citizens can appeal. “Even if the government does not 
see you,” one community leader said in trying to reassure members of a far-flung support 
group who bemoaned the sense of abandonment they felt at the hands of the government, 
“heaven does.”  For Lesotho, as in many postcolonial zones, the historical, colonial 
legacies of maps hold acute power: Maps are the tangible scratchings upon which the state 
was stripped of its most fertile lands (see chapter 2) and its citizens marooned inside of 
South Africa’s economic and political dominion (Ferguson, 2006, ch. 2).  
 It is through political geographies that we can come to understand the spatial 
nature of Lesotho’s citizens’ abandonment, but also the ways in which such abandonment 
is situated amidst the relentless counting, claiming, and mapping activities of NGOs (see, 
for example, Elyachar, 2003). Among today’s NGOs, geographical claims form a 
considerable basis for legitimacy: Note the ubiquitous and prominent descriptions of 
“where we work” on almost all NGO websites. These are space-claiming endeavors that 
echo earlier colonial mappings of territory, population, and resources. From Biehl’s (2005) 
“zones of social abandonment” to Agamben’s (1998) “spaces of exception,” non-belonging 
is increasingly territorialized, and it is this spatiality—and the power over life even amidst 
abandonment that is wielded within such spaces—that consecrates new forms of 
sovereignty. In response to the imagery of globalization—which too often presents the 




another—a few scholars have instead emphasized the cartographic potholes in an imagery 
of global space. Ferguson (2006) calls up images of “global shadows” and Ong (2005) 
refers to the “checkerboard patterning of the national terrain” and a resulting “variegated 
sovereignty” (p. 697). “Networks of political and economic connection,” Ferguson (2006) 
writes, “…hop over (rather than flowing through) the territories inhabited by the vast 
majority of the African population” (p. 14).  
 These uneven cartographies force us to confront the exigencies of life in spaces of 
abandonment. Ferguson is concerned with what this means for membership, and highlights 
the strange and at times heart-breaking efforts of African citizens to claim a meaningful 
global membership. In developing this work, and in hearing so frequently about 
informants’ failed or insufficient efforts to claim membership (and thus, a residual kind of 
social contract) with NGOs, state institutions, and donors, I began to think of their 
positioning as a peculiar dis-membership, both in the sense that they were effectively 
banned from membership in most kinds of entities and institutions, and in the sense that 
the political effect of this abandonment—and its felt impact for citizens—was a kind of 
dismembering of the citizenry. It is only through understanding the political geographies of 
citizen worlds—by which I mean the myriad institutions, programs, NGOs, and donors 
with whom they attempt to build membership and craft social contracts—that we can 
begin to grasp the full extent to which HIV programs effect a dis-membership of 
populations in places like Lesotho.  
 Finally, a note is necessary about the use of the term “citizen” throughout this 
work. I frequently refer to individuals as citizens (rather than as patients, recipients, or 
community members). This is not meant as a claim that my informants always retain and 




more enlightened, democratic ideals of citizenship with the forms of engagement more 
commonly observed in Lesotho, including through patronage politics, cosmopolitan 
strivings, or aid recipieny—decidedly political strategies of engagement that, while crucial 
to this study, nonetheless fall beyond more traditional conceptions of citizenship. My use 
of the term “citizen” is meant in a more universal way, a marker that serves as a 
reminder—of the focus of this study, of the importance of political recognition in these 
new political terrains, and of the ways in which the engagements and conversations of 
everyday life are inherently part of what constitutes the political in this study. Rather than 
asserting that all informants and subjects in this study are fully-fledged, rights-bearing 
political citizens, my use of the term highlights the importance of the political as well as 
the incompleteness of political membership and social contracts for many citizens. It 
ensures that readers remain aware of my informants’ striving for political agency even 
under unpropitious circumstances. Finally, it is intended to counter dominant narratives in 
public and global health literature that portray individuals primarily (and at times, only) as 
patients—when I do use the term “patient,” it is intended to highlight the subject-status of 
individuals receiving goods and services within the clinical environment.  
 
Survival  
 Finally, in the spaces of dis-membership created in the wake of HIV scale-up, 
survival becomes a unique challenge—as the social contract is emptied of states’ 
responsibilities to the poor, and as biomedical treatments increasingly replace social 
protection schemes. Even while seeking HIV services, patients showed that multiple forms 
of survival could be in play at any single time, and that each of these aspects of survival 




care. Relevant forms of survival include: economic survival (involving considerations of 
economic benefits of support group membership, or economic costs of disclosing status or 
attending clinic regularly); social survival (involving stigma, discrimination, and jealousy, 
but also the social support or collective vulnerability involved in support groups); spiritual 
survival (involving the many forms of healing and cures offered by traditional healers, faith 
healers, church services, and the importance to many of maintaining faith); and network or 
familial survival (involving the maintenance of family networks, support networks, and 
obligations of support to others). These comprised prominent concerns for my informants, 
but were largely seen as risks to adherence, or sources of clinical support on which 
patients could rely. Outside clinic walls, the disjunctures between biomedical and other 
survivals were particularly acute, as when patients refused to take treatments without food, 
claiming that treatments had a toxic power that could kill them in the absence of 
nutritional stability (see chapter 5).  
 Critiquing the tendency of literature on biopolitics and biological citizenship to 
inflate the dualism between “giving life” and “letting die,” Fassin (2010) points to the 
eminent importance of “survival” as an intermediary and agentive space, particularly when 
looking at HIV in South Africa. Rather than a “bare” or biologic life form, survival is a 
robust, active form of living. It is also a struggle, and in Fassin’s mind, a political and 
ethical one. Fassin sees the assertion of survival “as an ethical gesture through which life is 
rehabilitated in its most obvious and most ordinary dimension—life which has death for 
horizon but which is not separated from life as a social form, inscribed in a history, a 
culture, an experience” (p. 83). It is, after all, the struggle for survival in which our 
informants are most thoroughly engaged. I began to think of my informants’ endeavors in 




belongings, protections, and meaningful engagements—as an antithesis to the 
“technologies of the self” or the emptied, partitioned, temporary memberships that abound 
in a post-scale-up world. As Nguyen (2010) comments in reference to the demands of HIV 
programs in West Africa, “self-fashioning could be powerful, but it was about [biological] 
survival, not belonging” (p. 7). How might we re-imagine robust forms of survival and 
belonging as meaningful, moral projects towards which our informants are continually, 
doggedly striving? In paying attention to these strivings, my research reclaims them as 
important fields for political mobilizations and demands, even when they are woefully 
unsuccessful: for they express a sense of how things ought to be, and in doing so, articulate 
a moral world that is not, but should be.  
 
Why Lesotho?  
 This project’s choice of site and subject is, like many, an outgrowth of both 
personal experience and methodological consideration. In 2005, I moved to South Africa 
to work with a community-based HIV NGO supporting prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission (PMTCT) in clinics and hospitals across the country. The program at the time 
was quite small, but it has since grown, expanding into countries across sub-Saharan 
Africa. In 2005, however, our concerns were more proximate, as we attempted to build 
effective PMTCT programs amidst the considerable government efforts to impede HIV 
treatment scale-up. Though the African National Congress (ANC)-led government, led by 
President Mbeki, had acceded to the roll-out of ART beginning in 2003 and 2004, progress 
was slow to reach more rural areas, especially in under-funded provinces. The 
government’s AIDS denialism remained a considerable barrier for the millions of patients 




and the HIV/AIDS Law Project, who asserted that access to treatment was a fundamental 
human right. Among the clinics in which I worked, and among the young patients I 
befriended—first in rural Mpumalanga Province, and later in KwaZulu-Natal—the human 
toll of these policies was gut-wrenching and relentless. For anyone working in South Africa 
at the time, the driving questions underscoring HIV programs were political ones: What 
was fueling the state-sponsored denialism in South Africa? How could we explain the 
differences between the responses to HIV in places like Uganda, Brazil, Botswana, and 
South Africa? What lessons could be learned from the extraordinary, transnational social 
movements to secure treatment access and articulate the right to health as a fundamental 
human right?  
 Over the past decade, a number of scholars addressed many of these questions 
(Barnett & Whiteside, 2002; Bayer & Oppenheimer, 2007; Berkman et al., 2005; 
Alexander De Waal, 2006; Fassin, 2007b; Heywood & Altman, 2000; Lieberman, 2009; 
Nattrass, 2004; Parker, 2011; Parkhurst, 2001; Petchesky, 2003; Poku & Whiteside, 2004). 
As the phenomenon of HIV scale-up fully took root, however, and HIV treatment access 
became a reality across many countries, the political questions shifted. The experiences in 
places like Uganda, Brazil, and Botswana—in the sense that they were driven by internal 
political initiative—began to look exceptional. So too did South Africa’s denialism, which 
went largely unrepeated in other countries with generalized epidemics. For many other 
states, particularly in Africa, providing ART treatment on any scale would require the 
considerable assistance of bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as clinical experts. 
Beyond a few lucky activists who raised money to pay for treatment, found compassionate 
supporters in other countries, or cobbled together treatment through donations, schemes 




treatment plans, and prevention efforts were minimal (until HIV scale-up began in earnest). 
Thus, when global money for HIV began to grow exponentially and programs such as 
PEPFAR, the World Bank’s MAP and the Global Fund began dispersing funds, scale-up 
occurred as an externally-driven initiative, often in the absence of vibrant civil society 
responses or internally-funded initiatives (Lisk, 2010; Parker, 2000). International donors 
and organizations crafted rapid, technical deployments of services in response to global 
initiatives and extra-state priorities (Edström & MacGregor, 2010). It became apparent that 
the driving questions in HIV policy were no longer about “political will,” but about global 
power, organizational structures, and patterns of aid. As a result, I became committed to 
exploring the research possibilities of examining these processes from within a “recipient” 
country.  
 Lesotho, then, was a new sort of emblematic case, with its history of rapid, but late-
coming, funding advances, and its willingness to align itself with international policies 
(Kimaryo, Okpaku, Githuku-Shongwe, & Feeney, 2004; Owusu-Ampomah et al., 2009). Of 
course, it was not the only country I could have chosen—Malawi, Rwanda, Kenya or a 
number of others could have been promising options. But Lesotho offered a few additional 
advantages. First, as I will discuss in chapter 3, Lesotho undertook an unprecedented 
initiative called the Gateway Approach that was designed to raise awareness about HIV 
and to incorporate the priorities of communities into the national HIV and AIDS plans and 
policies. Surely, if there was a country where the political impacts of HIV scale-up had 
been positive rather than negative, and had involved the voices of citizens, Lesotho would 
be it. Second, Lesotho’s small size and the accessibility of various organizations and 
leaders made the research project’s scope more feasible. I was able to quickly gain a sense 




individuals working on HIV-related projects was small enough that I was able to get to 
know a great many people individually, and see them often. This proved particularly 
helpful in ensuring that my sampling frames for key informant interviews and my choices 
of field sites were not grossly skewed in one direction or another. Finally, I was able over 
successive summers in 2008 and 2009 to travel to Lesotho to work on various projects, 
network with clinicians and HIV program staff working in sites across the country, and 
begin developing a sampling and methodological strategy. These experiences provided a 
great deal of familiarity with various health systems, organizations, and key contacts, and 
provided a sense of the feasibility of the project I envisioned.  
 
Methods 
 From its very beginnings, this project drew on two primary methodological 
approaches: first, the practice of political ethnography as promoted by political scientists, 
sociologists, anthropologists, and feminist scholars; and second, Buroway’s “Extended Case 
Method” (2009). As anthropologists have increasingly turned towards studying elements of 
political worlds in their attempts to grapple with the rapidly changing forms of states, 
institutions, social movements, and citizenship (c.f. Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999; Das & 
Poole, 2004; Mamdani, 1996; Ong, 2006; Paley, 2002; Shore & Wright, 1997; Tsing, 
2004; Vincent, 2002), some scholars in political science and sociology have responded to 
the overwhelming turn towards quantitative and economic methods in their disciplines by 
re-examining what grounded ethnographic methods can contribute to scholarship on 
political forms, systems, and actions (Baiocchi & Connor, 2008; Tilly, 2006; Wedeen, 
2002). Together, these trends have produced a growing awareness that the political—in its 




through dynamic, contingent, socially-embedded meanings and actions among individuals 
and groups. This has lead to a number of groundbreaking works that test our thinking 
about core political forms, and allow researchers to confront and interrogate the challenges 
to states, institutions, and citizenship presented by neoliberalism, globalization, 
transnational movements, and contemporary aid practices (Appadurai, 2002; Chatterjee, 
2004; Das & Poole, 2004; Escobar, 1995; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Mbembe, 2001; 
Nguyen, 2009, 2010; Tsing, 2004). Ethnography in the realm of politics can remind us that 
the everyday lives of citizens and informants lend meaning to their (and our) political and 
legal realities (Das, 2007). This approach also allows us to embrace a far more expansive 
definition of what constitutes political action, institutions, or the state, at a time when 
much research in politics relegates citizenship to certain categories of belonging (citizens, 
non-citizens), discrete forms of action (voting, rioting), or sets of preferences that influence 
measurable political choices (as in rational-choice theory).  
 The work of studying everyday politics heralds from an even more prominent 
tradition in feminist political theory that challenged the bifurcation of private and public 
spheres (see Butler and Scott, eds., 1992; Elshtain, 1993; Fraser, 1990; Pateman, 1983; 
Rosaldo, 1980). The prominent dichotomy in political thought between the public (male) 
sphere of political action and the private (female) sphere of social relations reinforces a 
political patriarchy that not only legitimizes the exclusion of women from the public 
sphere, but delegitimizes labor, contracts, and even forms of violence that ensnare women 
in the private sphere (Pateman, 1983). Feminists have been at the vanguard of 
examinations of these “private” politics, emphasizing their centrality to understanding 
contemporary politics.  




perspective? Surely not all life is political, nor can all our informants’ actions and desires 
be considered politically-motivated or reflective of politics. And particularly in settings 
(like Lesotho) where expressing discrete political views can lead to retribution from 
political agents, patrons, or sources of support, informants may remain deliberately 
unengaged with politics in order to preserve their survival. As this project evolved, I began 
to think of the data of political ethnography as arising from three foci. The first was an 
emphasis on examining the dual forms of political subjectivity. As Good and colleagues 
argue in Postcolonial Disorders (2008), the focus on subjectivity in anthropology is a focus 
on both subjection to structures of power and subjective modes of being in the context of 
hierarchy, violence, and politics (p. 2). Subjectivity is inherently political:  
Subjectivity denotes…an urgent sense of the importance of linking national and global 
economic and political processes to the most intimate forms of everyday experience. It 
places the political at the heart of the psychological and the psychological at the heart of 
the political. Use of the term ‘subject’ by definition makes analysis of the state and forms of 
citizenship immediately relevant in a way that analysis of the ‘self’ or ‘person’ does not (pp. 
2-3). 
 Second, and linked to this emphasis on subjectivity, was a focus on what I call the 
“politics of the everyday.” Drawing on ethnography’s already rich attention to everyday 
life, it seemed natural to ask how politics, power, and discourse were represented in 
everyday life. This meant emphasizing my informants’ ongoing encounters with 
institutions, NGOs, programs, and other citizens, as well as the ways in which the patterns 
of their lives and livelihoods were shaped by the prevailing political environment around 
them. In doing so, I began to move away from what I think is an overemphasis in political 
science (and, perhaps, in our own public lives) on overt, but relatively rare, forms of 
political action: voting, protesting, rioting, or violence. Rather, we form ideas about who 




mundane patterns of everyday life. It is here that the persistent effects of power and 
resistance—as well as history—are made evident.  
 Finally, while I share the considerable criticisms of “civil society” as a conceptual 
category discussed earlier, Tocqueville’s (1994) original emphasis on “associational life” is 
richly productive as a tool for thinking about and observing diverse forms of cooperation, 
movement, and collective effort in the field. Associational life came to represent not just 
the work of support groups or the presence of local NGOs, but the efforts of women to 
care for the sick and orphaned, communal concerns about how to feed the hungry, the 
collective vulnerability of support groups who struggled to take responsibility for one 
another, and the informal gatherings of neighbors and citizens while waiting for services or 
NGO goods at clinics and government buildings. These were spaces where forms of 
solidarity and social life were being reworked and challenged, where collective ideas 
about responsibility, rights, and justice were repeatedly taken out, examined, and 
discussed. They were important social and political spaces, and to the extent that I was 
invited to participate in them, I did so eagerly.  
 The Extended Case Method is an approach to ethnographic research that allows the 
researcher to examine a social sphere through the lens of existing theory, leveraging in-
depth examinations of carefully chosen cases to challenge or reconstruct those theories 
(Burawoy, 1998, 2009). This method allows the researcher to see theory as closely 
connected to social reality, and to carry theory into the field site, utilize it, re-examine it, 
and, eventually, revise it (Burawoy, 2009, p. xi-xvii). And it allows the research project 
itself to remain in productive conversation with other scholarship that may assist in 
reading, or reconsidering, the data at hand. The Extended Case Method moves between 




social conditions in which he lives his life, and between everyday political interactions 
among citizens and the broad changes occurring in their political universe. Given the 
broad questions asked by this study, this methodological frame provided a way to maintain 
a bifocal view of the evolving project findings, shifting constantly between the minutia of 
everyday data and the tectonic shifts occurring at state and transnational levels that were 
shaping my informants’ subjectivities, survival, and social worlds.  Finally, the Extended 
Case Method provides a more thorough means of conducting the “ethnographic revisit” 
(Burawoy, 2009, p. 72) whereby the researcher returns to the site of a previous, often 
archetypical, ethnography to re-evaluate the social theory it produced. I cannot claim that 
this project accomplishes even the beginnings of a thorough revisit of James Ferguson’s 
(1994) ground-breaking study of development and politics in Lesotho, nor have I aimed to 
undertake the same approach, or endeavored to situate the study in a truly similar 
geographical or social context. Rather, I consider this an ethnographic “elaboration,” 
attempting to evaluate how and in what ways the “anti-politics” of the aid and 
development machinery have been re-tooled, updated and redeployed in HIV scale-up 
processes. This study is carried out against the backdrop of a markedly changed social and 
political world for Basotho. Particularly relevant for this work is that it takes place after the 
beginnings of the global health boom and the initial commitments of funding for HIV 
treatment scale-up, and at the peak and initial decline of HIV program funding (2008 – 
2011).  
 
Research Sites and People 
 As a result of these approaches, I conducted research in two primary sites. 




and then intensive field research was carried out over 15 consecutive months from 2010-
2011. At the center of the project were two programs providing clinical care for HIV: The 
first was a government clinic providing primary care services in addition to donor-
supported HIV treatment and care; the second was a workplace-based HIV prevention and 
treatment program run by an international public-private partnership named ALAFA. 
Government clinics operate decentralized HIV programs with a mix of public and donor 
support and funding, and are broadly integrated into the public health system of the 
country. ALAFA (the Apparel Lesotho Alliance to Fight AIDS) operates within the primarily 
Chinese- and Taiwanese- owned garment industries, which comprise Lesotho’s single 
largest privately-owned industry. It is cooperatively supported by (primarily US) garment 
buyers, Lesotho’s government ministries, NGOs, and private industry partners. For the 
government clinic site, I selected a medium-sized community-based clinic in the peri-
urban town of Ha Mamello, located about 30 miles from the capital city of Maseru. For the 
ALAFA clinic site, I chose a clinic within the New Century Factory, a larger and well-
established garment factory in the outskirts of Maseru.14 This case selection allowed an 
assessment of how and whether the political impacts of scale-up differ across institutional 
and project settings. Given the broad array of public, private, and public-private 
institutions involved in HIV scale-up and service delivery, it seemed insufficient to focus 
on only one model of care: By specifically selecting clinical programs whose purposes, 
interests, values, and services differed dramatically, I would be able to also evaluate how 
variations in services, and the ethics and values that underscore them, impact on political 
subjectivities among patients. Table 1.4 shows the differences between these two sites 
according to the primary variables of interest. 
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Criteria Government Clinic Site ALAFA Clinic Site 5,16  
Site name Ha Mamello  New Century Factory 
Location Peri-urban community Urban garment factory 
Institutional Type Public facility w/ limited NGO assistance Public-private partnership  
Services Primary care + HIV services HIV services, limited primary care 
Patient 
Demographics 
Mix of community, seeking primary care 80-90% women, seeking HIV care 
Medical Staff Foreign doctor provided by int’l org. 
Government nurses, most from Kenya 
Village health workers 
Private sector, contracted doctors 
Peer advocates from factory 
Additional Support Network of international NGOs may 
provide training, supervision, add’l services 
Limited partnerships provide some 
supplies, materials. 
Principal Oversight  Ministry of Health (MOHSW) Project Management Committee15 
Secondary 
Oversight 
Int’l orgs;  
MOH protocols set by board consisting of 
ministers, experts, orgs. 
Partnership of: factory owners, 
labor, government ministries, US 
corporations, Int’l orgs. 
Table 1.4: Comparative criteria for clinical research sites.  
 Most ethnographic research to date on HIV and citizenship is primarily situated 
within the environments of the clinic or the support group, focusing on the subjectivities 
and emergent forms of citizenship among patients and those living with HIV/AIDS. In 
addition to hypothesizing that not all clinical regimes are identical in their institutional 
design or their impact on political subjectivities and articulations of citizenship, I also 
endeavored to examine the political impacts of HIV scale-up as more than a clinical 
intervention. I wanted engage with the effects of scale-up well beyond the walls of the 
clinic, and beyond the populations of citizens who were aware of their status and were 
living with HIV/AIDS, or the limited sample of individuals who actively sought and 
maintained care as patients within a largely biomedical system of care. Because HIV 
services have been implemented in a more streamlined, technical, and well-funded 
fashion, the experiences of patients seeking HIV care can be worlds apart from the 
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experience of those seeking health care for other conditions. Investigating political 
subjectivities among non-HIV patients, and among non-patients, seemed essential. I was 
also interested in examining the political lives of individuals at the tense interface between 
their status as patients and as citizens. These sites—where citizen and patient identities, 
and HIV patients and their fellow citizens, encounter one another—seem a place of 
“friction” (Tsing, 2004) where ideas about belonging, rights, the social contract, and forms 
of survival that matter most are reforged.  
 As a result, it was especially important to interview individuals falling outside the 
scope of clinical HIV services to see how they viewed HIV services, the government’s 
responsibilities, and themselves as citizens. I primarily used the initial clinical sites as 
launch pad for a far broader investigation of HIV scale-up into the diverse surrounding 
communities. In Ha Mamello (the government clinic-affiliated site), this meant working 
throughout the town and communities surrounding the clinic; at New Century (the ALAFA 
site), it meant situating the research within the broader contexts of labor, production, the 
factory environment, and a transnational garment industry. In practice, this meant: working 
with support groups both affiliated with, and unaffiliated with, the clinics in both sites; 
interviewing a broad spectrum of patients coming for services other than HIV/AIDS care, 
testing and treatment; spending a great deal of time visiting the sick with community health 
workers; working with traditional healers seeing patients who utilized traditional forms of 
care—either in conjunction with, or instead of, care from the clinic; and attending a 
number of political and communal gatherings that had little to do with HIV or health care, 
including monthly meetings of the community council. In order to contextualize data from 
both field sites, I participated in and observed a host of national and regional policy 




organizations throughout the research period. In addition, I conducted archival reviews of 
news sources from before and during the process of HIV scale-up, comprehensive reviews 
of policy documents, grant applications and awards, and reports from donors and NGOs 
about HIV, scale-up, and health services in Lesotho. Finally, I conducted interviews—both 
informal and formal—among more than 75 NGO and donor representatives, civil society 
leaders, and other key informants throughout the research period.  
 Nevertheless, I remained painfully aware that research in the garment industry site 
presented particular methodological challenges, both inside and outside the factory walls. I 
chose to work primarily within a single factory—the New Century Factory in urban 
Maseru, the capital city—rather than across multiple factory sites.16 Accessing workers 
outside of the factories was difficult, as they lived throughout a broad urban area, and 
tracking workers from a single factory to be interviewed would require obtaining addresses 
and names from management, thus compromising confidentiality. Furthermore, factory 
workers worked such long hours in addition to shouldering domestic duties that I often 
found they were more willing to speak at work than at home. But conducting interviews 
within the factories meant contending with managers, who might either begrudge workers 
leaving work to be interviewed, or keep track of those who came to speak to us in order 
ensure workers were not giving unfavorable accounts of working conditions.  
 Thus, I found the research contending with the two driving forces that shape life for 
factory workers: the constant, grueling demands for worker productivity, and the equally 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Factories in Lesotho are primarily located in two different urban areas, Maseru (the capital), and 
Maputsoe, a manufacturing city located in the north of the country. These towns have some salient 
differences, as do the factories and workers within them. Workers in Maptusoe tend to emigrate with 
families and partners, while workers in Maseru are more likely to travel for work alone, though more 
workers in Maseru appear to emigrate from closer towns and cities. Workers in Maputsoe tend to be older, 
and are slightly more likely to be married, though these demographics are changing at both factory sites. In 
the end, I visited with workers from both towns, and ultimately decided that the differences impacted 
minimally on the research questions, and that the access provided to me at New Century in comparison to 




inescapable surveillance by factory management to ensure that workers remained silent 
about labor violations and worked to preserve the delicate image of the factory as a zone 
of “ethical production” (see chapter 6).  Providing a safe space for any research activities 
and ensuring confidentiality for informants was a considerable hurdle. Ultimately, the 
clinic space at the factory offered a partial solution. Since many workers came to the clinic 
regularly, and could access it with minimal oversight from upper management, I was able 
to recruit workers for interviews within the clinic. This did mean, however, that the 
interviews with this population were limited to those who came to the clinic, and were 
often hurried. While I was able to interview a diverse group of workers who came to the 
clinic seeking all kinds of care—from bandages and analgesics to TB and HIV treatment—I 
certainly missed speaking to those who avoided the clinic.17 There were, however, ways 
around this limitation. I developed focus groups with workers who were already away from 
work for ALAFA events or other trainings, and I was also able to interact with workers 
within the Ha Mamello community (see below). And once my presence was established at 
the factory, workers who wanted to speak to me would visit the clinic of their own volition 
in order to be interviewed, even if they did not need to use the clinic’s services. As for the 
time limitations, while workers appreciated the time away from the production lines, they 
were also under pressure to return and complete their “score” for the day. I allowed 
workers to stop interviews at any time, and if they wanted to return for follow-up 
interviews we were able to do so by having a clinic worker call them from the production 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 This likely meant that I was able to interview fewer men than I might have if I were recruiting from the 
factory floor. While 80-90% of the workforce of the factories is female, men tended to use clinic services 
less often. (Gathering exact numbers on the gender balance in factories is difficult, due to short-term hiring, 
under-reporting of statistics, and frequent changes in the overall workforce. But it appears that more and 
more men are joining the once female-dominated workforce as mining jobs in South Africa disappear and 




line on another day.18  Nevertheless, I frequently dealt with attempts by upper management 
and even clinic staff to tamper with sampling strategies and recruit workers for interviews 
who would offer narratives approved by management. As a result, I attempted to remain as 
flexible as possible in this setting, offering to end interviews early and conducting more 
interviews than was necessary, while managing as much of sampling and recruitment as 
possible on my own.  
 Research in the factory setting included participant observation of health-related 
activities both during and outside of work hours for workers. I never succeeded in gaining 
access to the factory floor as a participant, but only as an observer. This is a significant 
shortcoming of the research, though other rich ethnographies in the field provide a more 
close-up look at garment factory work itself (Plankey-Videla, 2006, 2012; Ong, 1988). I 
often had to rely on secondary accounts of factory floor relations, but pooled these from a 
wide array of sources. In addition to interviewing a broad spectrum of workers at the 
factory, I worked with and interviewed shop stewards, labor union representatives, 
independent factory inspectors, doctors, nurses, case managers, HIV counselors, and 
factory management. More importantly, I set up additional interviews and focus groups 
with workers from 3 other factories, and interviews with clinical staff from multiple factory 
sites, in order to gain a broader perspective on factory work, clinical services, and 
perceptions of HIV and health policies. These interviews and focus groups were held off 
the factory grounds, and also provided an opportunity to assess the differences in how 
workers spoke about labor issues and health services when inside and outside of factory 
walls.  
 The two primary research sites—Ha Mamello and New Century—shared a 
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considerable cross-pollination of informants that I had not initially expected but which 
ultimately became very beneficial for expanding the sampling frames of each site. This 
should not have come as such a surprise to me, as Lesotho is a very small country (so small 
that it is not uncommon to find that two people know at least one person in common, if 
they do not know each other) and its population, especially factory workers, is highly 
mobile. In addition, Ha Mamello was only about 30-60 minutes from New Century by car 
or minibus taxi. I interviewed workers at New Century who came from, or still lived in, Ha 
Mamello, and patients at Ha Mamello clinic who worked at New Century or other nearby 
factories. At the home of a traditional healer in Ha Mamello, I met factory workers seeking 
care who came not only from New Century and Maseru, but from as far away as the 
factories in Maputsoe, on the far northern border of Lesotho. In visiting patients in Ha 
Mamello, I encountered those who had once worked in the factories but were now too 
sick or weak to work. The proximity of the two sites allowed me to conduct multi-sited 
research simultaneously (even attending events and interviews on the same day) and keep 
tabs on informants in both locations for the duration of the research period. Encountering 
factory workers in and around Ha Mamello also allowed me to supplement the highly 
workplace-based data from New Century with observations and encounters that fell well 
outside the watchful eyes of managers and factory security. Because these sites shared a 
fair degree of proximity, however, I attempted to broaden this data with intermittent visits 
to much more rural clinics and towns. 
 One potential critique of this methodological strategy is that the research has not 
engaged fully with the particular issues and concerns one might observe in Lesotho’s very 
rural areas, which are expansive, frequently under-serviced, and severely marginalized. 




is common, access to basic goods and services is limited, and education rates are lower. 
Though only about 25% of Lesotho’s population lives in urban areas, urbanization rates 
have increased significantly over the past decade (Crush & Frayne, 2010). Nor can the 
remaining 75% of the population be considered purely “rural,” though it almost always is 
classified as such (Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Peri-urban towns and villages dominate the 
densely populated lowlands region of the country. Because the lowlands zone of Lesotho 
includes the bulk of Lesotho’s arable land, it also houses 70% of the population (Ministry 
of Health and Social Welfare [MOHSW], 2003). The common bifurcation of Lesotho’s 
population into “rural” and “urban” areas masks these significant peri-urban areas, as well 
as the considerable internal migration of the population. This bifurcation stretches well into 
the psyches of both development experts and Basotho themselves, and the image of the 
poor, uneducated, diseased rural peasant is a common one—so much so that even a 
person’s food choices or clothing can immediately identify him as rural or urban in the 
minds of onlookers. This divide, as is all too common in health policymaking (see Briggs & 
Mantini-Briggs, 2004), also leads to considerable blame of Lesotho’s rural populations for 
the spread of diseases, including HIV, despite the fact that HIV prevalence rates are far 
higher in urban, lowlands areas.  
 In crafting a sampling strategy for this project, I was reticent to immediately 
embrace, and therefore reify, these divides, but I also remained acutely aware of the 
marginality of Lesotho’s more rural populations. The dense concentration of development 
and global health aid apparatuses within Maseru, the capital of Lesotho, as in many 




states fueled by development practices (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).19 As a researcher it is 
all too easy to be drawn into the centripetal forces of Maseru’s centralized aid architecture. 
Nevertheless, I worried that if I sampled heavily from rural areas and found vast evidence 
of political disenfranchisement, I would be told that this was simply a byproduct of the 
rural areas’ lack of communication, poor education, and limited contact with government. 
Ultimately, I chose to purposively sample from both urban and peri-urban sites that would 
be much more likely to have ample opportunities to participate in, communicate with, and 
observe government and its partners. Thus, if I found considerable evidence of marginality 
and disenfranchisement, it could easily be hypothesized that these trends were worse 
among more rural populations. In order to gauge the rough differences between more rural 
and urban and peri-urban populations on the variables of interest, I also conducted focus 
groups and worked with support groups in far more rural areas from time to time.  
 The methodological plan for this project, as in most ethnographic undertakings, 
evolved as the research unfolded. Both the Extended Case Method and political 
ethnography emphasize that research questions should remain dynamic, changing in 
response to new data and reconsiderations of theory that occur in the field. As a result, the 
methodological means by which we pursue those questions should also remain flexible. 
Given the relatively short time frame for the research, I engaged in bits of methodological 
opportunism—when doors were open to new sources of informants or new sites for 
research, I tended to take them, while attending to the broad sampling strategies I had 
initially laid out. This approach, while requiring a fair measure of flexibility, generally, I 
believe, resulted in more diverse data and the sorts of happy coincidences and lucky 
breaks that can elevate research findings from the mundane to the surprisingly 
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transformational. For example, while I intended for one of my two primary research sites to 
be located within an ALAFA program site, I did not initially expect to have such 
considerable access to a factory that was also integrally involved in Gap’s Product (RED) 
initiative. While this site added more diversity of data and thematic content than I had 
initially planned on gathering—and at times even challenged the core research questions 
in that field site—it provided a truly remarkable opportunity to examine transnational 
humanitarian consumption campaigns from the perspective of laborers who were both 
producers and recipients of such humanitarian commodities.  
 Ultimately, in addition to the more than 75 interviews conducted with NGO staff, 
local experts, and clinicians, I recorded and transcribed close to 100 interviews in the two 
clinical sites and among patients and family members in the community. In each site I had 
key informants with whom initial interviews turned into long, wide-ranging conversations 
that spanned many encounters. A key portion of the fieldwork, especially in Ha Mamello, 
was long-term observation of, and participation in, multiple support groups. With one 
group in particular, this engagement stretched over a number of years. Clinic-based 
interviews were complemented by numerous visits to patients in their homes, and 
engaging in the practice of accompanying patients in seeking care outside the clinic site—
most often at secondary and tertiary care facilities. Finally, I frequently visited with and 
observed a well-known traditional healer in Ha Mamello, and interviewed patients who 
sought out her services.  
 
Ethical Considerations and Challenges 
 In addition to the considerable ethical challenges posed by research within 




HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) is widely recognized as involving additional ethical challenges. One 
paramount concern for HIV research, particularly in community-based clinics, is the 
inadvertent discovery of participants’ HIV status through association with the research and 
the researcher’s relationship with clinical and support programs for community members 
living with HIV. My primary approach to avoiding these associations was to relentlessly 
describe the research with informants as a project to explore the following two questions: 
First, what were citizens’ perceptions of health services and politics in Lesotho? And 
second, what did all citizens think about HIV, HIV policy, and HIV services?  In doing so, I 
went out of my way to publicly interact with, and interview, a wide array of citizens not 
seeking HIV treatment or involved in HIV activities. While I faced many erroneous 
presumptions during the research, the perception that everyone speaking to me had HIV 
was not one of them.  
 Another key ethical strategy was to never ask about HIV status directly. In many 
instances, informants either offered information about their status, or used local 
colloquialisms (e.g., “I am taking the treatment”) to hint to me that they were living with 
HIV. This prevented overstepping basic boundaries of comfort in interviews. Other topics 
of conversation, however, were equally sensitive, and I had to adapt interview protocols to 
these unanticipated discomforts. Foremost among these were direct questions about 
politics. Informants often worried that expressing political opinions would result in 
retribution from local government representatives, clinic workers, or even non-
governmental agencies (as I discuss in chapters 2 and 4). Of course, additional precautions 
to protect identities and confidentiality were necessary, and these protocols and measures 
were approved by the Columbia University Institutional Review Board (IRB), the national 






 In his research on HIV treatment, support groups, and the politics of ARV-related 
hunger in Mozambique, Ippolytos Kalofonos (2008) reported that he found it almost 
impossible to avoid being perceived as someone working on health programs, responsible 
for bringing “help” and “development” to those with whom he was trying to conduct 
research. He writes:  
I occupied an odd position. Rather than implementing projects and interventions, I was 
interested in how people interacted with them, and I did not have many jobs to offer. I was 
frequently approached for favors…I felt it necessary to somehow distinguish myself from 
development personnel and missionaries because I saw those relationships as characterized 
by conventional or institutional hierarchies….During my training I also developed the 
distinct impression that relationships in the field were contaminated and polluted by 
payment and material exchange, and the proper ethnographic relationship should somehow 
be more organic. How could I reciprocate without turning into a ‘patrão,’ a boss?...For me, 
the ethnographic experience was characterized by relationships of dependency, obligation, 
and misunderstanding (pp. 23-25). 
I believe these impressions and concerns are not unique, and I have frequently 
encountered them among colleagues and fellow students struggling with relationships in 
the field. But the prevailing writing on ethnographic methods—which both deconstructs 
the research encounter as hopelessly burdened by power relations that always impact the 
dialogue between researcher and informant, and projects an idealized vision of the proper 
research encounter as one of genuine solidarity—provides little guidance for navigating the 
everyday awkwardness and severe moral discomfort of these engagements.  
 These reflections point to two intertwined issues for researchers like myself: First, as 
a young, white researcher from the US with considerable expertise in health programs, my 
informants’ confusion over why I am not working with an NGO or a funder is justifiable. I 
was unmistakably a white outsider (makhooa), and in a small, insulated country like 




addressing this was to do what ethnographers do best—to build lasting relationships, to 
become embedded in social relations, and to allow my informants to know me, my 
intentions, and my project on an intimate level. This was the only way I knew how to 
combat such misperceptions. The second issue concerns expectations of gifts, goods, 
resources, and other forms of assistance: In many ways, the solution to the first problem 
provokes the second problem. Entering and exploring social networks, particularly in 
Africa, means becoming embedded in dynamics of reciprocity, assistance, and resource-
sharing. The extent of expectations that relatives, neighbors, and more well-off community 
members will share resources with those in need can be jarring to a first time visitor or 
researcher. As Nguyen (2010) succinctly points out, for many in Africa, their “number of 
dependents is directly proportional to income rather than actual kin relations” (p. 200). In 
Lesotho, the social good and the individual good—and social and individual well-being—
cannot be disconnected from one another. The selfish accrual or hoarding of resources is 
seen as a social transgression, a violation of moral order. 
 The refusal to participate and become enmeshed in networks of reciprocity by 
many international health and development workers in Lesotho only feeds communities’ 
distrust of them. But the disparities in income between myself and my informants was so 
extreme that the expectations of what I might be able to give and share were a 
considerable burden, and a minefield of ethical issues. As I spent more time in 
communities, I became better able to separate out the requests that arose from a 
misconception that I was connected to NGO and therefore had access to all kinds of 
project resources, and those that arose from expectations that I participate in a meaningful 
way as a member of a community. I developed ways of sharing with members that 




gave “gifts” without tying them to certain forms of participation in the research. Often this 
took the form of giving goods or services when they were most needed, and with the 
advice of key informants. I kept a garden whose meager harvests I brought with me when 
visiting sick patients and key informants. I occasionally intervened to assist patients in 
getting services, and frequently gave advice about where certain services could best be 
accessed. I gave money to, or arranged transport for, very ill patients when I could, and 
when it was badly needed. When I returned to the US, I collected donated and unwanted 
medical supplies—especially gloves and home-based care supplies—to bring back to 
support groups, care workers, and clinics. And while I relentlessly reminded people that I 
was not affiliated with any NGO or international donor, at times I was able to use my 
considerable knowledge of funding and organizations to assist support groups in writing a 
grant application, connecting with a donor, or preparing a report—though I only did these 
things at the explicit request of groups. At a certain point in the research, I realized that 
these “gifts” were frequently categorized by my informants as “given with love.” So when I 
brought medical supplies to an under-resourced support group and apologized that I was 
not able to bring more, I was told, “no. Because you give it with love, it is not small.” In 
this way, my informants subtly communicated that they understood my efforts were given 
with love—as part of a social network—rather than through obligation, or programmatic 
agendas. In doing so, they also demonstrated that such efforts were received in a 
fundamentally different way than the efforts of NGOs, donors, or HIV programs.  
 Nevertheless, there were times when my informants firmly believed that I was 
affiliated with an NGO or a funder and I was unable to convince them otherwise. Often 
this occurred when I met with a new group, or was poorly introduced by another 




(mothusi) rather than a “student” (moithuti) (as I was usually identified), hoping that I 
would not notice the somewhat subtle difference between the two words, and hoping that 
this identification would put significant pressure on me to produce goods or services for 
the community. When this misperception occurred, the appeals for resources or assistance 
became much more forceful and direct. At other times, it felt as though I was being held 
responsible by informants for all prior wrongs, all promises unfulfilled by other NGOs and 
foreign workers. “You come from America,” one elderly woman I was interviewing said to 
me at one point, “and there are some Americans who came here and they said they would 
give us some t-shirts that say, ‘know your status.’ So I’m telling you, we do like to know 
our status. We know our status.” She spent the better part of the interview asking me why I 
had not brought her a t-shirt. The tenor of these appeals reflected broader perceptions of 
the unfairness and corruption inherent in HIV funding. Sometimes they revealed the extant 
wounds of unfulfilled promises; sometimes simply the perception that NGOs, government 
officials, and powerfully networked individuals are keeping resources to themselves, and 
preventing goods and services from reaching citizens. Though these encounters never 
became comfortable, I learned to view them as an important aspect of the data, showing in 
unmistakable terms how citizens perceived those involved in HIV scale-up. Because 
NGOs and funders were also not known to just appear in villages and initiate open-ended 
conversations—and because official NGO and government visits prompted a complex 
theatrics among recipients, intended to demonstrate their gratitude and worthiness of 
assistance—these misperceptions also allowed me an important opportunity to experience 
communities’ claims-making towards NGOs, as well as perceptions of what they deserved 






 In what follows this lengthy opening, I attempt to describe the political changes I 
have observed in multiple sites across Lesotho. Chapter 2 provides a more comprehensive 
introduction to Lesotho: in particular, its political history and the most salient aspects of the 
contemporary political field. Chapter 3 introduces the context and unfolding of HIV scale-
up in Lesotho, focusing on the development of a few crucial policies that provide insight 
into how citizens are reconceived and politics rewritten under HIV programming. Chapter 
4 brings us for the first time to the clinical context in Ha Mamello, providing an intimate 
view of how clinical practice, patient subjectivity, and the constraints of the health system 
intersect in affecting how patients view and seek services from the government. Chapter 5 
extends the focus in Ha Mamello outside clinic walls, examining the inner workings of two 
competing support groups, whose labor and purposes differ but who nonetheless struggle 
with the same problems of collective vulnerability and a politics of recipiency. Chapter 6 
contrasts the data from Ha Mamello with the challenges posed by HIV treatment and 
“humanitarian consumption” in Lesotho’s “ethical” garment industry, where humanitarian, 
public-private partnerships to supply HIV programs can occlude attention to labor 
violations, poor working conditions, and occupational health concerns for workers. 
Finally, a brief conclusion points towards potential policy solutions and future trajectories 








“What are you saying about the government, my dear?” 
—HIV patient, in response to questions about  
how HIV services could be improved 
 
In an edition of Lesotho’s Public Eye newspaper in October 2010, commemorating 
the country’s annual Independence Day celebrations, a columnist asked whether 
independence day should even be celebrated, given the country’s current political 
problems (“Not quite," 2010). The Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) was enjoying 
the fruits of what was beginning to look like one-party rule, and few citizens were 
optimistic about upcoming election prospects. The columnist wrote that the best political 
change Lesotho could hope for would be an opening of the border with South Africa, 
which would allow Basotho to seek further economic opportunities in the neighboring 
state.20 The journalist’s suggestions are less radical than those of his contemporaries, who 
propose that the country be annexed into South Africa altogether. Another columnist 
(Motsoeli, 2010) argued that the country should abolish its national anthem, a song written 
by French missionaries and put to the tune of an old Swiss children’s song. The anthem’s 
middle three verses (already omitted from contemporary usage), are a relic of colonialist 
propaganda intended to quell Basotho anger over the loss of their most fertile lands to 
South Africa: “Some say our land is very, very small / we think it is large enough / we need 
no more at all / have we not our pastures, flocks and herds of cattle? / Does that not 
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longer seek economic opportunities in South Africa. Border security was tightened. South Africa cited 




suffice?” He suggested that Lesotho adopt South Africa’s national anthem—Nkosi Sikelel’ 
iAfrica—instead.  
Lesotho’s political and economic fates have long been determined by exogenous 
factors, and in this sense, the country’s Western-led, externally-accountable HIV response 
is nothing novel. But Lesotho’s colonial and post-colonial history creates a complicated set 
of conditions under which contemporary political subjectivities take shape. And these 
conditions—like the ever-present border with South Africa that appears so prominently in 
the Public Eye’s Independence Day musings—constrain social and economic possibilities 
as well. Any discussion of changing political landscapes and subjectivities in Lesotho must 
begin by examining history, and so this chapter begins with a brief political history from 
the early 19th century onwards. Others have transcribed this history more eloquently, and 
in far more detail, and so I refer readers seeking a more complete account to these fine 
works.21 I will then turn to the primary conditions of life for today’s citizens—including 
struggles with economic inequality, gender inequities, migration, and questions of 
statehood—and the constraints the state faces in delivering services amidst the pressures of 
neoliberalism. I then discuss data indicating that HIV scale-up processes are having a 
noticeable impact on political institutions and citizen outlooks in Lesotho. Finally, in a 
short post-script, I analyze how the research project was received by the government of 
Lesotho, and use this data to reflect on the meaning of participation for today’s citizens. 
The situation highlights the effects of an emphasis on documenting program success and 
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state accountability to funders.  
 
Political History 
Basotho date the origins of their modern state to the 1820s, a period during which 
Chief Moshoeshoe, the widely recognized “founder” of Lesotho and its later king, 
consolidated smaller tribes under his control. A keen leader and son of a smaller chief 
(morena), Moshoeshoe rose to power amidst the fighting, starvation, and vast population 
movements that marked the period widely known across Southern Africa as the mfecane, 
or in Sesotho, the lifaqane. For the people who gathered around Moshoeshoe in the high 
grassland region that now encompasses Lesotho, this was a time of enormous political and 
social change. They faced threats from the Zulus and other warring groups, felt the influxes 
of Boer settlers and British colonialists moving onto their lands, and sought protection 
from, and alliances with, new emerging leaders. In 1824, Moshoeshoe moved his large 
extended kin network and other followers to a plateau in what are now the western 
lowlands of Lesotho called Thaba Bosiu (“Mountain of the Night”). From this broad 
plateau, Moshoeshoe and his followers were able to successfully defend themselves 
against attacks, while expanding their ranks through more peaceful negotiating with clan 
groups wishing to gain protection.  
Moshoeshoe’s consolidation of power did not go uncontested. He faced acute 
challenges from Voortrekkers (Boer settlers) who were at the time seizing vast portions of 
fertile land in what is now Free State, as well as the British, who were also fighting to gain 
control of the region. Moshoeshoe took on an evangelical French missionary named 
Eugene Casalis with the intention of gaining his assistance in charting a way through the 




other missionaries who followed in his wake to advise him in the ever-changing 
negotiations with the British that continued throughout his lifetime. Though the British, 
who shared his desire to limit Boer settlement, marginally supported Moshoeshoe, they 
offered little protection in practice (Coplan & Quinlan, 1997, p. 31).  Beginning in 1868, 
Lesotho became a British “protectorate,” which allowed it to be governed by indirect rule 
and placed significant authority in the hands of chiefs. Tensions over authority at times 
erupted, as in the Gun War of 1880-1881, a standoff between Basutoland and the Cape 
Colony authorities. Lesotho retained only minimal independence as a protectorate of the 
British Empire (Poulter, 1972), but as Eldredge (2007) argues, Lesotho’s leaders showed a 
considerable capacity for working within the structures of power imposed by colonialism, 
engaging in a strategic acquiescence that employed tactics of what she calls “dissembling” 
and “disguise” (p. 29).  Thus, even as Lesotho’s leaders seemed to capitulate to colonial 
demands, they retained strategies for subverting, lessening, or circumventing colonial 
authority. 
Over a period of decades, ongoing threats from Boer settlers, negotiations with the 
British, and numerous treaties and agreements slowly stripped Moshoeshoe, his followers 
and his heirs of their most fertile and productive lands. Ultimately, more than two-thirds of 
Moshoeshoe’s realm was ceded to the Free State (Coplan & Quinlan, 1997, p. 31). Where 
once Lesotho was a surplus grain producer for South Africa, the loss of this land and 
subsequent impositions of protectionist trade measures to support the farmers of the Free 
State wholly undermined its agricultural production (Ferguson, 1994; Turner, 2005, p. 4). 
Turner (2005, p. 4) argues that the trade measures were a pointed attempt by the colonial 
government to assist the burgeoning mining industry in accessing cheap labor. And so the 




Kimberly now became migrant miners themselves, and Basotho became dependent on 
wages and remittances for economic survival.22  
The political legacy of Moshoeshoe enshrined local chiefs as the primary 
representatives of their people. Nevertheless, these structures of authority were not as 
hierarchical and patrimonialist as we might assume: “BaSotho relations with their chiefs 
were moderated by a political discourse among commoners and intellectuals, and not by a 
hegemonic ruling class ideology,” Eldredge (2007, p. 9) writes. Pitsos—local community 
gatherings called by the chief to discuss matters and make collective decisions—were 
understood as a forum in which individuals could speak openly and even criticize the 
chief’s decisions. In his own memoirs, Casalis (1861) describes the political openness and 
the structure of dialogue that marked the pitso:  
The… chiefs are bound to consult their subjects on occasions where the public welfare 
requires the adoption of important measures. These assemblies, called pitso (convocation), 
are always held in the open air…. The orators generally express themselves with the 
greatest freedom and plainness of speech. It is understood that on these occasions the chiefs 
must hear the most cutting remarks without a frown. Here, as everywhere, there is always a 
party for and a party against the government. The chiefs, therefore, when they have much 
opposition to fear, endeavor to gain beforehand those men of who support they are most in 
need. They also avail themselves, during the session of every little means in their power to 
influence the assembly…. The chiefs generally speak when all the others have finished; 
they commence with an exordium, setting for the legitimacy of their claims to authority…. 
The opening of the discourse is generally of an historical nature, and in the absence of all 
written documents the memory of the sovereign is subjected to the closest criticism. He 
must, therefore, first prove that he has a lucid idea of the concatenation of the facts to 
which the debate refers. “One event is always the son of another,” said a Mochuana prince 
to me on one of these occasions, “and we must never forget the genealogy.”…Then follows 
the declaration of the royal opinion, and the refutation of contrary ideas; and woe to any 
who have been imprudent enough to take undue advantage of the liberty of speech! If the 
potentate they have attacked happens to be a witty and sensible man, he will make them 
pay dearly for the impunity on which they reckoned. This is the fatal hour which gives birth 
to nicknames, which cling with the tenacity of a shadow to those on whom they are 
bestowed (pp. 233-6).  
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Nevertheless, as the colonial era progressed, the British had a heavy hand in 
promoting the “traditional” authorities of local and sub-national chiefs over the rights of 
citizens or more democratic forms of rule, as was their practice in other colonies (Coplan 
& Quinlan, 1997; Mamdani, 1996). Customary law was codified (in Lesotho, this became 
the Laws of Lerotholi), and used by chiefs to assert local power and penalize citizens 
(Poulter, 1972). At the same time, the colonial architecture of governance made chiefs 
accountable to colonial authorities, rather than to the people; this created fertile conditions 
for patrimonialism, greed, and abuses of power (Coplan & Quinlan, 1997, p. 36). As 
colonialism continued, chiefs proliferated, which meant, at the level of everyday citizen 
politics, an “all-encompassing presence of authority, down to the smallest hamlet, 
authority both accessible and immediately understood” (Coplan & Quinlan, 1997, p. 37).   
As Lesotho entered the post-colonial period, legacies of chieftaincy and political 
patronage clashed with independence movements sweeping across Africa, which 
frequently aligned with anti-traditionalist, communist-leaning, independence candidates. 
By the 1950s, the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) emerged, calling for self-determination 
and an end to the current system of traditionalist rule in Lesotho. Led by Ntsu Mokhehle, 
the party called for more representative rule, and by 1960, the National Council, which 
was originally made up of appointed chiefs, included members elected from the 9 districts, 
with an overwhelming representation from the BCP. In 1961, King Moshoeshoe II 
appointed a commission to develop a new constitution and make plans for an independent 
state, a process that took more than two years. The resulting constitution supported a 
Westminster-style system, with an upper house (consisting primarily of chiefs) a lower 
house (with representatives appointed through elections), a prime minister, and an 




day he retains a surprisingly powerful symbolic and cultural authority (Coplan & Quinlan, 
1997, p. 40; Epprecht, 2009; Maleleka, 2009, p. 2).  
In Lesotho’s first elections in 1965, the Basotho National Party (BNP), which was 
more aligned with the chiefs and the country’s sizable Catholic population, won a narrow, 
and surprising, victory. The BNP leader, Joseph Leabua Jonathan, became Prime Minister, 
and Lesotho gained independence on the 4th of October, 1966. Given the BCP’s ties to the 
South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC), the apartheid government supported 
Jonathan and his BNP party, whose platform was decidedly anti-communist, and friendly 
to the South African government. In the following elections, in 1970, the BCP claimed a 
majority, but Jonathan, citing the interference of “communists” (Ferguson, 1994, p. 106; 
Southall, 2003, p. 254) and sure of the support of both British security officers in the 
country as well as the South African government, refused to cede power. After the coup, 
Lesotho was swept with violence, and BCP members faced repression; Mokhehle was 
jailed, and later fled the country. What followed was a period of 16 years of uninterrupted 
rule by the BNP and Leabua Jonathan.  
Over the next decade, Jonathan shifted his alliances, realizing that a more 
oppositional stance towards the apartheid government could open up new opportunities 
for global partnership. As development aid blossomed, this anti-apartheid stance became 
much more lucrative. Over time, Lesotho became known as a crucial geographic haven in 
the anti-apartheid struggle: it provided space and support for exiled leaders and 
intellectuals, like the writer and activist Zakes Mda. As Coplan and Quinlan (1997) tell it, 
the resulting aid “was made to serve the ruling party and its clients. Foreign governments 
were the ultimate guarantors of Leabua’s rule” (p. 41). Foreign aid was so crucial to the 




(tsoelopele, lit. “civilizing”; later, ntlafatso, lit. “betterment” or “beautification”) with power 
and government (muso) (Ibid., p. 41). These perceptions continue to persist today, with aid 
associated with the power of the ruling government. Meanwhile, in a truly ironic twist, the 
South African government began funneling money to the BCP leader in exile, Ntsu 
Mokhehle, as Leabua courted Eastern Bloc countries such as North Korea and Cuba.  
After more than a decade of Jonathan’s rule, unrest was mounting, particularly in 
the army. In 1986, Major General Lekhanya led a coup to overturn Jonathan that enjoyed 
the broad support of the South African government. What followed was another decade of 
tempestuous politics and power-grabs by competing elites. King Moshoeshoe II challenged 
Lekhanya, and Lekhanya in turn deposed the King in 1990; the King abdicated to his son, 
who became King Letsie III. In 1991, Colonel Ramaema toppled Lekhanya in another 
military coup, and more political oppression followed. Finally, civilian anger boiled over 
in May of 1991, when rioting broke out after security guards at a South African-owned 
clothing shop beat a young mother to death after accusing her of shop-lifting. The rioting 
had an acute xenophobic fervor, turning not against the government but against businesses 
owned by Asian and Indian immigrants; citizens felt they had overtaken local business 
opportunities (Tangri, 1993; Turkon, 2008, pp. 213-14).23 Violence spilled over into a 
period of labor militancy among the workers employed in garment factories owned by 
foreign investors, many of them Chinese (Tangri, 1993). Frustration seemed to emanate 
from multiple grievances, relating simultaneously to the failure of government 
accountability to citizens, the long history of poor development and misuses of external 
development aid, and the abysmal treatment of Basotho workers by foreign-owned 
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factories and shop-owners (Tangri, 1993). Ramaema agreed to a revision of the 
constitution, which took two years, after which new elections finally took place in March 
of 1993. A now elderly Ntsu Mokhehle—the one-time independence activist, exiled under 
Jonathan’s rule, who had been in politics since the 1950s—won a landslide victory for the 
BCP.  
Peace, however, did not follow. Less than a year later, the heavily BNP-aligned 
army was again threatening to replace the government, and then factions within the army 
clashed—violently—over who should replace Mokhehle. South Africa intervened, again 
protecting Mokhehle, but violence continued. The army took four ministers hostage and 
demanded pay raises; police strikes destabilized matters further later the same year. In 
1994, King Letsie III, angry at his newly circumscribed role in the constitution, suspended 
the government in a “palace coup” that quickly deflated as neighboring countries 
intervened against him. Moshoeshoe II, his father, was reinstalled as king. Less than 2 years 
later, however, King Moshoeshoe died in a car accident, and his son once again regained 
the throne as Letsie III. In the lead-up to the general elections in 1998, Mokhehle 
responded to the unrest and criticism against his government with a bold move: 
Abandoning his party, he formed a new party, the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD). 
The BCP was sidelined in the following elections, and the LCD won in a landslide victory. 
Due to Mokhehle’s poor health, Pakalitha Mosisili was named Prime Minister.  
Peaceful elections again eluded the nation. Opposition parties claimed election 
fraud, and brought complaints against the first-past-the-post election system, which they 
said favored the ruling party (Fox & Southall, 2004; Turkon, 2008, p. 209). Rioting broke 
out again, with considerable destruction and casualties in urban areas. South Africa 




intervention was primarily motivated by South Africa’s concern for its own economic 
interests. Primary among these is the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a dam and water 
project that represents Lesotho’s most valuable export and largest foreign investment 
project, providing water to key urban areas in South Africa (Hatchard, 2009).24 An Interim 
Political Authority was formed to revise the electoral laws, and with the help of external 
mediators and political experts, revised the electoral system into a mixed, partly-
proportional system. Under the new system, 80 seats in parliament are elected through 
first-past-the-post constituency elections, and 40 seats are allocated on a proportional 
basis, allowing smaller opposition parties to maintain a voice in parliament (Fox & 
Southall, 2004). This system was first used in 2002, and though Mosisili still won by a 
considerable majority, the election seemed to restore some faith in the electoral process.  
By the time of the run-up to the elections in 2007, it seemed as if Lesotho might be 
settling into a pattern of more peaceful elections. The country’s first local government 
elections had been successfully carried out in 2005, and it seemed that citizens 
understood, and had some faith in, the new electoral system (Cho & Bratton, 2006; Fox & 
Southall, 2004). But by late 2006, Tom Thabane—a long-time politician who had served 
under Jonathan, Lekhanya (the General who overthrew Jonathan), Mokhehle, and 
Mosisili—broke with the LCD party to start a new party, the All Basotho Convention (ABC). 
While Thabane spoke of the new party as an alternative to the long-drawn-out political 
fights between the BNP, the BCP, and the LCD, and as a means of creating a new political 
trajectory for the country, his own resumé indicated that he might be more of a political 
survivor than a true reformer. A number of MPs (Members of Parliament) followed him, 
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however, and the ABC won 17 seats, carrying the vote among urban and younger 
populations who had long been underrepresented in, and disappointed by, national 
politics. This left the LCD with a considerably slimmer margin of victory than they had 
hoped for.  
Though international observers have declared Lesotho’s elections since 2002 “free 
and fair,” most local commentators are quick to explain that the ruling party still holds a 
remarkable advantage in any election. In the run-up to the 2007 elections, Mosisili called 
for the dissolution of the current government and scheduled new elections months ahead 
of the planned election date—a move that many believe helped the LCD to retain 
members in the wake of the ABC’s emergence. Given the country’s small size and limited 
election budgets, the incumbent party is able to control or influence much of the print, 
television, and radio media. It is not uncommon for government cars and other resources 
to be used in campaigning. Many have taken to calling the elections “free, but not fair,” 
and in 2007 Thabane contested multiple aspects of the election vote counting and 
proportional seat allocation (Turkon, 2008, p. 209). There is great distrust regarding the 
Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), whose employees I spotted driving the streets of 
Maseru prior to 2012 elections in brand new luxury cars with vanity plates like “IEC 1” 
clearly marking their affiliations.25  
In the run-up to elections in 2012, students, workers, and taxi drivers engaged in 
strikes, protesting poor economic and working conditions. Many in the country felt that 
Mosisili, who had held office since 1998, had been in power for far too long; but few held 
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out hope that he would be replaced in the coming elections. Mosisili looked more and 
more intent on holding onto power by whatever means, and a well-timed publication of 
the Wikileaks state department cables regarding Lesotho confirmed these suspicions for 
many citizens. The leaks contained diplomatic memos citing Mosisili’s “dictatorial” and 
“authoritarian” tendencies and made clear he had no intentions of stepping down—
providing what seemed like clear evidence of his anti-democratic intentions to already 
dissatisfied citizens (“Wikileaks hit Lesotho,” 2011).  Meanwhile, a split was brewing 
within the LCD, with part of the party opposing Mosisili’s re-election. Just at the moment 
when it seemed Mosisili would face a no-confidence vote brought about by a faction in his 
own party, he borrowed a trick from Mokhehle and formed a new party, the Democratic 
Congress (DC) of Lesotho, just prior to elections. Ironically, it was this same trick that had 
formed the LCD in the first place, and citizens joked that Mosisili had done nothing more 
than rearrange the letters of his party’s acronym. Despite the long history of successful 
election-tampering in Lesotho, the electorate in 2012 seemed savvy to Mosisili’s tricks. 
Though the DC won 48 seats and 39% of the votes, it did not secure a majority, and the 
ABC and LCD refused to form a coalition with the new party. Tom Thabane and the ABC 
were able to successfully form a majority coalition with the LCD and lesser opposition 
parties, and he was elected Prime Minister. Thabane’s rhetoric since forming the ABC party 
has been that of a populist, and once elected he spoke about the importance of improving 
job opportunities, schools, health care, and services for the poor. It remains to be seen 
whether his fragile coalition will hold in order for him to achieve these objectives, and 
furthermore, whether these goals will stay central to policy in the new government. 
Nevertheless, the successful—and peaceful—change of power brought to an abrupt halt 




that peaceful, uncontested, true transfers of power were possible.  
Nevertheless, there are ways in which Lesotho’s political history since 
independence largely makes a farce of legitimate democratic consolidation. In Przeworski 
and colleague’s (2000) celebrated discussion of democratization across the globe, they 
develop a measure of democracy that focuses on successful contestation between multiple 
parties: As Przeworski argued in an earlier work (1991), “democracy is a system in which 
both parties lose elections.” Such a barometer of democratic process teaches important 
lessons in Lesotho, which is one of those rare states in which the parties change, the rules 
change, and somehow the leading characters remain the same. A political scientist in 
Lesotho once quipped to me that the same four old men and their cronies had been 
fighting over the nation since the 1960s. Thus, Mokhehle was able to represent the BCP 
and then the LCD, and Mosisili to represent the LCD and the DC; Jonathan sided with the 
apartheid regime and the ANC, the Eastern Bloc and the West; and Thabane held posts 
under every major ruler since independence. While Lesotho’s history seems marred by the 
constant (and often violent) opposition between BNP and BCP, BCP and LCD, and LCD 
and ABC, to Lesotho’s savvy citizens it seems, in hindsight, like a long, drawn-out shuffle 
of a very short deck of cards.  
 
Nation, Identity, and Citizenship 
Statehood and nationality remain fuzzy categories in Lesotho (Mokuku, 2000). It is 
a country within a country, and a country that is formed of, and produces, migrants. Over 
the past decades scholars have noted with some surprise that Lesotho—though it appears 
to be a homogenous, culturally cohesive nation—is beset by divisions and bouts of 




to point out that, while Lesotho is today considered a rare example of a culturally and 
ethnically “homogenous” African state, “the history of the creation of the Basotho nation is 
one of amalgamation, with ethnic, cultural, and social diversity coming together under the 
welcome and open aegis of Moshoeshoe” (p. 11). Hypotheses to explain persistent, and at 
times destabilizing, divisions abound: Some blame the duress and external pressure under 
which Lesotho was formed (Coplan & Quinlan, 1997); others cite Lesotho’s decades of 
“dependence” on foreign assistance as undermining national cohesion (Weisfelder, 1977, 
cited in Coplan & Quinlan, 1997); and (more recently) Turkon (2008) has argued that class 
divisions, not political tensions are the true source of tension in the social fabric. Too often 
it seems that Lesotho’s persistent, exogenously-driven poverty somehow brings into stark 
relief its hopeless divisions, disqualifying it from true statehood. Yet the same divisions—
class inequalities, political tensions that can boil over into occasional violence, and some 
persistent religious differences—hardly disqualify many Northern societies from full and 
unfettered statehood.  
What is perhaps more interesting, as Aerni-Flessner (2011) notes, is that the 
Mosotho identity seems to transcend politics, defy national boundaries, and persist despite 
all of these divisions: but neither is it simply a “cultural” label. A self-identifying Mosotho 
can as easily be found growing up in Soweto, crossing the border for informal work in 
South Africa, or in a heated debate with friends at a bar in Maseru, discussing whether or 
not Lesotho should be incorporated into South Africa. The Sotho identity is not just defined 
by common language, culture, heritage, nationality, kinship, politics, or ethnicity. It is—as 
one respondent on a local online forum wrote in response to the question, ‘What makes 
me a Mosotho?’—“the love of Lesotho and Basotho” (“What makes me,” 2007). This is a 




people who identify as Basotho but are frequently separated by borders or misrepresented 
by their government.  While commentators may continue to presume that Lesotho’s 
national cohesion is unlikely given its inability to escape the shackles of 
underdevelopment (a discourse that closely echoes talk of “failed states” in Africa), the 
fuzzy boundaries of Sotho identity are surely a product of imposed circumstances that 
curtail the chances of survival. Citizens of Lesotho emigrate in great numbers because they 
are hard-pressed to find economic opportunity in the country’s curtailed markets; they rail 
against the government because decades of structural adjustment programs and 
“development” politics have stripped it of the ability to provide basic services and 
encouraged graft, corruption, and infighting over the remaining resources. That cohesive 
identities and sources of social solidarity persist in this environment points to the strength 
of the political society, not its weaknesses.  
One identity that does seem an emerging fissure in social life, however, is that 
between rural and urban—a divide that was certainly reified through historical and 
colonial practices, which identified the “local” as a fundamentally separate zone from the 
“national” (see Mamdani, 1996).  This divide is influenced as well by the persistent 
isolation of rural areas in Lesotho today. Current state practices of social service provision, 
resource distribution, and political outreach further reinforce rural citizens’ sense of 
geographic and political marginality. These divisions are socially prominent today, such 
that a person’s dress, manner of speaking, or even his preference for a particular type of 
bread might label him “rural” (and therefore a traditional, poorly-educated, member of the 
culture) or “urban” (and therefore a modernized, well-informed, cosmopolitan consumer). 
The caricatured divide between rural and urban – and between traditional membership 




to citizens in Lesotho today. Cultural members claim political legitimacy only through their 
place of birth (at the heart of Lesotho) and their attachment to norms and practices that the 
nation claims as its own at crucial moments of collective nostalgia. Beyond that, they are 
largely ignored—by programs, practices, and patterns of implementation—and therefore 
only enjoy moments of cultural, rather than fully-fledged political, citizenship. The 
cosmopolitan consumer, by contrast, is a modernized political subject whose primary 
forms of participation in political life are enacted through supplication to political powers 
and various strategies of consuming public funds and services. Beyond certain moments of 
collective anger (rioting, protests, or some of the actions of youth league participants), 
citizens lay claim to little that looks like the rights and participatory benefits. But these 
caricatures also mask the many postures and survival strategies of individual citizens in 
places both urban, and rural, and anywhere in between. Most citizens lead lives 
complicated by mobility, migration, cross-border kinship, and struggles for survival in 
either state or geographic zone. Claims of a rural or an urban identity have less to do with 
rigid identity categories, and much more to do with aspirational strategies for gaining 
membership in a shifting political landscape. In the research that follows, I try not to reify 
these divisions between local and national, rural and urban, preferring to understand 
subjectivities in reference to a more complicated political and social topography than these 
overly dualistic locatives.  
 
Life in Lesotho Today 
Custom in Lesotho holds that once an infant has reached a few months of age, 
female relatives will place the child outside during a gentle rain storm. As the baby 




are making you strong! We are building you up! You should not be weak!” This custom 
teaches a perfectly clear lesson about the inevitability of hardship and the importance of 
resilience that is central to the ways that many Basotho view the world. For the vast 
majority of citizens in Lesotho, life is extremely difficult. With little upward mobility, 
constrained by the economic conditions imposed by Lesotho’s place in the world, Basotho 
face the unremitting, demoralizing stress that arises from knowing their chances of 
escaping poverty are extremely slim. But as is true in many underdeveloped countries, it is 
not simply poverty that inhibits citizens’ life chances and binds their life choices: poverty is 
structured by history as well as contemporary political conditions.  
With 56.6% of the population living below the poverty line, and a gross national 
per capita income of $1,220 (current US), Lesotho ranks 153rd out of 180 countries in terms 
of per capita income (The World Bank, 2012), and 160th out of 187 countries in terms of 
overall development according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 
(United Nations Development Program [UNDP], 2012). With few employment 
opportunities and significant concentrations of wealth among a select cadre of leaders and 
professionals, Lesotho is one of the most unequal nations in the world, with a Gini index of 
63.2 (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2012). The country is small and landlocked, but 
with 1.8 million people spread over 30,360 square kilometers—an area about the size of 
Maryland—it is more densely populated than some of its neighbors (CIA, 2012).26 Much of 
the country is mountainous, high, and poor for farming. Those who live in mountainous 
areas are isolated, carving livelihoods from livestock grazing, minimal subsistence farming, 
and (when possible) sending migrants to work in South Africa or urban Maseru, the capital. 
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As a result, and because the opportunities for miners are dwindling, the country has seen 
increased pressure towards urbanization. While 27% of the population currently lives in 
urban areas, which form a ring of towns and cities along the country’s lowland borders 
(CIA, 2012), this figure is expected to rise quickly, reaching more than 40% by 2030 
(Crush & Frayne, 2010).  
Until recently, Lesotho was a major supplier of manpower to the mines in South 
Africa. In 1990, at the peak of mining migration, 130,000 men were involved in mining, 
and nearly 50% of households claimed at least one member who was involved in mining 
(and therefore, likely providing remittances) (Crush, Dodson, Gay, Green, & Leduka, 2010, 
p. 8). In less than two decades, the number of miners dwindled to 48,000, driven by 
declining work opportunities for miners from Lesotho. Remittances from migrants made up 
as much as 60% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1990s, but have since declined to 
about 30% (Romero-daza, Himmelgreen, Noble, & Turkon, 2009, p. 25).  While Murray 
(1981) and others (Van den Boogaard, Slater, Gugushe, & Phakoana, 2004) reported in the 
1980s that remittances were invested in agricultural capital, thereby supporting food 
production for families at home, more recent research (Crush et al., 2010) indicates that 
remittances are a source of much-needed cash for families, who use them to purchase 
necessary household items, including food. Three-quarters of households do not invest 
remittances; this is a rough indicator that the likelihood of longer-term security arising from 
mine labor is slim, and becoming more so all the time (Crush et al., 2010).  
The same is true of work in Lesotho’s fledgling garment industry. Since the early 
1990s, foreign-owned garment factories producing for US and European clothing labels 
have employed primarily young, urban women (or recent urban migrants) (Gibbs, 2005). 




requiring little training and great patience (Bennet, 2006). Jobs pay poverty wages with 
little hope of promotion (Raworth & Harvey, 2004). While Lesotho has invested heavily in 
this industry, and US trade representatives tout incentives for garment manufacturers as a 
key development strategy, it is unlikely to provide lasting benefits for either workers or 
their families. Wages are so low that supporting families with remittances is nearly 
impossible (Crush et al., 2010, pp. 21-22). And as I describe in Chapter 6, many female 
workers struggle to invest in things like children’s education, and commonly engage in 
transactional sex or second jobs in order to secure additional resources.  
Though high rates of education (particularly among women) and new job 
opportunities in the garment industry have given Lesotho a reputation for achieving 
considerable gains in gender equality, recent history might argue otherwise (Hausmann, 
Tyson, & Zahidi, 2010). “Political modernisation in Lesotho has brought little or no 
significant improvement to the social status of Basotho women,” wrote a political scholar 
at the University of Lesotho in 1997 (Makoa, 1997, p. 12). Under customary law—which 
gained much more legitimacy under British colonialism—women were treated as perpetual 
minors, unable to own or inherit property, obtain a divorce, enter into contracts without a 
husband’s permission, or have a prominent voice in decisions regarding where or how 
children should be raised. It was not until 2006 that these laws were repealed and the 
“Legal Capacity of Married Persons” act was passed. Pressure from the UN and donor 
countries promoting gender equality as a multi-sectoral HIV response strategy was an 
important factor in the creation of the law; so too was the role played by local activists. 
The Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA) in Lesotho was crucial to efforts to pass the 
legislation and educate women about the new law; nevertheless, some members of the 




difficulty. Despite legal changes, women still face entrenched inequality in gender norms, 
practices, and perceptions (Lesotho Planned Parenthood Association, 2009; Makoa, 1997). 
Intergenerational relationships, high rates of partner abuse, and considerable power 
inequalities in relationships fuel HIV infections (Khobotlo et al., 2009). My own research 
also indicated that women’s employment in garment factories did not earn them economic 
freedom, and at times exposed them to further violence, stress, and potential infection in 
relationships.  
Many have argued that Lesotho’s long-term patterns of migration contributed to 
high rates of partner concurrency, and to increases in HIV prevalence throughout the 
country (Murray, 1981; Romero-Daza, 1993; Spiegel, 1991). Today’s epidemic—which is 
concentrated among urban, female populations with more access to income (MOHSW, 
2010) —presents a set of prevention challenges with which the country has not yet fully 
come to terms.27 Many in the government still speak of the epidemic as fueled by 
“ignorance” and “traditional values” among rural, mountainous populations. Persistent 
gender and income inequalities drive the epidemic, and these, in addition to migration 
patterns, increase the likelihood of multiple, concurrent partnerships that increase risk of 
HIV infection. Intergenerational relationships, high rates of partner abuse, and entrenched, 
negative gender norms further fuel infections. HIV stigma, as discussed in other chapters, is 
significant, and tends to arise from the perceived shame of promiscuous and extramarital 
sexual partnerships (Holzemer, Gree, & Makoae, 2007; Holzemer, Uys, et al., 2007; 
Mothibeli, 2009, p. 62). Openness in discussing sexual matters is lacking, but grassroots 
education campaigns are slowly opening up public discourse to issues of safer sex.  
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Nevertheless, HIV has had an extraordinarily deep impact on life in Lesotho. Life 
expectancy at birth is 50 for men and women, down from 65 in 1990; the female adult 
mortality rate has risen from 171 to 573 per 1000 persons (WHO, 2012, pp. 54–55). 
Improvements in life expectancy, mortality rates, and basic health that should have 
occurred with considerable investments in health systems strengthening have been stymied 
by the effects of HIV on maternal and child mortality, TB rates, and secondary diseases, 
and by task-shifting of already slim human resource capacity towards vertical HIV 
initiatives. TB, once fueled by migration and mining, is now made more intractable by HIV 
prevalence. Chronic health problems—hypertension, diabetes, stroke—are also on the rise 
(WHO, 2012). Finally, food security and access to proper nutrition is a constant difficulty 
in Lesotho, and one that has become markedly worse over the past few years, as food 
prices have risen (See, for example, Initiative on Soaring Food Prices, 2008; Romero-daza 
et al., 2009; Turner, 2009). As Whiteside and de Waal (2003) first pointed out, HIV has a 
multi-pronged and sinister effect on food production capacities, household purchasing 
power, and vulnerability to starvation: The epidemic in places like Lesotho has created a 
second layer of hunger—a “new variant famine”—in addition to long-standing difficulties 
in achieving food security. In addition, Lesotho’s national insecurity as an agriculturally-
poor area and net importer of food means that families are less able to produce for 
subsistence and are more dependent on purchased food—though poor households lack 
access to much, if any, steady income. In addition, food prices are presently so high in 
Lesotho that urban households are reported to spend 75% of household income or more 
on food alone (Romero-daza et al., 2009, p. 26). As a result, more than 45% of children 
under five in Lesotho are stunted, the product of chronically insufficient access to food 




As Ferguson (1994) so eloquently demonstrates, Lesotho’s poverty is hardly the 
result of unhappy circumstance, but rather the product of a colonial history that stripped 
the country of its most fertile lands, and a post-colonial period of “independence” whose 
development projects construed endemic poverty as a problem of “dependence,” poor 
development, and national policy. “Poverty in the independent nation-state …has long 
been formulated in insistently national terms, as “Lesotho’s poverty—and thus, implicitly, 
Lesotho’s problem” (Ferguson, 2006, p. 60, emphasis original). Of course, Lesotho’s 
poverty is very much a problem of South Africa, colonial geographies, and world 
economies. Survival in Lesotho always seems to be carved out in reference to forces 
outside and beyond: the factory worker employed in the Chinese-owned factory that 
exploits US trade rules; the miner who spends half a lifetime in the South African mines; 
and the HIV support group participant who cobbles together a “salary” from the trickle-
down commodities of donor-funded projects. In comparing Lesotho with the bantustan of 
the Transkei under apartheid, Ferguson (2006) argues that the imposed circumstances of 
poverty in both places were strikingly similar. But whereas black South Africans could 
recognize the imposed “independence” of the bantustan as, in the words of Steve Biko, 
“the greatest single fraud ever invented by white politicians” (quoted in Ferguson, 2006, p. 
59), Lesotho’s internationally-recognized political independence only depoliticized its 
poverty and occluded the (decidedly political) conditions of its underdevelopment. As 
Ferguson (2006) writes, “through its very international respectability, Lesotho was rescued 
from P.W. Botha’s envisioned ‘constellation of states’ but simultaneously incorporated into 
a much larger constellation: the world community of nations, within which it occupies an 
equally powerless position” (p. 64). 




obligatory austerity that have placed additional limitations on Lesotho’s ability to provide 
services, and which represent the new political chains of its underdevelopment. 
Meanwhile, development projects, as Ferguson’s (1994) work makes clear, act as a 
depoliticizing force, obscuring the (external) conditions that create underdevelopment 
while prioritizing values of self-sustainability, responsibility, and independence. Other 
scholars (Van de Walle, 2001) have demonstrated the ways in which neoliberal policies in 
Africa have increased (if not incentivized) rent-seeking, corruption, and neopatrimonialism. 
The reliance on NGOs to provide essential state services, and their resulting proliferation, 
shunts the most talented staff away from government institutions and pays them higher 
salaries. As Ferguson (2006) notes, the residual government work force is less capable and 
lower paid, which creates “the inevitable consequences of corruption and an explosion of 
‘parallel businesses’” among civil servants (p. 39). Liberal economic reforms, claim 
scholars Jean-Francois Bayart, Stephen Ellis, and Béatrice Hibou (1999), shepherd African 
states along a pathway from privatization to criminalization.  
NGOs, meanwhile, have a limited ability to change livelihoods through policy and 
political change—say, by enacting national pro-poverty schemes like pensions, or by 
making the hard, sector-wide improvements that enact positive change for all citizens, not 
just recipients of limited programs. NGOs are inadequate to pick up the roles that states 
can no longer fulfill (Fisher, 1997; Pfeiffer, 2003). States have been variously described as 
emptied, hollowed out and marginalized—and it is apt to question their capabilities for 
producing and carrying out policies under the circumstances by which they are bound. But 
in another sense African states simply have another set of priorities and purposes: They 
attend to the business of getting grants, appeasing funders, and marketing natural resources 




not the organizations of ‘civil society’ that are ‘nongovernmental’,” Ferguson (2006) 
observes, “it is the state itself” (p. 39).  So when citizens say that the state is absent, what 
they mean is that they feel the state is broadly absent from their lives as citizens—no longer 
accountable to their needs, attendant to their visions of the future, or mournful over its 
failures to protect them. Though international agencies comment tirelessly on the need for 
“good governance” in African states, it seems that many are primarily interested in 
promoting “good governance” in the service of their priorities, grants, and outcomes. Even 
for those whose genuine interest lies in improving democratic politics and policymaking in 
African states, efforts are often stymied by leaders’ own resistance to such modes of 
governing (since they reap the benefits of such neoliberal systems) and the practices of 
neopatrimonialist governance which have gained such momentum in the wake of 
neoliberalism (see Bayart, 2009). As Daniel Smith (2008) points out in Nigeria, many good 
faith efforts at building better democracy fail to fully acknowledge the ways in which 
“elites and ordinary citizens live simultaneously” in multiple political worlds: traditional 
patron-clientelist, liberal democratic, and neopatrimonialist (p. 12).  
A simple example from Lesotho will help explain the realities of policymaking in 
the time of HIV scale-up. As I was finishing my fieldwork in 2011, international agencies 
were consumed with interest in medical male circumcision (MMC) as a prevention 
strategy, and pushing heavily for its adoption within a number of African states (see, for 
example, Bollinger & Stover, 2009). Ministers and other government leaders in Lesotho 
were less eager to implement such a strategy. The verb used for circumcision in Sesotho 
(ho bolotsa) referred to a great deal of practices surrounding traditional circumcision—
including attending an initiation school, undergoing a full set of initiation rights, and the 




either involve no foreskin removal, or only foreskin cutting, both of which are inadequate 
in protecting against HIV [Auvert, Lissouba, Geffen, Fiamma, & Heywood, 2009; Thomas 
et al., 2011; Wilcken, Keil, & Dick, 2010]). It was clear that HIV experts and ministry staff 
in Lesotho needed a different term, but more importantly, they needed a different practice. 
After all, a voluntary, medical male circumcision for the purposes of reducing HIV 
infection would be far different from initiation school rites. And traditional leaders were 
not likely to view a biomedical distilling and usurping of their complex cultural practices 
favorably. The Minister of Health, Mphu Ramatlapeng, a savvy and well-spoken woman, 
admitted at a major national meeting that circumcision was fast becoming a “major issue.” 
She reported that a politician had recently held a rally in his district in which he lambasted 
her for engaging in “cutting of foreskins” that had nothing to do with cultural practices. As 
a woman, and without a male child of her own, he said she had little right to speak of 
these things at all. “So you all know,” she warned the ministry staff, “…we are going for 
elections soon as you are all very aware. You will have all kinds of detractors [on this 
issue].” Throughout her speech she refused to use the term “circumcision” but admitted 
that they had no appropriate term for this new practice. By renaming the practice “cutting 
of the foreskin” they might be able to forestall some of these divisive political issues. But 
renaming a medical intervention did not address, nor even invite discussion of, the broader 
tensions in MMC between the science of risk reduction and the social practice of initiation, 
or between (already politicized) “tradition” and (aspirationally-apolitical) medical practice.  
The choice about whether or not to promote circumcision came down to the 
interests of funders. A few months later, I attended an event with many country heads of 
various health and development agencies at the house of the US Ambassador. The talk at 




not the Lesotho government would capitulate to demands that it initiate MMC. Additions to 
the current prevention plan were only making room for nationalized neonatal 
circumcision. Not to worry, reported a few of the experts present: The Global Fund had 
simply made it a requirement for receiving future funding, and the government was 
expected to add MMC to its prevention plan promptly. Because public health work—and 
HIV policy, in particular—proceeds according to the moral logic of getting the most 
desirable health outcomes in the quickest way possible, little attention is paid to the 
means, and great assumptions are made about the justifications which a positive ‘end’ can 
bring. But if we examine this from the standpoint of political process—or better yet, 
political ethics—the balance of ends and means is much less clear. The government 
isolates and marginalizes citizens who may or may not feel that such rituals are important. 
Co-opted as a biomedical procedure, circumcision policies prematurely curtail a public 
conversation about difficult compromises between ritual and medicine, tradition and 
technology. The government chooses a policy option not because it is clearly the will of 
the people, or even because it is the will of the government, but because it is the will of 
international funders.  
HIV scale-up has impacted other processes of government as well. It has vastly 
expanded the power of ministries in carrying out policies and programs, managing major 
finances, and working with funders and international institutions. Ministers are strongly-
affiliated with the party in power, and are typically appointed from the ranks of the most 
loyal party members. They are not subject to the direct appraisal of voters, but appointed 
(and fired) by the Prime Minister. Institutions like the National AIDS Commission and the 
Global Fund Country Coordinating Mechanism are poorly democratic at best (Birdsall & 




2010). Representation tends heavily towards international and non-governmental agencies 
as well as government ministries (Akoku, 2009a). Citizen representation often takes the 
form of tokenism: one or two persons from a certain identity group (persons living with 
HIV, or LGBTQ populations) representing the interests of a diffuse set of individuals who 
have little contact with representatives and whose interests do not always align with those 
who represent them (Akoku, 2009b; see also Cassidy & Leach, 2009, p. 22). Others are 
represented through national umbrella organizations (Lesotho Network of People Living 
with HIV/AIDS, LENEPWHA, for example) that, as secondary recipients for large grants 
managed by government agencies, are in an attenuated position to advocate against 
government policy decisions. Both of these types of representatives are in a poor 
negotiating position, and meetings and policy dialogues are power-laden spaces (Akoku, 
2009b; Birdsall & Kelly, 2007).  
Though the National AIDS Commission (NAC), established in 2005 in Lesotho, is 
meant to act as an independent coordinating body for the AIDS response, it struggled in 
practice to create a comprehensive area of work and implementation separate from the 
country’s Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW), which grew more and more 
powerful during scale-up. Both the MOHSW and the NAC were keen to control access to 
external funding and distribution of grants to smaller NGOs, and fighting over legitimacy 
and fiscal control came to a head in late 2010. MOHSW commissioned a “report” 
(authored by hired consultants) on the effectiveness of the NAC that turned out to be a 
scathing assessment of the agency’s role, determined to paint the NAC as unnecessary and 
out-of-step with current HIV policymaking practices (Matope, 2010). After a very public 
dissemination of the report’s findings, the MOHSW embarked on a systematic dismantling 




courage to remark negatively on the dismantling of the NAC. Most international partners 
were heavily reliant on the participation and cooperation of the MOHSW, and felt that 
coordinating activities with two agencies was tedious anyways. Internal civil society 
organizations feared that, with NAC dismantled, MOHSW would control all internal grant-
making processes, and reasonably assumed that contesting MOHSW’s stance would likely 
inhibit their access to life-sustaining grants in the future. Thus, in 2011, the very public and 
unapologetic closure of Lesotho’s only independent HIV policymaking body elicited 
almost no response from civil society or international partners.   
Much like their colonial predecessors (Aerni-Flessner, 2011, pp. 4–5), international 
HIV policymakers and their in-country partners place a great deal of emphasis on political 
stability and such euphemisms as “order” and “unity” (see Kingdom of Lesotho, 2004). This 
is a thinly veiled “anti-politics” (Ferguson, 1994), in which the government eagerly takes 
part, more than happy to oblige international partners in achieving “stability”—preventing 
political power change—by whatever means necessary.28 The money from HIV scale-up, 
even when not directly used in political campaigning, more subtly supports incumbents. 
Leaders are quick to claim HIV and health successes as their own, and HIV funding 
appeases lower-level civil servants and young professionals by providing jobs to an 
intelligentsia that otherwise would likely protest the government.29 In a telling moment 
during Lesotho’s negotiations for an enormous new development contract with the US 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), opposition parties and workers in Lesotho 
demonstrated in the streets, demanding that Lesotho not receive the grant. Their reasons 
were two-fold: First, they felt that levels of government corruption should have disqualified 
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the country as a recipient, arguing that the MCA and the government of Lesotho colluded 
to cover up practices of nepotism and corruption. Second, the opposition forces feared that 
such a large grant in the hands of the LCD would make it impossible for them to ever 
mount a significant challenge to the party in future elections.  
 
Democracy: A Measure of Faith 
The Afrobarometer project, which conducts randomized, cross-sectional surveys of 
African citizens in countries across Africa, has measured aspects of political and economic 
life in Lesotho since 1999, a year after the first (relatively) peaceful elections were held in 
the country. Since then, surveys have been conducted in 2003, 2005, and 2008. Taken 
together, these surveys provide a portrait of citizens’ opinions of the government, political 
parties, and democratic institutions over a ten-year period. The survey includes a large 
number of questions about democracy—what it means to citizens, how successful 
politicians are at upholding it, and whether or not citizens support various elements of a 
participatory democracy. At the most basic level, the picture that emerges from this data is 
that, from 1998-2003, citizens in Lesotho were developing, albeit slowly, a growing faith 
in, and support for, democratic institutions (Afrobarometer, 2009). But by 2008, following 
the elections in 2007, these measures once again dropped, with a growing percentage of 
voters (29%) responding that non-democratic forms of government could be preferable to 
their current situation (Table 2.1) (Afrobarometer, 2009, p. 3). Sixty-six percent of 
respondents indicated that if the current government could not produce results in the near 
future, another form of government would be preferable (Table 2.2) (Ibid., p. 4); 51% of 
voters thought the country was not a democracy, or was a democracy with major 




democratic rule, which had risen from 1998-2005, declined significantly by 2008 (Table 
2.3).  
 
Table 2.1: Preference for Democracy, 1998 - 2008: Percentage of respondents who agree with the 
following statements: Statement A—“Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”; 
Statement B—“In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable”; Statement C—
“For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.” Source: Afrobarometer, 2009, 
p. 3.  
 
Table 2.2: Patience with Democracy, 2003 - 2008: Percentage of respondents who agree with the 
following statements: Statement A—“Our present system of elected government should be given more time 
to deal with inherited problems”; Statement B—“If our present system cannot produce results soon, we 
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Table 2.3:Rejecting non-democratic rule, 1998 - 2008. Percentage of respondents who reject the 
following statements: “The army comes in to govern the country”; “Only one political party is allowed to 
stand for election and hold office”; “Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the Prime Minister can 
decide everything.” Source: Afrobarometer, 2009, p. 3.  
 
 
What, then, was the driving force behind these figures in the 2008 survey? Poor 
opinions of the election seemed to play a part: More people felt elections were not free 
and fair, but also expressed disappointment and frustration with the opposition parties, 
who were increasingly playing an obstructionist role. Citizens thought that freedoms of 
speech, association, and voting had improved, but there was increased confusion over 
other procedural elements of democracy. Should the president be limited to two terms? 
Those who agreed declined from 85% in 2003 to 51% in 2008 (Afrobarometer, 2009, p. 
5). Should the president pass laws without interference from parliament? Those who agreed 
increased from 17% in 2003 to 37% in 2008 (Ibid, p. 6). In some sense, the data seemed to 
reflect not how things should be, but how, pragmatically speaking, they already were. 
When citizens in Lesotho spoke to me about the condition of politics in their country in 
2008-2011, they often cited the same aspects of politics—too much power in the 
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conditions of their current system.  
What is surprising is that these declines in democratic measures occurred at a time 
when, by all external indicators, Lesotho’s democracy was becoming more entrenched and 
stable. Though the 2007 elections had resulted in some violence, it paled in comparison to 
the 1998 elections, when troops were brought in from South Africa to “restore order” (Fox 
& Southall, 2004). Given Lesotho’s lengthy history of political abuses, corruption, and 
coups, we might expect that a series of relatively peaceful elections with evidence of a 
growing opposition might gradually restore faith in democracy. Instead, it seemed the 
initial optimism regarding democratic institutions (if we could call it that—Lesotho ranks 
consistently low in support for democracy across the region) quickly waned.  
It is immediately apparent in the survey data that frustration with the poor provision 
of public services is a crucial source of declining faith in democratic institutions. After all, 
if the institutions of the state are not able to protect and provide for citizens’ most basic 
needs, what use is there in continuing to build democratic institutions? The influence of 
such citizen disappointment has been evident across African countries that enacted 
neoliberal reforms and harsh austerity measures at the behest of donors and international 
financial institutions throughout the 1980s and 1990s (see, for example, Bond, 2003; 
Ferguson, 2006; van de Walle, 2001). These measures, not surprisingly, have provoked 
citizens to look elsewhere for the fulfillment of basic needs—towards traditional leaders 
and neopatrimonialist solutions—while states have increasingly turned towards 
privatization of services (van de Walle, 2001). A certain nostalgia for patron-clientelism 
can be heard amongst citizens, who comment that at least that system provided something. 
In Lesotho, this is observed in the 79% of respondents who support traditional leaders 




should decrease) (Hall & Leduka, 2008). Privatization has come late to Lesotho, with an 
array of new initiatives to privatize various aspects of public services, particularly health 
care. Some citizens, frustrated by decades of poor service delivery, told me during the 
research that they would prefer privatization: at least they would know the cost of services, 
and have the rights of a “consumer” to demand services. Troublingly, such statements 
point to the sense among citizens that without state services rights have little meaning, and 
that an emergent, market-driven concept of entitlements may be obscuring struggles for 
more fundamental social rights.  
It is important to note how HIV scale-up has altered opinions of government 
service delivery, and therefore, broader faith in democratic institutions. Table 2.4 presents 
public opinion of how the government handles various economic and social services for 
citizens. As is not surprising, markers of economic performance—job creation, living 
standards, and food accessibility—indicate vast dissatisfaction with the government. A 
second tier of public services—fighting corruption, providing water and sanitation, 
reducing crime—gets middling grades. These are not seen as successes, but neither are 
they outright failures. The services that get the highest ranks in Lesotho are health, and 
more specifically, HIV initiatives. These are broadly supported by external agencies and 
donors, and represent the result of considerable policy efforts. But performance on HIV 
seems to have little bearing on overall satisfaction with the government; and approval of 
basic health services is considerably lower. It appears that general approval over how the 
government is handling HIV is not driving poor overall opinions of democracy in Lesotho. 
Nevertheless, in the chapters that follow, I explore the ways in which the institutional and 
social practices of HIV scale-up have vast impacts on how citizens view and participate in 




vast secondary effects on social and political processes that are difficult to assess in surveys 
such as the Afrobarometer.  
 
How well is the government 
handling… 
Very badly / 
fairly badly 
(%) 
Very well / 
fairly well 
(%) 
Don’t know / 
haven’t heard 
enough to say 
(%) 
Creating jobs 80 18 2 
Ensuring enough to eat 78 18 4 
Narrowing income gaps 77 14 9 
Improving living standards for poor 69 29 2 
Managing the economy 62 32 6 
Fighting corruption 56 35 9 
Providing water and sanitation 56 44 2 
Reducing crime 50 48 2 
Improving basic health services 34 64 2 
Combating HIV/AIDS 17 77 6 
Table 2.4: Government performance ratings on public services, 2008. Source: Hall & Leduka, 2008, 
pp. 30-33.   
Almost as striking as citizens’ lack of faith in democracy is their sense that non-state 
actors wield far too much power in government. In particular, 69% of respondents thought 
international donors and NGOs had too much influence over their government, and 60% 
felt that local NGOs and civic organizations also had too much influence (Hall & Leduka, 
2008, p. 62). In order to test whether or not opinions of NGO / donor influence had any 
bearing on faith in democracy, I ran a series of simple correlation tests which showed that 
perceived non-state actor influence was strongly associated with perceptions of democratic 
functioning and value across a number of variables (see Table 2.5 for summary statistics). 
In further exploring the cross-tabulation of these variables, it seems that perceptions of 
non-state actors having too much influence were more strongly correlated with perceptions 
of, and a preference for, non-democratic institutions, and perceptions that non-state actors 
had “about the right amount of influence” were more strongly correlated with a preference 




opinions of democracy, the dynamics associated with HIV scale-up (expansion of 
international / local non-state actor influence, for example) are correlated with markedly 
declining opinions of, and faith in, democracy.  
 
 Patience with 
democracy30 

























55.880 .000 105.182 .000 56.676 .000 
Influence of Lesotho 
civic organizations and 
NGOs 
57.415 .000 101.979 .000 63.757 .000 
 
Table 2.5: Chi-square correlation of perceptions of non-state actor influence with democracy 
variables. Source: Hall & Leduka, 2008.   
Of course, it is equally possible that citizens’ current frustration with democracy 
influences their (negative) feelings about how much influence other institutions have, and 
their suspicions that such institutions directly or indirectly boost the power of corrupt 
politicians, and in doing so, buy influence. There is too little data in the Afrobarometer 
survey regarding HIV and scale-up to assess causality in much depth. My suspicion is that 
falling faith in democracy and increasing external influences in the government feed into 
one another. Furthermore, the survey includes a subtle but extremely influential validity 
problem: more than half of respondents to the survey (55%), when asked who they thought 
sent the interviewer to conduct the interview, responded that they thought it was the 
government, the Prime Minister, a political party, or another government agency (Hall & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 For further information on variable “Patience with democracy,” see Table 2.2.  
31 “Level of perceived democracy” reflects responses to the question, “In your response how much of a 
democracy is Lesotho today?” Responses were categorized into the following variables: (A) Not a 
democracy / a democracy with major problems; (B) A democracy with minor problems / A full democracy; 
(C) Don’t understand / don’t know.  




Leduka, 2008, p. 63). In Lesotho, where citizens are still afraid of retribution for voicing 
political opinions or concerns (see Turkon, 2008, p. 209), we can imagine that this has a 
dramatic impact on how citizens respond to many of the questions on the survey. I 
encountered similar misconceptions when entering the field and first meeting 
participants—deeply entrenched skepticisms that persisted long after I explained (and re-
explained) who I was and what interests I represented. Prolonged contact, frequent and 
open discussions about my research, subjective empathy for participants’ fears, and simply 
being there were the only tools I had to counter mis-perceptions. These tools are 
fundamentally missing from quantitative survey techniques.  
Finally, these data paint a crude picture, and it is difficult to assess exactly why 
citizens are so skeptical of democracy, how much of a role HIV scale-up has played in the 
midst of broader political dynamics in reducing citizen faith in democracy, and how 
perceptions of the processes and changes of scale-up (like expanding influence of external 
organizations) are influencing appraisals of democratic functioning. In order to answer 
these questions, I use the remainder of this dissertation to explore qualitative, 
ethnographic, and observational data gathered from specific spaces of encounter, between 
citizens and clinics, between HIV patients and NGOs, between communities and donor 
agencies, and between the government, its partners, and citizens. I will attempt to use this 
field-based data to paint a rich, detailed picture of how political worlds, citizen-state 
relations, and everyday political life is changing in the wake of the scale-up of HIV 
programs.  
 
A note on “politics” 




still wield, citizens view political participation with a level of skepticism that often borders 
on fear. Turkon (2008) reports that his informants in rural areas of Lesotho are perennially 
“anxious” about the possibility of political persecution, recalling the violence they 
experienced during political campaigning in the 1980s and 1990s (p. 209). In addition, the 
long history of ruling party-run development projects has exacerbated the sense that access 
to development aid is dependent on one’s political affiliations (Turkon, 2008; Ferguson, 
1994). Even today, citizens reported to me their suspicions about which political or 
religious affiliations were preferred by various international NGOs operating in the 
country. In addition, citizens’ calls for equity in development schemes or government 
projects are frequently met with punitive measures (Turkon, 2008, p. 211). “Here in 
Lesotho, people are scared of responsibility,” a factory worker told me, “we are scared to 
voice our opinions, because we know that the government will abuse us—like, we know 
the police will always be there, and it’s going to be bad. We just keep quiet because we 
are scared, even if we know who should be [held] responsible.” Many informants in clinics 
and communities told me that if they spoke out to criticize a public service or policy—or 
even expressed an opinion about it—they feared they would no longer have a chance of 
participating in that service or program. This sentiment was so common that in about a 
third of all clinic-based interviews I was never able to get patients to reflect on what they 
wished the clinic or government would improve in health or HIV services. One respondent 
eyed me suspiciously when I asked her how she thought the government could improve 
HIV services at clinics like the one she attended. “What are you saying about the 
government, my dear?” she asked, cautiously. “Politics” was variously described to me as 
“a bind,” and “a trap.” It is “like having your toe stepped on,” one university student told 




stepping on you and it hurts and it is an instinctive response… But no engagement is a 
good one [here].”  To be “political” is to criticize the government or the ruling party, at 
one’s own risk; it also means engaging in the kind of mud-slinging, counter-productive 
party infighting that occurs relentlessly in Lesotho and at election times leads to murders 
and rumors of party-affiliated “hit squads” (Zihlangu, 2012).  
Thus, when I began the process of receiving government approval for my research 
on the political impacts of HIV programs, I was hardly well received. Before I even 
submitted the proposal, I was warned by the head of the in-country Institutional Review 
Board (IRB)—who was not Mosotho but, in his words, “sort of here long-term”—that 
Basotho are a “passive people” whose apolitical stance “makes them victims.” He asserted 
that this passivity and apathy among citizens was “just part of their worldview” and that 
“they don’t care” what happens to them politically. This discourse on the presumed 
“passivity” of Lesotho’s citizens creates an image of those who lack power in Lesotho as 
willfully poor, ill-educated, and unconcerned with advocating for themselves. Talk like this 
represents the apogee of the impacts of neoliberal thinking in Africa: After decades of 
externally-imposed policies and plans which leave little room for citizen input, incentivize 
lacking accountability and corruption among leaders, and turn a blind eye to poor 
democratic process and political oppression in the interest of preserving “stability” in the 
state, should it be any wonder that citizens are skeptical about the impact of their 
participation, and worried about whether criticism or advocacy will bring punitive 
measures?  
As my research proposal underwent review, I faced considerable pressure to leave 
the country entirely, and few in the ministry would speak to me directly. When I asked for 




was trying to bribe public officials. My Basotho colleagues who had connections to the 
government all attempted to get information for me—the message I received was that the 
government was afraid I would be investigating corruption in the Ministry of Health and its 
partners. Finally, I secured a meeting with one of the ministry officials in charge of 
research, and he indicated to me that the research was suspicious because it seemed that I 
was intent on criticizing the government. Political, he explained, meant critical. Wasn’t it 
true, he said, that if I requested to do this research in the US, with such an interest in 
politics, that it would be like criticizing the performance of President Barack Obama? 
Surely I could understand why they could not approve this project, he explained. In the 
end, I made appeals, as an ill-informed student and anthropologist, that I had not intended 
to criticize the government, but only to study the social impacts of HIV programs on the 
lives of citizens. From this point onwards, this would have to become the primary focus of 
my research with any participants, and my ability to interview any politicians or high-level 
government employees was severely constrained.  
 I recount the difficulties of this process for two reasons. First, I want to make clear 
the positionality of the research in relation to the current political situation in Lesotho 
during the time I conducted my research. I believe it is methodologically and ethically 
important to write about how the research was perceived, and under what unhappy 
compromises it had to be carried out. As a result, I limited the extent to which I asked 
informants directly about political perceptions, participation, or opinions of the 
government. An unintended benefit of the limitations placed on my project was that it 
forced me to have faith in the ethnographic method, to reveal to me what my informants 
felt was most important, to demonstrate through the observance of actions and life 




everyday life broader social phenomena. Happily, these examinations revealed a rich set 
of information about broader political and social changes—a finding that is especially 
important for future work in political ethnography. But I am certain that there are issues 
about which, had I felt able to ask more direct questions, I would have learned quite a bit 
more.  
 Secondly, the ethical approval process allowed me unique insight into the interests, 
concerns, and fears of Lesotho’s bureaucratic and political class involved in HIV 
programming. From these conversations it became clear that maintaining credibility, 
minimizing any information leakages about corruption or misuse of funds, and ensuring 
that research reflected positively on the government were central goals. In private 
conversations with NGO staff and other researchers who had attempted to obtain research 
approval for what seemed like far more innocuous projects than mine, I learned that the 
government was suspicious of any research that might reflect negatively on HIV 
outcomes.33 This extremely tight control on information—in a country with a healthy 
public discourse among local scholars and certain media outlets—was surprising. 
Certainly, it was incentivized by the grant-making processes and priorities of Lesotho’s 
international partners in HIV scale-up, whose own reporting and monitoring and 
evaluation systems incentivized and even required that Lesotho portray itself as reliable, 
honest, stable, and extremely capable at producing positive results when needed. One of 
the most important impacts of HIV scale-up on political functioning is that national 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 A prime example of this defensive stance on independent research is a project sponsored by ALAFA (see 
chapter 6) to study how its factory-based, public-private model for HIV treatment delivery might compare 
in terms of cost-effectiveness to public sector programs. This was a reasonable research question for an 
NGO, and their goal was to demonstrate to industry partners that the program was extremely cost-effective, 
and thus, to secure long-term commitments of funding from within the industry. According to staff at 
ALAFA, the government turned down their proposal for research because of fears that they would 
demonstrate that their program was cheaper than the public sector services, and thus undermine the 




governments’ pressures of accountability to funders and agencies create a situation where 








When Driving on Mpilo Boulevard: Competent 
Citizenship and the Politics of Scale-up 
 “We are determined to use this crisis as the opportunity that forces  
us to ultimately catapult this nation from the shackles of poverty  
and under-development into a prosperous and peaceful nation.” 
Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili,  
Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity (Kimaryo, 2004, p xxii) 
 
 Two different roads lead a traveler across Lesotho’s small but hectic capital city, 
Maseru. The first, Kingsway Bypass, is a two-to-four lane road through the heart of the 
downtown area. A cacophonous, busy series of lights and roundabouts, Kingsway can be 
maddeningly congested with cars at lunch time; at other times it drives like a hair-raising 
obstacle course, with taxis and mini-buses darting in and out, young hawkers stepping 
dangerously close to car tires, and Maseru’s notoriously insensitive civil servants driving 
government vehicles with an abandonment that only comes from not owning the car you 
operate. By contrast, Mpilo Boulevard traces a path across the hills south and above the 
downtown area. A newer highway, it benefits from on- and off-ramps and a divider, as 
well as a long, high, cement-reinforced wall against the hills. These features only seem to 
encourage Maseru’s motorists, however, to drive faster and with more abandon than they 
do on Kingsway—and though there are fewer obstacles, the accidents on Mpilo are 
frequent and terrifying. I once stood with onlookers and contemplated in sheer wonder 
how a mini-bus taxi had managed to arrive at a 90-degree angle to the road, perched atop 
a cement barricade, and teetering perilously above a 30-meter drop to a parking lot below 
the highway.  
 These two roads appear prominently in Basotho colloquialisms for safe and unsafe 




wear a condom, like Kingsway, is to take the trying, but safer route. One of my closest 
friends in Lesotho, Lebohang, laughingly explained the extended metaphor to me: 
[On Kingsway] it’s the first robot [traffic light] and the second robot down there and the 
third robot down there, and then the traffic circle. But with Mpilo, there’s no traffic circle, 
there’s no robots. So they say…Mpilo is living the fast life. So you drive over Mpilo, you’re 
driving your life very fast. And they normally say, when you take Mpilo road, you drive 
around [the] mortuary on the left, and Queen II [the major tertiary hospital] on the right. 
They say when you take Mpilo, either you land in Queen II, or you land in [the] mortuary. 
But they say when you drive through the robots [on Kingsway], you take a pause—they say 
you are doing it safe, you are using a condom—you take a break, your life goes on, you get 
to the second robot, your life goes one, you go on to the third robot, and they say before 
you get to the traffic circle, you [smell] the smell of bread [from the bakery] and know 
there’s life. But they say, on Mpilo, you’re driving your life at 220 [kilometers per hour]. 
In Lebohang’s description, “to drive on Mpilo” takes on a set of rich but accessible 
metaphors about sexual behavior, using the gentle admonishments of imagery and 
language to show how risk-taking can lead to death and illness, and how safe sexual 
practices can have their own sweet but subtle rewards. While I cannot judge its efficacy or 
impact on actual sexual practices, this seems to be the kind of HIV messaging that so many 
organizations and entities have tried to foster in the wake of Uganda’s success in its “zero 
grazing” policy: culturally-relevant, localized, easy to understand, and firm without being 
punishing.  
 Mpilo Boulevard is home to another AIDS message as well, and one with which I 
became much more intrigued as my time in Lesotho went by. Painted across the huge 
cement-block retaining walls on the hillside beside Mpilo is a message that stretches for 
the better part of a mile, so large that it can be read from across the city: “WORKING 
TOWARDS AN HIV AND AIDS COMPETENT SOCIETY.” Written in English, followed by 
the emblems for UNAIDS and the Maseru City Council, and bracketed on each side by 
enormous red HIV awareness ribbons, the sign is a far cry from the other message affiliated 




about who is working, or what an “HIV and AIDS competent society” might be. In what 
follows, as I trace the emergence of Lesotho’s HIV policy environment and the major 
moments that preceded program scale-up, I will return repeatedly, much as I did 
throughout my research, to examine this troubling message of a “competent society,” and 
the “competent citizenship” upon which it is built. I argue that understanding what 
competent citizenship means, and the objectives it serves, is essential to comprehending 
how HIV programs are altering democratic life and political subjectivity in Lesotho. In 
order to understand this concept, we must step back and re-examine the most emblematic 
moments in Lesotho’s brief journey towards scale-up. These include the government’s first 
major policy documents, which outline a strong “political commitment” to addressing 
HIV/AIDS; the Know Your Status campaign, a universal testing campaign spearheaded by 
the King and the Prime Minister; and the Gateway Approach, designed to utilize local 
government structures as “gateways” to HIV program implementation, decentralizing the 
HIV response and increasing in local community ownership of policies.  
 
The Second Wave 
 Like a number of other African nations, Lesotho achieved neither an early response 
to the epidemic, nor a groundbreaking approach to treatment or prevention. Nevertheless, 
the pace and scale of HIV program deployment between the years of 2003 and 2010 is 
remarkable, and reflects an extraordinary global shift in the momentum and philosophy of 
HIV program support during that time period—a shift felt by a great number of countries at 
the receiving end of HIV money and support during those years. Lesotho’s experience with 
HIV scale-up is emblematic of a “second wave” of HIV interventions across the globe, 




intensive projects, a focus on accessing as many beneficiaries as possible in order to show 
outcomes, and a period of at times intense competition between various funding bodies 
and implementing organizations (see, for example, Biehl, 2008; Cohen, 2008; Hirsch, 
Parker, & Aggleton, 2007; Merson, 2006; Schneider & Garrett, 2009).  The policies and 
programs that arose during this period are a reflection of national outlooks on the 
epidemic, but also of international forces and global dynamics; thus, as I describe the 
scale-up process within Lesotho, I will attempt to link its emergence to global powers and 
processes. By necessity, these descriptions will be painted in broad strokes, and in doing so 
I defer to other scholars whose long-term research provides a remarkable record of various 
phases in the global development and deployment of HIV programs, as well as the values 
and powers that shaped them (Barnett & Whiteside, 2002; Bayer & Oppenheimer, 2000; 
Bayer, 1991; Biehl, 2007; Fassin, 2007b; Heywood & Altman, 2000; Hyde, 2007; 
Lieberman, 2009; Lisk, 2010; Parker, 2000, 2009, 2011; Petchesky, 2003; Poku & 
Whiteside, 2004; Treichler, 1999).  
 The first case of AIDS in Lesotho was documented in 1986, and by 1987 the 
Ministry of Health had responded by putting together a small National AIDS Prevention 
and Control Program (Gayfer, Flint, & Fourie, 2005; Kimaryo, Okpaku, Githuku-Shongwe, 
& Feeney, 2004). More than a decade later, however, few significant strides (in terms of 
policy or programs) had been made, even as occasional data indicated that the virus was 
continuing on a path of destruction through the population: a 31.3% prevalence rate 
among antenatal clinic attendees at the national referral hospital in 1994 (UNAIDS & 
WHO, 2008, p. 15); the quadrupling of the number of persons reported with full-blown 
AIDS in a single year (1996-7) (Ambrose, 1998); and in 1999, evidence that more than 




National HIV statistics, though rough, show the prevalence among adults jumping from 4% 
in 1993 to 25% in 1999, and to 31% in 2002 (Kimaryo et al., 2004, chapter 4). In the 
meantime, the government, like many in the region, did not seem to know how to respond: 
AIDS committees were formed in the districts but quickly fell into disuse; government 
plans called vaguely for action on HIV/AIDS but little came of it (Gayfer et al., 2005). 
Finally, in 1999, with help from UN agencies, the government developed its first HIV and 
AIDS Strategic Plan, and Prime Minister Mosisili declared HIV a national emergency 
(Kimaryo et al., 2004). In the year or two that followed, Lesotho seemed to pick up some 
momentum on HIV and AIDS policy, forming the first national body to address HIV and 
AIDS, the Lesotho AIDS Program Coordinating Authority, roughly modeled on UN 
recommendations, and situated within the Prime Minister’s purview (Gayfer et al., 2005). 
The first HIV-related grants also began to trickle in: a tiny (by today’s standards) grant from 
Irish Aid for 2 million Maloti (about $230,000 at current exchange rates)34, and small 
contributions from other bilateral aid partners such as DFID (UK) and USAID (Babich, 
Nthunya, & Bicknell, 2006; Gayfer et al., 2005). These were matched by a commitment 
from the all government ministries that 2% of budgets would be dedicated to HIV and 
AIDS-related activities, a clear move towards establishing the kind of “multi-sectoral” 
approach to HIV and AIDS heavily promoted by UNAIDS (WHO, 2005). At the time, 
development partners such as DFID commented that despite these policy advances, uptake 
and availability of services like voluntary testing and counseling remained poor, and most 
efforts were directed towards information campaigns and basic prevention activities 
(Gayfer et al., 2005; Kimaryo et al., 2004). The major developments in Lesotho’s HIV 
response are outlined in Appendix B.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 During this same time, something unexpected was taking place north of Lesotho, in 
Botswana. In 2001, President Festus Mogae announced that the country planned to 
implement a national HIV treatment program with heavy input from private and 
international partners, aiming to offer treatment to any person living with HIV/AIDS who 
qualified for it. Though the program initially struggled and faced considerable skepticism, it 
represented the first attempt at a nation-wide treatment program by any African country 
(D’Adesky, 2006; Rollnick, 2002; WHO, 2006). It was a bold move: The program would 
be deployed amidst a population with the highest HIV prevalence rates in the world, and it 
would be funded in significant part by the government. In addition, after 2004, the 
program was paired with an aggressive initiative to offer routine, universal testing for 
HIV—which also met with significant concerns from onlookers, but did allow a greater 
number of persons living with HIV to be identified and initiated on treatment (Curran et al., 
2005; WHO, 2006). By 2004 or 2005, despite so many doubts, Botswana had 
unequivocally proven that universal treatment was not just within reach for African 
nations, but a moral priority (d’Adesky, 2006). By that point, as well, the world had 
witnessed an extraordinary outpouring of support for comprehensive HIV programs for 
Africa—as the Global Fund, and then the US President’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief 
(PEPFAR) initiated a competitive, but virtuous, cycle of funding outlays. Donors became 
eager to demonstrate that universal treatment access could be achieved in a cost-effective 
manner—and preferably by a single large donor—in other countries (Schneider & Garrett, 
2009).  
 Compared with Botswana, Lesotho offered significant draws for donors, as well as 
some cause for caution. Like Botswana, it had a high-prevalence epidemic concentrated 




million) (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2012). In addition, Lesotho had been working 
hard to demonstrate that the country had the “political commitment,” as many were calling 
it, to spearhead a campaign to treat HIV: to think with, and act upon, global principles 
about how the epidemic should be addressed in all sectors (Kimaryo et al., 2004). The 
2000 National HIV/AIDS plan named political commitment as one of Lesotho’s core 
prevention objectives, and stated firmly, “the Government will continue to ensure that 
HIV/AIDS and STIs continue to remain in the public agenda by seizing every opportunity 
to advocate on HIV/AIDS and STI-related issues” (Government of Lesotho, 2000, p. 7). 
Unlike Botswana, however, Lesotho was and is a much poorer country, with limited 
sources of national revenue to divert into HIV initiatives. Its public sector health services 
were in many places abysmal, vastly lacking the capacity in human resources or 
technology to implement a treatment program (European Commission, 2007; Gayfer et al., 
2005). Lastly, the country’s rugged terrain and limited road access meant that even 
accessing populations for testing, distributing drugs, or transporting lab results from many 
rural areas would require the use of donkeys, airplanes, or specially-equipped dirt bikes. 
Despite these challenges, Lesotho, along with Swaziland, offered a prime place for donors 
to deploy new, far-reaching HIV programs for treatment, prevention, and care.  
 It seems that these attentions were not at all lost on Lesotho’s leadership. The 
country had enjoyed a long period of fruitful development relationships throughout the 
1970s and 1980s (though these were not always devoid of corruption, or successful in 
improving Basotho livelihoods), but donor funding had declined sharply since the mid-
1990s (Turner, 2009). Under apartheid (as discussed in chapter 2), Lesotho’s geopolitical 
position had attracted significant development aid (Gayfer et al., 2005). But with the end of 




cachet of an independent, democratic (or semi-democratic) island of land within South 
Africa. As money for HIV began to increase exponentially, Lesotho’s politicians must have 
played close attention to Botswana’s scale-up. President Mogae visited Lesotho himself on 
a few occasions during the process of scale-up, promoting more aggressive HIV 
programming. It seems highly likely that Lesotho’s leaders looked to Botswana’s leadership 
on HIV and aimed to emulate it.  
 By 2003 and early 2004, policies began shifting towards treatment access in 
Lesotho, pushed along by the government’s growing realization that demonstrations of 
political commitment could attract significant sources of support for programming. Maseru 
hosted the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) conference on HIV/AIDS, 
and released an early memorandum titled, Scaling up the Fight Against HIV and AIDS in 
Lesotho (Gayfer et al., 2005).  Prime Minister Mosisili launched a national PMTCT 
program, which relied on donated doses of Nevirapine from the pharmaceutical giant 
Boehringer Ingelheim (Ambrose, 2003). By 2004, the country was developing a rough plan 
for the scale-up of HIV treatment, and had opened the first ARV clinic in the country—
again with the help of a significant pharmaceutical partner, Bristol-Meyers Squibb (“AIDS 
Treatment Clinic,” 2004). In the same year the country received its first World Bank 
HIV/AIDS capacity-building project, for $5 million, and its first grant from the recently-
formed Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM), for $35 million, 
$29 million of which would go to HIV/AIDS efforts (Babich et al., 2006; The World Bank, 
2010).  
 Throughout this period, policymakers from Lesotho had been working with a group 
of technical assistants from UN agencies and other international partners to pull together a 




Strategies for Scaling up the National Response to the HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Lesotho 
(Kimaryo et al., 2004), laid out a carefully-crafted vision of how the country could 
undertake a social and political metamorphosis in order to achieve a universalized, broad-
based approach to the HIV/AIDS crisis it faced. More than any other events occurring at 
the time, this document set the tone for the scale-up that followed, and established Lesotho 
as a prime candidate for HIV/AIDS funding and initiatives. The document reflects a 
deliberate effort to re-shape the population and the government of Lesotho in order to 
make them more worthy and attractive recipients of HIV programs and funds. As such, it 
deserves some attention as a key marker of the HIV-related changes that followed.  
 
Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity 
 Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity (Kimaryo et al., 2004) is infused with calls for 
change, but also a sense of mea culpa, as Lesotho’s leaders indicate that the time of crisis 
brought about by HIV is an opportunity to change governmental bad habits; it calls for a 
new dynamic of thoughtful and effective partnerships between recipients and funders. “We 
simply do not buy the mantra that ‘Lesotho has no implementation capacity’ as has often 
been said by some in the international community and, yes, even at times by ourselves” 
Prime Minister Mosisili asserts early in his introduction to the book (Kamaryo et al., 2004, 
p. vi). “It must be that the problem lies in the way we perceive development challenges—
like HIV/AIDS—and the kind of solutions that we devise for addressing them…” (Ibid., p. 
vi). Here, Mosisili refers to long-standing criticisms and fears about Lesotho’s ability to 
efficiently absorb development funds and put them to use: a “capacity” which was of 
particular concern to HIV funders. Assertions about Lesotho’s “absorptive capacity” 




“increased collaboration and higher absorption of existing and future funding”: 
This is very important, because up until now, the Government has, on the one hand, felt 
that this country is not receiving enough resources to enable it to effectively tackle the 
pandemic whereas, on the other hand, the donors and other members of the international 
community have felt that it will be difficult to make the case for additional resources for 
Lesotho unless it can be demonstrated that it is possible for the country to absorb such 
additional funds.” (Ibid., p. xxx) 
 Even as the authors struggle elsewhere in the text to define Lesotho’s lack of capacity 
as a “myth”—a problem of perspective and labeling—discussions of capacity deficits lead 
to calls for very real and transformational change: 
Often, the issue of capacity building is approached from the perspective of change, with 
approaches that do not bring change but are dressed up in the language of change. In the 
end, they contribute to strengthening the status quo. Transformational change, on the other 
hand, must start with clear political commitment at the top and be implemented [by] 
change champions in all institutions…” (Ibid., p. 35-36) 
Key to this conceptualization of transformational change is building an HIV response that 
is linked to fundamental democratic ideals and institutional improvements that “should be 
based on the evolution of new values…as well as using every available opportunity to 
promote participation” (Ibid., p. 58). Here, participatory democracy rooted in grassroots 
mobilizations is considered crucial to deploying a new kind of HIV scale-up effort: “It is a 
well-known fact that public debate and dialogue—including the identification of needs as 
well as solutions to societal challenges like the HIV/AIDS pandemic, permitted by political 
freedoms and civil rights, can play a major part in the formation of a country’s democratic 
values” (Ibid., p. 58). 
 Equally crucial to these efforts to build a fundamentally different environment for 
HIV scale-up is a re-conceptualization of the drivers of the epidemic and the necessary 
areas for intervention: 




understanding underpinning the national response to a more comprehensive 
understanding, and…to reflect this conceptual shift in HIV/AIDS related programs and 
interventions (Ibid., p. 46).  
The authors speak about the importance of addressing the underlying factors of HIV/AIDS, 
focusing on socio-structural drivers of the epidemic: power, gender relations, food 
insecurity and unemployment, lack of housing and basic services, social networks, 
migration and mobility, urbanization, and displacement.  
 Despite the far-reaching, progressive vision deployed in this document, few of its 
principles have held true in the HIV response that emerged from it. Rather than speak of 
socio-structural factors of the epidemic today, the government tends to focus on a 
decidedly behavioral approach, locating responsibility for HIV infection rates in the 
individual and his or her choices. Rather than speak of the impacts of urbanization and 
economic dislocation as drivers of the epidemic, and despite undeniable evidence of the 
high prevalence rates in Lesotho’s most urbanized districts, government officials speak 
openly about the “ignorance” among rural, “backwards” populations as a cause of 
persistently high prevalence rates (Bulled, 2012). Along with NGO partners, they blame 
not the conditions of factory employment or economic migration for HIV rates in urban 
populations, but the behaviors and indecencies of young female factory workers (see 
chapter 6). And despite the emphasis on building a grassroots democratic base for HIV 
policies, rooted in political freedoms and rights, the government and its partners have 
tended to promote a decidedly top-down approach with power over policymaking 
concentrated in institutions subject to little democratic scrutiny, and an absence of 
grassroots civic participation (see chapter 2).  
 Nevertheless, Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity was enormously successful in 




followed its publication: the formation of a National AIDS Commission and an HIV and 
AIDS forum; a national testing campaign; and the establishment of a new, national 
association of PLWHA. At the end of 2005, Prime Minister Mosisili announced a new 
testing campaign—the Know Your Status (KYS) campaign—modeled after Botswana’s 
universal testing initiative. KYS was introduced as a bold new attempt to test every person 
in the country over the age of twelve, using door-to-door testing efforts and improved 
access to voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) services in clinics (WHO, 2008). In 
addition, Lesotho developed a provider-initiated testing protocol, which meant that testing 
was offered as part of all routine services, and certain at-risk groups (women attending 
antenatal clinic, for example) would need to opt-out of HIV testing rather than opt-in for it. 
Thousands of lay counselors were trained in basic HIV testing methods and deployed 
throughout the country; nevertheless, many counselors did not receive test kits, were not 
properly trained, or were not deployed to all areas (Human Rights Watch [HRW], 2008). In 
a 2008 report on the KYS campaign, Human Rights Watch (2008) investigated widespread 
concerns about rights violations in the program—including lack of adequate consent 
procedures and forced testing. But as one of the report’s authors told me, the far greater 
ethical dilemma was that Lesotho lacked the capacity to provide any follow-up services (D. 
Lohman, personal communication, April 22, 2008). Without a comprehensive treatment 
program in place, counselors had no way to refer those testing positive to further care. It is 
not clear, however, that the objectives used by onlookers to evaluate KYS were even 
remotely similar to the objectives that drove the program’s development in the first place. 
Instead, it seems the initiative was deployed with two goals in mind: first, to attract global 
attention to Lesotho’s large population of patients in need of care and treatment; and 




citizens were medically accessible, ready for treatment, willing to submit to regimes of 
biomedical testing and treatment. Know Your Status created a cadre of patients-in-waiting 
for donors eager to deploy treatment programs across a significant, but manageable, 
national landscape.  
 By 2006, grant money and support had begun to flow in earnest (see Figures 3.1 
and 3.2 below)—and not only from the Global Fund. Numerous international 
organizations involved in global health and HIV/AIDS—like the Clinton Foundation’s 
HIV/AIDS initiative, Population Services International, and with funding from PEPFAR, the 
Elizabeth Glaser Pediatric AIDS Foundation (EGPAF) and Columbia University’s 
International Center for AIDS Care and Treatment Programs (ICAP)—were now fully 
engaged in service delivery or capacity-building in Lesotho. Bill and Melinda Gates, Bill 
Clinton, Bono, and Stephen Lewis all visited the country within a 2-year time span. By 
2007, funding had spiked upwards (NAC, 2011). With money came pressure to enact more 
institutional change—a host of laws and policies related to HIV prevention, the protection 
of vulnerable populations, and persons living with HIV/AIDS (NAC, 2011). In the past, 
perceptions of Lesotho as “good on policy, poor on implementation” had inhibited its 
attractiveness as a funding recipient (Gayfer et al., 2005). But now it seemed that 
declarations of commitment, policy development, and institutional change were the 
country’s winning characteristics, and a convincing measure of “capacity” and “political 
commitment.” This was not only true for Lesotho: The UN’s most comprehensive measure 
of HIV/AIDS response for quite some time has been the UNGASS “Status of the National 
Response” reports prepared by participating countries. This is an evaluation instrument that 
puts overwhelming emphasis on advances in policy, law, institutions, and civil society 




citizens or PLWHA (NAC, 2010b; UNGASS, 2007). 
  
 
Figure 3.1: Total funding commitments for HIV/AIDS, 2006-2011: Source: NAC, 2011.35 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Data on funding reported in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 is collected from the National AIDS Commission report 
on the national response (2011). The quality of data, however, is only as good as the efforts to collect and 
report it among government and its partners. There is significant room for confusion in accounting for 
funding and disbursements, and efforts have only recently been made to encourage public, consistent 
reporting among international donors about country-specific commitments. A number of informants 
expressed skepticism about the quality of government budget reports on HIV/AIDS spending in Lesotho; 






























Figure 3.2: Funding for HIV/AIDS by donor, 2006-2011: Source: NAC, 2011. 
 
Competency as Virtuous Citizenship 
 What, then, allowed for such an extraordinary shift from the language and goals of 
a vision-defining document like Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity to the pragmatic 
realities of scale-up only a few years later?  Some conceptual pathway must have provided 
a link across this disjuncture of policy. A notion of “competent citizenship” is established 
in Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity that demonstrates how discourses of participatory 
democracy and socio-structural causes evolved into the top-down, individualized 
approaches that actually occured during scale-up. The specter of the “competent citizen” 
is centrally embedded in the policy and programmatic advances that follow. Its presence 
reveals how success in obtaining and maintaining global support for Lesotho’s HIV 
programs was indelibly linked to a project to reconfigure Lesotho’s citizens as ideal 



































competent citizens demonstrates how HIV programs—even those determined to build 
“empowerment” and “capacity-building” among citizens, can end up marketing a national 
population as a reservoir of pliable, eager, subservient and diseased subjects for the scale-
up of HIV interventions.  
 A core component of Lesotho’s approach to HIV—in Turning a Crisis into an 
Opportunity and elsewhere—is the effort to make citizens and communities “AIDS 
competent.” Developed by UNAIDS and partner organizations around 2000, AIDS 
competence initiatives aim to build local community capacity to recognize the threat of 
HIV/AIDS, account for community strengths and weaknesses to address this threat, and 
build resources and efforts to respond to HIV and AIDS (Lamboray & Skevington, 2001; 
UNAIDS, 2001). The initiative emerged from (well-founded) fears that HIV messaging that 
emphasized behavior change education and top-down prevention strategies was largely 
ineffective in reaching and speaking to target audiences. The objective was not only to 
develop more community-oriented discussions about the causes and effects of HIV/AIDS, 
but also to develop local human capacity to respond to the challenges presented by the 
epidemic (Lamboray & Skevington, 2001). In Lesotho, AIDS competency became firmly 
linked to principles of citizenship. Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity speaks about the 
role of individuals in HIV/AIDS competencies as a set of civic rights and responsibilities: 
“Every Mosotho should know what his or her rights and responsibilities are…every 
individual is not only able to lay claims on society to have his / her rights respected in the 
context of this emergency, but also accepts that he / she has a duty to contribute to the 
fight” (Kimaryo et al., 2004, p. 5).  Beyond stating that citizens have a responsibility to 
become competent, however, this text and others remain relatively silent about what 




importance of strengthening local systems of government and forums for popular 
participation, creating a “more accessible government, which is more knowledgeable 
about local conditions and more responsive to people’s demands” (Kimaryo et al., 2004, p. 
91). Nor were these entirely empty promises: Lesotho is engaged in a long, painful process 
of health system decentralization spurred by these goals, and community and district levels 
of local government have taken on additional roles in HIV planning and processes (see 
below).  
 In practice, HIV competence approaches set the stage for shifting the responsibility 
for care-work and even for HIV infections onto citizens and communities. This led to 
expectations that citizens would provide free labor in carrying out care work, joining in 
community associations and support groups, and providing support to those on HIV 
treatment. Such expectations were spoken of as volunteerism, but in the context of poverty, 
lacking government support, overwhelming need, and the extraordinary funding for HIV 
entering the country, citizens perceived these expectations as unjust. Finally, HIV 
competence approaches marked a subtle change in perceptions of HIV that resulted in vast 
discursive changes: If citizens are made responsible for HIV, then their behaviors, outlooks, 
and levels of knowledge are to blame when they become infected—rather than social 
drivers of the epidemic like inequality, gender discrimination, and poor government 
policies. Given that South Africa’s President Mbeki was, at this same time, asserting to a 
world audience in Durban that poverty caused AIDS, governments, development planners, 
and global institutions faced a potential source of strife, or even civil unrest, if the notion 
took hold that poverty, not pathogens, was to blame for the millions of deaths due to AIDS 
in Africa. But rather than address the daunting challenges of tackling social inequalities, 




behaviors, individual responsibility, and knowledge about HIV. Approaches use the 
language of “empowerment” and “citizenship” to mask a great shifting of responsibility 
from governments to citizens. A handbook on HIV competence for local government went 
so far as to tell community councilors that “competence entails being aware of the 
importance of culture and its positive and negative impacts on HIV and AIDS and 
accepting the presence of HIV in your community” (GIZ, 2006, p. 11). Messages like these 
seem to encourage citizens to police the effects of “culture” on HIV spread. 
 Competency efforts are not unique to HIV, dating back to post-colonial, neoliberal 
development initiatives across Africa that emphasized individual capacities rather than the 
sculpting conditions of colonialism or poverty as the determining factor of development 
success (see, for example, Ferguson, 1994). The dismantling of the African state brought 
about by the rise of neoliberal approaches to health and development placed an increased 
reliance on individual responsibility, market freedoms, and citizen competency. These foci 
depoliticized poverty and ill-health, and turned landscapes for political engagement into 
spaces of blame for citizens (Pfeiffer and Chapman, 2010).  
 In Lesotho, efforts to build a “competent citizenship” in the time of HIV/AIDS 
focused on “decentralizing” responsibility while undermining communities’ senses of 
agency and voice. Calls for competence emphasized the importance of biomedical 
expertise among citizens about risk behaviors and prevention strategies, instead of 
strategies to foster accountability and participation in policymaking. Though materials 
spoke about citizens’ rights, discourses often offered only a right to freedom from 
discrimination, and did not include broader discussions of civil or social rights. Discourses 
of HIV competence allowed HIV to overtake broader spaces and practices of engagement 




education messages. Pitsos—community meetings called by a chief or high official—are 
the most prominent and important forum for participation and voice for citizens in Lesotho. 
As discussed in chapter 2, pitsos allow citizens to express opinions and make requests of 
leaders that they might not otherwise feel comfortable voicing, and the meetings often 
conclude with voting and consensus-building that leads to collective decisions about 
resource distribution, community endeavors, and future goals. But under development 
initiatives, and much more prominently during HIV scale-up, pitsos became forums for 
NGOs and local leaders to deliver messages about what NGOs would be doing in the 
community, and for HIV counselors to spread information about HIV within communities. 
These uses of the pitso, while efficacious to NGOs and government attempting to carry out 
HIV projects, subvert an important form of political engagement, turning it into a top-down 
space for disseminating information and telling communities about HIV and initiatives.  
 This tendency is not unique to Lesotho, and it is difficult to overcome: Even amidst 
Brazil’s quite radical state activism on HIV, Joao Biehl (2007) notes the ways that patients 
are drawn into the state as service providers and “biological citizens,” speak in dialogues 
that that reassert the power of pharmaceutical medicines, and become obedient to 
biomedical regimes of regulation and salvation.36 Nikolas Rose and Charles Novas (2000) 
have written about how ideas of personal responsibility for biomedical futures arise as a 
central effect of contemporary regimes of biopower—even among those suffering from 
genetic diseases, which are the by-products of chance and ill-fated parental pairings. Even 
here, we can observe citizens engaging in projects of “prudence and obligation” (p. 487), 
policing their very own bodies and their biological risks. In contrast, Steven Robins (2008) 
extends this analysis in his discussions of the political subjectivities of treatment activists 
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and support group members living with HIV in South Africa. For them, responsibilization is 
hardly a product of “the cultural hegemony of biocapital,” Robins argues, “and the 
downsizing neoliberal state’s imperatives of governance-at-a-distance,” but rather a form of 
empowering knowledge and action (p. 128). Particularly in the wake of these activists’ 
near-death experiences with AIDS (many of them at a time before ARVs were made 
available by the South African government), treatment adherence and biomedically-
responsible behavior is part of an awakening of new political subjectivities. These born-
again citizens, are “the product of more than HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns, sex 
education, treatment literacy and rational choice,” Robins argues (p. 142).  
Responsibilization becomes part of “hybridized” subjectivities used by citizen-patients to 
make claims to state resources and forms of belonging.  
 In Lesotho, I observed more troubling patterns of subjectivation, particularly in the 
absence of any meaningful patient-activism around HIV. While responsibilization is a form 
of governmentality in Lesotho that subtly and subversively encourages citizens to govern 
themselves, their bodies, and their pathogens, it has hardly been successful in this 
capacity—as even a cursory glance at Lesotho’s persistently high HIV infection rates will 
show. The only thing that seems truly self-governed is, as Swidler (2009b) notes, the 
discourse of a citizen when speaking to a well-heeled foreigner about HIV—citizens are 
adept at knowing how to say the right things in the right language about HIV “acceptance,” 
“stigma,” and “risky behaviors.” Instead, I am interested in responsibilization as a form of 
blame-shifting. In addition to discourses of responsibilization that markets citizens as self-
governing subjects and ‘good’ recipients of HIV programming, talk about responsibility and 
obligation, in conjunction with program decentralization efforts, allows blame for poor or 




governments. This tendency to shift blame towards the poor (even as structural inequalities 
limit their choices, and policies are deeply inadequate) is common—from blaming welfare 
mothers for their own poverty in the US (Reese, 2005) to “unsanitary” indigenous citizens 
for cholera outbreaks in Venezuela (Briggs & Mantini-Briggs, 2004; see also Farmer, 1992). 
Here, however, citizens are not just blamed for their own infections, they are held 
responsible for inadequacies in program outcomes, gaps in implementation, and policy 
failures. Responsibilization as blame shifting creates a troubling, but (for the government) 
productive, double-bind for citizens: The more they take action, responsibility, agency in 
responding to the presence of HIV (and at the request of the government and donors), the 
more likely they are to incur blame when outcomes are insufficient.  
 Like many tools, HIV competency’s ability to create social empowerment and local 
political enfranchisement depends, to a great extent, on how it is wielded. Catherine 
Campbell and colleagues from the University of KwaZulu-Natal’s HIV/AIDS Network have 
engaged in a long-term, community-based participatory research project to build HIV/AIDS 
competence in a rural, marginalized community in South Africa (Campbell, Nair, & 
Maimane, 2007; Campbell, 2009). In contrast with discourses of competency elsewhere, 
their vision of competence is an ambitious and progressive one, drawing on Freire’s (1970) 
strategies for building communal critical thinking, and Habermas’ ideal-typic public sphere 
(Habermas, T. Burger, & Lawrence, 1991). Campbell and colleagues (2007) identify six key 
characteristics of an AIDS competent community: 1) expanded knowledge and skills 
related to HIV/AIDS; 2) positive social spaces to foster critical thinking and dialogue about 
HIV/AIDS; 3) ownership and responsibility for drivers of and responses to HIV/AIDS; 4) 
confidence in local strengths; 5) solidarity and common purpose regarding HIV initiatives, 




social capital in order to link to sources of support and funding.  
 Troublingly, despite long-term, concerted work to foster these forms of 
“competence” in the community, Campbell (2009) faced numerous barriers: gender and 
age discrimination undermined efforts to spread knowledge and build solidarity; powerful 
community members used HIV initiatives as opportunities to reinforce, rather than 
deconstruct, persistent inequalities; older women bore the vast burden of responsibility for 
HIV care and prevention work; and despite broad connections to sources of funding 
through the researchers, the community did not succeed in securing sustainable funding 
for its projects or efforts. Women, who already occupied a weak position in the 
community, continued providing care and educational work unpaid, while unfulfilled 
promises soured hopes. Among Campbell’s (2009) conclusions is this troubling 
observation: “our experiences highlight the irony that many of the most powerful members 
of the Entabeni community have a vested interest in preserving the very social relations 
that facilitate HIV-transmission and undermine the well-being of people with AIDS” (p. 
17). 
 Writing on the impact of HIV programs on citizen subjectivity in Brazil, Vera Paiva 
(2003) differentiates between “consumers” and fully-fledged citizens. Drawing on Freire, 
she explains that HIV programs have a tendency to turn agentive, participating citizens into 
consumers through a “banking style practice” in which information and instructions are 
“deposited” into the person so as to encourage him to consume products and practices (p. 
113). For consumers (as opposed to citizens), “social and economic rights…including 
rights concerning faith and culture, all fall into the black hole of individual 
achievement…of empowerment considered to be a…compensating factor” for structural 




“perceived as the outcome of individual will, willpower that remains unconscious of the 
collective and contextual constraints [to health] (Use a condom! Take your medicine 
correctly! Convince yourself that you can do it! Be efficient! Improve your self-esteem!)“ 
(Ibid., p. 114). Emphasizing the agentive aspects of true citizenship, Paiva (2003) asserts 
that a citizen in the time of HIV  
…is conceptualized as the starting point for a lively interaction and not a consumer of a 
finished product… The individual/citizen in fact…follows a path of reconstruction or 
deconstruction of individual and collective appropriation of a range of proposals placed 
before him, by public services, community leaders, academics and the media, involving 
prevention or care (p. 114, emphasis original).  
Thinking of citizens as consumers and of HIV services as products, she argues, erodes our 
ability to think of patients as citizens and as health services as rights (p. 115). More 
fundamentally, however, it limits thinking about citizens as agents interacting in their own 
social worlds, whose collective agency itself can be a protective force against HIV 
(Berkman, Garcia, Munoz Laboy, Paiva, & Parker, 2005; Parker, 2011).  
 Paiva’s (2003, 2007) work in HIV education draws on Freire’s Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed (Freire, 1970)  to “conscietize” (p. 109) citizens about the structural factors of 
their vulnerability to illness, challenges in adhering to medicines, or inability to access 
health services (see Paiva, 2007). The challenge of conscietizing health services, she 
writes, is “to waken the ‘sleeping’ public citizen inside every private consumer, by 
transforming care and prevention activities into spaces which can embrace and foster 
psycho-social emancipation” (Paiva, 2003, p. 115). HIV efforts can lead to a process of 




encourage natural solidarity and capacities.37 But an emphasis on “competency” seems to 
more often lead to a process of responsibilization of the public, in which education efforts 
presume citizens’ natural incompetence, and where communities are asked to contribute 
labor, resources and effort to addressing HIV without gaining access to a means of 
changing structures of power that contribute to vulnerabilities. 
 I am interested here in how conscietization can provide a useful foil to 
responsibilization, and how these concepts are emblematic of different approaches to 
engaging communities in HIV projects. Here, a careful consideration of alternative 
futures—and of the conditions that produce this alterity—is essential to understanding not 
what is wrong with current approaches, but how they do not have be as they are. The 
chapters that follow highlight this contrast between conscietization and responsibilization. 
Responsibilization, as made emblematic in Lesotho by discourses of “competency,” is 
linked to short-term HIV projects with pre-determined goals and outcomes, and tends to 
decentralize blame for poor outcomes to citizens and their communities. Even if it has 
short-term positive impacts—on the knowledge base of citizens, or their ability to adhere 
to medical regimes—these come at the expense of more transformational changes. 
Conscietization, by contrast, is linked to long-term life projects. It reflects the priorities and 
goals of citizens, recognizes the multiple forms of survival for which they are striving, and 
addresses the structural limitations on their ability to achieve the things they have reason to 
value (Sen, 2001).  
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 Soon after HIV treatment became available in Lesotho, the government, in 
partnership with the German Technical Cooperation (GIZ, previously recognized as GTZ, a 
branch of Germany’s bilateral development aid institutions), and with assistance from 
UNAIDS, announced a new initiative called the Gateway Approach. As a formalization of 
the plans for decentralization and community-mobilization outlined in Turning a Crisis into 
an Opportunity, the Gateway Approach announced that communities—community 
councils, specifically—would now be the “gateway to fighting HIV and AIDS” (German 
Technical Cooperation [GIZ], 2006). This vague slogan enabled the Gateway Approach to 
become a kind of umbrella concept for a number of different interventions, 
decentralization strategies, and ideas about the role of local government in HIV scale-up 
efforts. Nonetheless, the Gateway Approach did, in many ways, represent a concerted 
effort to put HIV priority-setting in the hands of communities, to build community 
engagement in HIV projects, and to change the everyday politics of how HIV scale-up 
occurs. In this regard, it was a novel and promising strategy: If any country was going to 
succeed in utilizing HIV scale-up to build, rather than dismantle, democratic participation 
and civic action, Lesotho’s Gateway Approach seemed likely to provide the fertile 
conditions for such a development. The Gateway Approach led to two primary initiatives 
aimed at decentralizing power and priority-making processes: first, community councils 
were engaged in an HIV priority-setting process to determine “Essential Services Packages 
(ESPs)” and possible areas of community intervention in HIV (Ministry of Local 
Government and Chieftainship [MOLGC], n.d.); and second, district and community AIDS 
Committees were established to coordinate the response to HIV in communities and 




Gateway Approach’s original stated goal was to establish community councils as a 
“gateway” for the AIDS response—with implementing partners working in the community 
(NGOs, but also government agencies like Ministry of Health) obligated to work through 
and with councils. This would involve tailoring programs to meet council priorities, 
updating them on activities, drawing on their local expertise, and reporting back to them 
about project outcomes. In this original vision, community councils could have emerged 
as local-level institutions for coordinating the response, making community priorities 
heard, and holding implementing partners accountable to communities. Yet much like the 
goals laid out in Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity, policy objectives tended to be 
radically dismantled by reality, replaced with programs that hardly even resembled their 
originating conditions.  
 The Gateway Approach represented an ambitious vision of how HIV scale up and 
grassroots democratization processes could mutually benefit each other. It emerged from 
the idea that HIV interventions would be most effective, and most meaningful, when they 
arose from community consultations about needs and vulnerabilities, and when they 
enjoyed the thoughtful engagement of citizens. In fact, the Gateway Approach was one of 
the primary reasons I chose to conduct research in Lesotho—it seemed that if any place 
could succeed in harnessing HIV scale-up to positive political change, it would be 
Lesotho. From the beginning, however, the program struggled with the tensions already 
highlighted earlier in this chapter: tensions between conscietization and responsibilization, 
between meaningful participation and service provision, and between the decentralization 
of political power and the delegation of labor and blame. These tensions are evident even 
in the manual developed to explain the Gateway Approach to Community Councils (GIZ, 




developed the manual in 2006, and excerpts of the English version are included below. It 
is designed like a photographic comic book, with staged pictures presented along with 
brief dialogue that tells a story about how the Gateway Approach unfolds in one 
community.  
 The booklet (GIZ, 2006) opens with women gathering water at a dirty stream near a 
village. One woman complains to another that her child is sick with diarrhea from the 
water, and others agree that something must be done about it. A third woman (see Figure 
3.3, below) says that they can vote in upcoming community council elections, “and then 
we can have clean drinking water, which is what we need” (p. 5). Villagers vote in the 
elections, saying they will be good for addressing problems in the country. Later, the 
newly-elected councilor reviews community priorities: “Electricity, roads, drinking water, 
clinic,” she says, “this is like a wish list….it’s hard to know which priority to start with” (p. 
8). Then “HIV and AIDS Competency Training” facilitators arrive on horseback at the 
village: “Achieving an HIV and AIDS competent society is the key to a community and 
individual response towards the pandemic,” readers are told (p. 9). They host 
“Competency Trainings” for the community council, talking about what HIV is, how it 
infects the bodies, whether there is a cure for HIV. They are then told about competence—
that it involves knowing about HIV/AIDS and supporting those who are affected by it, as 
well as being aware of “culture” and how it affects risk for HIV (see Figure 3.4 below). 
They are told that the council is the “Gateway” to fighting HIV and AIDS, that this means 
“showing responsibility” and sharing this knowledge with others (pp. 10-11, see Figure 3.5 
below). The language becomes technical:  
Achieving an HIV and AIDS competent society is the key to a national, district, community 
and individual response towards the pandemic…. Obtaining HIV and AIDS competence is 
the basis and starting point to maintain the flow of the mainstreaming process through the 




The councilors are told that once they become “competent,” they will “integrate the work 
of HIV and AIDS into all our daily activities” (p. 12). Trainings continue for public servants, 
chiefs, and traditional healers, encouraging them to incorporate HIV into their work, and to 
think about HIV in each of the problems they face professionally. At this level, 
“mainstreaming” represents an interesting recalibration of how citizens think about and 
perceive problems in their community. Unclean water becomes a problem related to HIV 
and AIDS—clean water is needed for patients and caregivers—not as an element of 
primary health care for all villagers. The manual clearly conveys the message that, under 
this approach, community councils will take on responsibility for HIV in the communities, 
but does not discuss whether, along with these responsibilities, they gain any rights. It also 







Figure 3.3: A community council manual on the Gateway Approach: Contemplating the impact of 




Figure 3.4: A community council manual on the Gateway Approach: The gateway to fighting HIV and 





Figure 3.5: A community council manual on the Gateway Approach: The meaning of HIV 




 After the trainings, the manual depicts the community and district councils 
undergoing a priority-setting process for HIV and development goals. Projects to address 
needs are separated into three categories: those that have an impact on HIV and AIDS (for 
which funding has been set aside), those that are “self help” projects which do not require 
external funding or support, and “development projects” which ostensibly do require 
outside support (GIZ, 2006, pp. 24-26). In the village, clean drinking water gets the most 




and budgets for projects are sent up to the District Council, which decides on district 
priorities. It is not clear from the manual whether these priorities impact national planning 
processes, nor is it clear if the village gets financial assistance for its water tank, and if so, 
where it comes from. Nevertheless, the community builds the tank and the villagers are 
happy about the results. It is clear that the community has achieved its goal, but it has 
done so largely of its own accord—through its own funding and labor. What is seen here is 
how decentralization re-locates the onus of responsibility for problems and their solutions 
within communities—not an entirely detrimental goal, if communities are endowed with 
the resources and capabilities to develop those solutions. But without a clear vision of how 
communities are impacting broader national dialogues about HIV and development, nor of 
how communities can gain a foothold in discussions with NGOs about their priorities and 
needs, it is unlikely that these resources and capabilities will simply materialize as a result 
of the decentralization process.  Ultimately, what impact does this new process have on 






Figure 3.6: A community council manual on the Gateway Approach: Viva local government. Source: 
GIZ, 2006.  
 
 In 2007, Community Councils across the country were led in an HIV/AIDS priority-
setting process that was a loose re-enactment of the one outlined in the Gateway Approach 
manual. This process, referred to as the “Essential HIV and AIDS Services Package”—more 
commonly, the ESP—allowed councils to choose priorities in five different categories of 
“objectives” in the HIV/AIDS response: “Prevention through change in sexual behavior”; 
“access to HIV testing and health services; prevention of mother to child transmission”; 
“orphans and vulnerable children”; and “support for people who are HIV+” (MOLGC, 
n.d.). Councils could select and rank their top three priorities from predetermined lists of 
between four and eight interventions that had been drawn from the National Strategic Plan 
on HIV and AIDS. These interventions were laid out for the councils in a handbook that 
included specific formats, outcomes and benchmarks for each intervention (MOLGC, n.d.). 




given small grants as part of a pilot program to be used to implement their chosen 
interventions.  
 While the priorities selected by the councils offer a rough ranking of some of the 
more important HIV needs in their communities, it is difficult to see how the process truly 
gave councils an empowered role in priority-setting, especially when the priority choices 
are pre-selected. The National Strategic Plan (NSP) is a document that broadly reflects 
global funding and intervention priorities. It is in the government’s interest to reflect these 
priorities in order to attract funding, and international partners contribute heavily to the 
creation of the NSP.  The distilled choices offered to councils were even more limited. As a 
result, councils scoffed at the choices they were given, and said the process “could not 
accommodate some of the issues they would have wanted to include” (Chiyoka, 2009, p. 
10). Other councils simply listed the additional interventions that they felt were important. 
These additional interventions showed surprising similarity, and reflected many of the most 
pressing and under-acknowledged needs that communities face in the time of HIV: acute 
food insecurity; a concern about vulnerable populations often overlooked by formulaic 
HIV policies, like “herdboys” (young men who spend months at a time tending cattle with 
little access to education or services); and educational and training needs for 
additional/nontraditional groups in HIV/AIDS (Community Council Plans, n.d.). These 
additional priorities are outlined in Table 3.1. Finally, some of the most commonly-
selected priorities, which spoke to deficits in the health sector like lack of trained staff, lack 
of transportation, and the need for PLWHA to work as expert patients, were later dismissed 
by national stakeholders and the ESP organizers as “not within the scope of [Community 
Council] work and therefore ill-advised.” It was “generally agreed” that these priorities 




“not…entirely realistic [or] sustainable” (Chiyoka, 2009, p. 23). 
                                                                       
Additional Community Council HIV Priorities 
# of councils 
listing priority 
HIV education needs of special groups:  
   -herd boys 
   -traditional healers  
   -support groups 
   -public servants (teachers, council, police) 
   -elderly 




















Develop traditional/herbal medicines to treat HIV 5 
Human rights and gender equality campaigns 4 
Other improvements in clinic service/infrastructure 4 
Need to train men in home-based care 2 
Table 3.1: Additional community council priorities on HIV: not included in pre-determined priority lists 
for councils. Source: Community Council Plans, n.d..  
  
 The grants for councils to work on interventions, though they did not go far, did 
result in a great number of small-scale interventions, mostly in terms of registering patients 
or orphans, coordinating trainings, and organizing condom distributions. Some councils 
succeeded in working with NGOs to assist them in service delivery, on projects like 
condom distribution campaigns. Others were less successful: A great number struggled to 
work with NGOs at all, and a few were actually charged exorbitant fees by the Ministry of 
Health for basic trainings on HIV and AIDS that ate up the majority of their budgets. An 
assessment of the project reported that only “a few” councils were able to leverage the 
program in order to establish better coordination with NGOs and service providers in their 
area. But blame for these insufficiencies was placed squarely on the shoulders of the 
councils: “the roll-out of the Gateway Approach is yet to be fully understood and 
‘accepted’ by all players…[as a result] stakeholders continue to implement their 




p. 16). Nevertheless, many councils reported that the process had helped them, that they 
felt better able to speak about HIV in their communities, as if they had been granted a 
small space for agency in addressing the epidemic: “Our communities feel for the first time 
HIV has been brought to their doorstep,” one councilor reported, “[we] now know that the 
prevention of HIV and care for the affected is not [just] the work of NAC…” (Ibid., p. 32). 
Perhaps this delegation of responsibility, no matter how daunting, felt refreshing in its 
novelty, even if the scope of action was limited by a lack of change in the structures of 
power or processes of decision-making. Ultimately, the councils’ grants were not renewed, 
and had been dependent on external funders in the first place. There were accusations of 
corruption and mismanagement of money, with councils saying that the National AIDS 
Commission had never released their funds, and funders accusing councils of pocketing 
the money. It is difficult to assess which, if any, of these accusations is true. In many cases, 
councils, faced with a renewed awareness of the enormity of economic vulnerability and 
food insecurity in their communities, chose to allocate the funds on food packages and 
small gifts of goods and medical supplies to sick patients, their families, and orphans. This 
was deemed a misuse of funds by the program organizers (Ibid.).  
 Following the ESP process, AIDS committees were established in conjunction with 
councils at district and community levels in 2009. The purpose of these committees was to 
establish a local, standing body responsible for coordinating the HIV response in 
communities. It was hoped that these bodies, made up of representatives from sectors and 
groups relevant to the HIV response (clinicians, PLWHA representatives, traditional 
healers, support group representatives) would be more knowledgeable about HIV and 
better able to coordinate with NGOs, clinics, and the National AIDS Commission to 




deployed to all districts as Community Council Support Persons to assist committees in 
their first few years. In October 2010, I attended a meeting of AIDS committee members 
from across the country; the meeting was convened to review a recent assessment that had 
been conducted of the committees (Chiyoka & Hoohle-Nonyana, 2010). The news was not 
good: Though committee members were extremely enthusiastic about their positions and 
expressed sincere desires to address HIV issues in their communities, they were not clear 
on their roles or responsibilities, lacked basic knowledge about HIV, and frequently had no 
idea what they were actually supposed to do in their “coordination” role. In discussions at 
the meeting it emerged that many committees had been hurriedly put together, with 
representatives selected ad-hoc. Both representatives and their intended constituents were 
unaware of representatives’ intended roles. One attendee at the meeting explained: 
I don’t even know where the idea itself came from that such committees should be 
established…. They went to the clinic and they told the nurse, ‘we are establishing a 
committee of the council, we need a person living with HIV, can you give us a person 
living with HIV?’ ….Even the nurse does not even know what that person is going to do in 
the committee…. The only thing they [said] is that they are establishing a committee, but 
it’s not clear what this committee will be working on…or what their role will be on the 
committee… 
Thus, rather than bringing democratic decision-making and participatory processes to a 
local level, AIDS committees’ confusion about their roles and mission complicated the 
local political terrain around HIV and AIDS responses.  
 Though AIDS committees were intended to fill a coordination position between 
local government, service providers, and citizens, official documents explaining their 
actual duties emphasized their obligations as local implementing agencies. They would 
design and carry out small projects, collect data, submit reports on activities and data to 
national entities, raise and budget funding, and develop and carry out monitoring and 




lacked the specialized skills necessary to do much of this work, and were not trained for it. 
But Community Council Support Persons and other policymakers often blamed their lack 
of knowledge on “illiteracy” and poor education among members, even though literacy 
rates are very high in Lesotho. Despite these apparent limitations, and without significant 
training, members made efforts to index and address HIV needs in their communities. 
Though they struggled to fulfill their “advocacy” roles without training and support, and 
though many remained unaware of how to engage in law or policy reform, they were quite 
active in their communities in mobilizing support from neighbors for orphans and patients 
in need of care. Without training in how to solicit funding or support from donors or 
NGOs, councilors appealed to community members themselves for financial assistance 
during funerals, school meetings, pitsos (community meetings called by the chief), and 
churche services (Ibid.).  
 Neither the ESP nor the AIDS Committees succeeded in dramatically, or even 
incrementally, altering how the politics of HIV programming plays out in Lesotho. By and 
large, these institutions emphasized a set of localized strategies for implementing policy 
and channeling information upwards without giving citizens opportunities to impact 
policymaking, or access new forms of knowledge and information about donors, policies, 
government, or even the epidemic. Sometimes the key players involved in driving the 
Gateway Approach seemed painfully aware of these insufficiencies; at most other times, it 
seemed as if these original objectives had been forgotten, washed away by the rising tides 
of scale-up. These cases highlight crucial differences between meaningful and token 
participation, between shaping and implementing initiatives, and between setting and 
picking priorities. While councils welcomed the opportunity to take action on HIV, their 




them to take part in planning, policymaking, and participating in scale-up, and by the 
structures of power within scale-up processes to which communities were already tightly 
bound.  
 
Negotiating the right to govern 
 As institutions caught between NGOs, funders, initiatives, and recipient 
communities, councils and AIDS committees struggle to fulfill their roles. In addition to a 
lack of capabilities or training, my observations and discussions with councils revealed that 
their primary obstacles were their unequal relations with those executing HIV programs. 
HIV program staff, NGOs, funders and government officials all seemed to use councils 
only when they needed something, like data on orphans, condom distribution, or a 
building site. This inversion of the original intent of the Gateway Approach was well 
known, even a source of jokes: When Bill and Melinda Gates and Bill Clinton visited 
Lesotho, a local newspaper ran a picture of the trio with the caption, “The Gateway to 
Treatment,” a play on words that emphasized the Gates’ influence over Lesotho’s access to 
HIV treatment.   
 Even though many HIV programs seemed extremely sincere in their commitment to 
community partnerships and their emphasis on getting buy-in from the community, when 
observed from the perspective of citizens and councils, these exchanges were unequal, at 
times dishonest, and often extremely stressful. Councilors and citizens felt that “these 
people” just came and went, often “disappearing” for long periods of time. When I first 
began working with the community council for Ha Mamello, we spoke at length about my 
project and my desire to sit with the council for their meetings over the course of a year. 




said to me, “so now you are just going to disappear?” Even despite my lengthy 
reassurances to the contrary, the council believed that I would arrive, speak to them, and 
disappear for months on end, much as so many other people (particularly those from my 
own country) had done before. This constant movement of NGOs and programs in and out 
of council areas causes considerable problems for communication and mutual 
accountability. An AIDS committee member from another district explained: 
[As a committee member] you don’t know who is in charge of what. The NGOs and the 
committees, they are never sure who is responsible because today they come with one guy, 
and the next time they come with another guy…and there is no follow-up of issues. Now 
we are getting confused because today we go [to meet the NGO] and we find one person; 
next time we meet them again, and it’s someone else entirely, and it really seems confusing.  
This also means that committees and councils have no idea who they work with on a long-
term basis, which means that when they have questions or problems with a program they 
have no one they can contact, no means of getting in touch with the program’s managers. 
This compounds their sense that programs arrive and subsequently “disappear.”  
 Even when programs have a presence in the community, the power inequalities 
between councilors and NGOs can utterly corrupt decisions about how programs will be 
run, as well as councilors’ own mandates with their constituents. During the time I worked 
with the Ha Mamello council, they were having difficulties with an American volunteer 
who was working for a small NGO I will call the Lesotho Community Development 
Society (LCDS). Their interactions with this volunteer provided a striking, almost haunting 
contrast to the dynamics envisioned in the Gateway Manual. LCDS had decided they 
wanted to undertake projects in a village near Ha Mamello, and approached the council. 
The American volunteer proposed conducting a needs assessment of the village that would 
highlight areas for possible intervention. He had told the council that LCDS expected to 




young American volunteer, the council was eager to attract grant funds that might be 
available to help the community, and so they deferred to his leadership. They seemed to 
have consented with little input, eager to appear willing and flexible given the possibility 
of grant support. By the time I began meeting with the council, a mere few months later, 
the relationship had soured considerably. After conducting a needs assessment in the 
village, the volunteer had decided—largely on his own—that water access was the most 
important issue, and had approached the local village’s water committee [a sub-committee 
of the community council] about designing an intervention. While the volunteer felt that 
he had never promised grant funding, both the village and the community council felt that 
he had made promises, and when funding did not materialize, frustrations mounted. 
“Initially, when you came [to us] we saw that you had your own funds and were going to 
help the community, and you were going to start working with [this village],” one of the 
councilors reprimanded him, “and I was even jealous that [this village] was going to 
receive that help [when my village would not]. But now it’s like you are wanting help 
[from us]!” Adding to the mounting frustrations at this meeting, the volunteer then 
explained that “the [water] committee had to be restructured. There was a problem with it, 
[the members] weren’t showing up. So then we had to restructure the water committee.” It 
appeared that he had taken on this “restructuring” of a community-appointed committee 
largely on his own, and of his own accord. The councilors were, understandably, incensed 
that they were not consulted during the restructuring.  
 After “restructuring” the committee, the volunteer decided that, in the absence of 
any grant funds, the project could best move forward if it gathered a small operating 




village tax, charging each adult in the village 20 Maloti—or about $2.30.38 This was no 
insignificant amount for people to pay, especially on a per-head rather than a per-
household basis. Not only had he restructured a local government committee, but he had 
essentially imposed a community tax without any council involvement; he even had the 
gall at the meeting to request further funds from the council.  “You’re overtaking the role of 
the council,” one member explained to him with what seemed like a generous amount of 
patience. Another councilor continued:  
Our concern is that if you are making development projects in the village, the councilor 
should be the one going to the village and collecting funds in the community. She should 
be the one collecting funds in the community. If people contribute, she should be in charge, 
and then come to you and say, this is the amount that we have, and there should be some 
agreement between you guys [about what to do with it.]  
The council had clearly lost face with the community, and was worried about the fact that 
they would be held accountable for the results of the project—or even be accused of 
stealing the money for it—if their constituents were unhappy. Furthermore, they had little 
say in the project, let alone its identified “priorities” in the community.  
 The ease with which this young volunteer was able to restructure a local 
government committee and impose a village tax was dizzying. He was surprised by the 
council’s response—it seemed as if he thought he had done what was necessary to “get 
things done,” and viewed the council as an obstacle to community development. In return, 
the council was relatively unsurprised by his transgressions; his was not an uncommon 
perspective among NGO workers. (Indeed, we can see how, from a development 
perspective, the volunteer’s actions reflect concerns with sustainability, efficiency, and 
community ownership.) But what troubled me more was the sense I got from council 
members that, had the volunteer succeeded in bringing in grant money, they would never 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




have questioned his actions or the intervention he wished to carry out, even if he had 
persisted in collecting a village tax. By their reckoning, his failure to bring in grant money 
changed the power dynamics of their relationship with him, and the unspoken rules about 
how they would interact with NGOs and funders. I realized, with a considerable level of 
distress, that I was witnessing a moment of relative empowerment for the council, as its 
members clarified their roles, reprimanded the American volunteer, and clearly discussed 
how they wanted the project to proceed in the future.  
 The incident laid bare the ways in which the Gateway Approach underestimated 
the power imbalances between councils, citizens, and those involved in and orchestrating 
HIV scale-up and other initiatives. It placed the onus of responsibility on councils to 
change the way that NGOs and donors interacted with them, while those entities 
continued to circumvent councils, pay them minimal lip service, and wield great influence 
over them because of existing power dynamics between funders and recipient 
communities. Many agencies persisted in interacting with councils in this way even as they 
praised the Gateway Initiative at national-level meetings as a new way to achieve good 
governance. At the same time, citizens in communities like Ha Mamello took on more and 
more responsibilities for HIV—not only in terms of caring for the sick, and in managing 
their own treatment regimes, but internalizing discourses about their own responsibility for 
infections, for their inability to “accept” HIV’s presence in their lives, and for a persistent 
“culture of hand-outs” and “dependency syndrome” in their society. In chapter 4, I 
examine the impact of discourses of responsibilization on citizen subjectivities, and the 
effects of HIV scale-up dynamics on support groups and associational life in Ha Mamello. 




working from the perspective of recipient-citizens and their interactions with the 





Patient Citizenship: Navigating Institutions 
and Obtaining Care 
 
 The most consistent interaction with government entities for many citizens in 
Lesotho occurs while seeking care in the public health system. This is true for HIV patients, 
but also for a vast number of people who regularly, or semi-regularly, seek services at 
clinics: for other diseases (diabetes, high blood pressure, tuberculosis); for reproductive 
health care (family planning services, care for sexually-transmitted infections [STIs], and all 
maternity services); or for pediatric services (routine immunizations, childhood diseases). 
Citizens in Lesotho do, of course, come into contact with the government in other ways—
the elderly receive small pensions monthly through the local post office, citizens appeal to 
the community council to resolve land disputes or problems in local services, and citizens 
occasionally (resources permitting) apply for passports, government jobs, or government 
assistance. But in this chapter I will demonstrate how citizens’ increasingly consistent 
contact with clinics shapes—and is shaped by—their political subjectivities and their 
expectations of the state. By changing the way that citizens interact with the clinic, as well 
as the ways that clinics handle, educate, and discipline patients, HIV programs are altering 
forms and functions in everyday political life for citizens.  
 Recent literature on biological citizenship in the space of the clinic explores how 
the experiences of individuals who become immersed in biomedical regimes of treatment, 
cure, or care create new, emergent forms of citizenship that are indelibly rooted in 
biological identities, disease symptomologies, and clinical strategies of discipline (see, for 
example, Biehl, 2007; Fassin, 2007a; Nguyen, 2010; Ong, 1995; Petryna, 2002; Rose, 




understand the clinic and medical programs as political endeavors (Comaroff, 1993; 
Foucault, 1973; Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987). Studies of HIV treatment regimes describe 
how recovery creates new political subjectivities (for example, Robins, 2008), how 
treatment institutions create new boundaries of belonging and abandonment (Biehl, 2007), 
and how access to precious medicines amidst scarcity and inequality imparts specific 
lessons for “therapeutic citizens” (Nguyen, 2010). These studies tend to focus primarily on 
HIV patients, rather than on the broader community of citizens of which they are a part. 
But HIV is also changing the way that those without HIV perceive the state and its roles. In 
addition, I am not just interested in how HIV medicine is altering biological forms of 
citizenship, and citizenship within biomedical regimes, but also how, within the context of 
HIV programming, broader political forms and conditions of citizenship are changing 
dramatically.  
 HIV programming within clinics is changing the ways that citizens think about 
government responsibility, and ultimately, the faith they have, or do not have, in 
democratic systems. These effects are intensified by the broader institutional contexts 
through which HIV programming is deployed: How do citizens interact with, and perceive, 
the dispersed webs of non-governmental organizations operating amidst, and above, their 
communities? The political terrain of HIV programming is a landscape populated by 
numerous NGOs whose presence fractures responsibility for public services even as they 
are routinely absent from everyday political life. This dynamic—of shaping political life but 
not existing in it, also has dramatic effects on how individuals embody and act upon 
citizenship and their faith in state institutions. Throughout this chapter and the next, I will 
explore how these changes are unfolding in citizens’ lives: in this chapter, by focusing on 




examination of two community-based support groups and their attendees. As all of these 
entities are largely located in, or affiliated with, a town I call Ha Mamello,39 there is 
considerable overlap between ‘community’ and ‘clinic,’ much as there was during my 
research. I do not attempt to impose an artificial barrier between data that belongs in one 
‘site’ and data that belongs in another ‘site,’ instead allowing these spaces and dialogues to 
percolate into each other, much as they did in my own fieldwork and in my informants’ 
everyday lives.  
 As I describe in chapter 1, my choice of Ha Mamello as one of two primary 
research sites was due to strategic methodological choices, some of them difficult. Ha 
Mamello is a medium-sized peri-urban town, which is actually made up of a few smaller 
villages in relative proximity to each other. It lies outside of, and is considerably smaller 
than, Lesotho’s capital and its larger “camp towns” established by colonial administrators 
in each district to act as administrative and trading hubs. Ha Mamello is not, though, one 
of Lesotho’s tiny mountaintop villages, nor is it in one of the inaccessible rural areas. Ha 
Mamello provided easier access to the community council (whose members met in town), 
and a variety of support groups and other HIV-related initiatives. Crucially, it contained 
multiple support groups whose work I contrast in greater detail in chapter 5. Overall, 
however, the town remained small enough that I was able to repeatedly encounter 
informants with whom I had previously met, and to visit the households of most local 
patients on foot.  
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Clinics and Citizens in Lesotho 
 Lesotho’s public health care system consists of 191 health centers and filter clinics, 
18 secondary care centers that could best be described as “mini-hospitals,” and one 
tertiary hospital, colloquially called “Queen II,” and named after Queen Elizabeth II 
(Mwase et al., 2010, p. 13).40  With limited professional education in the country and no 
medical school, Lesotho struggles to train and retain health workers of all kinds. In 2010, 
there were 64 doctors working in the public sector in the entire country, amounting to little 
over three public sector doctors per 100,000 patients (MOHSW, 2011).41 In 2005, the 
Ministry of Health reported that 80% of the doctors whose training it had sponsored in 
other countries over the past 20 years (with the agreement that they would return to 
practice in Lesotho) had nonetheless left the country to practice elsewhere (MOHSW, 
2004). Many of the best-trained local doctors decide to work in the private sector or are 
hired by international organizations or funders to run in-country programs—positions in 
which they can earn significantly more money. In an effort to address “brain drain” and 
perennial understaffing in the health sector, numerous international partners have 
contributed to schemes for boosting human resource capacities. The Clinton Health Access 
Initiative (CHAI) funds salaries and incentive packages for 257 nurses to be placed in the 
most hard to reach (and therefore most unpopular to work in) public clinics, and donors 
have supported numerous efforts to improve nurse training in the country (MOHSW, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Lesotho also has three specialty hospitals: a psychiatric hospital, a leprosy hospital, and a TB treatment 
center which, in partnership with Partners in Health, administers TB and MDR-TB treatment. 
41 This figure comes directly from the national annual joint review; I have tallied all health workers 
reported in various health centers. Unfortunately, most figures, including this one, are rough estimates. But 
all available figures show extremely low levels of physician coverage. Mwase, et al. (2010) report that, in 
2003, there were 89 doctors and 1123 nurses and midwives in public sector, which amounts to about 5 per 





2011). Despite efforts to retain local health staff, however, a large percentage of health 
workers (including most doctors and many of the nurses sponsored by Clinton Foundation) 
are from other countries: Doctors hail from Cuba, Nigeria, India, and the US; nurses are 
predominantly from other countries in Africa. For patients, the impact of this resource 
shortage is that they rarely, if ever, see a doctor, and if they want to see a doctor who 
speaks their language, they must turn to the private health system. Within primary care 
clinics, patients are likely to encounter a nurse who does not speak their language. This 
means that a defining element of health care in Lesotho is the feeling of not being heard, 
and of not being able to express complaints or ask questions except for in gestures or 
poorly cobbled-together English.  
 Because most health services offered in local clinics focus on primary, pediatric, 
and maternal care, children, women, and the elderly are most likely to attend clinics. Men, 
particularly young men, tend to avoid services until they are acutely ill. This is partly due 
to men’s perceptions of health as a female domain, partly to their discomfort with nearly 
all-female clinic nursing staff, and partly a result of additional challenges men face in 
accessing clinics when working outside the country, on part-time jobs away from home, or 
when farming and herding animals high in the mountains. Like the rugged, weatherworn, 
long-suffering livestock many men herd as adolescents, Basotho often say that “a man 
should die like a sheep—without crying,” meaning that he should die without complaint or 
signs of weakness. These are social expectations that can deter men from seeking care until 
it is urgently needed. But HIV treatment has brought even men into clinics on a regular 




on treatment.42 In some ways, the presence of HIV treatment has re-acquainted men (or at 
least some men) with the public health system, but women remain the primary targets of 
disciplinary practices related to health, and HIV policies can exacerbate this. Women are 
largely responsible for children’s health, and attend clinic more regularly than men do for 
pre- and post-natal care. After Lesotho adopted its provider-initiated testing policy, women 
attending clinics were the primary subjects of this policy, particularly during antenatal 
care, when the importance of testing is emphasized as part of PMTCT efforts. Many 
citizens reported to me that they were under the impression that HIV testing was 
mandatory for pregnant women—some even said it was mandatory for anyone attending 
the clinic. Even if this was not true in practice, the perception of forced testing has far-
reaching effects among potential clinic patients—deterring some from attending, and 
making others agree to testing even when they do not want it. Such a policy—and its 
public reputation—places an undue “responsibility” on women for testing and knowing 
their status, one that is not equally shouldered by men who do not require maternity 
services, and find it easier to avoid attending the clinic.  
 About 40% of public facilities in Lesotho are run by the Christian Health 
Association of Lesotho (CHAL), a long-standing Christian aid association in the country that 
is slowly being integrated into the government-run clinic system (Mwase et al., 2010). 
CHAL clinics do not compete with public clinics; rather, they are part of the public clinic 
system. Patients rarely choose between one clinic and another; they typically seek care 
where it is closest, most available, or least stigmatizing (Mwase et al., 2010). As a strongly 
Christian country, abortion is illegal everywhere in Lesotho, and causes significant 
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problems for women’s health.43 In many CHAL clinics family planning is also not offered, 
and condom education is discouraged. Nevertheless, recognizing the significant need for 
these services within the patient population, many nurses and counselors at clinics 
endeavored to find ways to counsel patients about family planning and condoms, even 
though they cannot be distributed on site.  
 The clinic that serves Ha Mamello and the surrounding areas is a small but 
relatively well-functioning CHAL clinic, which is loosely affiliated with the Catholic 
Church nearby. The clinic is simply referred to by its location—Mamello clinic. It consists 
of a few small, rectangular brick buildings arranged around a small garden, and 
surrounded on all sides by a chain-link fence. The front building is the main clinic 
building—consisting of a few consulting rooms for nurses serving primary care patients, at 
least one room crammed with beds and other supplies that tend to go unused, and a 
kitchen for the staff.  Another two buildings on the site are primarily used for meetings and 
patient education. At least a few days a week the larger of these buildings is crammed full 
of new or expectant mothers and their babies, as they attend prolonged group antenatal 
care sessions or well-baby appointments. Patients line up along the sides of these 
buildings, waiting for appointments. Many arrive at six or seven in the morning, and the 
nurses try to see the bulk of their patients prior to 2 PM. Patients who arrive “late”—that is, 
after eight or nine in the morning—are not seen. In the back of the clinic lot, another small 
rectangular building with two tiny offices comprises the “HIV Corner,” where all HIV 
services are provided. During my time at the clinic, another tiny building—a temporary 
round hut made of particle board—was donated through funds from the Clinton 
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Foundation, and used as additional counseling space. While the “HIV Corner” was likely 
intended to offer some privacy to patients seeking HIV services, it instead had the effect of 
making it very clear who was seeking HIV services at the clinic, and who was not. HIV 
patients waited in a separate area, and nurses and counselors often shouted out their 
names to call them up to receive medicines, CD4 counts, or test results. Unlike private 
clinics, where providers take pains to make the experience of getting care a private one—
offering covered windows, private consulting rooms, and smaller waiting rooms—seeking 
care at public-sector clinics is a decidedly public venture.  
 In 2008, Lesotho decided to abolish user fees for all services in its primary care 
facilities—health centers and filter clinics. This was a positive step towards providing more 
universal access to health care, but it is not clear that it has significantly improved overall 
health care access. Health clinics are routinely understaffed and under-supplied, and even 
on the best of days only able to provide very basic services. If patients in most areas 
require an X-ray, need to start TB therapy, or want any kind of obstetric services, they end 
up going to one of the district or tertiary hospitals, which still charge fees for services.44 
Frequent scarcity of basic drugs (often called “stock-outs”) results in patients being referred 
to pharmacies where they can buy their own medicines, or seeking care from other 
secondary or tertiary facilities. Lastly, because many individuals still live quite far from 
health facilities, transportation is a significant health care cost that is never reimbursed, and 
rarely acknowledged, by the health system. The cost of getting to and from a regional 
hospital can be between 20 and 40 Maloti ($2.30-4.70); the cost of getting to Queen II in 
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the capital for any serious care can be far more expensive, from 40-200 Maloti ($5-23).45 
These prices are prohibitive for many patients.  
 With HIV, clinicians’ burdens have grown exponentially. Access to HIV treatment 
and PMTCT services in the country ballooned over a very short period of time, 
concentrated between 2006 and 2012 (see chapter 1, Figures 1.1 and 1.2). In 2009, the 
government of Lesotho decided to decentralize HIV treatment services to health centers, 
eventually expanding the program to enable access to ART at nearly all health centers in 
the country. In 2010, more than 80% of women had access to PMTCT services, and 58% 
of eligible patients had been enrolled on ART (MOHSW, 2011). These represent significant 
increases, but enrollment of patients has tapered off in recent years, even as services have 
been decentralized, and there is a vast deficit between the numbers of patients who qualify 
for such services, and those who actually access them. After 2008, the government also 
implemented WHO guidelines which recommended that patients be able initiate HIV 
treatment at a CD4 count of 350, rather than 200. This has added to the considerable 
burden clinics already face in meeting patient needs. When Lesotho decided to 
decentralize HIV treatment to health centers, nurses were given primary responsibilities for 
initiating patients on treatment, addressing side-effects, and monitoring adherence. 
Counselors, in addition to providing HIV counseling and testing (HCT), also became 
involved distributing CD4 count results, educating patients about treatment, providing 
ongoing treatment counseling, and organizing support for patients struggling with 
adherence or side-effects. While access to treatment expanded rapidly, the work of 
clinicians and counselors in the clinic shifted noticeably towards managing and triaging 
treatment regimes for patients with HIV.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




 HIV is also accompanied by a great deal of other medical needs, conditions and 
diseases—including appetite and weight loss, TB, shingles, and more prevalent but harder-
to-treat STIs. All of these conditions are first seen, in all likelihood, at the primary clinic 
level, adding to clinic workloads. In addition, the influx of funding and supplemental 
programs from outside partners has meant that nurses and counselors are asked to help 
manage, or provide support for, food aid initiatives, additional staff training, support groups 
and patient education. Finally, HIV scale-up has meant a vast increase in the amount of 
data collected at local clinics, as governments, NGOs, and funders all require various 
“monitoring and evaluation” (M&E) efforts in order to document their program successes 
and worldwide impact. In clinics, this responsibility falls to already over-burdened 
clinicians with limited training, and becomes quite time-consuming. As a result, even at a 
relatively well-staffed clinic like Ha Mamello with comparatively easy access to Queen II, 
nurses estimated that each one of them saw and treated seventy patients a day. During 
well-baby clinics, nurses will often see between fifty and seventy patients in the clinic in 
addition to their regular caseload. Nurses typically work from 8 AM until 4:30 PM, but 
often do not start seeing patients until 9 AM and stop accepting patients between 1 and 
2:30 PM. While some are critiqued for not working hard enough, the remaining hours are 
often filled with paperwork, sorting medicines, collecting lab results, ordering supplies, 
and dealing with acutely ill patients who need to be sent to another hospital. With nearly 
seventy patients squeezed into a 4-6 hour time frame, nurses will spend little more than 
three to four minutes with each patient. That is not the amount of time that they will spend 
talking with a patient; it is the time they will spend diagnosing, treating, administering 
drugs to, and fielding questions from, a patient.  




well—if not with ease, then at least at a level that frequently meets basic health care needs. 
Beneath this relatively functional surface, however, the statistics are grim. Even as health 
care access grows, Lesotho is one of the only countries in Africa to show signs of 
worsening maternal and child mortality in recent years (see chapter 7) (WHO, 2012). 
Obtaining any care beyond the most basic services is fraught with difficulties, and patients 
die not only from treatable diseases, but from treatment itself—from misdiagnosis, lack of 
therapies, or simple neglect. Services at Queen II are so abysmal, and so many patients die 
from poor treatment at the hospital, that for many years Basotho have claimed that certain 
nurses simply kill sick patients to make space for new ones, operating like a kind of 
triaging death squad. “Ngoan’eso, Queen II b’a u qetela,” people are known to comment: 
“My brother, at Queen II they finish you off” (Selinyane, 2001). Certainly, the stress and 
lack of resources that health workers face contributes to exhaustion and poor outcomes, 
but these are not only the fault of health workers. Much of the national health budget is 
consumed within the Ministry of Health, and patients rightly attribute poor health care to 
the government’s mishandling of budgets as well (see below, and chapter 5).  
 
Arranging Care in Times of Crisis 
 The tensions and inadequacies of the health system were often revealed to 
patients—and to myself—in times of acute illness, rather than in the context of routine 
care. On a sunny, but brisk, day at the clinic, I stepped out of a series of interviews to 
discover an extremely ill and wasted woman curled up in a wheelbarrow that had been 
parked just outside the clinic door. Like so many patients with end-stage AIDS, Mme 
‘Mats`epo appeared easily 20 years older than she was. Curled up in the small 




sides, she also looked childlike, like one of the wild-eyed neighborhood boys who would 
take turns riding and driving wheelbarrows at break-neck speeds down the hill to pick up 
sacks of mealie-meal. ‘Mats`epo’s son had delivered her to the clinic from many miles 
away: Too sick to walk, she was hardly the first patient to arrive by wheelbarrow. It had 
taken her son most of the morning to get to the clinic. Once they got there, the nurses 
chided ‘Mats`epo for having stopped taking her medicines. Rather than consult with her 
privately, they grew angry and made a public example of her on the lawn between the 
regular clinic and the HIV corner. “This lady says she stopped taking her pills because she 
had no food. Is that true?” The other patients regarded her silently. A woman who had 
arrived with ‘Mats`epo asserts that she did have food. “Did she stop taking her pills 
because she ‘forgot’? No! It is because she has not accepted her status. She wants to hide. 
She is a defaulter. She has stopped because she is a defaulter.” ‘Mats`epo lays on the 
wheelbarrow, prone, a thin jacket and a stray hand resting on top of her face. I don’t know 
if she hears this, but it is likely she does, and I can’t read how it makes her feel. Amidst a 
dialogue about ARV adherence that blames ‘Mats`epo and pays little attention to the real 
reasons why she did or did not have stop taking her medicines, a strange kind of care is 
played out in public by the nurses and the patient-onlookers.  
 The causes of ‘Mats`epo’s inability to adhere to her medicines do not concern the 
nurses or the counselor for very long. They briefly make an example of her, and then the 
moment of shaming seems to pass: They get down to the business of trying to find care for 
her. ‘Mats`epo’s family, realizing how ill she was, had transported her to Queen II, at 
significant cost, the previous day. When she got to Queen II she was turned away. Due to 
a new decentralization effort in the health system, all patients have to follow a referral 




obtain a hospital referral, usually to their local secondary care hospital: Anyone just 
appearing at Queen II would be turned away unless they required emergency care. In a 
country like Lesotho, ‘Mats`epo’s condition, though immediately life-threatening, was not 
an emergency. But patients still routinely sought care at Queen II because it was the only 
hospital with many of the things they needed, and because they knew it offered the best 
chance of getting high-level care (even despite rumors about murderous nurses). The 
nurses at Mamello clinic could tell with a single glance that they would not be able to care 
for ‘Mats`epo on-site. She was in critical condition, and would need to be admitted to a 
hospital. They suspected she might also have TB, and would need to be tested. They were 
supposed to then refer her to Scott Hospital, in Morija, a town that was, ironically, 
considerably further away than Queen II. By this point many of the ladies waiting outside 
the clinic also began to chime in, asking whether she had had a TB test, and what kind. A 
few, including the HIV counselor, commented that Scott Hospital had “many problems,” 
especially since the programs run by Médecins Sans Frontièrs (MSF) at the hospital were 
turned over to the government. Another woman pointed to the young woman sitting beside 
her—one of her daughters-in-law—and said that she had been “much sicker than this 
lady,” referring to ‘Mats`epo. “And I took her to Scott for HIV and TB, and look at her 
now!” Her daughter-in-law looks perfectly healthy, if somewhat mortified.  
 ‘Mats`epo’s son returns to the clinic, forehead gleaming with sweat, his clothing 
ragged and his feet bare. He has been going house to house in the nearby villages begging 
people they know for a bit of money to pay for transport to the hospital and medical care. 
What little resources the family might have had are clearly drained at this point, and he 
returns back empty-handed. One of the nurses and a counselor give him small bits of 




‘Mats`epo will need someone to accompany her so that she can be lifted in and out of the 
taxi, and be taken care of at the hospital. The outspoken mother-in-law in the crowd 
reassures ‘Mats`epo’s son that once ‘Mats`epo has taken the TB test, and started on 
treatment, he will be able to pick it up for her from Scott if she is too sick to get it. Her 
advice attempts to lessen the anxiety of mounting financial tallies that seem to be running 
through his head. I give him the rest of the money he needs to get to the hospital, but he’ll 
have to wait another day. It’s after 1 PM; by the time he gets ‘Mats`epo there the nurses 
may turn them away. He picks up the handles of the wheelbarrow and begins to make his 
way back home, one of ‘Mats`epo’s feet dragging lightly on the ground as they head 
towards the road.  
 Patients in need of care that transcends the rote doling out of pills, or the scripted 
education sessions about ARVs or TB, often find themselves caught within the strange 
institutional logic of a beleaguered, strained health system. The encounters can be 
simultaneously dehumanizing and compassionate—as the nurses publicly chide ‘Mats`epo 
for being an irresponsible patient, and then give her taxi fare from their own small salaries. 
Both of these forms of treatment were common, and patients often reported that they 
trusted the nurses to know what was best for them, even if it sometimes involved rituals of 
public shaming. One patient reported to me that she liked the care at Mamello quite a bit, 
because “even when the nurses shout at us, we understand why. They aren’t just shouting 
at us because we are sick.” Within these new care regimes, nurses struggle to meet the 
biomedical needs of patients amid pressures to alleviate their social and economic needs. 
New treatment regimes encourage nurses to depart from more social—and socialized—
forms of care, streamlining patients and emphasizing education as a means of addressing 




body and the immaterial mind—is elemental to Western medical thought, the fundamental 
rupture for clinicians here seems not between the human mind and the patient body, but 
between the biomedical practice and the social world (Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987). 
This disjuncture is best represented in the figure of the nurse—a disjuncture made all the 
more acute when the nurse shares neither language nor culture with her patients (as is 
frequently the case). Attempts to streamline and standardize care—particularly as HIV 
treatment has come under the purview of nurses—mean that patients taking treatment are 
quickly acclimated to a medical regime made up of rules and policies that are rarely 
negotiable. Most patients accept these rules gracefully, but those who cannot accept the 
rules—for reasons of circumstance, debility, or stigma—usually end up voluntarily exiting 
from the clinical care system. Some of these cases will be discussed in further detail in 
chapters 5 and 6; for the purposes of this chapter, I focus on the subjective worlds of clinic 
workers and patients amidst HIV treatment decentralization. 
 
HIV Knowledge and Political Subjectivities 
 A number of anthropologists have begun paying closer attention to the ways that 
forms of HIV knowledge, particularly in HIV treatment education initiatives, remakes 
patient subjectivities. These changes—combined with patients’ experiences with support 
groups, activist initiatives, NGOs, and transnational HIV efforts (forms of “biosociality,” to 
use Rabinow’s [1996] term)—have fueled the emergence of new forms of biological or 
therapeutic citizenship (see, for example, Biehl, 2007; Kalofonos, 2008; Nguyen, 2010; 
Rose, 2007). Following Foucault (2008), a crucial ingredient in the making of these new 
citizenships are forms of authoritative knowledge that subtly discipline the conditions of 




politics of triage determined access to scarce ARVs in West Africa, where patients were 
encouraged to use “confessional technologies” in order to demonstrate that they were 
living “openly” and “positively” with the virus. The considerable and entrenched stigma 
surrounding HIV can inhibit patient success in adhering to ARV treatment regimens. But 
the messages and strategies used to confront stigma, particularly in the context of 
treatment, are value-laden and prescriptive. So, too, are the messages to patients about 
how to maintain their health. Kalofonos (2008) notes the ways in which HIV education in 
Mozambique, intended to ensure adherence to treatment regimens, in fact inculcates ideas 
about the ideal patient-citizen: modern, rational, educated, open about his status, and 
biomedically-savvy.  In a context where treatment scarcity is still the norm, values such as 
these become standards by which good, deserving, responsible patients are parsed out 
from bad, “lazy,” “ignorant,” or irresponsible patients who are less deserving of treatment.  
 Combined with strong messages about the dangers of herbal or traditional 
medicines, these discourses often encourage a turn away from what patients and 
practitioners perceive as “traditional,” “cultural,” and “rural” mindsets, and towards a 
modern, rational, urbanized patient identity. Such dichotomies were commonplace in the 
treatment programs at Mamello, and in national dialogues about HIV treatment and 
prevention. Because these forceful messages are also tied to goods (ARVs, certainly, but 
also services, food packages, and money), they demarcate, and oversee access to, zones 
where survival is considerably more likely and more comfortable. In these zones, a certain 
kind of biomedical, physiological survival is promoted—and only for those who suffer from 
a certain disease (see Nguyen, 2010). In Lesotho, as elsewhere, however, each individual 
requires survival in multiple domains. These include: social survival, where one’s social 




social standing and “face” (see Benson, 2011) in the community; economic survival, where 
one is able to retain work, continue bringing in income, or able to maintain relationships 
that provide monetary support; spiritual survival, in which one’s belief systems are kept 
intact, or even strengthened; and what we might call moral survival, where one’s values 
are preserved, and one is able to retain those things one has reason to value.  
 HIV treatment, then, has fostered a considerable social division in Lesotho between 
modernist / urban / biomedical and more traditional / rural / cultural ways of thinking. The 
divisiveness of this discourse prompted traditional leaders and healers in Lesotho to form 
their own political party prior to the last round of local elections. One of the party leaders 
said that they felt traditional values like care and respect were not being served by current 
government policy, and that the party was a response to “the growing contempt towards 
cultural beliefs” in Lesotho, the “despicable attitude towards traditional circumcision” as 
HIV prevention initiatives remade this cultural rite into a medical procedure, and “the 
continuous clash between traditional healers and medical doctors [and] the lack of respect 
for traditional doctors.” Among the urban elite the party platform was met with derision 
(Lesotho News Agency, 2010; Ntsukunyane, 2010).  
 In Sesotho culture, as in many African ontologies of health, well-being is located in 
the social and relational world as well as in the individual body (see, for example, 
Comaroff, 1985; Germond & Cochrane, 2010; Levi-strauss, 1974; Livingston, 2005). 
Bophelo, which in Sesotho means both “health” and “life,” refers to social and 
physiological harmony; the search for health can involve social and spiritual interventions; 
and illness can be the result of social transgression or disruptions in the social world 
(Germond & Cochrane, 2010; Romero-Daza and Himmelgreen, cited in Livingston, 2005, 




informants, they often projected a modified set of disease etiologies, wherein illness 
seemed to arise less from disappointing ancestors and spirits (balimo) and more from social 
injustices. It is not uncommon, then, to hear that “people with HIV die of hunger,” not 
AIDS, and that the stress of poverty and everyday struggles to survive causes chronic 
illnesses. As Adam Ashforth (1998, 2005) notes, contemporary life for many Africans is 
shaped by “spiritual insecurities” as well as material ones, and it is these feelings of dual 
vulnerability that figure prominently in belief systems. In addressing illness, and seeking 
various forms of treatment, my informants relied heavily on kin (rather than looking to 
ancestors), and examined the strengths and weaknesses of their social relations when 
crafting care-seeking strategies. Echoing the findings of other anthropologists who 
document the diverse forces at work in patients’ “therapeutic itineraries” (Klein, 2007; 
Samuelson, 2004; Smith & Mbakwem, 2007) my informants’ perceptions of both illness 
and the systems to address it were shaped by diverse strategic negotiations with belief 
systems, disease etiologies, kin networks, economics, and forms of survival. 
 HIV infection still comes with its own set of stigmas, as it echoes older disease 
etiologies which stated that sexual infidelity and promiscuity, particularly on the part of a 
woman, would result in illnesses similar to AIDS, or the birth of a disabled or weak child. 
Senyeha refers to children who, literally, become “spoiled”—suffer “weight loss, severe 
diarrhea, lack of appetite and failure to thrive,”—because of their mothers’ sexual 
promiscuity (Romero-Daza and Himmelgreen, cited in Livingstone, 2005, p. 174). For 
many in Lesotho, disclosing an HIV-positive status is tantamount to admitting that one has 
been promiscuous, a charge still laden with immorality and social shame. The primary 
stigma of HIV, therefore, is a stigma of moral transgression—the physical evidence of 




inequalities: As these same inequalities drive infections, they reinforce the perceived 
veracity of stigmatizing beliefs (Parker & Aggleton, 2003). As a result, social, relational, 
and economic survival factor heavily in individuals’ decisions about whether, and how, to 
seek care for HIV.  
 Nurses and counselors struggle to integrate these other forms of survival into their 
rhetoric about treatment. Their messages are frequently boiled down to the most basic 
components of patient responsibility, particularly as counselors became more and more 
integrated into treatment (rather than prevention or care) modalities. Since I was not able to 
sit in on individual patient counseling sessions, I met with the clinic counselors—many of 
whom where living with HIV themselves—to ask them about the messages they tried to 
convey to patients. In the dialogue below, we can observe the strong emphasis placed on 
biomedical treatment regimes during patient counseling: 
NK: So, in counseling people who have tested positive…what do you think is the most 
important thing for them to know?  
‘Mampho: [The most important thing] is for that particular person [with HIV] to go for blood 
tests and get their CD4 count.  
NK: What else is it really important for people living with HIV to know, from you?  
‘Mampho: [They should know] how they should protect themselves [from reinfection], and 
[for] those who are already on treatment, how to take their treatment. And how to live 
positively.  
NK: How do you explain to patients what it means to live positively?  
[Silence] 
‘Mampho: The main thing is that they should know what HIV is.  
NK: So to be educated, to be knowledgeable? 
Puleng: —and also how to take their treatment, how they should take care of themselves, 
how they should eat, how they should avoid reinfection… 
Palesa: The major thing is that they must start by accept their status. To take responsibility 
for themselves.  
It is difficult to see how this kind of education effort imparts the kind of agentive, 
empowered ideas about citizenship and “treatment literacy” promoted by organizations 
like the Treatment Action Campaign (Heywood & Altman, 2000; Robins & von Lieres, 




they seem to mean that patients should have successfully absorbed the information 
provided in the clinic’s three-week “school” for those starting ARVs, and should 
adequately follow the “rules” of a treatment regime. In fact, the final step towards enrolling 
on ARVs at Mamello was to pass an oral “test.” During ARV “school” the counselors 
repeated treatment information over and over again to prepare patients for the test. They 
warned patients about the consequences of failure, saying that they felt “ashamed” when 
patients did not pass.  
 Frequently, when I asked about the presence of stigma in communities, or about 
why a certain person had not started taking treatment, the answer I received was that “so 
and so has not accepted her status.” I was confused, though, about how adherence, or 
more importantly stigma, could be explained by such a vague measure of patient 
psychology. I asked the counselors, as I did many other people, what they thought 
“accepting one’s status” meant. Palesa replied, “it means you keep on coming to the clinic. 
A patient has accepted her status if she keeps on showing up.” “And taking care of 
yourself,” Puleng added. These messages clearly impart the notion that “acceptance” is a 
process of coming to terms with medical obligations and responsibilities, not with the 
disease itself. To accept one’s status, then, is to accept one’s place in the new order of 
things brought about by HIV treatment regimes—to become modernized, to leave behind 
tradition, to submit to the rules and expectations of biomedical rationality. It is accepting a 
reordering of the hierarchy of forces of survivals that orders citizens’ lives. It is also, of 
course, the acceptance of a certain social status that comes with HIV treatment. Finally, 
such messaging overlooks the ways in which stigma is rooted in, and exacerbates, existing 
socio-economic inequalities and injustices (Parker & Aggleton, 2003).  




(2008) concludes from his studies of the Treatment Action Campaign and other HIV 
support groups that a new kind of citizen-subjectivity emerges from the transformative 
experience of taking treatment and regaining health after being “near death.” This 
pathway—from death’s door to a new, robust life—creates a cadre of born-again citizens 
for whom survival is the result of patient responsibility and pharmaceutical thaumaturgy. In 
the context of South Africa, where treatment access was a hard-won victory for grassroots 
activists, and those near-death experiences were the result of government malfeasance, it is 
not surprising to see that treatment creates strategic and productive new forms of 
citizenship. But elsewhere this was not the case. In Mamello clinic, discussions of rights 
and responsibilities were hardly emancipatory, and treatment initiation yoked patients to 
changes in citizen subjectivity that seemed imposed, not embraced. During ART training 
for new patients, counselors emphasized that patients were not being “forced to take this 
treatment; rather, you make an informed decision.” In practice, training served to weed out 
those who were unable or unwilling to learn about HIV, adhere to treatments, and “accept 
their status”—in essence, those patients who were a poor investment of donor dollars, and 
would ultimately taint the scale-up statistics. 46 It was more likely that training enabled 
clinicians to make an informed decision about patient eligibility, rather than enabling 
patients to make emancipated choices. The choice to initiate treatment is, in fact, always a 
decision made under duress—whether it is the duress of a pathogen or that of a physician 
seems to matter little to patients in Lesotho.  
 Nevertheless, nurses emphasized that patients had a right to ask questions about 
their treatment, and to speak up if they felt they were not getting the right treatment. “These 
ARVs are very dangerous, and they can kill you! So you have a right to ask questions. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




Never be quiet, because if you are quiet, you are the one who’s going to suffer.” Even 
descriptions of rights seemed to have more to do with patient responsibility given the 
dangers of ARV resistance. I asked Mampho, a counselor at the clinic, about whether she 
thought patients had a right to access HIV treatment. She responded:  
Sure. that’s why we offer trainings on adherence, so that people can know more about 
treatment. After that, they can always let us know whether they are ready or not to start the 
treatment. It’s their own choice. Our responsibility is to make sure that they have enough 
information.  
Talk about patient knowledge and education echoes broader national discourses about 
HIV competence, and citizens’ responsibility to be informed. In this context, accepting 
one’s status and becoming educated about HIV treatment is framed as a choice between 
biological survival and death. By making treatment a choice, and distilling rights into 
measures of patient knowledge and “acceptance,” this discourse portrays the lack of 
universal access to treatment not as a systemic or political failing, but as a personal one. In 
doing so, it loosens the bonds of obligation between patients, the health system, and the 
state, ignoring the social protections that may be necessary in order to secure biological 
survival. 
 
Knowledge, NGOs, and Power 
 If HIV treatment in the clinic emphasized a transformation of citizens into patients 
versed in particular forms of knowledge, I was also interested in the forms of knowledge 
that were missing in the clinic and the community. Citizens were broadly knowledgeable 
about government services—they knew the details about pensions for the elderly, and were 
aware of new social welfare programs that gave out small cash grants to extremely 




were offered on what days, and knew when to seek services from another hospital or clinic 
because Mamello could not provide them. When the clinic ran out of stock of common 
medicines, many patients where aware of which medicines were out of stock, as 
information filtered through networks of neighbors and fellow patients. This information 
was accurate enough that patients would simply not attend the clinic when the drug they 
needed was out of stock, and would get medicines from another clinic or a pharmacy, 
finances permitting.  
 Nevertheless, when it came to the myriad NGOs working with institutions in their 
community and providing various services, I was repeatedly struck by the utter lack of 
information available to citizens, even when they were directly benefitting from those 
programs. When I asked those receiving HIV treatment at the clinic whether they knew of 
any organizations, churches or groups providing additional services to people living with 
HIV, they were rarely able to reply in the affirmative. Those who knew of programs had 
only vague ideas about what they did or where they came from, as shown by the following 
responses: 
-There are some people here [at the clinic] who are getting help, and get food from the 
clinic…sometimes I hear they [those bringing the food] come from America. I’m not sure. 
 
-You want to know about people who are helping with HIV? I guess I know that there are 
people who are helping…like there are some [local] businessmen who make some 
donations, but I honestly can’t figure out who is doing what. But I see that people are being 
helped. 
In an attempt to better capture and understand citizen and patient perceptions of the 
impact of NGOs in their community, I amalgamated data from interviews and 
conversations with patients into a “knowledge map” of various HIV-related institutions and 
programs. In Figure 4.1, below, the knowledge map depicts all key institutional actors in 




government—arranged in concentric rings according to the depth of knowledge most 
citizens had about each entity. Institutional actors, in purple, are linked to, and 
differentiated from, specific programs, in orange. The inner dark green ring houses entities 
and programs in Mamello with which a majority of interviewees had a good working 
knowledge—they knew where to find these things, how to access them, and had an idea 
about the status of services. Even if they didn’t know much about the entity or program 
directly, they could easily find someone who did know more. In some cases—as with 
awareness about stock-outs of drugs in the clinic—this knowledge is quite sophisticated. It 
is notable that most local government entities, as well as both community support groups, 
are found in this central ring.  
 
 




 Moving outwards, knowledge becomes more scattered and limited. The second, 
lighter green ring houses entities and services about which there is some general 
knowledge, and typically, markedly uneven knowledge among the general populace. In 
these cases it was difficult but not impossible for a citizen to find someone else who knows 
something about the entity or program, but there was also considerable confusion or 
conflicting stories about what the entity provides, who is responsible for the service, or 
whether or not the service is still available. Further out, in the lightest green ring, citizens 
have only the remotest familiarity with programs and entities, meaning that very few were 
able to name the program or give a vague description of the populations being assisted 
(“there is someone who is helping with orphans”). Among key contact persons for these 
organizations in the community (if they have them), there may be more knowledge. The 
area outside the rings, in grey, includes programs and initiatives about which citizens I 
interviewed had no direct knowledge. Often these are programs that have secondary links 
to Ha Mamello through local institutions or indirect forms of support. More proximate 
entities and programs are linked to relevant partner institutions in the community with 
lines. For example, the Clinton Health Access Initiative provides technical support to 
Mamello clinic, but no one in the community was aware of this linkage. I have only 
included those with linkages to community entities or programs, but this grey area could 
also include institutions like the National AIDS Commission, the Lesotho Council of NGOs 
(LCN), or the Global Fund’s Country Coordinating Mechanism (CCM). 
 Lack of knowledge among citizens was not for want of trying, and I often fielded 
questions about which NGOs had different programs, and how they could be contacted. 
Knowledge about NGOs was not inconsequential: Citizens and patients were eager to 




myopic focus on treatment within the clinic setting, NGO programs provided additional 
services like child support grants, food packages, condoms, agricultural support, small 
grants and various donated goods that were extremely valuable to those who could access 
them. World Vision, for example, provided much sought-after food packages to patients 
currently on ARVs at the clinic. Only a tiny fraction of those patients who were on 
treatment actually got the food packages, and it fell to the nurses and HIV counselors to 
devise some kind of fair system for distribution. Since they were unable to divide up the 
packages (World Vision delivered them and oversaw their distribution), and because it 
seemed almost impossible to choose the most needy or deserving of those among the 
hundreds of patients who were food insecure and without work, the clinic staff decided 
allow each person to access the food packages for 3, 6 or 9 months, in order to allow each 
person to have a turn. Midway through my research, the food packages stopped coming. 
No one knew why. Patients were mid-way through their time allotments, were waiting on 
the packages without any other source of food. A month went by, then two, then three: 
Patients were desperate but no one seemed to do anything. I probed the HIV counselors: 
isn’t there anyone who knows anything? No. “Isn’t there some way to call World Vision?” 
“Really, nobody knows,” Puleng answered in a resigned tone. They had no phone number 
for World Vision, and it seemed like every time the packages were delivered, someone else 
brought them, so they had no ongoing working relationship with anyone at the NGO.  
 Finally, at a policy meeting with national stakeholders in Maseru months later, I 
happened to hear that World Vision’s distribution of food packages had ceased for the 
foreseeable future—it had only been a two-year program. Ironically, the cancellation of 
programs is often said to be done in the name of sustainability, as NGOs assert that the 




over, and bemoan the “dependency” that might be created among recipients should food 
distribution be continued. These concerns may be valid, but in practice, and from the 
perspective of these recipient-citizens, “sustainability” looks very much like inexplicable 
abandonment, as they are food insecure and dependent on aid whether or not an NGO is 
giving them food packages. The banality with which such abandonment is executed—or 
simply allowed to take place—echoes the increasing banality with which the HIV 
epidemic itself is addressed, and the changing values driving response, as ideas like 
sustainability, rights, and partnership are emptied out and inverted.  
 Citizens were so accustomed to programs coming into the community and 
subsequently “disappearing” that most reacted to the disappearance of food packages with 
resignation, and decided they would simply “wait” until packages arrived again. While 
Lesotho’s citizens do seem to have a long-suffering patience when it comes to politics, 
their resignation is much more acute when dealing with NGOs or their programs. As 
NGOs take what could be state functions and turn them into temporary provisions of 
goods according to mysterious criteria and amidst competition from other organizations, 
responsibility for core and peripheral state functions with regards to citizens fractures and 
disperses.  
 In the midst of this fracturing of responsibility, citizens grasped at various strategies 
for forging meaningful bonds with the myriad entities upon which they depended for 
survival. Pointing to the multiple small gardens in her yard, one woman told my research 
assistant, Ponts`o: “this is my garden for CRS [Catholic Relief Services], this is my Send-A-
Cow garden…” Each represented a separate bond of membership, however small, and a 
separate hope that a more permanent social safety net might be formed.	   ‘Malefu, an older 




Vision had lined up all the current recipients and asked them to pose for pictures, to be 
used on IDs for those who received food packages. As she understood it, the workers from 
World Vision had created discrete expectations by promising ID cards:  
[They] promised us, as people living with HIV, that we would be given money. And we 
believed we were going to be given IDs, those things that you put here, around your neck, 
IDs. And our hopes were so high, really, that we might be given support. And we felt that 
maybe this disease of ours was important and worth something. We were told we would be 
given those IDs so that they could help us to get payments. And they lied. 
For ‘Malefu and others, World Vision’s failure to deliver ID cards was an even greater 
injustice than the constant unpredictability of the food packages. ‘Malefu did not just want 
a 10 kilo bag of maize meal; she wanted access to the social protections and safety nets 
that are fundamentally absent in interactions between citizens and NGOs and the state in 
Lesotho. ID cards promised membership, belonging—in a place where citizenship offered 
few entitlements. The goods and initiatives brought about by HIV scale-up have the 
capacity to reduce the social contract to a set of recipient exchanges which are 
unpredictable, mystifying to recipients, and lacking in guarantees.  
 It was often difficult to engage patients in lengthy conversations on the subject of 
NGOs—how do you, after all, talk about things about which you have no knowledge?  
Refiloe, a schoolteacher in a neighboring area who was taking HIV treatment from the 
clinic was more outspoken than most, and the excerpts below provide one example of 
what citizens’ viewpoints were like. As we talked about the rights he thought he had as a 
patient, he asserted that patients did have rights, though he could not specify what they 
were. But, he insisted, “we don’t normally exercise these rights, such as they are!” I asked 
him why he thought this was the case. Citizens are to blame, he said, because “we are not 
aware of the rights that we have.” These contradictory statements point to the muddy 




knowledge is established as the responsibility of citizens, any failings to seek rights on the 
parts of citizens are seen as the failings of an “ignorant” and “passive” population. Refiloe 
argued that part of the problem in understanding rights was that it remained hard to tell 
which entities are responsible for what: “The problem is that I am not aware of most of 
these NGOs…they may be playing greater roles…” He puzzled through the question 
aloud: 
…Because, I mean, if an NGO is playing a role…in any given community—if there is 
someone who is playing a very, very large role, you will know a lot about that individual, 
or that NGO. [But] you only hear about these UN organizations and all these things, so I 
don’t think I can say that there are any NGOs here.  
At this last realization he slammed his hand down on the table. What he meant was that, 
surely, if someone were playing a significant social or political role in the community, he 
and others would know about them, much as everyone knows who the “big men” are in 
the community. But he had only heard about “these UN organizations”—those that exist in 
a kind of intangible place outside of, but for, the country. He seemed to be trying to figure 
out what being here meant, trying to reconcile his lack of knowledge about the local NGO 
presence with his knowledge that somewhere in the country, all those NGOs he’d heard 
about were carrying out projects. “They are here, probably, but tell me about that 
particular NGO that is here, playing a big role.” He wasn’t able to identify a single NGO 
by name. I responded that I did know that World Vision had been delivering some food 
packages to the clinic for patients on ARVs. “Okay, yeah, World Vision….World 
Vision…All I know is that there is World Vision. Sure, I can see the cars, which have the 
World Vision logos on them. But what do they do? I have no idea, I tell you!” He was 
laughing by this point, as was I. “Red Cross?” I probed. “Red Cross? Haha! No, Red Cross 




feeling this confusion. “Honestly,” he replied, “if the NGOs play a role, it should be an 
active one, which the community can actually be aware of!”  
 Many NGOs in Lesotho, and elsewhere, speak of their work with an abundance of 
nouns like “participation,” “community partnership,” and “accountability.” Without 
reifying the divide between the “top” and the “bottom,” the “local,” and the “global,” it 
should be noted that the reality of these discourses—in practice, as observed by citizens—
seems like a stark inversion of such principles. World Vision, whose cash and in-kind 
fundraising in 2011 netted a staggering US$2.79 billion, has been at the forefront of a 
movement towards what it calls “transformational development” (Kelsall & Mercer, 2003). 
The organization’s vision of development relies on three defining characteristics of the 
relationship between donors in the Global North and recipients in the Global South. All of 
these characteristics are suffused with Christian ideas about charity and biblical metaphors. 
First, World Vision encourages practices of “Christian witnessing” and the forging of 
personal bonds between donors and recipients through individual child sponsorship, 
efforts to connect donor and recipient church congregations, 30-hour fasts for fundraising, 
and its experiential story telling exhibits on display in its headquarters. Second, it 
emphasizes accountability to individual donors by providing pictures of recipients and 
extensive accounting of gifts received—efforts that aim to build bonds of “trust” between 
World Vision and its supporters. Finally, World Vision endorses partnership with 
communities—a guiding doctrine that has become so strong within World Vision that Alan 
Whaits (1999) surmised that the organization’s original “evangelical” philosophy had been 
replaced with an “ideology of partnership” (p. 421). Through “transformational 
development,” and an “ideology of partnership,” World Vision’s approach relies on 




(Kelsall & Mercer, 2003).  
 It is not clear, however, that these principles gain any traction in citizen-recipient 
experiences on the ground—at the least, they were not observable in my time at Ha 
Mamello. Food packages were intermittent and untrustworthy, and the distribution of 
donations in the context of acute scarcity never seemed fair. Citizens who had walked past 
World Vision’s offices in Maseru referred to them as “the parking lot,” commenting that the 
organization must spend all of its funds on the emblazoned cars, trucks and SUVs that litter 
its headquarters. Occasionally World Vision would visit the community council and ask 
for a new list of names of destitute orphans; often the request was passed on to Mme 
‘Mats`eliso, an older community leader who worked with orphans throughout the 
surrounding area. She would call pitsos [community gatherings] and gather the names of 
orphans in need, but she rarely got her hopes up that help would arrive. “It would be good 
if they would do anything to help, but they never do,” she said to me once. “We keep 
calling the pitsos, calling the children, and they [World Vision] take their names, but they 
are just toying with the orphans…we are now so discouraged.” Whatever World Vision’s 
reasons for helping or not helping the community, these perceptions reflect the lived reality 
of relations with NGOs for communities in Lesotho.   
 James Ferguson (2006) reminds scholars of African politics in this global era that, 
even as African citizens see the potential of becoming connected to the global system, that 
system remains full of gaps and exclusions. He describes the relationship of citizens to the 
West not as a network, but as a pattern of shadows and light, of opportunities and 
marginalities. This produces “new kinds of more or less desperate claims to membership 
and recognition at a supranational level,” he asserts (p. 14). Pleas for membership arise and 




basic services. They are fueled by the fickle nature of aid money, and, in the time of HIV, 
the increasingly stringent criteria by which it is decided who will obtain resources and who 
will not. World Vision attempts to create “relationships of belonging” between individual 
givers and recipients, recasting ties of kinship and obligation for those lucky sponsored 
children (Bornstein, 2001, p. 614); but in doing so, it also erases more hallowed social 
contracts between citizens and states, replacing politics with the kindness and “Christian 
love” of strangers, rewriting entitlement and rights as gratitude in the form of thank-you 
letters sent from the sponsored to the sponsor. Survival in Lesotho, as elsewhere in Africa, 
is now a game of meeting the criteria of membership and belonging set out by extra-state 
entities. For citizens, these relations have reduced the social contract to what seems like a 
set of promises with fast-approaching expiration dates, written in pencil, carried about on 
multiple slips of scrap paper.  
 These socio-political relations have a direct impact on how patients and 
community members conduct themselves as citizens. This was most evident in the way 
patients approached the clinic when it ran out of medicines. While I was working with Ha 
Mamello, the clinic ran out of blood pressure drugs and other primary care medicines, and 
was forced to tell patients to go buy the medicines they needed for a few months. Stock-
outs are hardly uncommon in Lesotho, but for those who require consistent drug access 
(like those with high blood pressure), they were stressful, and placed an additional and 
unexpected strain on household finances—that is, if households could afford the drugs at 
all. Rather than blame nurses, most patients simply accepted that stock-outs were a 
problem of “suppliers”; though they had little idea who was responsible for supplying the 
drugs. I had many conversations with patients about the situation, recieving answers to my 




situation that were very similar: 
Mme Molapo: They [the nurses] just tell us that there are no pills….it’s very frustrating.  
NK: Do you think there’s anything that you could do about this, or anyone you could talk to 
about it?  
Mme Molapo: About the pills? … With someone inside the clinic or outside?  
NK: With anyone.  
Mme Molapo: Honestly, it hasn’t occurred to me that I can talk to anyone.  
NK: …Would you ever think of going to the community council to say, “hey, there are no 
medicines in the clinic?” 
Mme Molapo: No, really.  
NK: Why not?  
Mme Molapo: No, I think this is a very good question. [Laughs.] Most of the time, we 
Basotho don’t have the light [information / knowledge]. I never go up there [to government, 
officials], because I am always down here, hoping that they [the pills] will just 
arrive…These questions are very interesting. I wish I had done something so that I could 
answer [you] affirmatively. But I haven’t, unfortunately. I haven’t gone there. I never 
thought about [doing] it. I am not activist about these things. Because I just remain here, 
hoping that next time there will be pills available.  
This kind of hopeful, patient resignation was common among citizens. In light of this, the 
frequent admonishment that patients should “accept their status”—which itself strays so far 
from rights-based dialogues about HIV—takes on an additional, poignant meaning. Those 
who live with HIV in the time of scale-up find themselves both privileged and damned, 
entitled to occasional handouts but forced to recognize their own marginal place in the 
transnational hierarchies of care and treatment. Yet when citizens become resigned to their 
marginal status, policymakers identify this not as the result of an unfair and 
unrepresentative new political system, but as the sign of citizens’ own political 
deficiencies: they are passive, uneducated, irresponsible.   
 “Maybe I am a very shy person,” Mme Molapo tried to explain to me later, even as 
she was criticizing the government in our interview for not doing more for orphans. “It’s 
not that I hate [the government], it’s just that I fear them, especially if I don’t know anyone 
[in government, personally]…I fear these people because they are in very high positions. I 




As discussed in chapter 2, any citizens in Lesotho believe that engaging in politics—and in 
particular, publicly complaining or speaking out about poor services—will result in them 
losing what little access they have to goods and resources. HIV and other development 
funding channeled through central governments—and in particular, through the institutions 
of government that are not subject to direct elections by the people (ministries, National 
AIDS Commissions)—increases the virulence of neopatrimonialist relations. HIV funding 
has replicated and shifted patron-client dynamics in Africa (Swidler, 2009b). But as I will 
argue in chapter 5, HIV scale-up elicits new dynamics between donors and recipients that 
extend beyond what we tend to recognize as patrimonialism. I call these dynamics a 
“politics of recipiency”—and they are fed by the fracturing of state responsibilities, a 
distilling of politics into dynamics of resource-seeking and giving, and hierarchies in 
relations between citizens, NGOs, the state, and funders. 
 The reigning dynamics of citizen - state relations in the time of HIV scale-up 
indelibly shape citizen subjectivities. They reflect the replacement of citizenship with 
temporary forms of membership in state or NGO short-term projects, and of the social 
contract with a politics of recipiency. As I will show in the chapters that follow, citizens in 
various settings continue to search for more meaningful means of engagement with state 
and non-state institutions, attempting to forge durable conditions of belonging. But in the 
contemporary political landscape in which citizens eke out the conditions of survival 
(material, spiritual, medical, and social), one of the most prominent elements of political 
subjectivity for citizens is the experience of temporary belonging, and the eventual, 
inevitable, loss of membership in state or NGO projects. This is reflected in the constant 
“disappearance” of food packages, pills, and NGOs, as well as the felt impact within 




scale-up, citizens experience acute periods of dis-memberment—an experience marked by 
the loss of membership in social programs, but also reflective of the broader 
dismemberment of the “body politic” (Scheper-Hughes & Lock, 1987). Amid such 
experiences of dis-memberment, and the sense that no one is truly responsible for their 
survival, patients turn inwards. Mme Moipone, another patient on blood pressure 
medicines who had not received them for 3 months when I first spoke to her, told me that 
she could not possibly speak to anyone about the situation, comparing the act of 
“becoming political” with itlama: being tied up, or bound, tying something around oneself. 
“So the best thing to do,” she said, “is to keep quiet. You’ll just say, ‘when they [the pills] 
are there, they are there. When they are not there, they are not there.’” She had no money 
for transport, or for purchasing the pills from the pharmacy. “I don’t know how I manage” 
to survive, she said: “It is only God up there who provides.” It is only with God that the 
social contract remains in the hands of citizens; prayer becomes the final act of negotiation 





Support, Support Groups, and Survival: 
The Basotho Hat Turned Upside Down 
 “Ngoan’a salleng o shoela tharing” 
(“The baby girl who fails to cry dies strapped to her mother’s back.”) 
—Sotho proverb 
 
I met Mme ‘Mats`eliso on one of my earliest trips to Lesotho, and she quickly 
became a champion of my research within Ha Mamello. She is a formidable presence—
outspoken, confident, vibrant—and these qualities easily elevate her to the level of 
community leader. By trade, she is originally a traditional healer, but in the time of AIDS 
her work has become centered on the disease and its social consequences. For a long time 
now, she has been leading a group of community members—mostly older women—in 
providing home-based care and support to families suffering with illness and orphans. In 
English, they identify themselves as a support group; in Sesotho, they are sometimes an 
“association” (mokhatlo), sometimes a “group for support” (sehlopha sa ts’ehetso). They are 
not a support group in the sense imagined by global AIDS experts, who, drawing on the 
traditions of Alcoholics Anonymous and on strategies of “confessional technologies” 
(Nguyen, 2010) emphasize socio-psychological support as a means of achieving mental 
well-being and “acceptance” amidst illness. They consider themselves a support group 
because they provide support in the form of material goods (when they have them), care, 
and failing these, prayer. In their work, they don’t ask whether orphans have lost parents 
due to HIV, and don’t serve only those with AIDS. For them, the disease’s impact is such 
that it is present in every illness, every sick or emptied household. For these workers, care 
is an engagement in everyday politics, a form of social solidarity that attempts to fill the 




as often as it deals in drug regimens. This form of care attempts to address the broad 
spectrums of survival (social, economic, familial, spiritual, subjective, political) that are 
under threat in the weakening of bonds between states, citizens and the institutions of HIV 
scale-up. In doing so, it also draws attention to the insufficiency of such care work to 
address these needs and overcome the many challenges to collective efficacy arising from 
HIV scale-up processes in Lesotho.  
In the everyday work of groups like this one, the mandates set forth for them by 
funders, the government, and global modalities for HIV care and prevention are integrated 
into long-standing patterns and practices of neighborliness, social support, maternal 
caregiving, and communal redistribution of goods. Without romanticizing these earlier 
forms of support and exchange (which can and do lead to marginalization, stigma, or 
unfair patronage—see Campbell, 2009; Rau, 2006; Turkon, 2009), it is important to realize 
that the new ethics of “care” and “support” being taught to citizens in places like Lesotho 
are understood as an extension or modification of older practices—and long-standing 
forms of membership in local political worlds (Bowsky, 2004; Germond & Molapo, 2006; 
Makoae & Jubber, 2008). HIV initiatives have added new equipment (gloves, condoms), 
vocabularies (“accepting one’s status,” “risk behaviors”), skills (positive prevention, 
infection control), and incentives (stipends, small grants, supplies) to existing practices of 
care and social solidarity. But in the everyday work of caregivers and support groups, these 
new modalities are often pushed into the background by the broader social ills that they 
confront on a daily basis, and which they are still poorly equipped to ameliorate. HIV 
initiatives have frequently emphasized the importance of community-based responses to 
HIV, asking citizens to devote considerable (and often unpaid) labor to care and 




processes, and unable to obtain the forms of support (for themselves or others) that would 
provide a means of long-lasting survival. Contemporary support groups in Lesotho find 
themselves at tense junctures between survival and support, between belonging and 
abandonment, and between desert and dependency. It is these junctures that I explore 
below, and which, I argue, shape the political subjectivities of engaged citizens in the time 
of HIV scale-up.  
In this chapter, I explore and contrast the work of two support groups in Ha 
Mamello: Mme ‘Mats`eliso’s group of home-based carers, which I will call Bahlokomeli 
Support Group, and a support group of persons living with HIV/AIDS sponsored by the 
clinic, whom I call the POSWA (People Openly Surviving With AIDS) Support Group.47 I 
am particularly interested in how these groups define themselves, and how these collective 
identities are at points challenged or reinforced by national ideas about the meanings of 
care, support, desert, and collective efficacy. These groups reflect the ways that HIV scale-
up is changing and remaking associational life in recipient countries. The challenges faced 
by each group are worlds apart, though they occupy the same community space. These 
differences reflect the diversity of possible experiences for citizens at the center of local 
efforts to address HIV. Finally, by observing the challenging, difficult, uncomfortable day-
to-day dynamics of these two groups, we are able to witness the fissures in social solidarity 
which are emerging in the midst of scale-up, and to pay careful attention to the possible 
ramifications of these social tensions. In what follows, I will first describe the work and 
evolution of Bahlokomeli, and then turn to a discussion of POSWA. The chapter ends with 
a discussion of the ramifications of HIV scale-up’s project culture and politics of recipiency 
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for the broader community. 
 
A House Full of Patients  
I came to know Ha Mamello best through Mme ‘Mats`eliso, who allowed me to 
follow her volunteers around the villages as they bathed patients and changed dressings, 
provided treatment support to those with HIV and TB, and shared food or soap with 
orphans and the destitute. I learned village gossip sitting outside her house on sunny days, 
as neighbors and patients came to ask for help or advice. And on my walks through the 
village with her, her encyclopedic memory of social relations helped me to understand the 
landscape of social suffering brought about by poverty, hunger, and AIDS. Though she had 
begun her care work decades ago as a traditional healer, her contemporary role in the 
village combined leadership, healing, and HIV advocacy. Over time she came to see the 
purpose of her traditional healing work as a means of supporting and filling the gaps in the 
biomedical HIV system, and she became widely known as for her work with HIV patients. 
She never claimed to be able to cure HIV, and was quick to reprimand sick patients for 
failing to get an HIV test, or not seeking ARVs through the clinic. She generally would not 
give any ingestible treatments to those on ARVs, for fear of liver damage and drug 
interactions, but would offer topical, and sometimes spiritual, balms. She provided healing 
services that addressed the opportunistic infections of HIV (especially shingles, “labanda” 
in Sesotho) for which the clinic’s services offered little reprieve, and she tried in many 
different ways to ease the pains of hunger that inhibited so many patients from adhering to 
their treatment. Combined, her traditional healing and care work represent “hybrid 
strategies” (Decoteau, 2008; Robins, 2008) common in contemporary public life in Africa, 




and become symbiotic advantages. In many ways, Mme ‘Mats`eliso is a classic “organic 
intellectual” (Gramsci, 1971)—able to understand, and give locally relevant and eloquent 
articulation of, the structures and possibilities of social life.  
A few weeks before Christmas, in the depths of Lesotho’s short but intense summer, 
I found myself following Mme ‘Mats`eliso as she set a mean pace up one of the hills 
outside of Ha Mamello. The thick, tall summer weeds slapped against our faces and arms 
as we made our way up a narrow footpath. The previous day, Mme ‘Mats`eliso had used 
up precious airtime on her cell phone to call me, frantic, at 7 AM on a Sunday morning. 
She had just visited an elderly man who was very ill with a lung infection, she told me, and 
who was unable to take his medicines because he and his wife had no food. Chronic 
illness in food-insecure contexts tends to trigger conditions of starvation: a patient gets sick, 
and the household shifts resources to care for them; fewer family members work or are 
able to tend fields and gardens; the household loses its already tenuous foothold in the 
margins of food security; the patient is unwilling or unable to take medicines without any 
food; the patient becomes sicker because of lack of food and medicines, and other family 
members are more likely to become ill. If the patient is lucky, he somehow survives on 
occasional handouts and sheer will, and may after some time regain strength enough to 
work and no longer require round-the-clock care. If he is unlucky, he will die, either from 
starvation itself, or from the infections or diseases that might have abated had he been able 
to take his medicines. Death causes further financial woes, as funeral expenses cause 
families to go into great debt; worse still is the shame of families who cannot afford to bury 
their dead. More debt, less food, followed by more sickness: without proper nutrition other 
members of the household succumb to illness, and the cycle deepens.  




met him. He had initially been diagnosed with TB, and had taken a full six months’ 
treatment for TB with no improvements in his health. Finally, when he failed to recover, his 
family pooled its resources to bring him to another doctor at the TB hospital, who said he 
did not have TB, but instead had a lung infection, and started him on antibiotics. Ntate 
Khotso had been sick for so long that he and his wife had both lost any sources of 
income—they had no fields, and they were unable to work in anyone else’s fields for food. 
He claimed he could not take the antibiotics without food, as they made him nauseous and 
he only lost what little was in his stomach when he vomited them up again. So ‘Mats`eliso 
and I made a visit on Monday morning to the small malaene [a low, rectangular building 
comprised of single-room dwellings] where Ntate Khotso and his wife had a room.  
First, though, ‘Mats`eliso had someone else for us to meet. Just next door, the other 
half of the malaene was occupied by Mme Lerato, a TB patient. ‘Mats`eliso stood in the 
grass outside the malaene and hollered at its occupants to open their windows, chiding 
them about the risks of infecting their families, and us. It was her best, and often only, 
protection against this occupational hazard. Mme Lerato had become gravely ill with 
severe back pain while working part-time jobs in South Africa, and was diagnosed shortly 
thereafter with spinal TB. She started treatment in South Africa but did not get better. By 
the time she traveled back across the border to take up a full time position as a patient in 
her aunt’s house in Ha Mamello, she was paralyzed from the waist down. Inside the house, 
Lerato was cheerful, excited at the rare luck of having visitors despite her grim 
surroundings. She lay naked under a blanket in a dark back room, which smelled of urine 
and feces, and a fat catheter drained into a bucket on the floor. Though she had been on 
TB medicines when she returned home to Lesotho, the clinic had refused to continue her 




prescription bottles. Though she had a clinic booklet and a TB care record which showed 
which medicines she had been prescribed, and for how long, the clinic had rules: patients 
who did not present their empty bottles as evidence of adherence could not be given new 
prescriptions. This policy is a corollary of the work burdens at clinics and attempts to 
streamline the endless flows of patients. But in the absence of a sense of rights within the 
clinic, such rules resulted in patients being turned away with little or no recourse. Break 
the rules, and you were out of luck; after being turned away, your best option was to show 
up at the clinic in your needy, pathetic state and hope that the nurses would help you, or 
go to another clinic and plead your case to a new set of ears. Neither of these options was 
available to Lerato, of course, who was stranded on this rugged hilltop where taxis would 
not go.  
Mme Lerato was also HIV-positive, which at the time I met her seemed a mere 
footnote to her other health problems. But this meant she was also not accessing her ARVs, 
and I worried constantly after meeting her about those half-treated, persistent diseases 
raging in her body. While visiting Lerato, ‘Mats`eliso and I strategized ways to get her care 
from a clinic. Lerato held out little hope about her chances, seeming more interested in 
strategizing about how to get me to visit her more often, offering Sotho lessons and further 
interviews. Ultimately, I ended up orchestrating her transport to the clinic myself—in an 
old station wagon and with the help of those strong enough to help me load her into and 
out of it. Each trip was excruciatingly painful for her, and a full day’s effort.  
The scene at Ntate Khotso’s house was much less hopeful. He was barely 
conscious when we arrived, emaciated and attended by a lazy chorus of flies. He was too 
sick to strategize, and his wife was sick as well. She sat in the tiny room sweating 




she have for herself, after all, when she and her husband were locked into this private, 
hellish fight for survival? There was little food, and what there was, she gave to her 
husband, and they hoped he could keep it down with his medicines. Often he couldn’t. 
Without food, the medicines always made him feel sicker, and what was the point of 
taking pills if he was likely to die of hunger anyways? Later in the day after visiting their 
house, I brought by maize meal, and they treated the small gift as if it was medicinal, 
though maize is the staple of the diet in Lesotho. How much should he eat, they asked? 
How much water should we prepare it with? How many times a day? There was no 
mistaking that the real medicine here was food.  
A few days later Ntate Khotso was a bit better, well enough that he wanted to go to 
the national TB hospital with Lerato, in the hopes of getting better treatment. He walked 
away hours and hours later, exhausted, holding medicines but of course no food. He and 
his wife were depleted by the trip, and I wondered if it was worth it, he seemed so far 
gone. A few days later, I received a text message from Lerato on my phone: “oh dear Nora 
I am very sorry to tell you that Ntate has passed away.” 
After the Christmas holidays and Ntate Khotso’s funeral had passed, I traveled again 
up the hill to his house with ‘Mats`eliso, and another support group member, a smiling and 
ever-jovial woman named Mme ‘Mathuso. Ntate Khotso’s widow sat outside the house, 
and I told her again how sorry I was for her loss. She looked at me, smiled, and shook her 
head slowly. “Mme Nora, Mme Nora…” she said quietly. Things were equally grave at 
Lerato’s house. She had sent a family friend to the TB hospital to pick up her second month 
of her (renewed) prescription, and he had returned empty-handed. Though we had 
previously gotten a nurse at the hospital to agree that Lerato could send someone to pick 




another nurse on staff was less willing to bend the rules. None of us was eager to repeat 
the struggle involved in getting Lerato to the clinic. “I don’t know what to do now,” she 
said to ‘Mats`eliso, sounding angrier and more hopeless than I had ever heard her. Her 
face was half buried in a pillow as the conversation about her fate circulated above her. I 
volunteered to go to the clinic and appeal to the nurses again, but none of us were hopeful 
about the outcome. ‘Mats`eliso muttered that “we must have faith” and began to pray 
quietly. Lerato placed an arm over her face and quietly cried while ‘Mats`eliso and 
‘Mathuso prayed. She seemed to think that death was near; Ntate Khotso’s quick passing 
must have made her vulnerability that much clearer to her. As we left and walked back 
down the hill, ‘Mats`eliso kept repeating, “what is there to do? What is there to do?” Again 
she turned to prayer. “We can only pray for wisdom.”  
In Mme Lerato and Ntate Khtoso’s world, survival requires much more than 
pharmacology. Those like ‘Mats`eliso who step in to assist them confront the gaping needs 
in their lives, and face pressure to fill them with their own scant resources. Lerato, as it 
turned out, did not die. Assisted by Mme ‘Mats`eliso’s persistence and my own resources, 
she eventually got two different clinics to provide her with regular medicines for TB and 
HIV, but it was a monumental struggle. Four months later, she could move her toes; a few 
months after that, she could lift her legs. And there it was: survival. In Lesotho it often 
seems like a random and miraculous feat when patients shake off death’s dogged pursuit. 
Survival in these contexts depends on chance, but also on social networks—on sewing 
fragile webs of support from the fragmented and unpredictable systems of health care and 
social assistance in Lesotho. Support groups face—and are often held accountable for—the 
unfair patterns of death and survival in communities. Though their work seems to mediate 




entities which fund HIV programs ultimately set the rules of the game, determining which 
conditions of life merit assistance, and which do not. Finally, though money seems to pour 
into the country, many support groups perceive these funds as remaining “up there”—with 
government, bureaucrats, and experts—rather than being sent “down here” to where needs 
are acute. After Lerato recovers, Mme ‘Mats`eliso narrates her story for others in the group: 
“The clinic did not help…The American grants did not help…funding comes for TB, for 
HIV, but it goes for their fancy hairstyles in Maseru,” she says, referring to the intricate, 
frequently changing hairstyles of civil servants and local professionals in the capital 
(Maseru) who seem to profit so visibly from the funding of HIV and AIDS.  
 
Bahlokomeli 
Mme ‘Mats`eliso and the Bahlokomeli support group members often give 
conflicting accounts of their group’s origins. For ‘Mats`eliso, the group began to coalesce 
as she and others were trained in HIV prevention and care strategies, and more recently, 
when they became community-based workers for the Know Your Status campaign, going 
door-to-door in surrounding communities and offering HIV testing. For other women in the 
group like ‘Makabello, a community health worker affiliated with Mamello clinic, the 
group emerged in direct response to their struggles with the burden of HIV: “we were 
struggling with all of the sick, and we ended up realizing that we had to come together to 
stand up on our own feet, and figure out how to help ourselves and our families [in the 
face of the disease]. There are so many patients, there are so many orphans…that is why 
we are doing all of these things.” A few older women in the group claimed it started much 
earlier, and gave hazy accounts of earlier epidemics that spurred its growth: locusts that 




Africa. In many ways, the group had not formally started, but had always been: it was less 
a group than an amorphous collection of community members helping the sick, trading 
acts of neighborliness, and building social solidarity as a poor person’s insurance against 
troubles that would, inevitably, arise. Various forms of associational groups are common in 
Lesotho—ranging from rotational savings groups, to farming collectives, to charitable 
projects organized by chiefs (African Religious Health Assets Programme [ARHAP], 2006; 
Turkon, 2009).  
Most group members recalled that the group had become an “official” HIV support 
group in 2000, when the government first put out a call for community groups to help in 
addressing HIV in their communities. By 2002, the group members attended a government 
training for care-takers, learning about routes of HIV transmission and strategies for 
preventing infections and protecting themselves while caring for sick patients. They were 
also given caregiver “kits” at this time that included gloves, soap, and basic first aid 
supplies. But many group members insisted that they had been doing care work—without 
gloves or other materials—for years before they received these kits. With the increases in 
HIV funding for community-based care and support efforts in Lesotho, beginning around 
2005-2006, these robust forms of associational life were largely overwritten by the 
particular vision of community-led support networks advanced by global HIV 
policymakers (Kimaryo, Okpaku, Githuku-Shongwe, & Feeney, 2004; Rau, 2006). In this 
vision, civil society groups provided a cheap source of (largely) volunteer labor for the 
implementation of HIV initiatives, turning potential sources of grassroots HIV activism into 
lay service providers (Bowsky, 2004; Lesotho News Agency, 2005; UNAIDS, 2001). 
Support groups would provide peer education about prevention and treatment, serving a 




based care workers could, with minimal inputs of training and supplies, provide care and 
support to the sick and orphans, and implement campaigns like KYS [Know Your Status]. In 
many places in Lesotho, citizens enthusiastically responded to demand for community-
based organizations (CBOs), either forming new entities or revamping old associations to 
meet new HIV objectives (Bowsky, 2004). Though their emergence was incentivized by 
newly available resources (and some group leaders could be heard saying they wanted “a 
piece of the cake [of HIV money]”), many others were genuinely grateful to be included in 
efforts, having sat by empty-handed as relatives and neighbors died and orphans 
multiplied. HIV had strained all social support networks beyond the breaking point, and 
any assistance in addressing need was welcome. The sense for groups like Bahlokomeli 
was that they would do what funders and donors needed in order to simply get any 
supplies and resources into their communities.  
Being the object of new financial flows could suddenly place groups at the center 
of tense conflicts over who deserved, and had access to, HIV money. When more than fifty 
of Bahlokomeli’s members came forward to volunteer for KYS in 2007, Mme ‘Mats`eliso 
reported that by that time the clinic staff didn’t “like [outside] people helping with HIV and 
AIDS in the clinic,” because, among other reasons, “we can see what they [clinicians] do.” 
What she means is that their presence as part of clinic activities provided another layer of 
accountability that was uncomfortable for clinic workers. Resources can cause tension as 
much as they address need, and some clinic workers feel that they are in competition with 
community-based groups for limited funds and assistance. One nurse in particular, 
Bahlokomeli members claimed, withheld the stipends they were meant to be paid for their 
work with KYS—whether for her own benefit or simply to punish the KYS workers is 




many people who, after the HIV money began to flow into clinics and communities, “took 
off” and “then…were running the business of HIV.”  This is when things began to be 
“political” and she realized that “HIV and AIDS is for the politicians”—that is, for people 
who are interested in gaining power and resources from HIV, who can succeed at such 
“political” games—not for those who are interested in helping the sick.  
In addition to training as KYS volunteers, the Bahlokomeli members attended 
numerous trainings for community health workers and HIV educators. After their extended 
efforts to test people in their communities, they now were faced with the additional 
psychological and material burden of those who they had identified as HIV-positive. As 
those patients and others became sick, Bahlokomeli focused its attentions on two primary 
activities—home-based care (HBC) work, and caring for orphans. For a long time, the 
government had suggested that it intended to pay community health workers (CHWs) and 
those providing HBC—not a full wage, but what was termed an “incentive” to 
acknowledge their efforts (“Global Fund Round 6 Proposal,” 2006). Years went by without 
Bahlokomeli’s volunteers receiving any assistance.48 They poured their own resources into 
feeding and caring for patients, borrowing gloves and first aid supplies from clinics and 
organizations, and failing that, purchasing them on their own. Then, in late 2010, the 
government finally began to pay community health workers incentives, and even paid an 
amount of “back pay” to make up for the delays in funding. But in what seemed like an 
exceptionally arbitrary rule to community-based caregivers, only a handful of the 
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Bahlokomeli volunteers were “chosen” to be official CHWs and to receive incentives. The 
rest could continue their work, but without payment or recognition.  
To Mme ‘Mats`eliso and the volunteers, this was a terrible outcome, forcing an 
arbitrary division between paid and unpaid volunteers, fostering jealousy and anger among 
the group’s members. Suddenly, some in the group had “jobs,” and others didn’t, and the 
labor of some was more valuable than the labor of others, though they did the same work. 
Paid CHWs felt pushed out of the group by other members’ jealousy; unpaid members quit 
in frustration;  ‘Mats`eliso was barely keeping what remained of the group together. 
“Where are these other [community health workers] supposed to go?” ‘Mats`eliso asked 
me angrily one day while we were meeting with members on her porch and she was 
intermittently seeing patients who were arriving at the house seeking assistance. “Because 
they are living here, in Lesotho, where they are helping people, all these affected and 
infected.” She means that, because they live in communities with the sick, members have 
no choice but to help them, and they are indelibly part of the communities that they serve. 
“That’s the main problem of HIV and AIDS,” she continues, “hobane ba bang ba rua, ba 
bang futaneng”—“because the rich are those that inherit, and everyone else becomes 
poorer.” She points towards a child, skinny and wasted, who has been brought to her 
house by his grandfather; they are sitting nearby in the yard, waiting silently. She explains 
that they have come to her begging for transport money to get to the pediatric HIV hospital 
in Maseru, where the child is hoping to get assistance. Two years prior, I had interviewed 
the grandfather, a sweet, shy man who had disclosed to me at the time that his daughter 
was very sick with AIDS. His wife was gone: he talked about the shame he felt as he 
bathed and cared for his own daughter, having to see her naked body, but he had no one 




the child are also living with HIV. “Look at this child now,” she says, “they”—the 
government, the clinic, the people with money—she doesn’t specify, but it’s always the 
same batch of culprits: “they don’t care about him, they don’t care about this lady [his 
mother], no, no, no…so I told him he should come here, and he came. They don’t have 
food, so I share my maize meal with them. We share our meals together. We share soap. 
How can we do otherwise?”  
In the aftermath of the government’s decision to pay some CHWs, the anger of 
Bahlokomeli’s members festered; they began to speak openly about what they felt they had 
sacrificed to engage in this care-work. “I am still crying,” Mme ‘Mats`eliso said to me many 
months later, “If I had the strength or the capabilities I would go outside to these countries 
[that are funding Lesotho] and tell them about this.”  Members of the group emphasized 
that they had been “hurt by caring”: they identified themselves to me as living with HIV, 
and claimed that they had been infected while caring for patients. Such claims are not 
uncommon in Lesotho, and I frequently encountered elderly men and women at the clinic 
who were HIV-infected and presumed their infection was acquired while caring for 
children or partners with the disease.49 This is a population about which few statistics are 
collected, and so it is difficult to say how prevalent HIV is among older populations.50 It is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 It is hard to determine the veracity of these statements, as almost no studies have been conducted on the 
likelihood of caregiver infection in settings where sick patients are sent back to homes with inadequate 
supplies and limited resources to require long-term, intensive care (Negin & Cumming, 2010; Negin et al., 
2010; Makoae, 2009).  In these contexts, even a task like washing frequently soiled bed linens is a 
monumental effort—as water has to be fetched from far away and the linens have to be scrubbed by hand. 
Many families with sick patients cannot afford washing powder, bleach, or gloves (see also Makoae, 2009). 
Care work in these situations is messy, and contact with bodily fluids becomes an everyday part of care. 
Infection among older adults and even the elderly is surprisingly common, but poorly documented, in Sub-
Saharan Africa (Negin & Cumming, 2010; Negin et al., 2010; Ng’anjo & Diwouta, 2011). 
50 Recent modeling by Negin and Cumming (2010) estimates that the prevalence rate among older persons 
in Lesotho (ages 50 and up) could be as high as 27.8%. At Mamello clinic, 5 of those I interviewed were 
over the age of 60 and HIV-positive, and fully a third of those I interviewed at the clinic who were living 




harder still to assess how many in this population are infected through care-giving efforts. 
Such explanations certainly offer an easy escape from the stigma of HIV, which in Lesotho 
is strongly associated with promiscuity and sexual immorality. I am not sure (for the 
purposes of this inquiry) if it matters how these elderly caretakers became infected. Rather, 
what I find striking is how they spoke about their HIV infection, and the meanings it held 
for them. In discussions with caretakers, I did not hear the apologetic discourses of people 
trying to explain away their stigma; I heard talk that was infused with anger and a sense of 
injustice. Care-givers talked about their lack of knowledge and supplies like gloves, of their 
children’s fear of stigma. “What was I to do?” one woman said about her daughter, who 
had been severely ill with AIDS. Referring to her lack of gloves, she said, “was I not 
supposed to touch her? She is my child. And so I would be touching her carelessly 
[tlapurela; lit., to hold carelessly; also, to cling to].” Whether or not it was 
epidemiologically accurate, claims by caretakers that they had been “hurt by caring” were 
a means of drawing attention to proper ways of caring for the sick, and thereby 
highlighting how the government and its partners were failing patients and their caretakers. 
By emphasizing that infections were a direct outcome of the lack of government support 
for those who were sick and their families, talk of care-giver infection highlighted the 
broken ties of obligation between government, funders and citizens.  
These claims about infection are related to support groups’ acute concerns that HIV 
money does not reach them, and that their labor is under-valued. When Bahlokomeli care 
workers were initially called on by the government to volunteer their time, they were not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This means that they were not included in the national prevalence projections (Negin & Cumming, 2010). 
While caregiver infection is possible—and certainly merits more research into infection routes and rates—it 
is erroneous for researchers to presume that the elderly are not sexually active or are an insignificant 




promised wages, but “they [the government] said there would be incentives [with which] 
to buy soaps and other supplies…Because they talked about the Global Fund money” 
which they had received for this purpose, one member told me. Instead, it seemed “the 
government is making use of the Global Fund for its own benefit [only].” But she 
emphasizes that they were never told they would get real pay for the work, “we were just 
told to volunteer, that there was no pay, they just said we would get the [caregiver supply] 
kits, but [then] we never got those either.” Support group members sought incentives or 
salaries as form of recognition, rather than reimbursement—payment as a form of respect, 
not of reparation. Monetarily, their expectations were quite low. I spoke to a support group 
member from a neighboring village during the research who insisted to me his group was 
paid for its work. By whom? I asked him, how often? After a drawn-out period of 
questioning, it became clear that what he meant by getting payment was that the group 
had once attended a nationally-sponsored, week-long training event, for which their 
transportation was reimbursed. And if members did not eat the lunch provided, they were 
given an additional M40 (about $5) at the end of the week as meal reimbursement.  
Though donors and supporting NGOs frequently selected support groups to receive 
‘incentives,’ packages of goods, or small grants, these donations were paltry compared to 
the labor value that support group members invested. Often—as with a small grant to 
support group activities in the area of prevention education, or income generation projects, 
for example—the grants themselves required support groups to take on whole new areas of 
work for which the labor was rarely, if ever, reimbursed. Bahlokomeli received a small 
U.S. Embassy grant while I was working with them, but the grant rules clearly stipulated 
that it could not be used for any salaries, or for building any structures. Instead, it was 




required vast inputs of time, effort, and supplies on the part of volunteers. And because the 
income generation arm of the project could provide more flexible funds to spend on 
community needs, the group spent most of their time on income generation, to the 
detriment of HIV prevention activities. When I spoke to group members, they emphasized 
again and again that they wished the group could have funding for two things: some small 
stipend with which they could buy supplies for care-giving and food for the patients they 
visited, and materials with which to construct a small building in the community where 
they could meet, hold education sessions, and most importantly, provide meals and life 
skills education to the ever-growing population of village orphans. Building, in particular, 
is a crucial means of achieving legitimacy as a person, family, or entity in Africa,51 and it is 
likely that the group wished to build in order to create a long-standing resource that would 
remain after their short-lived grants were gone, and so as to establish roots and acceptance 
in the community.    
Thus, by refusing to pay for either labor or building, funding parameters for 
community-based support groups deprived them of the two forms of support that would 
provide the most reliable sense of legitimacy. Since the support of donors is also 
inconstant, unreliable, and mysterious, groups like Bahlokomeli feel as if they are laboring 
without recognition, invisible to those who hold the purse-strings. Mme ‘Makhotso, an 
energetic group member, explained it this way:  
As we look at the media on the television, and on the radio, we see that there are people [in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Julie Livingston (2005) describes building, or boaga, in Botswana as a crucial “life strategy”: “‘Building 
continually reaffirms personhood by forging connections over time and across generations—linking the 
doing of today and yesterday with tomorrow…In Botswana, where personhood is understood to be a 
process, building is what one continually strives for. Through building, or self-making…people create and 
reinvigorate social relationships. They develop moral, economic, political, social or spiritual capital. It is 
the primary means through which the promise of liberal individualism…can be harnessed to the making of 




support groups] who have achieved so many things that we have not achieved. And we 
wonder how they were able to accomplish those things, because we know that support 
group members are those people who are not working [i.e., they are not paid for the work 
they do, they have no other jobs]…so we wonder how they can accomplish these things 
[without salaries, or other funding]. So our intention—our desire—when you see us meeting 
here and there every day, is that ultimately we want somebody to see us and to help these 
people—the orphans and the vulnerable children and of course the patients. But I suppose 
we are lucky, because there are villages that have no support groups at all. 
Support groups thus remained caught in webs of illegitimacy, where their labor was not 
valued and funders insisted that they would not pay salaries, promoting instead values of 
community support, social solidarity, and volunteerism. Support groups often 
demonstrated these qualities almost to a fault, but lack of material resources, as I will 
continue to discuss below, caused undue strain among members and between groups and 
the citizens they assisted. Even when “incentives” finally came from the government, they 
had the pernicious effect of damaging solidarity, and devaluing the work of certain 
members.  
 Bahlokomeli’s lack of material resources led to difficulties with patients as well. 
Those whom members visited at home often bristled at the idea that care workers would 
enter their homes and provide “care,” but come empty-handed, without offering groceries, 
soaps or small gifts. Like Ntate Khotso and his wife, many patients and their families 
remained marooned in a chronic state of food insecurity and hunger. Pharmaceuticals from 
the clinics and the care offerings of poorly-equipped neighbors are often perceived as 
insufficient medicine. As in Nancy Scheper Hughes’ (1991) accounts of the “madness of 
hunger” in the shantytowns of Northern Brazil, medicines and biomedical discourses in 
contexts of severe resource scarcity and socioeconomic oppression become tools for 
masking hunger and its causes. But patients in Lesotho spoke of hunger forcefully and 
frequently with those who offered them care. Rather than turn their frustration towards 




care workers. Mme ‘Mats`eliso spoke often about her struggles with patients in this regard:  
I tell people not to be bitter [when we cannot bring them food]; I tell them not to be bitter, 
because we can’t do otherwise. Because we still have nothing to [offer to] help them, you 
see? Nothing [with which] to help…some [people] they don’t want these groups of ours to 
go see them. Because they will say, “you are always coming, with no food, nothing! No 
food, nothing!”…they say, “we are hungry, we are hungry, we have to make food, but we 
are always crying [for want of food].” So we tell them, “we don’t have food, either, to give 
you”….but we always share together what we have. What we have we share. 
Mme ‘Mathuso tried as well to explain why people became angry at them:  
People feel like the support group is failing to do its duty when we cannot bring them 
anything. We try so hard, but the problem is not between us, the problem is between the 
clinic, and the funders, and the government. They [the patients] blame us, they think maybe 
we are practicing favoritism…they think it’s a sign that we don’t care for them. 
 What is tragic about these responses is that Mme ‘Mathuso, Mme ‘Mats`eliso, and 
the other women in the support group truly offered care sincerely. Perhaps they took some 
pride in being trained as HIV counselors, or in offering home-based care, but anyone who 
watched them engaging in their work could see that it was selfless. Often the group 
members and their patients would contrast true charity as assistance “given with love” 
from aid as “handouts.” But as aid and neighborliness became conflated, patients struggled 
to understand why caregivers could not provide better connections to the networks 
through which HIV resources flowed.  
 Mme ‘Makabello told me a story about one of her neighbors, who was on TB 
treatment, and for whom she was a treatment supporter, overseeing him take his medicine 
daily as part of directly-observed therapy approaches.  
So sometimes he arrives at my place…and he tells me that he is very hungry. I haven’t even 
eaten any lesheleshele (porridge) yet, but I know that this patient shouldn’t take the 
treatment without eating, on an empty stomach. So now when you don’t have any food, 
what are you going to give this patient?  I enter inside my house, and share the bread I have 
made for my children, which is not even enough [for them]. I will give him tea or coffee, 
and he eats. I have already dipped into the share for one of my kids—so that he can eat, 
take the medicine, and go. And I am left there with the drama of replacing the share for this 
child. He is taking the treatment, and you understand it makes him hungry, and you know 




make them sick and kill them, I swear! 
For ‘Makabello and the other volunteers, offering care also meant becoming embedded in 
new networks of obligation. Acts of care stretched their social safety nets to the point of 
breaking, as their care work bound them to more and more patients who were hungry, 
needy, or dying. Because HIV scale-up created expectations among patients that they 
would receive the help they needed, they were far less reserved about asking directly for 
assistance. And because support group members were sometimes their only meaningful 
point of contact, patients articulated their needs to them, and vocally.  
 In a time of rapid HIV scale-up, money abounded, and therefore schemes to access 
HIV money did as well. Other support groups were less well-intentioned, and citizens 
suspected many groups of secretly hoarding HIV monies or using the names of the sick (or 
falsifying their own HIV statuses) in order to obtain funds. And so this source of true social 
solidarity and collective efficacy became an object of mistrust and derision. Citizens, 
unable to hold governments, clinics, or NGOs accountable, and with little reliable 
information about where funds went or why, turned their anger against those most 
accessible to them, those whom they did know. As a result, some support groups became 
more secretive about their work, guarded their activities more closely, and blamed patients 
around them for being “lazy” and relying too heavily on handouts and charity. “These 
blessed patients,” one of the Bahlokomeli members explained to me, exasperated, “they 
begin to believe that they are sick, that they should just sit and be sick. That is the 
problem…FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], World Vision…World Food 
Program…these people who give them food packages…and even when they have 
recovered, you find that they are now not willing to do anything. They are lazy!” Of 




citizens in the broader community.  
 In this climate, support groups could be held accountable to communities for 
programs, goods or services over which they had little control, even as funders were also 
holding them accountable. Efforts to provide this kind of dual accountability took up a 
great deal of effort. When I visited her, Mme ‘Mats`eliso was as likely to be engaged in 
efforts to build trust, both with fellow community members and various donors and 
agencies, as she was to be engaged in care work. As the most educated member of the 
group, and the most outspoken, these responsibilities fell to her. With donors, ‘Mats`eliso 
went to pains to document funds and group work. To improve trust with group members 
she would always make and receive important phone calls surrounded by group members, 
her small cell phone set to speakerphone so that everyone could listen in on her 
conversations. She was quick to understand that data was the currency of HIV initiatives, 
and kept messy, but dutiful, logs of patients and orphans in the community. With the 
community, building accountability was tougher, especially as the years of HIV scale-up 
wore on. During the research, and just months prior to national elections, Bahlokomeli 
received gifts of food packages from a national NGO that was run by the Prime Minister’s 
wife, ‘Mathatho Mosisili.52 A large event was held in the community, and 25 large, 25 
kilogram food packages were distributed to the elderly in the village—“too much, really!” 
the Bahlokomeli members commented afterwards. They had been asked to identify the 
most needy in the community to receive the packages. Gifts of food are a common tactic 
used by the ruling party to garner votes in Lesotho (Bird, Booth, & Pratt, 2003), and it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Lesotho is not alone in having a powerful political leader’s wife founding and running a national charity 
in her name (see Smith, 2008). In endemically corrupt countries, these entities have been used to siphon off 
public funds. In Lesotho, the organization took its mandate for charity quite seriously. Nevertheless, it 
remains a telling example of how HIV funding disbursements can circulate through the hands of various 
powerful, politically-connected individuals. The organization received the bulk of its funding from the 




would not be surprising if this was their ultimate purpose. A few women from Bahlokomeli 
excitedly talked afterwards about the First Lady’s appearance, and the presence of a 
television crew from the national television station. During the event they looked jubilant, 
dancing and singing praise songs for the First Lady and her entourage.  
 Later, Mme ‘Mats`eliso wearily told me, “we promised we would be back with 
more.” I was confused by what she meant, until she explained that “a few” remaining 
elderly in the village had not received packages, though they were equally needy, and they 
had originally been on the list of eligible recipients submitted to the organization. Then 
there were the orphans, she said, who of course also needed food. She insisted that those 
who had gotten food today were only “the first group” to get aid, and that Bahlokomeli 
could make up the difference, providing the extra bags needed. After quite a bit of 
prodding, I got her to admit numbers: 25 bags had been originally distributed, but she still 
had 28 more on her list who were in dire need. “So we are thinking that as a support 
group, we should buy things for those others, with money from our own pockets. Maybe 
we can at least get 12.5 kilos for everyone…we will do that to make sure that things are 
transparent…and fair…we will contribute from our own pockets…and perhaps we will 
invite the First Lady, so she can observe this as well.” As she spoke, determination 
evaporated into exhaustion. Of course she wanted to be able to provide enough to 
everyone in the village who was truly needy, not just those who had been chosen, but her 
impetus was also fear—fear that neighbors would think they were hoarding the additional 
packages, or that they were to blame for the deficit. To keep peace between Bahlokomeli 
and the community, the members would have to pay for additional food packages—more 
than were originally given—out of their own pockets. I had been with them long enough to 




angry? “It’s more difficult nowadays because donors have policies and laws, and when 
they say 25 [people] that’s it…It’s painful for us because the donors have their own 
policies, which we can’t influence.” My research assistant, more attuned to the potency of 
jealousy in Lesotho, asked, “won’t people just complain about getting different packages?” 
“Yes,” ‘Mats`eliso replied, “but half a loaf is better than no bread at all.”  
 Mme ‘Mats`eliso and the Bahlokomeli members were hardly immune to feelings of 
distrust and embitterment when it came to NGOs and funders. ‘Mats`eliso was by far the 
most outspoken about these feelings, and our conversations would frequently trace a 
circuitous, but familiar, route between the illnesses of those around her, to her ideas and 
efforts about what could be done, to the unfairness and corruption of aspects of HIV scale-
up. Early on in the research when I brought up the Global Fund, she said to me 
conspiratorially, “we know that they came here [to Lesotho], we know the secret that they 
were coming here to help everyone with HIV and AIDS.” She spoke of this as a secret 
because, by her reasoning, no one would want Lesotho’s citizens to know about Global 
Fund’s true intentions of helping everyone, since the government had done such a poor job 
of distributing the funds and implementing the programs. Of course, these perceptions—
the acute disappointment at the lack of government “implementation” of projects, the 
suspicion that HIV money was stowed away somewhere in the capital making civil 
servants ever richer, the sense that nothing good or truly visible had come of HIV money—
was shared by many I interviewed in Ha Mamello. And ‘Mats`eliso did not only reserve her 
derision for the Global Fund. Once when I was attempting to assist Bahlokomeli in 
obtaining a small grant from a foundation in Canada to continue its work, ‘Mats`eliso 
quipped, “Canada is okay, but not those tsotsis [gangsters, thugs] from UNICEF.”  




shift its identity in response to funding availability and the expectations of government, 
donors, and fellow citizens (see Table 5.1, below). In some ways these shifts were simply 
pragmatic; but in other ways they seemed to reflect deeper, and more troubling, shifts in 
how citizens perceive the opportunities for self-making and collective efficacy amidst the 
shifting winds of HIV scale-up. When I first met Bahlokomeli they identified as a support 
group, and the members were mostly older women living with HIV. They were working on 
community education, the national testing campaign (KYS), and assisting families of 
patients and orphans. The work touched on a broad range of issues, from a standpoint of 
solidarity with those living with HIV. That the group members were mostly upstanding, 
older citizens added credibility to their work and reduced the stigma surrounding HIV. As 
treatment efforts unfolded in communities, and as funders focused more on engaging 
community organizations as lay service providers, the work shifted more towards care for 
the sick, treatment support, adherence education, and identifying and serving orphans in 
the community. The group’s members more often referred to themselves as workers, and 
labor was organized around treatment outcomes and monitoring patients. Finally, as the 
research came to a close, ‘Mats`eliso attempted to heal the rifts among members caused by 
the payment issues for CHWs by once again shifting the group’s focus and identity. 
Frustrated by their experiences with governmental and non-governmental sources of 
funding, she now believed that more steady, and flexible, funding for projects could come 
from income-generation projects. At the time, the government had been increasingly 
frustrated by the “dependence” groups had on external funding, and emphasized values of 
self-reliance, accountability, and economic acuity. These messages echoed broader value 
shifts in the global HIV funding discourse, as funders became frustrated with poor 




Watkins, 2009). Following the global financial crisis which began in 2008, funding 
commitments waned, and shifted even further away from resource-intensive, long term 
commitments to objectives like treatment assistance and community support, and towards 
biomedical and technological innovations which they believed were a more efficient use 
of funds (Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation, 2010; Medecins Sans Frontieres, 
2011; Parker, 2000; The World Bank, 2009; UNAIDS & The World Bank, 2009). 
 As ‘Mats`eliso and the other Bahlokomeli members poured resources into income 
generation projects, and embarked on trainings in micro-lending and small business 
ownership, they began to speak of themselves as “entrepreneurs” and “empowered 
women.” I asked ‘Mats`eliso directly if she saw the group as a business or a support group 
anymore; she responded, “we can do these things equally…we are empowered women, 
[but] we will not just focus on the business.” She said that with many members of the 
group “crying” because they were not being paid (as the new official CHWs were), she 
needed to find a way to create income for their work. Redefining the group’s work was a 
strategy for increasing their sense of ownership and empowerment: engaging in income-
producing projects and identify as “empowered women” owner-workers would give them 
control of goals, finances, and future projects. She characterized their previous care work 
as a work of death, whereas entrepreneurship was a labor that was life-affirming: 
“especially in regards to HIV…our minds have to be focused on work, rather than on mafu 
(disease, death).”  This also meant many group members no longer saw value in publicly 
identifying as PLWHA. “They don’t want to be PLOWAs anymore” ‘Mats`eliso said to me, 
using the colloquial term for PLWHAs: “they know they’re positive, but they don’t want 
that identity.” Time will tell how this shift in identities impacts HIV stigma and 




about HIV status is flexible and subject to change, driven by external incentives as well as 
solidarity with other PLWHA. It is important to note that, even after this change, 
Bahlokomeli still sought to assist community members struggling with illness (primarily 
HIV) and its social effects. The shift towards entrepreneurship was not simply driven by 
selfishness, nor did it represent the group turning away from community needs, though this 
might be a likely long-term outcome of the changes. Even as Bahlokomeli seeks increased 
funding and independence in order to better serve community needs, it is likely that these 
new routes to acquiring funding will be viewed by fellow citizens as self-serving 
undertakings. Furthermore, if the group is successful in obtaining resources in this manner, 
it is likely that the presence of these private funds in sight of needy citizens will increase 
patron-client dynamics between support group members and their neighbors.  
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 Bahlokomeli’s evolution over the years conveys lessons about the challenges to 
solidarity that local, community-based groups face in the context of HIV scale-up 
processes. Though classic studies of collective action (c.f. Olson 1971) make grim 
predictions about its likelihood of success or survival, it is evident here that collective 
action proliferated in the early years of scale-up. Olson’s (1971) theory of collective action 
allows that collective action for the provision of public goods (like caring for the sick) will 
be more likely in small groups where individual incentives (like payment for labor) are 
provided. Bahlokomeli is a smaller group, but its members continued work for more than 
half a decade without any individual incentives materializing. Even if the impacts of its 
work were meager given their limited resources, the effort expended and the collective 
efficacy demonstrated in their day to day work was very considerable. Similar findings 
have been reported by researchers, working in Lesotho (ARHAP, 2006; Bowsky, 2004) and 
elsewhere (see Robins, 2008; Parker, 2000, 2011; Petchesky, 2003) who argue that robust 
forms of associational life and collective endeavor are a rich but under-appreciated social 
resource in addressing HIV/AIDS. My intent here is not to romanticize African forms of 
“civil society”—an approach that has been thoroughly and adeptly critiqued by other 
scholars, whose views I share (see, for example, Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999; Mamdani, 
1996). Rather, I am interested in how these nascent but important forms of collective 
action in the face of AIDS—which represent crucial aspects of citizen participation and 
everyday political life in Lesotho—have been challenged, not by the ravages of disease or 
the poverty of their participants, but by the machinery of HIV scale-up, which itself 
frequently claimed to assist, fund, and support such community-based groups.  
 New Social Movement theorists overturned skepticism about the potential for 




dynamics as identity politics and transnational networks for social movement mobilization 
(Castells, 2000; Tarrow, n.d.; Touraine, 1981, 2000). But as Steve Robins (2008), a South 
African anthropologist studying social movement-NGO partnerships, reminds us, “for the 
vast majority of poor people in the developing world the benefits of global civil society 
seem elusive, and their social lives remain as parochial and isolated as ever” (p. 85). Nor is 
the community a space of comfort or easy collectivism—inequalities and unfairness 
abound amongst the poor, exacerbated by the kinds of individualistic strivings for survival 
fostered by global neoliberal realities (Biehl, 2005; Boo, 2012; Roy, 2011). The sculpting 
conditions of everyday life in Lesotho still gravely inhibit the success of collective efforts, 
and are more likely to create feelings of marginality and dislocation than a sense of 
participation and belonging. In contrast to studies by scholars like Appadurai (2002), 
which celebrate a “grassroots globalization” crafted by partnerships between local social 
movements and transnational NGOs, recent work from South Africa (Robins, 2008) and 
India (Roy, 2011) emphasizes the shifting bonds of partnership and boundaries of identity 
in such projects and the pitfalls of inclusionary politics amidst development agendas. Such 
partnerships in Lesotho remain flimsy and power-laden: they did not improve 
Bahlokomeli’s access to information, policymakers, or national conversations about HIV. 
When support was provided (as in the form of salaries for CHWs, or food packages from 
the Office of the First Lady), it often unintentionally posed striking challenges to group 
solidarity and, more importantly, to relationships with other citizens. Collective efficacy 
here is constrained by external factors and resource availability, but also by strains 
between support groups and the citizens they ostensibly aim to serve. Negative perceptions 
and suspicion of national HIV programs among citizens are directed at local support 




and sought out for goods they do not have.  
 
POSWA 
Whereas many PLWHA groups in other countries formed to foster patient activism 
and awareness in order to hold governments accountable to the needs of those affected 
and infected by HIV (Berkman, Garcia, Munoz Laboy, Paiva, & Parker, 2005; Fassin, 
2007b; Parker, 2000, 2011; Petchesky, 2003), most groups in Lesotho emerged in the 
absence of any meaningful activist movements regarding HIV. What is the nature and 
political subjectivity of groups that have formed as a response to the delivery of HIV 
programming, not as a driving force in creating or demanding such programming? Unlike 
Bahlokomeli, many groups in Lesotho emerged after the arrival of material support and 
even ARVs for HIV sufferers. As such, these groups are organized around a galvanizing 
HIV identity, but an identity that underscores mutual efforts to access the resources 
necessary for social and material survival, not participation in activism and social 
movements.  This is largely the case with POSWA (People Openly Surviving With AIDS), 
which started during my research in 2010, a year after ARV treatment had been 
decentralized to clinics across Lesotho. POSWA was started at Mamello clinic, encouraged 
and fostered by the clinic’s HIV counselors. As one of the counselors, Mme ‘Mampho, 
related to me, the people in the group were “people living with the virus. And in that group 
we give each other advice, because sometimes it’s the case that a person is living with the 
virus but she really fails to accept her status. So we give each other psychological support.” 
This view of the support group’s purpose—which emphasizes accepting one’s status and 
psychological support—reflects the intended roles of support groups as envisioned by 




discussion of the support group role evolves: “yes, we have a support group here and we 
give each other advice on how to survive [mekhoa ea ho phelisana]…we make projects, 
we develop projects…because it is said that when you are living with HIV you have to be 
self-reliant; you can’t depend on others.” As it turns out, ‘Mampho’s second statement 
about the group was far more reflective of reality. Despite the attention paid to visions of 
psycho-social support, mutual support, and a kind of “talk therapy” for PLWHA within and 
beyond Lesotho, when POSWA’s members spoke about support, they most often meant 
material support, and communal projects that could provide for their collective and 
individual survival.  
Despite the fact that many support groups in Lesotho have never succeeded in 
accessing funding to support their activities,53 the perception among patients and citizens 
was that PLWHA groups existed to assist their members in accessing resources. Though 
most agreed that Bahlokomeli was a fundamentally different kind of group than those 
designed to obtain resources for PLWHA members, I encountered community members 
and even NGO staff who skeptically dismissed Bahlokomeli as corrupt and presumed its 
members were only after donor funds for themselves. Thus, whereas support groups (as 
imagined by development and HIV experts and policymakers) were intended to provide 
the conditions for psychological well-being and improve treatment and prevention 
outcomes at a grassroots level, they were perceived by patients and citizens as a crucial 
social safety net amidst the economic and social vulnerability brought about by HIV/AIDS. 
Leabua, a middle-aged man getting treatment at the clinic, told me he would “love” to be a 
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tiny village in a rural area in central Lesotho. They had been working as a support group for almost a 




member of a support group “because we [PLWHA] are living such stressful lives. There are 
a lot of things that cause our stress, and the associations can help even in cases where a 
patient dies—your kids will have a means of survival.” Though Leabua talks about stress, 
the stresses in his life are decidedly material; he worries about how he can provide for his 
children if he dies. For him, the support group, which fosters bonds of obligation among 
members, might provide an answer to his concerns. Interestingly, however, even when 
support groups offered potential access to HIV funds, they also required an investment of 
resources from group members that could be considerable, and is often overlooked by 
Western policymakers. Within POSWA, members paid dues that were intended to operate 
as a rotating saving association (mokhatlo) among members (similar to a South African 
“stokvel”). But instead of putting members’ dues towards capital for projects or loaning 
them out for interest, as is usually the case in such associations, dues were used to pay for 
members’ transportation to the hospital when sick, for funeral fees, or to support dead 
members’ families.54 Even among groups that did not collect dues, like Bahlokomeli, 
membership required investments of time, materials, food, and money for transportation. 
Thus, when I asked Letsie, a young man who was unemployed and living with HIV, if he 
wanted to join a support group, he replied, “I don’t think I can afford it.” As a result, 
support groups, especially those like POSWA, do not represent the most needy populations 
of patients; rather they represent those who have enough financial cushion to invest bits of 
money into the group and commit time to group activities and meetings.  
POSWA had been started in the tense aftermath of World Vision’s introduction of 
food packages at the clinic. Because the clinic had so many patients in need of food 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 A key difference here is not about the distribution of funds—there are even mokhatlo that operate as 
informal funeral schemes—but the rules and practices for distribution. Here, distribution is determined by 




packages, and packages were limited, they rationed the food packages by giving them to 
patients for three-, six-, or nine-month periods, an attempt to rotate as many patients as 
possible through the experience of receiving food packages, a strategy that likely did little 
to improve their long-term nutrition. Though the process for ranking patients on the list of 
the needy was shrouded in secrecy, most informants reported that those who had appeared 
first on the list were those who had been taking ARVs the longest—not patients in the most 
acute need of nutritional assistance. Unfortunately, when the clinic moved to take the first 
group of patients off of the food package recipient list, the patients complained about 
suddenly losing access to the packages. The clinic counselors instead encouraged them to 
form a support group in the hopes that they could start an agricultural or food cultivation 
program, and assisted them in reaching out to various sources of support. Ultimately, the 
group became connected with Send a Cow, a smaller NGO that was promoting household 
gardening schemes and livestock husbandry among community groups in Lesotho. As Send 
a Cow took on the group as part of its community food sustainability program, the group’s 
labor and purpose shifted noticeably towards developing household gardening systems and 
learning about nutrition.  
Because Lesotho is perennially food insecure (Makenete, Ortman, & Darroch, 
1998; Mphale & Rwambali, n.d.; Turner, 2009), particularly among patients and families 
affected by HIV and AIDS (Drimie & Casale, 2009; Drimie, 2003; Himmelgreen et al., 
2009; Romero-daza, Himmelgreen, Noble, & Turkon, 2009), a number of household 
gardening and food security schemes have proliferated in recent years, spearheaded by 
different NGOs. At the centerpiece of most strategies is the “keyhole garden” approach, 
which encourages participants to build round, elevated household gardens—a design that 




water-conserving, and a source of more diverse nutrition for families (Romero-daza et al., 
2009; Turner, 2009). NGOs promoting such gardening schemes compete with one 
another, each claiming a more effective or successful strategy. For Send a Cow, the guiding 
objective of the project was to use a stepwise training process with communities that 
focused on building sustainable gardening and agricultural skills as well as on instruction 
to “change recipients’ mindsets” and address what the program director called 
“dependency syndrome” among Basotho. At the end of this process of training, groups 
were guided in giving “gifts” of young chickens or livestock that they had raised to other 
members. In this way, the program made recipients into “donors themselves.” By “creating 
donors…and beneficiaries” in communities, the program director reported to me, members 
become empowered: “now they are EUs, UNDPs, don’t you see?” (M. L. Lepele, personal 
communication, January 18, 2011). 
Ultimately, the group’s interaction with Send a Cow (SAC) wavered between 
frustration and confusion. Lack of clarity about what the NGO was going to give them, and 
at what times, led to accusations of hoarding and corruption against the group’s leaders. 
SAC emphasized productive labor on projects as evidence of commitment to the program, 
and as a rough measure of group participation. Most support group meetings started off 
with a tallying of whose gardens, trenches, and other projects had been completed. Among 
HIV patients—a number of whom were dealing with the symptoms of AIDS or bouts of 
severe illness—this measure of success produced tensions and anger towards members 
who could not pull their weight, even as the group struggled to acknowledge that as a 
support group they should be supportive of all members.  
Motsumi was a member of the group who also worked as the clinic’s gardener. He 




during the time I worked with POSWA. As POSWA’s partnership with SAC continued, his 
frustration mounted. When I first met him at the clinic, he said to me bluntly,  
Maybe you are just like these people, who are just using us—saying you are doing things 
for the sake of people with HIV, talking to us, and maybe you are going to get some funds 
and they will be of no use to us! …It’s because Send a Cow—these people came here and 
registered our names, and they were asking us how they could help us. I have pigs already 
so I said, “you can help me with feed, and help me understand how I can develop this 
thing, and sell things and get something.” So you understand that they are promising us 
[things], and making it seem as if we are going to get something. And in the end there is 
nothing. 
Motsumi continued to be very vocal about the fact that he felt NGOs were using support 
groups like theirs—and in particular, the names of people living with HIV—to get grant 
funds, and then failing to distribute those funds to communities in ways that actually 
assisted them. “When you look at all of these organizations coming here, when you take a 
close look at them, you realize that these are the organizations that want to use us to 
become rich themselves.” He uses the phrase, “ba ja ka rona,” which literally means, 
”‘they eat through [or because of] us,” but plays on a second meaning of the organizations 
eating from the patients, literally growing fat from their flesh. (Below, I further discuss the 
meanings of discourses of “eating” among patients in Lesotho.) Motsumi was also 
outspoken about the fact that he expected to get resources in return for participating in a 
support group. For him, the support group was the “group of Send a Cow” (emphasis 
added).  
 Motsumi’s perspective was both refreshing and distressing to hear. On the one hand, 
he gave voice to common, but often unspoken, fears among HIV patients that they were 
being used by the government and NGOs. Often these fears were fueled by lack of access 
to information about HIV programming, and the common perception that no one was 




This is why we are living under oppression [khatello], because you know that when these 
people [the government and NGOs] come and tell us, “we’ll do this and that,”…They come 
to us—and we realize that this is the way that they eat from us. Because the money that 
they received will be coming from other countries and they will be saying that they are 
doing something for us, but these are just empty promises…these other countries think they 
are giving aid [phallela] to these people [living with HIV], but the aid never reaches them. 
On the other hand, however, Motsumi also gives voice to widely-held but typically 
unspoken presumptions among community members that HIV will bring aid, money, and 
resources into their communities. He, along with others, assumes that support groups are 
established in order to obtain money from the government. Despite the fact that he has a 
job, and even has livestock (which, by local standards, makes him better off than many—
certainly not at risk of starvation), he believes membership in a support group should 
provide him with goods and resources.  
 Why are discourses like these so uncomfortable for those in the development 
industry to hear? I believe it is because they disrupt a set of core presumptions about the 
meanings and purposes of HIV programming and aid: that support groups should arise 
organically, operate selflessly, and respond to patients’ psychological needs; that HIV 
programming and “development” are different programs, with different purposes; that the 
largely biomedical provisions for persons living with HIV have the power, alone, to ensure 
survival; and that recipient populations should respect the priorities and programming 
decisions of HIV experts, government planners, and funding agencies. Of course, from the 
perspective of patients and citizens in Ha Mamello, it’s not difficult to see why they would 
assume that HIV money would improve their lives, why their survival would necessitate 
more than tests and drugs, and why they would use any means possible to transform HIV 
from a life-threatening illness into a condition of survival.  
 It was not long before Motsumi was kicked out of the group, but not because he 




more disruptive ways. Motsumi did not see the benefit of being in the group, but neither 
did he want to quit—he held out hope that funds would eventually materialize. Instead, his 
fellow group members pushed him out of the group in the middle of a meeting, after he 
had reported that he was struggling to build his own gardens and work on others’ gardens 
because of his failing health, and his responsibilities as the clinic’s gardener. His inability 
(and perhaps, to some degree, his unwillingness) to contribute enough labor to the group 
disqualified him from membership in the eyes of the group. It is labor that concerned 
POSWA’s members, and I attended many meetings where HIV was not even mentioned, 
except amidst bickering over the consequences of a sick or dying member not paying their 
dues.  
 When HIV finally did come up at a meeting, it arose because the group had 
renewed its connection with LENEPWHA, the national association of people living with 
HIV, which serves as an umbrella body for support groups of PLWHA scattered across the 
country. Though POSWA paid dues to LENEPWHA, contact had been limited until its 
members were invited to attend a national training on Positive Prevention for persons 
living with HIV. At this meeting, POSWA’s leaders proudly reported to LENEPWHA that 
they had formed a partnership with Send a Cow and were involved in many agricultural 
activities. In response, they were reminded, firmly, that they were not just some mekhatlo 
[village association] intended to raise pigs and have cooperative gardens and save money 
for themselves—they were a support group. LENEPWHA had recently gone through 
changes, having lost funding and then acquired a new director from Uganda. Priority shifts 
had been enacted as well, and relayed to support groups through district LENEPWHA 
councils. Income generation projects (like gardens) were being discouraged, and groups 




bring in income for activities. In addition, they embarked on a new positive prevention 
strategy, encouraging PLWHA to be “catalysts for prevention” in their communities, and 
asking groups to engage in prevention education among themselves, but also with the 
broader community. Drawing on the language of transnational patient-activists, 
LENEPWHA’s director spoke about the principles of Greater Involvement of People with 
AIDS (GIPA) and about activism, but harnessed these principles to the objectives of 
positive prevention: the most important way to involve PLWHA, he said, was through their 
participation in prevention activities. Involving support groups as service providers was re-
imagined, by LENEPWHA, as the embodiment of patient activism (J. Taineomwangire, 
personal communication, 4 June 2011).55  
 I sat with POSWA’s members in their monthly meeting following the LENEPWHA 
event. The discussion that unfolded, over the course of a few hours, reflects a dense web of 
tensions and concerns in the group that deserve further attention. Like Bahlokomeli, the 
group was on the cusp of an identity shift, and also faced internal struggles over resources, 
labor, and their collective and individual vulnerabilities. Though they faced similar 
constraints, the group’s goals and understandings of their role were markedly different from 
those of Bahlokomeli.  
 POSWA’s leader—a forceful, sometimes dismissive older man named Ntate 
Moeletsi—cautioned members that they must “change the form of our group. We are not a 
society [mokhatlo], are we? We are a group for support, arent’t we?” Here, he tries to draw 
a comparison between the tradition of mekhatlo—societies—in which community 
members pool resources in order to start a business or make money, and support groups, 
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(2007), which argues that support groups and activist organizations are increasingly co-opted by states 
intent on using their labor for service provision. In this case, however, the limited engagement of activists 




for which he uses the English phrase, “group for support.” A support group is less about 
mutual accountability (which is a driving force in mekhatlo or “stokvels,” as they are 
known in South Africa) and more about mutual assistance. Yet the group struggled with 
this differentiation between two forms of support [ts`ehetso]: how are they to practice 
mutual support if they do not have resources with which to assist one another? 
LENEPWHA had also conveyed to support groups that they should not concern themselves 
with activities like taking care of orphans and vulnerable children (OVCs)—these fall 
outside the scope of what a support group should be doing. This advice hardly even makes 
sense to the group, and many of the older female members are outraged: “the orphans 
come from us, from this group!  Because we are the ones who die and leave them behind!”  
 Josefa, an often outspoken, and at times confrontational, young member, has 
attended the meeting, and reports back his reactions to what they were told by 
LENEPWHA. His anger—which at other times would be considered rude by the older 
members of the group—opens up a space for honest dialogue about painful group 
dilemmas, dilemmas which are often only manifest in terse silences and frequent bickering 
among members. “So I emphasized [at the meeting] the major problem we are facing as a 
support group…I asked whether LENEPWHA can actually help us if we have a problem 
here.” He goes on to ask, “what if we have a corpse?” using a derogatory term for the 
dead. He asks what LENEPWHA would do if they had a member who had passed away 
and had no funds with which to bury that person. He talks about how the group struggles 
to pay for the death and illness of its members: 
Sometimes we have to break our own wardrobes [to make a coffin]. So we [members] are 
not working [we don’t have income], and this member of ours who is dead was living in a 
rented apartment. Maybe she doesn’t have relatives [who support her] anymore. It’s a huge 
problem for us. [So I asked LENEPWHA] can we come to you here to see that we get those 
bones out of the malaene and into the grave? And they said no. And I said, okay, so let’s 




orphans who are left by us [as support group members] and left to us directly [to care for, as 
support group members], not those that we are helping as a support group more generally 
[in the community]. Where are the orphans going to stay now that they are living in a 
rented apartment? …[So I said to LENEPWHA], are you not going to answer me this 
question?  And they said they were not going to say anything. 
Josefa continues, emphasizing that he is not begging LENEPWHA for help, but asking 
because “the funds are coming into the country!  Yet they are not reaching down into the 
community the way they were meant to.” He mentions with disgust that LENEPWHA’s 
leaders told him they should be able to earn their own money; someone else tells him they 
should take the children to the office of Social Welfare, an answer he finds similarly 
insufficient.  
I said, I have been going for more than six months now requesting assistance from Social 
Welfare for my crippled child [without getting help]!  Yet [from those offices] we always 
hear, “The government has nothing! The government hasn’t received anything!”…How can 
we wait for the government to receive [funds] while we have a corpse waiting in this 
house? 
He asks where the HIV money has gone, if it has not gone to the government, and not 
gone to the support groups, and not gone to the communities. He tells the group that 
LENEPWHA’s response was, “‘our assistance is only in the form of psychological 
counseling trainings, and workshops like this one. That is what LENEPWHA is accountable 
for.”  
 By speaking about what LENEPWHA will and will not do for them, Josefa touches 
on deeper issues regarding the meanings of support for the group. In recent months the 
members have seemed to realize that being part of a support group binds them through ties 
of obligation to other members. In this, it acts as a second family in Lesotho—it is obliged 
to help when members are sick, and resources must be shared among the group. For those 
group members who have been pushed out of their family homes, or lost family support as 




obligation can quickly become bonds of mutual susceptibility, as the sicknesses and deaths 
of other members demand material assistance from those that are well, and members take 
on the considerable financial responsibilities of other members’ funerals, families, and 
illnesses. Group members can quickly became resentful of those binds when support or 
resources are not provided by the government or NGOs, particularly for groups that have 
formed at the behest of these entities.  
 Ntate Moeletsi is frustrated by Josefa’s outburst. “Let me tell you something,” he 
says firmly to the group, as other members also begin to complain about LENEPWHA’s 
indifference. “Some members have shown us that there are problems they have with the 
organizations [like LENEPWHA] that [we] are accountable to…The only way to overcome 
these problems so that the government can know what we want and what we don’t want is 
through LENEPWHA, because it is like our mother. It is the mother of all of these 
organizations. Unless we stand up on our feet to make this right with LENEPWHA, without 
LENEPWHA, there’s nowhere we can go. We have no other channel except LENEPWHA.” 
Later on Ntate Moeletsi tells the group that one of LENEPWHA’s leaders had recently been 
threatened by a government minister [he does not clarify which one], who chided her for 
criticizing the ministry’s work, and warned her not to “talk about him or her in a bad way 
on television, or talk about any of the ministry’s issues….this minister got offended when 
she told the public, ‘these are some of the challenges,’ and even threatened to disband 
LENEPWHA, saying, ‘nka se qhala seranthana sena’ [‘I can break up this whole useless 
piece of trash’].’” He cautions the group that, like them, LENEPWHA also has to 
“remember its place,” and though he emphasizes that it is an “independent association in 
the country” and “only pointing out our rights,” it is obvious that he is trying to convey a 




in power. His speech is cautionary, but not just about the role of the government. If the 
government can break up LENEPWHA, then LENEPWHA can break up POSWA. He 
emphasizes, “it is only through LENEPWHA that the government and the funders will listen 
to us.”  
 Josefa responds, still angry. “We should meet with the leaders, with our complaints 
and our cries…I’m trying to say to you, that with all of our concerns, as long as we are just 
shutting our mouths, nothing will work for us, because we are saying nothing! Ngoan’a 
salleng o shoela tharing! [The baby girl who fails to cry dies strapped to her mother’s 
back]”56 This interchange between Ntate Moeletsi and Josefa gets to the heart of the danger 
and frustration groups encounter in a context where activism is punished. As an umbrella 
organization and service provider, LENEPWHA operates with broad assistance from the 
government and ministries, which allow it to be a recipient on large grants from the Global 
Fund and other agencies. In return, LENEPWHA serves as the token representative of 
PLWHA in Lesotho on committees, at national meetings, and in policymaking sessions. It’s 
a dangerous bargain they’ve struck with the government—and one in which the 
government can easily strike down their funding or replace them with another organization 
if they criticize government services.57 Similarly, groups like POSWA view LENEPWHA as 
a gatekeeper to resources and grants, and are loath to forfeit that source of support, paltry 
though it may seem at times. Since LENEPWHA speaks for support groups at a national 
level, they are afraid of losing membership in that voice, and so refrain from speaking out 
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interest groups, but as service providers, are poor activists because they are also dependent on governments 




against government policy themselves, even when it seems that LENEPWHA has served 
them poorly. These clientelistic relations—between support groups and national advocacy 
bodies, and between LENEPWHA and the government—undermine the possibilities for 
real activism on HIV policy, and citizen participation in national dialogues. Despite Josefa 
and other POSWA member’s awareness that failing to cry out may result in their eventual 
ruin, there is little likelihood that these words will translate into action.  
 
Project Culture and a Politics of Recipiency 
 What emerges from the experiences of these two support groups, despite their clear 
differences, is a story about how citizens craft survival, mold political identities, and 
interact with powerful institutions amidst HIV scale-up. Even as NGOs and governments 
tout community-based responses to HIV and ask citizens to devote considerable labor to 
their initiatives, citizens and groups remain highly marginalized within HIV scale-up 
processes. The changing dynamics between citizens, support groups, NGOs and the state 
are also changing broader patterns of citizenship and democracy, altering trust in 
institutions, expectations of the state, strategies for survival, and opportunities for collective 
engagement and solidarity. HIV scale-up has created a “project culture” that permeates 
both the structure of work for NGOs and governments and the structure of everyday life for 
recipient-citizens.58 Yet Bahlokomeli and POSWA are primarily engaged in projects for 
community, group, and individual survival and membership. Amidst the project culture in 
which they are ensnared, such groups struggle to create life projects (see chapter 3) that 
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provide for legitimacy, belonging, and long-term access to social and material capital. One 
survives in this social landscape through engaging in a politics of recipiency. By this I mean 
a set of actions, discourses and orientations towards institutions that may provide 
temporary resources and membership. This includes group and individual efforts to remake 
identities (over and over again) to meet changing priorities, various strategies of seeking 
and obtaining resources from funders and institutions, and work undertaken during and in 
the aftermath of projects to translate project goods and priorities into useful and equitable 
social goods.  
 The politics of recipiency occurs in the midst of prevalent discourses about the 
Mosotho citizen as someone dependent on aid, unable to provide for his or her own 
welfare, whose abilities have atrophied due to years of “charity.” It is not uncommon to 
see citizens turn this discourse inwards, towards themselves, their neighbors, or fellow 
support group members. Citizens bemoan a “culture of hand-outs” and blame others for a 
“dependency syndrome” even as they are reduced to supplicating themselves to NGO 
workers and begging for basic goods whenever they have a chance to do so. At a high-
level, national HIV policy meeting in mid 2011, a leading representative of the National 
AIDS Commission began the meeting by speaking about the global economic crisis, its 
impact on HIV funding for the country, and his fears that this would mean disruptions in 
treatment for PLWHA. He chided the audience that the country had become “dependent” 
on external funding, cupping his two hands together in a gesture of begging. “What are we 
going to do to stop wearing the Basotho hat upside down?  Because we know that when 
you are wearing it upside down you are getting all of the donor money, right?” The 
Basotho hat (mokorotlo) is a conical-shaped hat woven of grass that is one of the most 




mountain near which King Moshoeshoe settled with his displaced followers and 
established Lesotho, but it also reflects a more contemporary set of symbols central to 
national pride and political identity. Its shape recalls the shape of the roofs of Lesotho’s 
traditional round houses (mekhoro), which symbolize shelter, but also kinship, community, 
and neighborliness. If the mekhoro and mokorotlo are essential national symbols, then the 
Basotho citizenry can be said to reside under a single roof, and he who wears the 
mokorotlo shows a pride in the self-sufficiency, unity, and collective solidarity of the 
nation. Speaking of the “Basotho hat turned upside down” creates an image of an inverted 
cone, whose shape the speaker compares to two hands cupped in a gesture of begging. But 
there is a deeper inversion here—a loss of culture, and a symbol of a house upended. In 
place of a roof there is a vessel, but one that evokes a sense of collective vulnerability. This 
metaphor is emblematic of a current Basotho crisis of identity, in which a nation which is 
dependent for survival on “hand-outs” and “charity” nonetheless sees these resulting in an 
inversion of national values. Even as the speaker reprimands his audience for their 
dependence on foreign aid for HIV, he speaks in the second person, indicating that he and 
his listeners are all guilty of these practices.  
 Kalofonos (2008) reports similar dialogues about laziness and the search for truly 
“deserving” recipients of aid among PLWHA in Mozambique. He rightly points out that 
these discourses trap recipients in a double-bind where they will never be truly deserving 
of aid:  
Association members and people living with HIV/AIDS were accused of having become 
accustomed to and dependent on aid programs, and as their stated needs were therefore not 
real, they could be dismissed as the products of laziness. In the clinic, on the other hand, 
those with too much agency were not deemed worthy of receiving food aid because they 
were not helpless enough. The search for the worthy beneficiary, the passive and authentic 
sufferer, the innocent victim that could be saved by humanitarian aid, was fruitless (p 211-




But fears about “dependency” and “cultures of handouts” in a time of AIDS are emerging 
at the same time as institutional changes that are dismantling the links between state and 
citizen. Bonds of civic obligation between institutions and citizens and the recognition of 
the basic elements of social survival—the very core of social contracts—are being replaced 
with projects, poor information, lack of recognition, and broken dialogues. Even as HIV 
scale-up conditions create perceptions of aid dependence by disrupting the social contract 
between states and citizens, the architects of HIV programming ask citizens to be self-
sufficient, “sustainable,” individualistic, and deserving consumers of program services 
(Kalofonos, 2008; Nguyen, 2010; Swidler & Watkins, 2009; UNAIDS, 2001). Nor is aid 
dependence simply a financial matter: dependence reflects deeply-embedded forms of 
governmentality, hierarchy, and control between donors and recipients, subjectifications 
that are too often overlooked amid perceptions of “giving” as inherently good (see Galvão, 
2000). 
 As a result, citizens experience acute feelings of invisibility and dis-membership. 
Those I interviewed, visited and spoke to in Ha Mamello and other villages constantly 
asked where the money had gone; certainly, they felt they had never seen it:  
-  The government is above us, but the money never comes down and reaches us! 
-  The government reports these statistics to funders and other governments, but we never 
get any of the money! 
-  We see the cars driving around that are for the Ministry of Health, but they never come 
here! 
I am less concerned with the objective accuracy of these statements,59 and more 
concerned with what they reflect about citizen subjectivities in the time of HIV scale-up. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 For, certainly, HIV money had expanded HIV treatment into clinics across the country, broadened the 
health care workforce, trained nurses and doctors to manage HIV and AIDS, and funded programs for 




First, distrust regarding the way money is spent and suspicions of corruption are most 
frequently turned towards the government. This likely contributes to the declines in 
democratic faith that are evident in the Afrobarometer data discussed in chapter 2. NGOs, 
funders, and international organizations are rarely held responsible to the extent that the 
government is, despite frustration over how programs are carried out. Second, as citizens 
gaze out the windows of public taxis at trendy, well-designed ad campaigns promoting 
condoms and safe sex, or stand on street corners and watch fancy new government 
vehicles drive past them, they become more and more aware that HIV money has not 
reached their lives in meaningful ways. Though ARVs are available in clinics, and 
clinicians are far better trained to dispense them, and programs abound for those living 
with HIV or orphans, the palpable sense among citizens is that they are being cheated of 
the funds intended to help them. This is likely in part because the average citizen sees little 
impact of such funds on his or her daily life. Furthermore, even citizens who lack 
knowledge about specific programs are capable of identifying unfair distribution when they 
see it. Regardless of the extent of its validity, it is the perception itself that should concern 
us; if citizens feel there has been no implementation, if they see no value in the services 
being deployed, and if they sense that nothing has been done with the money the country 
has received, then an ever-widening chasm opens up between citizens and the state, and 
between recipients and donors of such aid.  
 
To Eat and Be Eaten 
 Though citizens are often afraid to speak openly about their disapproval of HIV 
scale-up, for fear that they will lose what little access they have to programs, they are not 




but none constitute truly bold and effective forms of participation. Rather, they are 
“weapons of the weak” (Scott, 1987), discursive guerilla warfare that relies on metaphor, 
masked claims, and calculated appeals (see also Swidler, 2006). In this final section, I 
discuss the most prominent of these strategies of engagement—talk of hunger, eating, and 
the bodies of the ill and dying—as evidence of a discursive resistance and veiled 
engagement among citizens who see the processes of HIV scale-up as damaging and 
insufficient.  
 “Eating” and “hunger” occupy a prominent place in the African political lexicon. 
Bayart (2009) drew attention to “the politics of the belly” as a prime condition of African 
statehood after colonialism, identifying “eating” of state resources and the rotund bellies of 
prominent statesmen as a currency and symbol of political power. To “eat,” to “have a 
slice of the [national] cake,” or to “get fat” are phrases used across African countries to 
describe the actions of those who are more powerful and consume more than their fair 
share of resources, typically through processes we in the West would consider corrupt 
(Smith, 2008; Bayart 2009). HIV/AIDS funding initiatives open up new opportunities for 
“eating,” for politicians, but also for new AIDS entrepreneurs: Epstein (2007) reports on “fat 
AIDS” in Uganda, where HIV has been transformed from “the slim disease” into an 
opportunity to acquire vast resources. “Fat AIDS had become so common in Uganda…that 
if you said you were working on HIV, people thought you were a thief,” she writes (quoted 
in Kalofonos, 2008, p. 213). Nearly every discourse about eating is also about unfairness 
and inequalities, and in Lesotho, patients, support group members, and even political 
leaders spoke to me in the language of eating as well. When I spoke to a community 
member about whether she thought POSWA would allow new members to join, she 




people!”; when I asked a longtime patient from Mamello clinic what has been the most 
noticeable change since ART was introduced, her only answer is, “some people have 
gotten fat.”  
 In his landmark work on hunger and ARVs in Mozambique, Kalofonos (2008, 
2010) explains how hunger among PLWHA is simultaneously a physical condition caused 
by HIV treatment and the often myopic focus on biomedical services at the expense of 
attention to social needs in HIV programs, as well as a metaphoric discourse that contests 
the marginal position of Mozambicans amidst scale-up. In addition to Lesotho’s lengthy 
and worsening patterns of food insecurity and periodic famine,60 it is unquestionable that 
HIV thrusts individuals and families into acute and chronic episodes of hunger—what De 
Waal and Whiteside (2003) term “new variant famine.” The wasting caused by AIDS and 
the subsequent metabolic changes brought about by HIV treatment also cause acute 
hunger among HIV patients (Kalofonos, 2008; Mangili, Murman, Zampini, & Wanke, 
2006; Tang et al., 2002). Finally, patients in Lesotho and elsewhere constantly complain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Lesotho faces persistent, long-term food insecurities that have recently been seriously exacerbated by 
HIV-related illness and death. Anthropologists and historians have described how Lesotho’s food insecurity 
is the result not of bad luck, poor farming skills or unhappy circumstance, but of the absorption of its most 
fertile lands into South Africa (Ferguson, 1994).  Whereas Lesotho was once considered the breadbasket 
for South Africa, exporting grains and staple foods to the mining and industrial areas, it is now entirely 
reliant on food imports. While history has not been kind to food production, increasing population density, 
overgrazing, erosion, and drought have further inhibited families’ abilities to grow their own food. 
Research in the 1960s-80s documented the increasing risks and decreasing returns involved in food 
production in Lesotho, with Colin Murray (1981) pointing out that it was only cash income from deployed 
and returning labor migrants to South Africa that made farming a feasible investment, and allowed rural 
families to eat. Poverty has increased dramatically since the 1980s, following successive waves of mining 
retrenchments. Currently, only 10.87% of land in Lesotho is arable, and the country is a net importer of 
food, getting nearly 70% of food from imports (Romero-Daza et al., 2009, p. 24). The diet of most Basotho 
is also markedly over-reliant on cereals, primarily maize meal, and lacking in variation (FAOSTAT, cited 
in Romero-Daza et al., 2009). More than 45% of children under 5 in Lesotho are reported to be stunted, a 
major indicator of severe and chronic nutritional deficiencies (WHO, 2012). Those who subsist daily on 
papa and meroho [pap and green vegetables] are keenly aware, in such a strikingly unequal society, of the 
nutritional and symbolic inadequacies of such a diet. Food is an extremely salient marker of class 
inequalities. Because the price of food is so high, and opportunities for subsistence production are rife with 
difficulties, many Basotho spend the vast majority of any cash income they have on food. Poor households 
in a recent survey reported that they spent 75-80% of their collective income on food (Romero-Daza et al., 




that taking ARVs on an empty stomach causes nausea and stomach cramps, and inhibits 
their ability to adhere to medication regimes.  
 Discussions of HIV and hunger were, by far, the most common topic of concern 
among my informants in all research sites. Comments about hunger were strikingly similar 
across different contexts and groups, and always focused on the following argument: 1) I 
am hungry, and I do not have enough to eat; 2) I am on ARVs, and the doctors tell me to 
take these pills with food; 3) If I do not take these pills with food, I will die. In each and 
every case, patients attributed vast power to their ARVs, speaking of ARVs as agentive:  
-  The pills want us to eat [lipilisi li batla re je]…otherwise you will die….I’m scared of these 
pills…so if I don’t eat, I won’t take them.  
-  The pills force us to eat [lipilisi li re qobella ho ja]. 
-  The pills eat us from inside [lipilisi li ja ho rona]. 
-  The pills force me to steal. 
In Sesotho, eating takes on additional meanings. In common lore about witchcraft and 
Satanism, powerful individuals are said to consume the body parts of strong, young victims 
in order to gain power and economic wealth (sometimes bodies are burnt, and the ashes 
consumed).61 Through occult, evil practices, eating bodies is seen as a means of gaining 
power one has no right to have. When Mme ‘Mats`eliso and her support group members 
tell me of their anger at the government for not paying them for their work, they assert, “yet 
we are the ones who are bringing [the government] the blood!” In a literal sense, they are 
speaking about the spots of blood on the HIV tests they collect during community testing 
campaigns, and of the blood of the patients they send to the clinics to be tested. Yet they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  These	  stories	  are	  so	  ubiquitous	  that	  my	  research	  assistant	  recalled,	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  a	  child,	  attending	  public	  
assemblies	  at	  her	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  which	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  Indian	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also speak about “blood” in the sense of the infected blood of the patients whom they send 
in to the clinics. This way of speaking about “bringing [the government] the blood” draws 
on more sinister perceptions that the government is consuming the diseased blood of 
patients in order to obtain further funds for HIV.  
 In addition, the passive verb form of “to eat” (ho jeoa, “to be eaten”) is used in 
Sesotho as a common expression of illness. A sick patient is often asked, “u jeoa ke eng?” 
or, where are you eaten? The sick are eaten from inside out: such expressions gain even 
more symbolic weight in the era of rampant HIV and TB, where wasted bodies look 
distinctly as if they are eaten away by illness. And, of course, patients’ ‘eating’ and 
consumption of medicines has the dual purpose of not just healing the body, but feeding it, 
restoring it to its fattened status.  
 What are we to make, then, of these prevalent discourses about ARVs, and the 
forceful role they play in creating patient hunger, and even causing patients to steal food, 
or die from the toxicity of drugs?  First, we should not underestimate or overlook the very 
real experiences of hunger among patients affected by HIV, and the vast insufficiency of 
current food aid programs in Lesotho to address the current crises of food insecurity. As 
Vinh-Kim Nguyen asserts, ARVs and food packages serve primarily as “postcolonial 
palliatives while the rich continue to eat the poor” (quoted in Kalofonos, 2008, p. 218). But 
given the rich meanings attributed to “eating” across African polities, these discourses 
cannot simply be read as commentaries on material deficit and physiological experience. 
Rather, they simultaneously speak to broader concerns among PLWHA and other citizens 
in Lesotho about the redistributive insufficiencies of HIV programs and the injustice of HIV 
scale-up processes. As political leaders and civil servants get fat off of AIDS money, the 




basic resources. When patients speak about “being eaten” by ARVs, they use a phrase that 
typically describes physical illness (ho jeoa) to highlight the insufficiency of 
pharmaceuticals, the way they make them sick in the absence of other resources for 
survival. These claims also speak to the feeling of being eaten by those who have gotten fat 
off of AIDS money—as their diseased and wasted bodies are counted, treated, and used to 
bring in funding. Talk of hunger, then, is a decidedly political endeavor, and eating 
becomes a language, a lexicon, of the experiences of marginality and injustice that citizens 







The Body Sac(RED): Public Treatment and Private 
Interests in the Transnational Garment Sector 
 “Even if your father is used to whipping your mother,  
he doesn’t do it in front of visitors.” 
—HIV counselor, New Century factory clinic 
 
 I arrived at New Century factory62 on a cold, rainy morning in February 2011 to find 
a crowd of workers forming a recalcitrant line against the drab outer wall of the on-site 
clinic. I was surprised to find so many women waiting for services. Whereas queuing up 
for services in Lesotho’s public clinics constitutes a kind of patient labor—and a labor of 
patience—that can stretch on for days, the factory management frowned on workers 
lingering too long at the clinic. Their time was more valuably spent laboring on the 
“lines”—row upon row of sewing and cutting stations where they worked 10 to 12 hour 
shifts producing garments for US labels. Nevertheless, workers, especially those on ARVs, 
would arrive at the clinic early for appointments, or request doctors on already crowded 
clinic days, so as to afford themselves a moment of respite waiting in the cramped hallway 
outside the examining room. Sitting on hard benches, heads resting on the wall behind 
them or on a neighbor’s shoulder, they collected and bartered these quiet spots of time 
away from the machines, the noise, the constant moving and making of the factory floor.  
 This day felt eerily different. The hallway of the clinic was empty but for a few 
patients holding their treatment cards, and a floor manager was blocking the doorway to 
the clinic, shouting at the soggy and perturbed workers outside to “shut up” and “stop 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 To protect workers from harm—either from their bosses, or from their factories losing contracts—the 
name of the factory has been changed. This likely does not offer full factory anonymity, but offers some 
measure of protection. This is buttressed by withholding any personal, identifying information about any 
individuals included in the chapter. Data includes information provided by workers from other factories, 




being rude.” Inside the clinic, the normal shuffle of patients in and out of the nurse’s office 
was absent. Workers were being shuttled into another consulting room by the manager, 
where, beyond the tightly shut blinds, they were asked to submit themselves to a vaginal 
examination, conducted by the clinic staff and overseen by the factory management. The 
exam was intended to determine whether or not they had recently had a baby.  
 In order to explain how this deeply troubling incident came about—how a factory 
clinic and its clinicians were co-opted into performing forensic investigations of female 
workers’ bodies, and how female workers were successfully coerced into submitting to 
such investigations—it is necessary to trace a recent history of the global forces shaping 
Lesotho’s garment industry. Though the focus of this chapter is a factory-based HIV 
treatment and care program, the politics of treatment provision in this case are situated 
within much larger spheres of interest—those of a highly flexible, global industry; of the 
markets for “humanitarian consumption” it created; and of the “sweat-free” zone of 
production fostered in Lesotho to meet these consumptive desires. In examining these 
dynamics, the mechanisms and tools of HIV treatment and care, no matter how clinically 
successful, become visibly situated within global networks of production, consumption, 
and inequality. Ultimately, by detailing these private and public histories of labor and 
industry, this chapter will explore the fragility of rights beyond HIV programming and the 
challenges for HIV politics when embedded within corporate concerns and priorities.  
 As global funding for HIV programs tapered off in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis, corporate social responsibility (CSR) arrangements and public-private partnerships 
(PPP) for health gained considerable popularity, as well as the attention of anthropologists 
concerned about trends in privatization and the conflicting interests of corporations in 




2007; Newell, 2005; Ponte, Richey, & Baab, 2009). This research provides a timely case 
study, situated at the confluence of these trends—a public-private partnership for providing 
HIV treatment and care in factories as part of global corporate social responsibility efforts. 
This initiative does not deal extensively with occupational health and safety issues, but 
instead centers HIV treatment as part of a global strategy to brand Lesotho’s industry as 
ethical, and utilize its products in retail humanitarian marketing for the Product (RED)™63 
initiative, whose products were manufactured, in part, at New Century factory. I propose 
that efforts like these comprise new patterns of humanitarian consumption64 and 
commodity fetishism; because HIV is central to such initiatives, they compel us to also 
challenge the ways in which HIV programs can occlude, and even subvert, the pursuit of 
broader rights and recognitions.  
 In what follows, I first trace the evolution of Lesotho’s garment industry, and efforts 
to brand the country as an “ethical” production zone. I then examine how HIV became 
central to CSR schemes for companies like Gap, and document the creation of an industry-
wide PPP for HIV prevention and treatment within Lesotho’s factories. Extended qualitative 
research within a single garment factory producing for Gap’s RED line reveals a range of 
labor, workplace, and health concerns for workers, including the central roles that bodily 
strength and vulnerability play in their efforts to maintain economic and biological 
survival. Importantly, factory-based HIV programs—though they show overwhelming 
clinical success—reconfigure perceptions and discourses of HIV risk in the workplace, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Also known as (RED), Product RED, and (PRODUCT)RED. For simplicity’s sake, I use RED or Product 
RED in the text that follows. 
64 Richey and Ponte (2008, 2011) call this “compassionate consumption.” I prefer the term “humanitarian 
consumption,” as it highlights the ways in which corporate production and marketing are now centrally 
involved in humanitarian efforts. This term has been used by Schultheis (2008) to describe the (slightly 





erasing awareness of the social, economic, and industrial drivers of HIV infection among 
workers, clinicians, and the broader public. Finally, I examine how HIV initiatives in the 
factories intertwine with, and also undermine, many of these concerns, obscuring broader 
issues of workers’ rights and health by providing biomedical services that are deeply 
embedded in the networks of power and interests that make up this transnational industry.  
 
The Making of an Ethical Industry 
 Employing approximately 40,000 workers, more than 80% of whom are women, 
Lesotho’s garment factories constitute the country’s single-largest private-sector industry 
(International Labour Office [ILO], 2009). Garment manufacturing enjoys a long history in 
neighboring South Africa, where Hart (2002) describes its origins and emergence as a 
nexus of movement and policy, involving the emigration of Taiwanese factory owners, 
apartheid policies of industrialization and dispossession, decided shifts toward 
neoliberalization in the wake of apartheid, and US trade policies. Lesotho’s earliest 
garment producers were primarily Taiwanese and Chinese immigrants, who had been 
operating factories in South Africa. After being driven out of their home countries by rising 
wages, decreasing returns, and the quota constraints imposed by the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement (MFA), they sought out places like Lesotho (Hart, 2002). The MFA encouraged 
small and mid-sized firms to relocate their production to countries with low manufacturing 
costs. Because a sizable portion of the cost of garment manufacturing is labor, producers 
sought out poor countries with low (if any) minimum wage restrictions and relatively lax 
labor laws (Raworth & Harvey, 2004; Seidman, 2009). Simultaneously, US garment labels 
began sourcing the bulk of their stock from external factories, preferring to allow cut-throat 




prices extremely low (Hart, 2002; Seidman, 2009). This had the added advantage of 
distancing buyers from accusations of labor violations and sweatshop conditions in their 
factories, as supply chains became more difficult to trace—though this did not succeed in 
isolating major brands like Levis, Gap, or Nike from harsh interrogations of their labor 
practices.  
 South African firms relocated to Lesotho during the end of the apartheid era to 
escape the trade sanctions placed on South Africa by the US and European nations 
(Edwards & Lawrence, 2010; Hart, 2002). After apartheid—as labor union strength grew, 
minimum wages rose, and labor laws were more strictly enforced—factories found a 
willing, and cheaper, workforce across the border in Lesotho. In the early years of its 
industry growth (1980- early 1990s), Lesotho enticed factory owners with a set of 
incentives that emphasized tax breaks, low wages, and support from the Ministries of Trade 
and Labour. By far the most attractive incentive at the time, however, was its lax 
enforcement of labor laws: 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there was little motivation for manufacturers to improve 
working conditions…. The government was either unable (because of a lack of resources) 
or unwilling (for fear of losing one of their few sources of foreign direct investment and 
jobs) to enforce existing labor laws. Unions were actively suppressed by manufacturers who 
severely limited the ability of workers to collectively lobby for improvements…. During this 
period, the companies sourcing from Lesotho had minimal on-the-ground compliance 
presence in the country (Foreign Investment Advisory Service [FIAS], 2006). 
In this early period, strikes were commonplace, though often disorganized, and frequently 
met with violent crackdowns from police, military, or private factory security forces 
(Baylies & Wright, 1993; Gibbs, 2005). In 2001, Lesotho’s public image was rocked by a 
Clean Clothes Campaign report (“Producing Garments in Lesotho,” 2001), which 
lambasted the country’s factories for their poor working conditions, and the lack of legal 




found widespread evidence of harassment and abuse by managers, repression of union 
activities and membership, health and safety violations, and forced overtime. Protests of 
brands sourcing from Lesotho ensued, driven in Lesotho by labor union representatives. 
Brands in the US, already damaged by reports of sweatshop conditions elsewhere, began 
to take notice of factory conditions in the country (FIAS, 2006).  
 In 2000, President Clinton signed into law the African Growth and Opportunities Act 
(AGOA), which allows duty- and quota- free access to the US market for manufacturers 
based in sub-Saharan Africa, with special provisions for the garment industry. With AGOA, 
industries became much more profitable, and the garment sector in Lesotho blossomed. 
Between 1999 and 2004, production exports increased from $100 million to nearly $460 
million, employing more than 50,000 workers at peak levels (see Table 6.1). In 2004, the 
industry accounted for 75% of overall exports in Lesotho, the vast majority of which were 
intended for US markets (Bennet, 2006; FIAS, 2006). Yet as Seidman (2009) tells it, the 
movement of garment factories into more and more impoverished countries created a 
strange new development opportunity for US policymakers that was embodied in AGOA: 
“Trade deals were re-imagined as a form of development aid…US trade rules could 
provide incentives for manufacturers to invest in the country’s allies and create new jobs in 
poor regions, while lowering prices on imported goods for US consumers” (p. 583). It was 
this strategy of ”trade as aid” which laid the groundwork for the garment industry’s 
considerable growth in Lesotho, but also the shift towards “ethical industry” in later years.  
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 Unfortunately, Lesotho experienced a series of setbacks in 2005 from which the 
industry never fully recovered. First, the MFA quotas, which protected Lesotho and other 
countries with smaller industries from competition from China and India, expired. In 
addition, the South African rand, to which Lesotho’s currency is pegged, began to grow 
stronger against the US dollar, thereby undermining the favorable export conditions which 
Lesotho had enjoyed for the previous years (Bennet, 2006). Overnight, the industry was 
transformed: In the first half of 2005, exports dropped by 25%, and 10 factories closed, 
some shutting their doors and fleeing the country without notifying employees or paying 
them the salary or severance they were owed. Remaining factories operated at limited 
capacity, implementing what workers call “short time” practices, whereby they are 
cyclically put on short periods of unpaid leave, often with little warning (FIAS, 2006, p. 16; 
MFA Forum, 2006). Trouble was also looming with AGOA: One of its requirements 
stipulated that countries must develop the capacity to manufacture their own fabrics in 
order to maintain AGOA eligibility past 2007. Though the expiration was later postponed 
through 2012, Lesotho has proven unable to accomplish in-country fabric manufacturing, 
despite ample warnings about these deadlines (CNN, 2011). The industry, whose foothold 
in the global garment markets was always tenuous at best, remains tethered to the risks of 
the market, which constantly threaten to drive factories elsewhere. The garment industry in 
Lesotho accounts for an enormous portion of the country’s economy. In 2006, it 
constituted 20% of overall GDP, and more than 70% of all exports (MFA Forum, 2006). 
This puts Lesotho’s government in a difficult negotiating position when it comes to 
incentives or labor regulations: With the threat of factories moving elsewhere, government 
and other stakeholders frequently cite factories’ thin profit margins in capitulating to their 




 In the face of these constraints, and in the interest of buttressing Lesotho’s struggling 
industry, global partners, the World Bank, and buyers pushed Lesotho to streamline 
production and further reduce costs (MFA Forum, 2006). Acknowledging the hurdles 
Lesotho faced in lowering costs, however, they developed an alternative plan for Lesotho 
to market its industry as a kind of “ethical trade zone,” with garments produced in Lesotho 
labeled “sweat-free.” This proposal enjoyed the enthusiastic assistance of the International 
Labour Organization (ILO), US buyers, and trade representatives (Seidman, 2009). 
Emerging from more than a decade of serious criticism about labor practices, a “sweat free 
label” manufactured in a developing country with high rates of HIV offered a new, 
potentially quite profitable form of corporate social responsibility. In many ways, it was a 
startling move for a country entrenched in poverty. Rather than engage in a “race to the 
bottom,“ Lesotho’s factory owners would appeal to a new kind of market: ethical 
consumers concerned enough about factory conditions to pay a premium for ethically-
sourced garments (Seidman, 2009). This plan played nicely into the concerns of US buyers 
about conditions in their factories and the potential public relations disasters they could 
unleash; buyers like Gap, Inc. were increasingly relying on codes of vendor conduct and 
factory audits to ensure factories met core labor standards and avoided health and safety 
violations. The Minister of Trade, Mpho Malie, told international stakeholders in 2006, “I 
am confident that we can one day soon announce to the world…that Lesotho is the 
“Destination of Ethical Choice” (MFA Forum, 2006, p. 11).  
 These initiatives encouraged a broad shift in how Lesotho perceived its obligations to 
industry, allowing the country to implement revisions to the national labor code: It has 
ratified 23 international labor conventions, and is a signatory to additional ones, with 




over wages and policy between the Ministries of Trade and Labour, factory owners, and 
union representatives. Union action has lessened considerably, and workers have access to 
dispute resolution processes. Lesotho has also recently joined the ILO / International 
Finance Corporation (IFC) Better Work initiative, which invests in training for workers and 
aims to “improve competitiveness of the industry…by improving compliance with Lesotho 
labor law and the principles of the ILO…” (ILO, 2009). One aim of the initiative is to build 
collective cooperation between industry, unions, and government to meet labor standards. 
It provides for ILO inspections of all factories, with an aim of streamlining and integrating 
inspections (ILO and International Finance Corporation [IFC], 2010). The program, 
however, is not without its critics, who often point to the ILO’s increasing role in economic 
development and cozy familiarity with finance organizations, whose interests may 
significantly conflict with those of unions or workers. Sunny, optimistic reports from 
Cambodia, where the pilot project was located, failed to divulge that union activists had 
recently been murdered and imprisoned by the government (Seidman, 2009, p. 588).   
 It is essential to note that events in Lesotho represent pronounced shifts towards 
privatization of the creation and enforcement of labor regulations across the globe. These 
shifts tend to weaken union activities and limit public regulation of factories while 
upholding the image of an “ethical” industry. Is the industry any more ethical in practice? 
In reviewing these developments, Seidman (2009) predicted that “branding an entire 
national industry ‘sweat-free’ might silence workers’ voices, rather than encouraging them, 
if the entire country’s exports depend on presenting production as problem-free” (p. 594). 
His predictions were chillingly accurate. Voluntary, private audits of factories by 
international brands pose problems: In addition to well-documented patterns of monitors 




2000), companies have little incentive to hire highly critical monitors. In addition, as I will 
describe below, factory inspections often elicit a ritualistic theatre of compliance from 
workers and managers that has little bearing on everyday factory practices. Workers 
remain aware of the fact that their jobs are dependent on maintaining an image of an 
ethical industry, and engage—sometimes willingly, other times under duress—in 
producing and performing the “ethical” for fear of losing their jobs.  
 
HIV Treatment as Corporate Social Responsibility 
 HIV initiatives in the factories are intimately bound up in this history—and in current 
efforts to maintain Lesotho as an ethical production zone. By 2005, labor representatives, 
the Government of Lesotho, and external partners were becoming acutely aware of the 
HIV rates in the factories. Demographics alone—workers tend to be young, female, urban, 
unmarried migrants—did not bode well for infection rates. Today, the HIV prevalence rate 
among factory workers remains above 40% (ALAFA, 2010). At New Century and a few 
other factories, cursory programs and policies were in place to assist workers to test, access 
treatment, or return to work after becoming ill. But many workers struggled to access HIV 
services during working hours, or missed days from work to go to local clinics.  
All seemed aware that HIV threatened already declining worker productivity, and therefore 
the viability of the industry in Lesotho.  
 For buyers, HIV presented a timely opportunity to engage in CSR that had little to 
do with working conditions, factory pollution, or other potential reputation-tarnishing 
issues. No one took better advantage of this situation than Gap, whose leadership on CSR 
meant that its activities constituted more than 40% of overall industry output; Gap was 
instrumental in the leadership of AGOA and the MFA forum (Edwards & Lawrence, 2010). 




special “RED” products that give a portion of profits to the Global Fund. The campaign 
encourages participation through consumption in forms of “charity” and “consciousness” 
that are celebrity-laden, glitzy, and expertly-branded (Ponte et al., 2009; Richey & Ponte, 
2008, 2011). Nowhere was the campaign more visible than in Gap stores across the US, 
where shoppers could, for the (slightly inflated) price of a t-shirt, re-brand themselves as 
caring, liberal-minded, and somehow (no matter how elusively) connected to Africa 
(Richey and Ponte, 2008). 65 Through what Richey and Ponte (2011) term “Brand Aid,” 
“international development assistance becomes another marketable product,” enabling 
Western consumers to participate in HIV scale-up and donor culture (p. 13). Gap’s RED 
line was produced at New Century Factory, which Bono visited in 2006, while he and his 
wife, Allie Hewson, were also visiting factories that produce for her ethical clothing line, 
Edun. In the years that followed, workers at New Century cut and sewed RED clothing, 
RED promotional posters decorated the walls, but none I spoke to recognized the links 
between the shirts they produced and the pills they consumed. For them, (RED) was just 
another logo. But the choice to have the campaign’s t-shirts produced by a highly HIV-
infected population is crucial to the campaign’s broader humanitarian production 
enterprise: Lesotho, unable to offer cheap production, instead provided the advantage of a 
workforce infected with HIV. 
 ALAFA, the Apparel Lesotho Alliance to Fight AIDS, was launched during the same 
period, following the release in 2006 of a detailed report commissioned by ComMark Trust 
exploring the viability of various workplace HIV care and treatment programs for the 
industry (Colvin, Lemmon, & Naidoo, 2006). Soon afterwards, in 2006, ALAFA was 
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formally launched as a public-private partnership forged between US Buyers, local 
garment industry representatives, and the Lesotho Ministries of Health and Social Welfare 
(MOHSW) and Trade and Industry, Cooperatives and Marketing (MOTICM). ALAFA would 
offer a new form of public-private HIV prevention, care and treatment—an industry-wide 
commitment to providing care—supported by international funders as well as by US 
buyers.66 Bono was present at the launch, as were key representatives from Gap. Gap 
committed to funding the pilot project for ALAFA at one of its own factories, New Century; 
Bono announced that proceeds from Edun’s “ONE” campaign t-shirt would also support 
ALAFA (Gilden, 2009).  
 At the launch of RED in Davos, Bono described these new HIV initiatives as integral 
to the production of RED in Lesotho:  
A woman working in a Lesotho garment factory that produces Gap products becomes part 
of a cycle of hope…. She works for an employer that offers her services and support and 
access to HIV testing and treatment. And she’s making a product that will be sold around 
the world, the profits from which will be invested back into her country (quoted in Richey 
and Ponte, 2008, p. 722). 
Thus, from its very beginnings, ALAFA was central to these intertwined agendas, and the 
workers at New Century were engaged in multi-layered labors. In addition to working long 
shifts under hard conditions for marginal wages, they were making products that, through a 
unique form of humanitarian consumption, would ostensibly fund part of their own 
treatment. They were also engaged in the patient-labor of adhering to a regimen of pills 
and behaviors intended to make them more productive, efficient, and valuable workers. 
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Finally, their work—both as patients and as workers—helped sustain Gap’s image as a 
responsible, socially-engaged, and humanitarian company. ALAFA, aligned closely with 
the association of factory owners—the Lesotho Textile Exporters’ Association (LTEA)—is 
explicitly tied to efforts to “produce” an ethical industry, and thereby, increase profitability. 
Dagmar Hanisch, who directed ALAFA’s earliest efforts, justified the program to industry 
representatives by reassuring them that it would “contribute to building the Lesotho 
apparel industry’s image as an ethical sourcing destination. The intervention should 
therefore bring financial benefits to the industry” (MFA Forum, 2006, p. 29).  
 ALAFA is part of global trends towards privatization in humanitarian initiatives. In the 
past few years, global health initiatives have embraced PPP strategies, and more and more 
entities like the World Bank, the US Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), and 
multinational corporations are taking on health projects as core areas of their work. While 
privatization gives many academics and health activists pause, it has been embraced by a 
number of NGOs and governments, who see it as a key strategy for making health projects 
and funding more efficient, accountable, and productive. In Lesotho, for example, a new, 
public tertiary care hospital (the only one in the country) was launched in 2011-2012, the 
product of a public-private partnership between the MCA, the MOHSW, and a private 
South African health corporation, Netcare. Arrangements like these are rapidly changing 
the dynamics for how health care is provided, to whom such care is accountable, and how 
health priorities are established and met in resource-poor countries. Far too little scholarly 
research has critically engaged with such endeavors, and while this chapter hardly 
constitutes a full appraisal of them, I hope that it will point towards some of the advantages 






 It is essential to highlight two key elements in ALAFA’s mission and services. First, in 
achieving what it sets out to do—to provide high-quality HIV, STI, and TB care in factory 
settings, and in doing so, to ensure workers are healthier and HIV prevalence is less severe 
than they would otherwise be—ALAFA succeeds in spades. Second, ALAFA is a product of 
the industry and its partners, and as such, its services and approach reflect the broader 
interests of its creators. ALAFA’s work is perennially negotiated, carved out from the spaces 
between private and public, factory and clinic, worker and patient, and industry and labor. 
Its mandate is forged through partnerships with industry (US buyers, the LTEA, and factory 
management in Lesotho), government (the Ministries of Health, Trade, and Labour), donors 
(UK aid agency DFID, PEPFAR, Global Fund, and others), and labor representatives 
(unions, the ILO, and organizations like ComMark Trust).  
 Though a complicated public-private partnership, ALAFA’s day-to-day work is 
executed by a staff of managers, nurse case managers, and counselors who monitor 
activities within particular factories. Each factory also has an appointed HIV coordinator 
who is responsible for all care, treatment, and prevention services at their factory. ALAFA’s 
work is roughly divided between prevention services (support groups, testing initiatives, 
condom distribution, and peer education [meruta methaka]) and treatment services (a full 
ARV treatment program, as well as STI and TB care provided on site). Some factory sites 
have both programs, some only have prevention services, and some (about 10%) do not 
participate in ALAFA at all, though the goal is to achieve both prevention and treatment 
programs in all factories. In order to qualify for a treatment program, a factory must allot 
space for a clinic somewhere on the factory grounds. This space allows a doctor to 




care and assist with treatment provision, while counselors offer HIV tests. The range of 
services varies at factories depending on the size of the clinic, the availability of nurses, 
and the investment by factory ownership.67 Nevertheless, all factories with treatment 
programs provide free, on-site HIV, TB, and STI care. Rather than place additional strain on 
the public health system, ALAFA contracts with local private doctors to provide care, 
which most workers strongly prefer to the services at public clinics. Workers can also see 
the doctor on-site for other primary health care services, but fees for those services are 
deducted from their pay; no free, comprehensive primary health care is offered. If workers 
struggle with stigma, they can see doctors at their private practices instead of at the factory 
clinic, and there is no charge for this service.  
 New Century has ALAFA’s oldest and perhaps its best treatment and prevention 
programs, which are housed in a small, multi-roomed clinic on factory grounds. Doctors 
come for some time nearly every day of the week to see new and old patients. A full-time 
nurse, who also acts as HIV coordinator, assists and provides basic care to workers—
prophylaxis for pain and headaches, first aid for injuries, and directly-observed therapy for 
TB. An HIV counselor is also available; she assists in getting patients from the factory floor, 
providing HIV testing, distributing free formula to new mothers who have HIV, and 
directing once-weekly support group meetings. Workers with chronic illnesses (HIV, but 
also TB and diabetes) are allowed a short break at 10AM to eat a snack and take their 
medicines.  
 Apart from the relatively small contribution of the factory, ALAFA obtains funding for 
its services from international donor agencies, but also from US garment buyers like Gap, 
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Wal-Mart and Levis. ALAFA strategically leverages partnerships to pressure recalcitrant 
factories to open clinics and support programs. When US buyers are in town visiting 
ALAFA, program staff will sometimes make a point of taking them to visit one of their 
factories that does not yet have a comprehensive program. US buyers are eager to see HIV 
programs in place, and their disapproval is often enough to pressure factories into 
participating in ALAFA. But these productive partnerships also position ALAFA firmly on 
the side of the garment industry when it comes to labor concerns, wage negotiations, or 
union-factory disputes. While ALAFA staff members sincerely want the best for workers, 
especially given their frequent contact with them, their program prioritizes HIV treatment 
and prevention above other services for workers or broader labor issues.  
 ALAFA’s success as an industry-wide HIV program model is unparalleled, and it has 
received international recognition for its innovative program design and success with 
multiple stakeholders. Though many workplace HIV initiatives have emerged in the past 
decade—most prominently, in Southern Africa, among Anglo American and other mining 
companies (see Rajak, 2010)—ALAFA is unique in its approach to provide and manage an 
industry-wide HIV program. Its example has helped build momentum for workplace HIV 
policies in other industries in Lesotho. The program’s efforts in HIV prevention are 
remarkable: 94% of workers have been reached with preventative services; condom 
distribution and usage has been normalized across the population; 75% of workers have 
tested for HIV at least once; and a majority of workers are aware of ALAFA’s peer 
education programs and support groups. Treatment and care statistics are equally 
impressive: Because testing rates are high and workers are encouraged to test regularly and 
before getting ill, those who test positive remain aware of their CD4 counts, get regular 




created a unique patient tracking system to monitor adherence and assist in keeping track 
of workers who leave factories or move between factories. Overall, ALAFA reports a 
treatment uptake rate of 83% (ALAFA, 2010).  
 The program enjoys broad approval and support among workers, who are grateful 
that they no longer lose paid hours visiting public clinics, and enjoy their access to 
ALAFA’s clinicians. “There’s good care for all of us in there” one worker commented to 
me, “even the doctors that work in there are special. They will talk to you and make you 
feel counseled.” Being able to make appointments, ask a doctor questions, request 
additional tests or treatments, or simply have a conversation with the provider are unheard-
of luxuries in a public health system that is vastly over-worked and understaffed, reliant on 
clinicians who do not speak Sesotho. ALAFA’s treatment program is in most respects 
superior to that of the public health system, where HIV care is largely orchestrated by 
nurses. Many workers reported that they feared losing their jobs because they would have 
to return to the public sector to get services, and one worker even reported to me that she 
had decided to apply for work at New Century after leaving another factory because she 
knew that at New Century workers were getting HIV treatment. These are powerful 
endorsements of the program’s efficacy and success.  
 In addition, the focus on HIV treatment within the factories has enabled workers who 
qualify to access certain comforts and entitlements—tea breaks, waiting time in the clinic, 
formula for newborns—that are precious goods in such a setting. Comforts and 
entitlements, however, point to undeniable limitations in what the program can provide. 




primary health care services are not available.68 Working mothers who do not have HIV 
complain that their babies starve while they are at work, because they do not have access 
to formula; other workers request family planning, which is not currently available. At HIV 
prevention and testing rallies workers wondered to me why tests for diabetes or cancer 
were not being offered. The lack of these services highlights the ways that vertical global 
health programs can unintentionally exacerbate social inequalities. ALAFA, of course, 
would like to provide these services, but building momentum for them is difficult. In the 
fall of 2010, funding fell short as current grants expired, and workers feared the program 
would close and leave them without access to medicines. During national wage 
negotiations this year, ALAFA proposed a contributory health scheme between labor and 
industry, both of whom seemed to support the idea. It is unclear whether such a scheme, 
either for primary health or for HIV services, would be popular with workers, who would 
be asked to pay for services that are available for free in the public sector. But wage 
negotiations fell apart when one union made demands for a living wage for workers, which 
was met with dismissal and criticism by factories, ALAFA, and other unions.  
 Given that ALAFA is a public-private partnership and an industry-level intervention 
(rather than a private, factory-level program), we might expect its mandate to be 
independent of factory interests. But as a partner of industry, and as a program indelibly 
shaped by global interests, ALAFA’s independence from concerns about worker 
productivity and industry value is fragile. Its justifications for treatment and prevention 
programs for factories are couched in the language of business: “We know from extensive 
research within other workplaces that this type of intervention will improve the morale and 
productivity of employees,” Dagmar Hanisch told industry representatives just after ALAFA 
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was formed (MFA Forum, 2006, p. 28). Today, ALAFA’s justifications of its HIV treatment 
programs to donors and the international community are similarly situated within a 
discourse about industry, development, and costs and benefits: 
The care and treatment component of ALAFA increases the sector’s productivity by 
reversing adverse effects such as progressing illness, increased absenteeism, increased staff 
turnover, presenteeism, and general human suffering. Securing the industry’s future combats 
two of the key long-term drivers of the HIV/AIDS epidemic: poverty and gender inequity 
(ALAFA, 2010). 
While ALAFA does address, as in the quote above, the “suffering” of workers, they speak to 
a particular form of suffering—that from specific illnesses—and they rarely use rights 
discourses about HIV treatment or working conditions. Instead, ALAFA talks numbers: “The 
apparel industry provides around 40,000 jobs, mainly for relatively unskilled 
women…producing 19% of the country’s GDP…. 47% of employees are the only 
breadwinners, and 95% regularly send money to the extended family” (ALAFA, 2010). By 
treating the bodies of workers, ALAFA “secures” a tenuous industry, promotes 
development, and supports impoverished networks of kin. Nor are workers oblivious to 
management’s attention to productivity. Workers like Amohelang, a peer educator, 
assumed ALAFA’s work was bound up in these interests as well:  
All they care about is production, not the health of the workers. As long as there is an 
increase in production, whether [or not] it’s increased by sick people—as long as there is 
production. If people don’t get counseling [about HIV], they will die, [and then] where will 
the production come from?  
While ALAFA’s goals should not be trivialized, they create and uphold a certain set of 
values about what workers contribute and why they deserve treatment.   
 
The Clinic as Between and Among 




space of its clinical services deserves more attention. The clinic simultaneously offered a 
space of solace away from the factory floor, and a space situated firmly within the 
disciplinary research of the factory. Exploring these tensions helps to explore the political 
positioning of HIV services within the factory, as well as the constructed divisions between 
worker and patient bodies. In discussions with workers, my research attempted to tease out 
answers to two questions: what realms of the factory/clinic space are safe, or promote 
health, and how are the clinic and factory spaces differentiated? This helped to build a 
sense of how spaces and bodies functioned, and served functions, within the broader 
factory.  
 For many workers, the clinic offered a space of respite, and even safety, from the 
grueling work and intense pressure of the production lines. “This clinic is where I find my 
safety…it the place where you get relief,” one worker said. Another commented to me 
wryly, “I feel like I could get sick more often [so that] I could stay here in the clinic.” Yet 
these strategies for seeking care and respite were frequently frowned upon by factory 
managers, who saw the clinic as a potential barrier to productivity. Workers admitted that 
overuse of the clinic could result in the management refusing to allow anyone to see the 
doctor. If a manger noticed that a worker was frequently going to the clinic, they might use 
this information to publicly ridicule or threaten him. HIV coordinators complained that 
factory management harassed them to disclose the names of workers living with HIV. 
Discrimination against sick workers, despite workplace HIV policies, seems commonplace. 
Thusi, a young male machine worker related the following story about a co-worker who 
was sick with HIV: 
He wasn’t able to do his work anymore… he was too weak to work… [But the 
management] didn’t fire him. The workers ended up discriminating against him, along with 
the Chinese [management]. The Chinese would laugh at anyone who would have to share 




factory]. The Chinese knew what was happening with that person, and everyone else ended 
up knowing too. They all discriminated against him. There was no one who was on his 
side. 
In this way, discrimination and stigma could be leveraged by troublesome managers to 
pressure poor-performing employees to quit of their own accord, even if they could not be 
fired. 
 On a few occasions, informants were patient enough with my questions about clinic 
space to allow me to engage them in projects to diagram and draw the clinic and its 
relationship to the factory. I encouraged them to depict how they perceived the clinic and 
the surrounding factory; mostly, however, they focused on the similarity and relationships 
between factory and clinic. Though my informants spoke of clinics as safe spaces, their 
visual depictions of these two spaces told a different story. In the two drawings below 
(Figures 6.1 and 6.2), constructed by two different informants, we can see an emphasis on 
the pathways between the factory and the clinic, and the similarities between the shapes 
and dynamics of each entity. The first artist (left image) depicts her sense of the factory and 
clinic buildings—each a near replica of the other, but with the clinic noticeably smaller. 
She emphasizes their connection to one another through the pathway drawn between 
them. The drawings by a second artist (right image) depict the flow of workers and labor 
within the factory and the clinic, and between each site. The two leaf-like shapes are 
nearly identical; again, the clinic is a smaller replica of the larger factory structure. What is 
interesting here is that in two different renderings, intended to depict different aspects of 
space (structure and movement), the overall message conveyed is strikingly similar: The 
structure and flow of life in the factory is repeated, on a smaller scale, within the clinic. 
Interestingly, workers at New Century as well as at other factories often assumed that HIV 




activities were run by ALAFA. One informant reasoned that factories ran clinics: If ALAFA 
ran the clinics, they would be in every single factory; because they are not, it must be up to 
the factories. Of course, this is not erroneous—but the confusion between these institutions 
impacts workers’ perceptions of services.  
 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2: Picturing clinic and factory spaces. Two informants’ depictions of clinic / factory 
spaces. In each depiction the factory is rendered on top. The writing on the right image reads “Basebetsi” 
(“workers”) and “clinic.”  
 
When the Work Makes You Weak 
 Work in garment factories is widely acknowledged to be repetitive, exhausting, and 
painful (Lashuay et al., 2002; Ong, 1988; Prentice, 2007; Raworth & Harvey, 2004). While 
I was aware that conditions in these factories could be poor prior to starting the project, I 
did not intend to make them the primary object of study, wanting to focus instead on the 
HIV treatment programs. How naïve—to think that working conditions could be delicately 
overstepped in the pursuit of a different research question. As it was, the conditions of 




informants. Dimensions of coercion, discipline, and productivity permeated every 
conversation, every body presented for care, and each patient’s subjectivity. Given 
Foucault’s (1975, 1980a, 2008) preoccupation with surveillance, punishment and 
discipline in institutional spaces, and his argument that such spaces exude forms of 
discipline that structure and reshape subjectivities as well as bodies, it should not be 
surprising that this was the case. An important lesson from this subset of the research is that 
HIV programs cannot be lifted from the social conditions which surround them—and that 
the politics of treatment in any place are defined by the porous membranes between the 
treatment world and the social world in which care is embedded.  
 The conditions that shape everyday life on the factory floor also shape workers’ 
conceptions of health and illness. Pain and exhaustion are a constant presence in the 
factory, where work involves exposure to occupational hazards that cause health problems 
ranging from the chronic (stress injuries and lung diseases from particulates) to the acute 
(injuries from cutting machines, for example) (Raworth & Harvey, 2004; Lashuay, et al., 
2002). Everyday health complaints like headaches, stomachaches, nausea, aches, light-
headedness, and common colds are so common as to be a constant source of low-level 
misery. Pain has its own vocabulary: Workers often complain of lehlaba, a sharp, stabbing 
pain in the back or chest, which can arise from the strain of sitting hunched over machines 
for long periods, but is also linked to lung diseases and TB in local illness taxonomies. 
Occupational health and safety is a primary concern for workers, but is rarely discussed in 
the clinical setting. Patients who complain of headaches, chest pain or lehlaba are given 
ibuprofen or aspirin, perhaps some water, and returned to work. Medicines rarely ease 
acute and chronic pains, and more severe illnesses cannot be addressed in the clinic.  




workers talk incessantly about the smell and feel of “bad air” from chemicals, waste, dust, 
or smoke—diagnostic discourses that echo a pre-germ theory science of miasmas and toxic 
air. Recent work in anthropology has highlighted how space, place, and exposure reorient 
our thinking about bodies and health, breathing a strange new life into the plausibility and 
use of miasma as a conceptual device for those who inhabit or study “inescapable 
ecologies” (Nash, 2007; see also Petryna, 2002). These ways of thinking are especially 
salient in the factory, where dangers are unknowable and minimally-controlled. Workers 
expressed fears about developing cancer from the chemicals; heart disease or diabetes 
from the sedentary, stressful work; or lung diseases from the air. “We have heard we are 
very vulnerable” to cancer, one patient said, while requesting screenings for cancer and 
diabetes. 
 In garment factories, the air literally can be toxic: The chemicals used to treat and 
dye fabrics, the particulate dust created by cutting fabrics, and the smoke generated by 
incinerators and trash fires are all capable of causing cancers and lung diseases if proper 
methods and protective gear are not used. After spending only a few hours visiting the floor 
of a denim factory, I left with a severe migraine and pain throughout my sinuses and lungs; 
for days afterward when I sneezed or blew my nose my tissues turned a bright, indigo 
shade of blue. Workers are poorly-equipped with masks—not only are the ones they are 
given to use on a daily basis not up to industry standards, but they are rarely replaced. 
“The masks are not safe at all, it’s not a proper mask, it’s just a light material,” Tlali, a peer 
educator, said to me. The mask, he said, acts “like a sponge,” soaking up the bad air and 
toxins from the factory air. “Now you can imagine, because you’re actually breathing 
[through] it, it’s right next to your nose and your mouth, you’re breathing that bad smell. 




every breath].”  
 Illegal factory waste dumping is widely acknowledged, though after international 
news agencies reported on the issue a few years ago, efforts were made to change 
practices (McDougall, 2009). Residents of Ha Thetsane, one of three primary industrial 
areas in Lesotho, still refer to their local river as “the blue river” because of all the dyes 
dumped into it. Residents recounted stories of a toxic, foul smelling cloud of gas which 
emits from factories at night and seems to hang over the valley. Locally, Lesotho’s factories 
have a dubious reputation for health and safety violations (Matope, 2012; Motsoeli, 2011; 
“Sebapo’s death,” 2012). A factory monitor whom I interviewed reported that he frequently 
caught managers hurrying into the factory ahead of him to distribute the proper masks that 
are required by buyers. Inside the factories, managers engage in various strategies for 
hiding their health and safety code violations from inspectors—strategies described to me 
in great detail by workers, ALAFA staff, and even factory inspectors themselves. Everyday 
work on the factory floor thus consisted of a normal workflow—that was dangerous, 
unhealthy, and damaging—punctuated by orchestrated moments of abnormal workflow—
that was safe, healthy, prescribed, and performed—when inspectors, buyers or visitors 
arrived.  
 To locals and workers, these were open secrets; but factories went to considerable 
lengths to keep me69 or factory inspectors from finding them out. Informants reported that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Managers tampered with my sampling strategies, and on one occasion, upon closing a window in the 
clinic before starting an interview, I was startled to find a manager crouched outside it, ear pressed to the 
glass. Some workers said little in interviews, which were often ended early, for fear of the authenticity of 
consent; with others, it was as if the floodgates had opened, and they were half relieved, half thrilled, to tell 
these stories. I had considerable worries about revealing these truths here, for fear of retribution against the 
workers who spoke to me. Ultimately, in extended conversations with workers and factory inspectors, I was 
strongly encouraged by them to tell these stories, as workers believed in their importance and were aware 





factory managers coached them about what they should tell inspectors, and they complied 
because they knew they could lose jobs, or the firm could close:  
When there are people visiting, workers are called to be interviewed about how things are 
going…[and] they usually hide the things that are happening [in the factory] so that the 
factory won’t be closed. You won’t benefit from that [the firm closing], so it’s usually best 
just to hide the corruption that has been happening. 
‘Malineo, a shop steward at New Century, explained how workers were co-opted into 
participating in factories’ arts of deception: 
For example, buyers come—maybe the big buyers of the factory are the ones coming. 
Normally, [the management] will assemble the workers outside, they…choose workers 
[who will talk to buyers]—they are the ones picking, right? And when they pick and choose 
for themselves, [we are told], “do not tell the buyers that this and this and that happened, 
because you will not be able to find work [afterwards].” But we are laboring for these 
buyers ka pelo tse seng monate [with hearts that know no joy]. 
‘Malineo goes on to clarify that management enlists union representatives in ensuring that 
workers conceal factory conditions.  
We don’t want to say to the workers that they shouldn’t express their opinions. But the 
management come to us as shop stewards, asking us to tell the workers. They know it’s 
through us that the workers will do what they ask… Here, every time you voice a 
complaint, there is no response except a promise that you will lose your work, or that, “you 
better leave!”—they want us to say good things about them to the buyers…. So the workers 
cry constantly to us as shop stewards that they are not satisfied, but every time the buyers 
come, for the sake of saving our jobs, they end up providing information to the buyers that 
is not true, because we are trying to keep our jobs. But the truth remains: We are not 
working under acceptable conditions. 
Later in the discussion I ask if workers feel scared. “In all of these factories—all of them—
the cry of the people is that they are scared.” But she is quick to note that the factories are 
also scared of the buyers. “It’s because…the buyers do not want workers who are working 
under oppressive conditions.” Thus, in factories beholden to a branded image of ethical 
clothing, a collective theatrics among workers and managers produces a temporary 




their factory’s contracts with buyers, workers labor knowingly to fabricate the ethical 
perceptions upon which buyers’ brands (and the RED campaign) are dependent.  
 
Managing Workers, Managing Health 
 While management strategies vary, they are often a source of considerable conflict in 
the factories, and impact how workers seek care and maintain their health. In the general 
hierarchy of Lesotho’s factories, Chinese or other foreign nationals occupy management 
positions, but line supervisors—who enforce production quotas, ensure discipline, and 
implement policies for management on the factory floor—are typically older and better-
educated Basotho women. These supervisors occupy an unenviable position between the 
expectations and policies of upper management, and the often angry and over-worked 
young women below them. Some supervisors were caring and even maternal towards 
workers. One worker who was hospitalized for many months explained that her supervisor 
came to the hospital to feed her, bathe her and care for her when her young children were 
unable to do so. More often, though, workers spoke of a generalized “oppression” 
(khatello) that trickled down from management to supervisors. One frustrated supervisor, 
Nthabi, confided in me that she thought the workers made mistakes on purpose, and then 
gave her “attitude.” “I get sick of these workers,” she said. “…Sometimes I wish they were 
my own children so I could just take them and whip them.” The maternally-tinged 
relationships between female supervisors and workers occupy a spectrum between care 
and coercion, and in doing so, thrust care practices in the factory into suspicion. In 
contrast with Mme ‘Mats`eliso’s maternal care work in chapter 5, the “care” in the factory 
is tinged with considerations of productivity, with shades of discipline, and with the tense 





 There were other casual references to workplace abuse in my conversations with 
workers that revealed its normalcy and acceptance. ‘Mampho said to me dismissively in 
one of our conversations, “sometimes we are hit, sometimes we are not.” Another time, I 
asked ’Malineo, the shop steward, what she meant by khatello—oppression—and she 
responded by explaining that there were distinct rules about punishment and abuse in the 
factory. A Chinese manager could act with impunity to discipline a worker by hitting her, 
but “we are told that when you have a conflict where a Chinese person beats a Mosotho 
[worker], the Mosotho [worker] shouldn’t hit him back. We are trying to educate the 
workers, so that they understand [not to hit back]. You know, it’s not easy when somebody 
hurts you, to just let it go, to endure it.”  
 At other times, punishment was less physical, but no less severe in the minds of 
workers. A few reported that Chinese managers would draw on Basotho notions of illness 
etiologies to mete out punishments. Among Basotho, exposure of body parts to cold air or 
surfaces is seen as dangerous to one’s health. On numerous occasions during the research 
when I absent-mindedly sat down on cold concrete walls or benches without a blanket or 
a notebook to protect my hindquarters, it would elicit shouts from nearby women who 
worried for my health. At the factory, a common punishment required factory workers to 
sit outside in the shade of the roof’s awnings, on the cold benches that lined the factory 
walls, for hours on end.  
 Lesotho’s labor laws are intended to protect workers from physical punishments, and 
an independent labor board has been established to deal with disputes and challenge 
unfair firing. Nevertheless, workers felt that unions and labor laws had limited capacities to 




successfully address the more mundane and common practices of oppression, rights 
violations and punishments within the factory. For example, one common punishment 
strategy involved forcing workers to sign warning letters detailing their misbehaviors and 
violations (either real or contrived), and then ordered unpaid suspensions as punishment. 
Workers can be suspended with little oversight, and suspensions then go to an internal 
disciplinary committee. Ideally, disciplinary committees are able to resolve such disputes, 
but management could deliberately delay committee appointments while the unpaid 
worker was obligated to remain at home without pay, travelling back and forth to the 
factory to check on her case. The financial strain this imposed usually drove workers away 
from the job before they ever had an opportunity to appeal. And the factory avoids facing 
fines and inquiries for unfair firing: “She just ends up giving up the job, and leaving the 
money [she is owed]…” ’Mathabo reported.  
 From time to time, this strategy was used on sick workers, who were supposed to 
enjoy special protections against unfair firing under HIV workplace codes. ‘Mathabo 
explained,  
I saw a woman who was sick one morning, and when she was not done [with her work], 
the supervisor was called. She showed the supervisor her bukana [her clinic booklet] 
showing that she’s sick—she’s coughing and the supervisor doesn’t want to understand that. 
And since this patient did not meet the score, the supervisor took her again to upper 
management. They were forcing her to resign. They told her that she might be trying, but 
that she was only hurting other people, and that she should stop [working] so that she could 
spare everyone the pain of her failures, so she would be the only person feeling this pain.  
At other times, however, workers reported that management were understanding about 
their periods of illness and allowed them to take time off from work (see below).  
 Ultimately, workers remained aware that the law was of little help, and their fates left 
up to the inclinations of management. Legal provisions, ILO conventions, and union 




I’ve observed that the management uses the power they have, not the laws and the policies 
that are there…. The management uses their own power. They are not held to the policies 
that are in place, the policies that are there to protect the workers, because they don’t want 
to work according to the policies.  
And workers are aware that buyers’ codes of conduct for factories also have little bearing 
on reality. Thus, the conditions of work which workers found most harmful—low wages, 
backbreaking work, unhealthy conditions, lacking protections—were viewed as 
unchangeable realities, indelible parts of the work itself. In light of this—and because they 
were unable to voice frustrations to visitors or buyers—workers felt decidedly silenced. 
“Even if we cry out” about the conditions, I was told, “nobody can hear us.” As I will 
demonstrate below, the contours of oppression (khatello) and struggle (sokolang) on the 
factory floor influence how workers understand their bodily health—and ultimately, what 
place ARV treatment plays in their lives.  
 
Weak Bodies, Empty Pockets  
 Because workers are physically and politically vulnerable, bodily strength or 
weakness becomes a particular concern. Despite the vast cultural differences between 
Basotho workers and their Chinese managers, both share an interest in extending the 
stamina (and therefore the productivity) of bodies. To this end, “boosters”—
commercialized variations on more traditional muti or types of meriana (herbal mixtures 
developed by traditional healers)—are often peddled among workers. A popular brand 
from South Africa called Positive Life (the reference to HIV is overt, and intended) was 
marketed at a discount to workers at New Century, who could purchase products and have 
the price deducted directly from their paychecks. Some of the most popular formulas 
included “Mixture of Life” an herbal mix whose advertised benefits included 




Strong One” designed to “restore stamina to people burdened by exhaustion.”  While 
ALAFA staff worked hard to dispel beliefs that boosters could cure HIV, their persistent 
appeal among factory workers is driven by more than erroneous beliefs about HIV cures. 
Even though many taking boosters were living with HIV, their more prominent concerns 
were about bodily strength and stamina in the face of exhausting, but necessary, labor.  
 Witchcraft also becomes involved in the quest for bodily strength, though often in 
the most mundane ways—used to boost the strength of workers so they could survive their 
shifts intact, or protect them from succumbing to the lung diseases or chronic pains that 
were so endemic. ‘Mathabo, who worked in quality control as a “checker,” told me that 
she had tried to become a supervisor. When she was promoted, she succumbed quickly to 
illness. She explained that she was not strong enough to withstand the witchcraft used 
against her by jealous fellow workers, and had neglected to solicit the skills of a traditional 
healer to protect her. ‘Mathabo spoke of her inability to become a supervisor as a physical, 
bodily failure: “I couldn’t make it,” she said, “I was too weak for [the job].” Without proper 
(legal) protection and knowledge about occupational exposures, workers rely on herbal 
boosters and forms of spiritual assistance to defend weakened and vulnerable bodies. 
Similar beliefs fed into the tragic massacre of striking mine workers (many of them Basotho) 
at Marikana in South Africa in 2012. They were reportedly given muti that was intended to 
shield them from bullets only hours before being gassed and gunned down by a heavily-
armed special police force (Conway-Smith, 2012). One can only imagine the severity of 
powerlessness and lack of legal protection that might drive workers to embrace such forms 
of protection.  
 While workers are provided some paid sick leave under national law, many reported 




chronic pain and illness put them well above their allotted days; at other times they failed 
to produce proper documentation; still more often, managers denied requests for various 
reasons. In interviews and informal conversations, the mantra of “no work, no pay” was 
repeated over and over again. Even when workers did access paid sick leave, the 
prevailing moral world was one in which only a full day’s work would result in pay. 
Nthabiseng, who worked on the line and served as a peer educator at another factory, 
described the perils of becoming weak or sick: 
The health of the factory worker is never safe. Because as long as you are in the factory, you 
are told, “no work no pay.” If you are somebody who is careful about your health, if you 
feel like you’re not feeling well, you know that you need to do something about it…[which] 
means staying home from work [to rest]. But now u lula naheng e sokolang [you are living 
in a struggling country]—or I can say that bophelo bo re sokolang [life in general is a 
struggle]—situations force you to go to work while you are still sick…and regardless of 
whether you are sick or not, if he [the manager] wants you to make a certain score [quota], 
you have to do that!  So in that case you are not safe. 
Sick workers also felt that they constantly risked angering managers because of their 
declining productivity, trapped in a double-bind between the risks of taking time off to 
seek care, and the risk of becoming more ill while continuing work. ’Mathato explained 
that management was unhappy when workers spent too much time at the factory clinic, 
but: 
Even if you go to the clinics outside and miss work, they are still not satisfied with that. And 
if you feel like, no, I’m not feeling well, I need to rest for the day, they’re still not 
satisfied….so I really don’t know what makes them happy!  When you are healthy, they 
love you, but when you are sick, they don’t…you will see that they are impatient and 
untrusting with you. But in this kind of work, you will find that your sickness is caused by 
your work…and if you just suffer through it, after that, when you become terribly sick, 
you’ll see that they are still not satisfied with you! 
Ailing workers seemed to be regarded with distrust: a threat to productivity and a source of 
draining resources.  




condition), and in an environment where bodily weakness adds another layer to physical 
vulnerability, the provision of ARVs and other medicines becomes a means of boosting the 
body, restoring it to its previously robust state. It is also valued as a means of restoring 
productivity. Weakness and exhaustion are paramount concerns for workers because 
they cannot afford the loss of pay should they need to take leave. Despite the financial 
hardship it poses, more than a third of workers interviewed at New Century had taken at 
least a month’s leave in the past, and some had “resigned” for longer periods.70 Often these 
resignations were due to exhaustion or ill health—some named conditions; others simply 
said they were “tired.” “I know the work is heavy, but I have to do it anyway, because that 
is the only thing I know how to do,” Mathato, a widowed mother of three, told me. “But it 
is good here at New Century because we are given time for sickness. We can go home and 
recover and come back to work. But it is also stressful because we are not earning any 
money when we are at home.” A number of workers reported that they did not come back 
to work because they felt physically recovered, but because they where overwhelmed with 
financial worries and obligations. More than a few women also temporarily resigned after 
the death of a partner or a child. In fact, more than 40% of workers interviewed had lost a 
child or a husband, a psychosocial toll from poverty and HIV/AIDS that was not always 
visible in the factory, but affected far too many workers.  
 Despite these multiple constraints on workers’ efforts to forge their own bodily 
wellness, their talk about bodily suffering and workplace illness constitutes an important 
strategy for challenging the authoritative knowledge and clinical silences regarding 
occupational health that workers confront in the clinic and in HIV programs. These 
dialogues strove to re-forge linkages between factory exposures, illnesses, and violations of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




workers’ rights that are left under-recognized by the clinical care available: 
Kananelo: And now when you get sick because of the dust in there, they fire you. Yet they 
are not even giving you the appropriate safety gear… 
NK: Is your sick leave paid [for this]?  
Kananelo: It’s there, but they [the management] get tired of it. When you’re always bringing 
the sick leave [letters], they get tired and can just fire you… But you are sick because they 
are not providing the appropriate attire for the workers! For protection, against all of these 
things that they know are dangerous. [My emphasis] 
Workers emphasize that the difficulties of getting sick leave are compounded by the 
injustice that the work itself seems to make them sick: “It means you get sick at work!” Lefa 
emphasized. “U seqhoala sa feme.” Seqhoala is a crippled or disabled person, in this case 
made disabled by illness. But the emphasis is on sa feme—by the factory: You are disabled 
by the factory, your disability belongs to them. This rendering draws on beliefs about 
caring and responsibility for the sick that are deeply rooted in Basotho social organization 
and culture. By speaking this way she creates a notion of obligation and responsibility—
not just for the illness itself, but for the care it necessitates.  
 For some workers, the broader injustices of their lives confronted the limits of clinic 
services, and this clash was most clearly expressed, as it was in Ha Mamello, through 
claims of hunger. For ‘Mamohau, a widowed mother of four who was in serious financial 
straits when I spoke to her, hunger threatened to boil over into action:  
I am happy with the services [here in the clinic]…but the pills force me to 
steal….Sometimes I fall down [from exhaustion], I am very weak. The services here tempt 
us to steal…[Because] these pills I am taking…you have to eat a lot of food. They tempt me 
to steal, because they demand more and more food.  
When ‘Mamohau spoke of her hunger, she drew a line connecting the pharmacological 
effects of her treatment (“the pills…demand more and more food”), her financial situation 
(being unable to buy enough food to satisfy her hunger), and the clinical services (which 




emphasis, again and again, is on stealing—stealing because she cannot afford food, 
stealing from the factory simply because she can, stealing because she is desperately 
hungry. In doing so, ‘Mamohau speaks of pharmaceutical treatment as the agent driving 
her actions (“the pills force me to steal”). We could read this as an excuse: or, we could 
read it as an accurate appraisal of the social conditions of care on the factory floor, where 
treatment only seems to exacerbate injustice, social ills, and unmet needs.  
 
Braai Packs and Bad Behavior: Conceptualizing HIV Risk 
 Despite the grim descriptions factory workers offered about their working 
environments, conditions for factory workers have in fact improved in the past years. These 
improvements have occurred both in and out of work: wages have risen and acute labor 
violations have abated; and as the worker population ages, more workers are married, 
have developed firmer community support systems, and have built up financial savings 
schemes. Regardless of these improvements, however, female workers continue to embody 
a set of extensive, interlocking social vulnerabilities that threaten their health and survival. 
A common, derogatory saying about female factory workers in Lesotho is that, when 
coming to visit a factory worker, “a man should knock her door with a braai pack.” A braai 
pack is a bag of cheap chicken parts, usually intended for grilling, and despite its poor 
quality, outside the budgets of poor families in Lesotho.  Nevertheless, it is valued—
craved, even—as a source of meat. The saying indicates that a man who visits a woman in 
the malaene—the cramped, single-room apartments factory workers usually live in—with 
the intention of having sex with her must bring her food in order to have sex with her. It 
points not only to the social expectations that sex for factory workers is often transactional, 




about workers, their sexuality, and their economic vulnerability further imperil their safety, 
social standing, and ability to negotiate for safer sex. These vulnerabilities are widely 
known. For example, all workers are paid at “month-end,” and as the days of the month go 
by, their money dwindles, going to food, rent, taxi fare, school fees for children, and to pay 
the interest on already existing loans (see Table 6.2, below). Late in the month, cars and 
taxis line up at the factory gates, knowing many women can no longer pay for transport, 
offering rides in exchange for sex. At month-end, after workers pull cash from ATMs in 
town to pay rent and loan sharks, thieves try to rob them on their way home or alone in 
their homes, knowing they are flush with cash.  
Typical Salary: 863M − 968M  
Food costs:71 431.5 − 484 
Rent: 100 − 300 
Medical bills: 0 − 40072 
Taxi fare: 150 - 200 
School fees, 2 children:73 5 − 100 
Total living costs: 686.5 − 1,484 
Table 6.2: Typical factory worker’s salary and expenses, in Maloti (approx 8.58 Maloti = 1 USD in 
January 2013) 
 
 It is likely that these vulnerabilities contribute to further HIV infections in workers. A 
rich literature across the globe has established the linkages between social and economic 
inequities, migration, structural violence, and HIV/AIDS (see, for example, Barnett & 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Food costs are a sizeable portion of salaries in Lesotho. Among the urban poor, they have been estimated 
to be as high as 75% of monthly salary; here they are estimated at 50%, which is probably a very 
conservative estimate. 
72 Workers spend varying amounts on health care, depending on their health status, their family’s health 
status, and their preferences for care. One informant reported casually that she spent approximately 400M 
on medical care for herself and her family each month—this amounts to about 2 visits with a private 
physician, and nearly 50% of her salary. A visit to the on-site doctor at the factory clinic for a patient 
receiving primary care services (which are not funded by ALAFA) cost 85M. 
73 Lesotho offers free primary school education for children, though school fees and supplies must still be 
purchased. Secondary school is prohibitively expensive (often much more than what is reflected here), as is 
any private schooling. As is shown here, even a “cheap” private / secondary school fee for workers is out of 
budget. Many are eager to educate their children, but feel that their salaries are simply too low to 




Whiteside, 2002; Farmer, 2001; Gupta, Parkhurst, Ogden, Aggleton, & Mahal, 2008; 
Parker, Easton, & Klein, 2000).  A 2008 study (Makoae & Mokomane, 2008) of Lesotho 
garment workers’ vulnerability to HIV transmission reports that low pay and migrant status, 
along with gender inequities, are major drivers of women’s susceptibility to HIV infection. 
Specifically, the study reports:  
Women’s low wages and the resultant shortfalls in their monthly budget, particularly led 
many women to engage in sexual behaviors such as concurrent multiple partnerships and 
transactional sex as a coping strategy. The need to work overtime to augment the low 
wages [and thus travel home after dark] also indirectly increased their risk of being raped, 
thus [decreasing] their chances of negotiating condom use (p. 6).  
While many citizens in Lesotho simply assume that women in the factories get HIV 
because they are promiscuous and suffer from too much independence because they are 
factory workers who earn salaries, ALAFA takes a firm stance that higher rates of HIV 
prevalence among workers is purely a product of demographics—they are young, often 
unmarried, urban-dwelling, migrant women. ALAFA also makes the argument that the 
garment industry supports women and the poor by employing them, and therefore reduces 
some of the social drivers of the epidemic in Lesotho. But a study commissioned by the 
Health Economics and AIDS Research Division (HEARD) and carried out by researchers at 
the National University of Lesotho concluded that Lesotho’s garment industry created and 
exacerbated four core population risk factors that are known to fuel HIV infections: labor 
migration, insecure employment, material poverty, and the additional health and social 
problems that women face in the context of these other vulnerabilities. The report argued 
that garment industry policies—particularly those that increased the unpredictability and 
insecurity of employment and kept wages extremely low—were thus at least partly 
responsible for the exceptionally high HIV prevalence among factory workers. 




attempts to address, workers’ social vulnerabilities. HIV messaging for factory workers 
emphasizes their personal responsibility over sexual health, and encourages them to 
negotiate for condom use. Education campaigns and support group discussions focus 
heavily on individual behavior and convey the message that workers must take 
responsibility for their own sexual and reproductive health. Primarily as a result of its 
negotiated status as a public-private partnership, this silence augments, and deepens, 
ALAFA’s reluctance to address working conditions and factory workers’ perceived health 
vulnerabilities due to workplace hazards.   
 Support group meetings at the factory—led by the HIV counselor or a dynamic 
ALAFA staff member—were run like patient education sessions, assisting workers to 
understand how to manage illness and prevent HIV infection and STIs. Support group 
leaders openly emphasized personal responsibility and workers’ abilities to manage their 
own sexual health: 
One thing you have to know, again, is that I have a choice. Who? Me. Not other people. I 
have a choice to use a condom. I have a choice to use a condom or to not use a condom… 
When you go to your bedroom, who is making decisions? It’s me. But if you are only going 
to listen with your ears [not take this to heart], when you are somewhere else, you’re only 
going to do what you want to do. And who will get sick? You. Hence, I’m sounding a call 
for all of us to take responsibility…. It’s true that now we are educated. And I should do 
what now? All of us should do what?  
At this meeting, the group responds enthusiastically that they should “take responsibility!” 
Only twice did I hear talk about rights among factory workers, and both times this talk 
occurred in the support group meetings. The first was in this discussion about condom use 
and STIs. Because STIs are not airborne, the support group leader said, and because one 
had condoms, STIs would not automatically infect anyone. “Because I have a right,” the 
support group leader said, “it’s not like STIs are a disease that is transmitted through the air, 




 The second time rights were mentioned was in another support group meeting some 
months later, and again the notion of rights was strangely bound up in a discourse about 
personal responsibility and being “educated” about one’s health. The group leader was 
encouraging the group to talk to their doctors and ask questions, to become 
knowledgeable about their treatment. “Why don’t you ask the doctor?” she chided them, 
“You see now [that when we do not ask questions] litokelo tsa rona tsona re hana ka tsona 
[we deny ourselves our own rights].” While we should applaud efforts to engage workers 
in their care and in asking questions about their treatment, such discourses—either about 
rights or behaviors—are inconsistent with the broader structures of inequality in women’s 
lives. Surely, many women learned through these discussions how to circumvent such 
structures in order to protect themselves or their health. But women also took 
conversations about behavior and responsibility to heart in such a way that they were 
unable to fathom how their work might put them at risk for HIV. These conversations 
undermined the fragile linkages workers attempted to build between workplace conditions, 
illness, and injustice.  
 It is far easier for factories to distance themselves from the factors that contribute to 
the markedly high HIV infection rates among this population than it is for them to deny the 
workplace exposures that increase debility among workers. Yet, strangely, it is the 
provision of HIV services that enables these occupational health concerns to subtly fall by 
the wayside. The overall emphasis on HIV within the factory setting—talk about it, services 
oriented around it—may obscure worker claims about broader bodily ills and occupational 
health. Certain factories—particularly those with more dangerous production processes—
have not allowed ALAFA to provide treatment services, though they demonstrate support 




presence of an on-site clinic would lead to a documentation of worker injuries and 
illnesses that might draw attention to occupational hazards and poor conditions. But for 
the majority of factories, ALAFA’s services have not caused significant tensions or drawn 
attention to broader factory responsibility for worker health. While it is still possible that 
the clinic site will prove to be fertile ground for building recognition of and agitation 
against occupational hazards, there were no signs during the research that this was the 
case. Discourses about HIV and factory workers’ risk reinforce this inertia, and also 
reinforce ideas among workers that health problems are theirs alone—in cause, and in 
consequence.  
 
When Your Father is Whipping Your Mother 
 The events that occurred on and prior to that rainy day when I encountered the 
factory management conducting vaginal inspections on workers are intimately bound up in 
efforts to produce and maintain the industry’s “ethical” image. It had been a terrible week 
at the factory: On the previous Thursday, I had arrived to find the clinic deserted, the HIV 
counselor absent for hours before she returned to convey, hesitatingly, that a newborn 
baby had been found dead in the bathroom of Area 4, purportedly left there after delivery 
by a night shift worker. The staff hadn’t wanted me to find out: “Even if your father is used 
to whipping your mother, he doesn’t do it in front of visitors,” I was told brusquely. While 
the HIV counselor admitted that there were many “scandals” at the factory, and that it was 
not uncommon to hear that women had absconded to the toilets during shifts to try to 
perform abortions on themselves, “this is worse,” she said, “than anything we can have [or 
tolerate] here.” Abortion is illegal in Lesotho, and female factory workers find that, despite 




wages due to enforcement of mandatory, but unpaid, maternity leave. Hiding their 
pregnancies until the very last moments, factory workers were known to go into labor on 
the factory floor, or even complete a shift before taking the taxi to the hospital for delivery.  
 In subsequent days, the clinic staff suspended their daily work to unfold what 
seemed to be a practiced—and to them, practical—course of action. Clinic workers told 
me that it would be easy to find the woman who did this. All they had to do was “inspect” 
those who worked in Area 4 that night: check who was bleeding, who looked to have just 
delivered, whose breasts were producing milk. The police were only tangentially 
involved—the management led the search, and the clinic workers assisted in inspecting 
suspects. The violation was portrayed as a moral transgression that besmirched the 
factory’s ethical reputation and required internal policing, rather than a crime violating 
local law and falling under the purview of local authorities.  
 By the time I arrived on that rainy morning and was squeezing my way through the 
clinic door, the workers outside begged me to help them—but not to stop the inspections; 
to get them done more quickly. They had worked the nightshift and were held for hours 
afterwards to be inspected; it was now past 9 AM, and they wanted to go home. 
Afterwards, few workers were willing to speak to me about the incident or the inspections 
that followed. Those who did traded gossip about who might be guilty. If they mentioned 
the moral or legal parameters of the inspections, it was only to point out that the 
inspections were “not good,” because the culprit was never found, and could have easily 
eluded detection by staying home from work.  
 In his work on biopower, Agamben (1998) presents the figure of homo sacer, the 
sacred man. An obscure figure from ancient political theory, homo sacer represents an 




purview of punitive law, but never protected by it—defined by law, but only to be banned 
from membership—the “sacred” man is not saintly, but an entity that sits outside society, 
who has been exiled from full political life. He is left, in the “space of exception” created 
for him, bare—a life that can be taken with impunity. Agamben’s work holds particular 
poignancy when applied to spaces of humanitarian action, those realms in which 
discourses so often hold up the humanity of the Other for inspection and compassion. 
Here, as Feldman (2006) describes it, the ambiguity between the sacred and the profane in 
the image of homo sacer allows for a “politics of compassion” to engage in “saving a bare 
life that has been prepared for rescue by the sovereign ban,” which has created it in the 
first place (p. 17). Therefore, “humanitarian discourses that proclaim ‘the sacredness of life’ 
do not oppose punitive and violent forms of political power; they are embracing a bare life 
that has been constituted by sovereign power” (p. 17). In corporate social responsibility 
and humanitarian consumption schemes, the very act of “doing good” occludes a broader 
attainment of, or attention to, rights—in particular, rights relating to other health and 
occupational issues. For workers, even as ARVs give biological life, they inadvertently strip 
away one’s status as a fully-fledged, rights-bearing citizen.  
 For Agamben, the work of humanitarian initiatives not only depends on the 
presence of bare life, but in providing assistance, further reifies life itself as bare. This 
approach has been critiqued for creating an overly bifurcated division between political 
life and the life rendered bare (see Fassin, 2010) . What seems more likely is that moments 
of stark nakedness, emerging within humanitarian projects, reveal the spaces of exception 
hidden amidst the mundane and dismal locations of everyday struggles to survive. These 
moments in turn reveal the structures of power and instruments of sovereignty, as well as 




2008). Here, a clinical space is co-opted in the execution of a kind of industrial vigilante 
justice; the clinical inspection of bodies also reinforces the strange moral order of a 
globally entwined workplace. The guiding principle of this moral world is not to build a 
truly ethical industry, but to construct the image of one, to brand it, and market it. In this 
world the worker body is divided in two: the ARV-treated body held up as sacred even as 
the damaged worker body is concealed and violated. In this schizophrenic duality, each 
part enables the other. Without efforts at ethical branding, ARV treatment would not exist; 
ARV treatment, however, assists in propping up ethical imaging, which in turn ensures a 
silencing of workplace rights violations.  
 The difficulty here is that no single entity creates this situation, and responsibility is 
refracted through the myriad facets of a global network of actors. Who might we hold 
responsible? The factory managers, who are pressured by US buyers to keep prices 
unrealistically low, and repeatedly told that ethical branding sells? The clinicians, whose 
space of biomedical practice is such a thin peninsula of sovereignty, bordered on all sides 
by the factory’s practices of productivity and discipline? ALAFA, whose entire mandate for 
work is shaped by, and responds to, a web of private interests over which it has little 
control? What is clear is that the global network of interests that turned US trade policy 
into a form of development aid, created markets for new practices in humanitarian 
consumption, and placed HIV initiatives at the center of these new practices, deliberately 
chooses to prioritize HIV above labor issues. “We do not think that trade is bad,” Bono 
stated at the RED launch. “We are for labor issues. Labor issues are very serious but six and 
a half million Africans dying is more serious” (quoted in Richey and Ponte 2008, p. 723). 
The implication, of course, is that labor rights and treatment for HIV are somehow 




While Richey and Ponte (2011) emphasize the ways in which celebrities like Bono 
become “emotional sovereigns, mitigating the threat to capitalist accumulation posed by 
the need to display corporate social responsibility,” here Bono demonstrates a more stark 
political sovereignty as well (p. 12). The vague network of forces for which Bono acts as 
spokesperson decides that HIV treatment is more important, and by extension, that labor 
violations, worker rights, poverty, occupational health risks are less urgent forms of social 
suffering.  
 When I spoke to ALAFA’s director about the labor violations I was observing in the 
factories, he said with resignation that “we” had learned “time and again that once living 
standards improve, manufacturing and garment industries move elsewhere…but as long as 
people want to buy cheap jeans, sweatshops will exist.” Workers and labor advocates 
frequently reminded me that a bad job was better than no job at all. But this is not simply a 
story about another sweatshop and another impoverished industry; it is a story about 
corporate social responsibility schemes and the fabrication of ethical industries, about a 
highly successful HIV treatment program that shifts attention away from social and 
occupational health issues that are much harder to address. In “campaigns” like RED, a 
new kind of commodity fetishism—per Marx (1990), the ways that capital strips products of 
the signifiers of the social conditions in which they were produced—is being born. What is 
especially dangerous about humanitarian fetishism is that it elevates the purchaser into the 
role of one who is “doing good” (Richey and Ponte, 2011). Whereas commodity fetishism 
strips products of their negative (unethical) ties to labor, humanitarian fetishism obscures 
the social conditions of production while simultaneously adding a perceived positive 




Finally, Bono’s trademark ambiguity about who “we” are and how we came to 
decide that HIV is more important than labor issues points to a second set of concerns 
about membership and belonging in global movements, and how they leave behind 
genuine aspects of rights and citizenship. On another occasion, again speaking about RED 
and its impacts in Africa, Bono commented, “I represent a lot of [African] people who have 
no voice at all…They haven’t asked me to represent them. It’s clearly cheeky but I hope 
they’re glad I do” (quoted in Richey and Ponte 2008, p. 721). Humanitarian initiatives 
assume a voice that speaks for their recipients; they also reconfigure the categories of 
belonging, claiming constituencies of recipients who may or may not share their priorities. 
HIV programs unintentionally re-shape the possible bounds of citizenship entitlements and 
rights engagements in realms well beyond the clinic or public health practice. Such 
revisions in the political worlds of workers and citizens have very tangible impacts on 
rights and well-being, but they are rarely attended to in public health practice. 
Presumptions about the inherent “goodness” of initiatives like HIV treatment programs 
ignore the social conditions under which they are produced, and the consequent political 
futures that they shape. For workers at New Century, violations and treatments of their 
bodies are intimately bound up in one another, as is the persistent weakness and danger 








 In May 2011, I find myself on a windswept hill in rural Lesotho, accompanied by 
Mme ‘Mats`eliso and Mme ‘Mathuso. We are visiting the Mapoteng74 community 
association, which is part of the larger network of “support groups” that Mme ‘Mats`eliso 
fosters across the country. On a day when the mountain air is so clear and cold that the sky 
looks the color of lapis lazuli, we sit on a congress of battered chairs and benches, 
wrapped in the thick woolen blankets that are the chosen uniform in Lesotho’s cold 
climate, and listen to the group’s frustration about their lack of support, their feelings of 
invisibility. They report a remarkable level of participation, including leadership from the 
village chief and his wife, and a long-standing history of solidarity in helping the sick in 
their community. Across town, they have carefully laid out 25 or more garden plots, each 
one assigned to a sick patient or family and tended by group members in order to ensure 
some level of food security. But the group is struggling without some level of external 
support.  
 Some members of the group are infected; many are not. Some report that they 
joined because they simply did not know what else to do—to stem the tide of deaths, to 
help decimated families. Women describe the terrifying early years of the HIV epidemic, 
speaking of it as a time when “the coffins came out from the houses and twos and threes, 
one after another.”  In small villages like Mapoteng, where entire families have crumbled 
due to illness, surviving community members find themselves trying to support orphans, 
sick adults, widows, and elderly grandparents off of meager pensions, scant remittances 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




from working relatives, and what remains of livestock and seed supplies not already used 
up or sold off to pay hospital and transport fees. The extent of this burden threatens the 
survival of entire communities. Support groups begin to look like sandbag levies erected on 
the eve of a hurricane’s arrival: a desperate attempt to preserve a doomed town’s survival.  
 The advent of HIV funding raised hopes and reinvigorated worn-out groups;75 the 
failure of that funding to reach many groups like this one creates resentment, distrust, 
disappointment, a sense of collective moral failure. The Mapoteng group has found little 
support from the government, its donors, or NGOs, despite the fact that they live close to a 
well-regarded clinic that receives international and domestic support. They hope that Mme 
‘Mats`eliso can help them come up with new ideas for attracting NGO or government 
assistance. She has few suggestions, though she often tries to get her own funders to 
accompany her on visits to these more far-flung rural associations. She talks about income-
generation projects and is willing to share her skills, to teach them how to make various 
products, but they lack any start-up capital, or the means to market and sell products once 
they are produced.  
 As we sit on this hillside ringed with mountain aloes the size of small buildings, the 
conversation is occasionally punctuated by the far-off noise of a car passing by on the dirt 
road below town. Each car is white—the ubiquitous color of government- and NGO-
owned vehicles—and they are all that pass by on the road. “We are working all alone,” 
one man says in frustration. “We are working hard but the government is just closing its 
eyes.” It is as if the government knows they are there (indeed, can see them out the 
windows of their vehicles as they pass by) but refuses to acknowledge them. And what is 
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the point of being seen anyways if nothing results from it? “We should be seen with eyes 
that are helpful,” he insists.  
 It is clear that Mme ‘Mats`eliso is at a loss for ideas that will help. The conversation 
has ranged from the need for job creation, to a washed out bridge that prevents patients 
from reaching the clinic. ‘Mats`eliso tries to emphasize that some issues must be taken into 
their own hands as citizens—brought to community counselors and government ministries. 
An older, retired miner stands up and speaks to me. “I understand this, but I, as one of the 
people who went to the mines to earn a living, I know that it is not easy for me to have a 
voice in that country [South Africa]. It is difficult to have a voice abroad the way you do as 
a citizen in your own home [country].” He looks to me and explains that much in Lesotho 
is decided by my own government, by the US. He asks me to return home and say, “’I 
went to Ha Mapoteng and I saw these problems.’” He wants to tell me that my citizenship 
matters more than his does in fixing these problems. It is hard to argue with him: His 
perception is a powerful and common one in Lesotho, difficult to overturn in the minds of 
citizens—in large part, because it is true.  
 Mme ‘Mats`eliso tries another tactic. If anyone can build a sense of optimism and 
empowerment, she can. She speaks to crowds like a preacher, drawing on religious 
metaphors and the call-and-response patterns used in many African churches. Her speech 
is worth repeating in its entirety here, as it gets to the heart of citizen subjectivities in a 
time of HIV scale-up in Lesotho. The responses of the group are italicized in brackets. 
I believe everything is good here, because everything is good in heaven, and so on earth it 
shall be good! 
Because the government is your children, isn’t this so?  
[yes!] 
It’s not Ntate Mosisili [the Prime Minister].  
[It’s not him].  
It’s not these other guys.  




It’s not Mme ‘Mathatho [the Prime Minister’s Wife]. It is your own children. Your children 
are being sent out but they never fulfill their duties. As we have talked, the cars have been 
going by. The cars are passing us by time and again. Do you think they don’t see you?  
[No.]  
Don’t they know that you are there?  
[They know!]  
Why is it that they are doing nothing about anything? It’s because of their hearts—they 
don’t have generous and good hearts. And yet we are even taken care of by people from 
other countries!  There—over there—are your children! [She points to the road.] Right now 
I have already seen about three cars [passing us by, on the road]! The government cars, 
they are just passing by aimlessly, and not entering into the villages!  But when you come to 
the places where they have claimed to be going [and giving services], then you find only 
mashata and mahlomola [unbearable situations of suffering].  
But you shouldn’t be discouraged, you should refuse to be discouraged, because everything 
is going to work out. Even thokolosi is running out of power.  
 ‘Mats`eliso tries to convince her audience that the government is “your children,” a 
repositioning that inverts the power structures of government, placing the responsibility in 
the hands of parents (citizens) for ensuring that their children go out and do their bidding. 
She compares a government that does not see suffering, does not recognize its people, to a 
naughty child that must be lovingly, but firmly, brought under the control of his or her 
parents.  
 Thokolosi is a well-known evil spirit, a sly, tricky little gremlin of a creature blamed 
for mishaps ranging from the minor (broken windows), to the considerable (an unwanted 
pregnancy, bad luck in relationships), to the catastrophic (death). Mme ‘Mats`eliso jokingly 
shouts at Thokolosi, “Now there is no one you can strangle and kill!” What happens next 
in the dialogue, however, is unexpected.  A woman from the audience, following the call-
and-response pattern of the speech, shouts out a retort: “Because AIDS has killed us all!” 
There is laughter but the response has a macabre humor to it that is deeply unsettling. 
‘Mats`eliso continues undaunted.  
So we should now meet, hold each other’s hands, and do this great work. I like this phrase I 
have been hearing—muso ha o re tsotelle [the government does not care for us]—because it 
is also our cry in my home village…Maybe if I was the only person who was crying, they 






At this point she seems at a loss for how to continue. It is not enough to simply say that 
they all feel the same way, but remain invisible together. She is grasping at ways to 
convince her audience that they can bridge the gap between the government, its far-flung 
funders, and this gathering of well-meaning but downtrodden villagers. She sighs, and 
concludes: “Even if the government doesn’t see you, heaven does.” 
 The extent of felt invisibility among populations experiencing HIV scale-up is 
profound. It is an invisibility so pervasive that when citizens appeal to forces “up there” 
(see Ferguson & Gupta, 2002) they are speaking about God, not government. In 2008, 
when I was just beginning this project, I met with a doctor working with an NGO in 
Lesotho and asked him about how decisions on HIV policy were made in the country. “We 
have a second government here in Lesotho,” he said, “an NGO government.” While it may 
appear to NGOs, donors and experts that Lesotho has a second government in which they 
are key participants, I have come to understand that for most citizens the concern is not 
about a second government, but a separate one—one that exists far beyond their reach.  In 
this dissertation, I have attempted to sketch out the parameters of citizen subjectivity and 
political worlds amidst HIV scale-up, where citizens engage primarily through a “politics 
of recipiency”; where patients and support groups struggle to craft survival through 
temporary, intermittent and broken forms of social contract; where faith in democracy is in 
the decline and perceptions of corruption are rampant.  
 For many who work in places like Lesotho, among NGOs, government programs, 
or as researchers, the data in these pages will be all-too-familiar. I tell these stories in the 
interest of painting an honest portrait of the political fallout of global health programs, but 
at the risk of repeating what others have observed, what in fact hides in plain sight. 




mostly remained a backdrop to other questions; here, I attempt to bring them into the 
foreground, and in doing so, to give them a full airing as defining social dynamics of HIV 
scale-up. In addition, I would not be surprised to find that the issues and trends I report on 
here represent only a small fraction of the evidence that could be brought to bear in 
answering the question of how HIV scale-up is affecting political worlds and subjectivities. 
This is an exploratory analysis; my hope is that it might be the basis for a much larger, 
more generalizable, and perhaps multi-country, multi-investigator project of research. And 
I hope that the questions I raise here might encourage other ethnographers to reexamine 
their field data for additional evidence that might more fully answer these questions. In 
what follows, I briefly describe the research’s implications, in particular its lessons for 
ongoing quandaries about aid effectiveness, citizen empowerment, and the effects of 
political dynamics on population health. I then discuss potential policy options for 
addressing some of the concerns about citizen participation, state-citizen relations, and 
NGO conduct.  
 
Making Aid Work? 
 A country like Lesotho will continue, at least in the coming decades, to be reliant 
on significant flows of aid to maintain a minimal level of survival for its citizens. 
Overhauling health care access and quality will require a much more intensive influx of 
aid money. Surprisingly, Lesotho funds more of its health system than other African 
countries, spending more than 10% of total government expenditures on health (WHO, 
2012, p. 136). Nevertheless, this amounts to less than a quarter of what South Africa 
spends per capita on health expenditures, and even less than half of that spent in 




global financial crisis in 2008 threatened to cause serious disruptions in treatment for 
patients living with HIV/AIDS because of the government’s reliance on donor funding and 
declines in South African Customs Union revenue that provides the bulk of the 
government’s operating budget (Medecins Sans Frontieres, 2011). And in late 2012, 
Lesotho sent out an urgent appeal to the donor community asking for support in addressing 
a mounting food security crisis, estimating that up to 725,000 citizens (40% of the 
population) would need food assistance in the coming year (Government of Lesotho, 
2012).  
 Events in the past decade have reignited a fierce debate among economists and 
Africanist scholars about whether aid works, why it doesn’t, and how to fix it (Easterly, 
2006; Hanlon, Barrientos, & Hulme, 2010; Moyo, 2009; Sachs, 2006; Singer, 2010). I have 
intentionally steered clear of these discussions, although it is not because they don’t 
concern me; they do. Much of this literature, however, seems to earnestly march down a 
one-way road towards ever more neoliberal and market-based options, using the troubles 
of development aid to justify the failures of anything not tied to, and guided by, the 
capitalist market (see, for example, Moyo, 2009; Sachs, 2006). While these critiques 
highlight the very powerful disappointments with development present in recipient and 
donor communities, they easily lead us into a moral zone where forfeiting responsibility for 
the suffering of others to the forces of capitalism seems like the most just option. This 
research brought me face-to-face with very broken, and troubling, forms of claims-making: 
the patient who stood in a neighbor’s house demanding food from her children before he 
would take his treatments; the elderly grandmother who insisted that I, as an American, 
must have a t-shirt for her because she indeed knew her HIV status; the factory workers in 




amidst these broken forms of request are very real desires and needs. How do we reconcile 
our informants’ acute social suffering and desires to achieve better forms of survival with 
critiques that throw the entire development enterprise into question?  
 One answer seems to be allowing citizens a greater deal of voice in the aid that 
enters their countries, making sure that institutions (NGOs, funders, ministries) are more 
democratically administered, and acknowledging that global health projects are inherently 
political. Some strides have been made in the form of SWAps (sector-wide approaches to 
health) that place more funding under the purview of national governments, and efforts to 
build accountability through increased participation in health (Bjorkman & Svensson, 
2007; Jesper & Kerstin, 2006; Rosato et al., 2008; Tendler & Freedheim, 1994). These 
approaches are partial ones, however, and pose additional difficulties. SWAps ensure 
government agencies have more say over how funding is spent, but still place a great deal 
of funding in the hands of government ministries, not necessarily citizens. As discussed in 
chapter 3, funding to government ministries can increase the power of ruling parties and 
unelected officials, thus reducing the likelihood and effectiveness of free and fair elections. 
Efforts to improve participation tend to place the onus of responsibility for accountability 
on citizens, without necessarily ensuring citizens have the capabilities or power to enforce 
good governance: They remain forms of self-governance and individualized responsibility, 
rather than emancipatory, collective, and transformative politics. In addition, increased 
participation often includes participants as consumers, not citizens, and overlooks 
potential inequalities in elevating the voice of ill-defined “communities,” trends I describe 
in more detail in chapter 3 (see also Campbell, Nair, & Maimane, 2007; Paiva, 2003). 
Efforts to increase the voice of Lesotho’s community councils in HIV priority-setting and 




they place responsibility on councils without providing the knowledge needed to build 
responsive policies and without attenuating the power of NGOs and funders in 
communities—forces that are difficult for councils to confront, let alone control. 
 The politics of recipiency reinforces citizen silence and broken forms of 
participation, and in doing so, reduces the likelihood that citizens will be able to play 
meaningful, agentive roles in future health initiatives. Yet even in Lesotho ripples of citizen 
response can be observed. In earlier chapters I have shown how support groups, 
community associations, factory workers and everyday citizens still strive to make 
meaningful connections with each other and their government, and do so against great 
odds. In recent years a new citizen-led group has emerged in Maseru. Called “Voice of the 
Voiceless,” it has participated in many recent protests and citizen demonstrations against 
the government. It aims to draw attention to citizen groups and issues that are not typically 
heard in Lesotho. There are other signs as well that the government must come to terms 
with constituencies it has repeatedly ignored or discounted in the past. During Prime 
Minister Mosisili’s reelection campaign in 2012, he visited factories and appealed to 
workers for their support, realizing he could not win reelection without this constituency. 
He was shouted off the stage by angry workers, who claimed that he had abandoned their 
interests throughout his two terms in office and had turned them into “slaves” (Zihlangu, 
2012). It was their support for Tom Thabane, and his attention to labor issues, that helped 
him win the 2012 election. And in 2011, I met with a Chief’s wife in Lesotho whose aim is 
to install innovative computers in every village that are linked by radio and internet 
connection, in order to increase citizens’ access to information about the government and 
their communication with other villages and the state. Though the pilot project’s 




committed to building technologies to better connect citizens who were too often isolated 
from political and social processes in the country. But even as new groups and movements 
emerge, others disappear. As I describe in chapter 5, Mme ‘Mats`eliso and her group of 
community health workers seem, today, wholeheartedly committed to building business 
enterprises, rather than continuing as a community-based support group. 
 And what about signs of resistance, those weapons of the weak (Scott, 1987) that 
leave room for hope—if not for overt social mobilization, then at least for nascent forms of 
agency in the face of powerful structures of constraint? Lesotho’s cultural and geographic 
proximity to South Africa makes the absence of citizen activism on HIV like that of the 
Treatment Action Campaign all the more noticeable. Experts and government 
administrators are quick to dismiss the populace as “passive,” while simultaneously 
demanding of citizens that they become “competent” as part of HIV scale-up (see chapter 
3). In the face of considerable hurdles to participation—lack of knowledge, broken social 
contracts, the fracturing of responsibility among myriad actors, rapid overturn in programs 
and policies—the discourses offered by citizens come across as crucial political dialogues 
about the programs and forms of survival that matter most to them. Talk of hunger, for 
example, speaks simultaneously to multiple fears: about the toxicity of ARVs in the 
absence of proper nutrition, about real food insecurity, especially in the context of HIV, 
about corruption and unfair distribution of AIDS funding, and about the power of the state 
to administer and take citizen life (see chapter 5). Speaking of hunger and refusing 
treatment in the context of food insecurity has become an important means of making 
claims–but like self-immolation or hunger strikes, it is a strategy of last resort, and one that 




 Nevertheless, discourses like these comprise speech acts that have the effect of 
reorienting talk about HIV towards issues that are of the most concern for citizens. They 
open doors to broader political discussions about issues that citizens feel are under-
represented in the wake of HIV scale-up, as a kind of political “redistricting” captures 
broad social issues and rezones them as constituents of an HIV/AIDS policy program. The 
tireless efforts among citizens to change the conversation and give voice to acutely felt 
needs are important, though at times futile, forms of resistance—discursive “weapons of 
the weak.” Unfortunately, like the patient who demands food from his neighbors, they are 
too often misdirected, turned inwards on other community members. As we saw in chapter 
5, forms of solidarity can, under the pressure of resource scarcity and unfair distribution of 
public goods, turn into social tensions and collective vulnerability. Citizens turn towards, 
or on, one another as the gap between citizens and the state grows wider, and as those 
responsible for administering programs (NGOs, donors, the state, etc.) seem more and 
more inaccessible to citizens. The more that citizens are treated and perceived as part-time 
patients, recipients, clients, or orphans (rather than as citizens), the further the space for 
meaningful engagement as citizens shrinks. Expecting individuals to act, collectively or 
individually, as citizens—that is, to mobilize, communicate, speak out, protest—when they 
are in fact treated more often as clients or recipients, is akin to asking someone who has 
been raised speaking English to suddenly start speaking Sesotho. We must begin by 
thinking about changing the structures that shape citizen subjectivities and limit their field 







Bad Politics is Bad for Your Health? 
 In previous chapters I have refrained from explicitly exploring the connections 
between political subjectivities, changing political landscapes, and the health of my 
informants. In many ways, this final connection was beyond the scope of an already broad 
research project, but it may be the most important direction for future research. Sen and 
Dereze’s (1991) exploration of hunger and public participation in India opened doors to a 
renewed recognition of the linkages between political form and function and the health of 
populations. The data here, though not explicitly intended to answer such questions, 
indicate that the quality of citizens’ relationships with the state, its partners, and clinics 
may dramatically impact how, where, and how often they seek services. It is not 
unsurprising to find that in Lesotho, as elsewhere, the ability to interact as a rights-bearing 
individual with the health system improves individual outcomes and broader shifts in 
health service provision (Bjorkman & Svensson, 2007; Rosato et al., 2008; Tendler & 
Freedheim, 1994). The case of Mme Lerato, presented in chapter 5, demonstrates the 
pitfalls of a public health system in which patients do not feel able to advocate for, or 
articulate, health rights. Paralyzed by spinal TB and reliant on family members to advocate 
for her at the clinic, Mme Lerato was particularly at the mercy of clinicians’ whims. Their 
strict adherence to procedural rules in the midst of burdensome patient loads and 
inadequate institutional support meant that Mme Lerato was not able to access the 
medicines or care she needed, and dramatically increased her risk of becoming resistant to 
both HIV and TB medicines. Unfortunately, she is not alone. Patients’ widely reported 
reticence about speaking to clinicians and fear of retribution when lodging complaints 
about government services create a host of poor service outcomes, and appear to deter 




clinicians,76 or must ask for services that are not immediately available. The persistent 
popularity of traditional and faith healers—as well as my own research with Mme 
‘Mats`eliso and her patients—indicates that therapeutic itineraries are heavily influenced 
by these dynamics between patients and clinicians.  
 More broadly, reticence about speaking to clinicians, government agencies, or 
NGOs, and fear about retribution if complaints are lodged means that meaningful feedback 
about the quality of services is rarely received. Yet as data from chapter 4 show, patients 
are very aware of the quality and availability of services at their local clinics. This creates 
an information deficit between citizens and clinicians, government agencies, and NGOs 
that impedes the ability to make services more responsive. Nevertheless, it is essential to 
point out that incentive and power structures make it difficult for citizens to speak out. 
Retribution from petty bureaucrats or clinicians for criticism is quite common; the politics 
of recipiency structures citizen interactions with NGOs and funders; few citizens have 
access to information about how to contact NGOs; and top-down priority-setting processes 
curtail and limit opportunities for citizens to give meaningful feedback. Studies have 
shown how patient “empowerment” is associated with better uptake and use of health 
services (Bjorkman & Svensson, 2007; Rosato et al., 2008), but empowerment, as I argue in 
chapter 3, can be a nebulous and incomplete measure of full citizen participation and 
mobilization (see also, for example, Finn & Sarangi, 2008; Petchesky, 2003).   
 Is it possible that these political dynamics have a visible impact on broader 
population health? Maternal and child mortality across HIV endemic nations remains 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Fear of facing clinicians when patients have not adhered to medicines or clinic instructions is particularly 
acute. This happens even when patients have strong reasons (such as hunger, migrancy, or inability to 
travel to the clinic) for treatment lapses. Additional research I conducted in 2008 on childbearing choices 
among women living with HIV indicated that when women become pregnant while on HIV treatment they 




persistently, shockingly high (WHO, 2012). Much of this mortality is attributable, experts 
agree, to the secondary effects of HIV (Hogan et al., 2010; WHO, 2012). But recent health 
surveys in Lesotho have shown rising mortality figures, despite efforts to expand access to 
free primary health care and vast increases in government health expenditures between 
2000 and 2010 (from $14 to $56 per capita) (WHO, 2012, p. 137). For example, cause-
specific mortality in children under 5 declined between 2000 and 2010 for HIV/AIDS but 
increased for other common diseases, including measles and pneumonia (Ibid., p. 70-1). 
Even as HIV treatment has expanded rapidly over these years and HIV incidence has 
declined, mortality remains so high that Lesotho ranks among the worst countries in Africa 
for improvements in child and maternal mortality (Ibid., p. 19-21). The most recent 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in 2009 provoked particular concern in Lesotho, 
showing that even between 2004 and 2009 child mortality showed an upward trend, and 
all-cause adult mortality increased by 22% (MOHSW, 2010, p. 257). Mortality estimates 
are problematic, even where statistical reporting is much more robust, but there are some 
signs that the quality of primary health services and interventions might be struggling even 
as HIV care and treatment improves. The WHO reports that the percentage of the 
population with access to improved drinking water actually declined between 2000 and 
2010 (WHO, 2012, p. 112), and maternal mortality rates are rising even as reports of births 
attended by a health professional increased significantly (MOHSW, 2010).77  
 Figures such as these, though exploratory, indicate that there is significant room for 
further study as to the drivers of persistently poor public health in places like Lesotho even 
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as HIV services have improved. Experts have worried about HIV scale-up’s effects on task-
shifting (incentivizing shifts in resources away from primary care and towards HIV 
programs, and moving human resources out of the health system and into NGO and 
bureaucratic positions) (Callaghan, Ford, & Schneider, 2010), and a now robust literature is 
exploring the capacity of HIV programming to build more long-standing improvements in 
health systems (El-Sadr & Abrams, 2007; Hafner & Shiffman, 2013). This leaves a great 
deal of room, however, for studies exploring how citizens’ relationships with health 
providers, government, and NGOs impact health outcomes, and how HIV scale-up is 
changing the way that patients seek and utilize various health services and public health 
interventions across the board.  
 
Finding a Way Forward 
 It is clear from these research findings that HIV scale-up processes, despite the 
strong relationships between activist movements and global HIV institutions throughout the 
past decades, have, in countries like Lesotho, largely left citizens and participatory politics 
by the wayside. This is despite very well-meaning efforts to build community participation 
and the greater representation of persons living with HIV/AIDS. An emphasis on 
administering a primarily biomedical program of action to address HIV has excluded 
everyday citizens and elevated the power of government agencies. And the vast size and 
scope of HIV scale-up has eclipsed other health, rights, and social issues. It is important 
not to romanticize democratic or participatory politics, especially in this neoliberal and 
globalizing age. But given the tendency of HIV programs to disrupt systems of participation 
and citizen access to government even despite the best intentions to do otherwise, and 




clear that we need to reexamine strategies for meaningful participation and true 
transparency and accountability.  
 A simple case in point is Lesotho’s pitso. As described in chapter 2, the pitso, or 
community meeting, is easily the most recognizable and robust form of public, 
deliberative, political participation in Lesotho. Accounts of the pitso from the 19th century 
indicate that, while led by local chiefs, they provided opportunities for public discourse 
that transgressed social hierarchy, questioning those in power and attending to the 
preservation of collective well-being. This form of public discourse is reflective of the sort 
of deliberative democracy promoted by Rawls, Habermas, and Sen, among others. For Sen 
(2009) in particular, it is “government by discussion” that enables a public, collective 
accounting of what might ensure the kinds of lives citizens “have reason to value”—or in 
the language of this work, pursue the forms of survival that matter most. HIV initiatives, 
building on the tendency of development initiatives to use pitsos to disseminate 
information about projects, have employed the pitso as a platform for HIV education and 
testing, or for the performance of donor aid as goods are handed out to community 
members. This is a vast departure from the original purpose and procedure of the pitso. In 
many ways, the change is emblematic of broader political shifts during HIV scale-up, and 
demonstrates the need for a return to more participatory, discursive politics.  
 How might we move towards deliberative democracy in HIV programming? Taking 
our cues from Sen (2001, 2009), we might think in terms of building capabilities, those 
“substantive freedoms” that would enable more meaningful participation. For Sen, 
democracy is essential to efforts to achieve the kind of life one has reason to value; his 
vision of democracy is associational, discursive, and driven by citizens. Sen’s capabilities 




ways in which they might be achieved), as well as to recognitions that full public 
participation as citizens is essential component of psychiatric recovery (Hopper, 2007; 
Ruger, 2010; Sen, 2002; Ware, Hopper, Tugenberg, Dickey, & Fisher, 2007). Sen’s more 
recent work (2009) has reemphasized the centrality of deliberative democracy in 
ameliorating injustice. He argues that a view of democracy as rooted in human interaction 
and public discourse, rather than in the organization or procedures of specific institutions, 
allows us to pursue democracy more vigorously, and flexibly—and at global as well as 
national levels (p. xiii). Where Sen falls short is in helping societies to confront the powers 
embedded in institutions that limit participation and curtail the pursuit of just and 
meaningful futures (c.f. Deneulin, Nebel, & Sagovsky, 2006). Thus, there are two broad 
levels at which we might aim to implement feasible changes. The first is at the level of 
large institutions and structures of power through which global health programming is 
executed. Changes in the ways that NGOs, institutions, and government branches set 
policy, develop priorities, and carry out everyday business can begin opening up more 
space for citizen involvement. The second is at the level of increasing citizens’ political 
capabilities. At this level, I discuss potential changes that would create the kinds of 
enabling conditions that allow citizens to participate more fully and forcefully. A 
capabilities approach helps us in avoiding the pitfalls of hoisting further responsibilities 
and expectations on citizens without changing the fundamental political conditions under 
which they live their lives.  
 At the level of institutions and structures, we can imagine a great many possibilities 
for change. National AIDS Commissions (NACs), Country Coordinating Mechanisms 
(CCMs), and other institutional bodies intended to represent citizens in setting HIV 




with HIV/AIDS or umbrella organizations must no longer stand in for more accountable 
and fair forms of representation.78 Representatives must be held accountable to clear 
constituencies and report back to them regularly. Even if positions are not elected, they 
should rotate on an ongoing basis. More fundamentally, Lesotho must reinstate its National 
AIDS Commission and ensure it is a strong and independent voice in HIV policymaking 
and funding decisions. Institutions like the CCMs must undertake a broader recognition of 
the hierarchical tensions between funders and civil society organizations reliant on such 
funding, as well as between themselves and government ministries. Funders, NGOs, 
activists, and government should engage in annual priority-setting processes that will 
fundamentally shape all HIV-related activities, and such processes must be driven not by 
external priorities, but by closer attention to citizen desires, needs, and concerns. As they 
stand now, joint annual meetings tend to present already agreed-upon priorities and 
policies, and primarily serve as information-dissemination opportunities. In addition, 
Lesotho’s effort to decentralize some HIV priority-setting to community councils through 
the Essential Services Plan and the Gateway Initiative is laudable, though unfortunately 
relatively unsuccessful. But this should not discourage the possibility of community council 
engagement in priority-setting in the future. In fact, community councils provide a 
promising structure for information exchange on HIV priorities and policies between 
citizens and government and its partners. A less top-down and more community-driven 
priority setting process on HIV and health initiatives is certainly possible. But to work 
effectively, citizen and council perspectives on HIV priorities must influence national 
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policy, rather than just providing a framework for council-led work in communities (for a 
further discussion, see chapter 3).  
 NGOs and funders must also alter the ways in which they work with citizens, 
endeavoring to build better transparency and accountability with communities, not just 
governments. Any discussion of how these processes may be improved must include a 
significant caveat: that there is a great variety among NGOs and funders, in terms of how 
they interact with communities, set priorities, and build processes for better accountability 
and participation. The recommendations here derive from my own observations of how 
various institutions engaged with the communities with whom I worked; as such, it is an 
inherently limited one, which must be complemented by studies conducted elsewhere, 
and among other communities and NGOs.  
 A primary step is improving the information provided to citizens and community 
councils about ongoing projects, allowing opportunities for open and honest feedback 
from citizens, and ensuring that NGO staff are far more accessible to citizens. Building this 
kind of accountability will require efforts in multiple areas. First, Memorandums of 
Understanding commonly drafted between NGOs and the government can firmly stipulate 
specific expectations for NGOs, including obligations to work through community 
councils and/or to report back to all communities in which they have programs about 
ongoing projects and plans for the future. Explicit in these dialogues would be the mutual 
understanding that citizens could provide feedback and influence priorities for the future 
without facing any retribution, and that such a dialogue would be separate from any 
resource distribution among citizens. In order to ensure that NGO programs do not 
exacerbate inequalities or favor certain geographic areas, government and civil society 




explicitly target the most needy, rather than populations that are most accessible. 
Governments can also require NGOs and funders to undertake longer-term contracts and 
programs in country—from 5-10 years rather than 1-3 years—since short-term programs 
create so much confusion among citizens and impede knowledge accumulation in 
communities about available services and resources. Longer-term programs may be more 
reliable, allow citizens to engage more fully in providing feedback that actually impacts 
program priorities and delivery, and enable relationships and mutual trust to build between 
citizens and NGO staff. It is also abundantly clear that citizens need more impartial bodies 
to assist them in communicating with NGOs, funders, umbrella organizations, and 
government agencies. Building more independent activism in civil society will assist in this 
process, but in order for those groups to remain independent they must access funding that 
does not require them to become primary service providers. An intermediary step might be 
to establish a national ombudsman office intended to assist citizens in understanding 
rights, resolving disputes, and ensuring they do not suffer punitive action.  
 Clearer messaging is required about the kinds of labor expected of patients, 
participants and support groups involved in clinical and NGO programs, as well as in the 
care of the sick. How are individuals to be reimbursed, if at all? What is expected of them? 
What benefits and resources might they expect to receive? Governments and funders will 
have to set clear policies as to whether and how care-givers and support groups will be 
supported, with considerable input from citizens. And NGOs should distribute easily-
understood information to participants, patients, or support groups about what 
“participation” in their programs includes, what benefits may be expected, what will not 
be provided, and what efforts, risks, and costs may be involved for any participants. 




in such contexts, it may be time to consider some kind of ongoing consent process 
between NGOs and participants. Such a tool would ensure that both parties clearly 
acknowledge and come to a shared understanding of expectations, commitment, and 
program objectives. But even more important is ensuring that NGOs provide ample and 
fair opportunity for dialogue with citizens and participants about all aspects of their 
programming and priorities, and use such dialogues to shape future work. Doing that will 
require a fundamental re-thinking of how NGOs and even governments are funded—an 
approach that has started with broader acceptance of SWAps but that has much further to 
go.  
 Nevertheless, a caveat is necessary. NGOs—and more importantly, CBOs—still 
provide an important alternative voice on policy in many countries. Especially where 
government approaches are authoritarian or discriminatory, non-governmental entities can 
play an important role in activism. As more and more organizations are absorbed as 
service providers, they tend to become more politically docile. Maintaining and supporting 
independent, activist-leaning organizations is important, and too much regulation by 
governments (either through funding arrangements or accountability measures) may limit 
the scope of productive political critiques in public health programming. In recent years, 
the Government of Lesotho has shown its ability to arbitrarily shut down or take over 
independent programs which it deems a threat to its influence over policy and provision, 
including its closure of the National AIDS Commission. While a number of initiatives like 
SWAps attempt to build better accountability between central governments and NGOs and 
funders, what is perhaps more important is to build better systems of communication and 




Gateway Approach demonstrates, even concerted efforts in this domain can be swallowed 
up by global funding hierarchies, NGO mandates, and existing priority-setting processes.  
 How can we develop the democratic capabilities of citizens more directly? 
Lesotho’s citizens rank quite high on core capabilities: The population has very high 
literacy rates, takes interest political issues, and most citizens have access to radios (Hall & 
Leduka, 2008; Tsikoane, Mothibe, Ntho, & Maleleka, 2007). Despite these capacities, 
however, acute deficits in basic needs demonstrate a powerful ability to distort political 
engagement and the articulation of rights and concerns. Sen (2001) and Nussbaum (2000) 
have referred to the self-damaging or seemingly irrational decisions of agents under the 
long-term duress of poverty as “adaptive preferences.” The term particularly refers to the 
tendency of citizens—long imprisoned by the lack of choices imposed by poverty—to 
struggle in articulating preferences, let alone expansive rights and desires, even when given 
a chance to do so. This inability to imagine the many parameters of a good and decent life, 
or to see one’s treatment as a violation of one’s rights, is often taken as a sign of passivity 
and acceptance among Lesotho’s citizens. As demonstrated by my informants, issues like 
chronic hunger or persistent economic insecurity show a striking ability to damage claims-
making, social solidarity, and public participation. Addressing and providing for citizens’ 
most basic needs—and doing so in a way that is neither temporary nor dependent on 
participation in or endorsement of other programs—is the most important building block to 
democratic capabilities.  
 Moving beyond basic needs, Sen (2009) argues that democratic participation 
involves “the capacity to enrich reasoned engagement through enhancing informational 
availability and the feasibility of interactive discussions. Democracy has to be judged not 




diverse sections of the people can actually be heard” (p. xiii). This means providing the 
information and knowledge to citizens that allows them to engage meaningfully, and 
creating the enabling conditions that allow voices to be elicited and heard. At the most 
basic level, data in this dissertation has demonstrated that citizens have an acute desire to 
know more about NGO programs and services in their communities, but lack access to 
basic information. Public institutions—clinics, community council buildings, post offices—
should have postings about all NGO projects going on in communities. NGOs should be 
required to provide clear, concise, widely-accessible information on a regular basis, and 
all information must include the contact information for a staff member whose primary role 
is to interface with citizens and community groups. Ironically, Lesotho does have a vast 
online database of NGOs working in the country that includes detailed information on 
projects, intended beneficiaries, funders, and contact details (www.letsema.co.ls). 
Ironically, this information is inaccessible to almost all citizens, even as it enables NGOs 
and governments to be highly aware of activities throughout the country.79 These kinds of 
information deficits among citizens are easy to address, especially given citizens’ keen 
interest in having more information about NGOs and high literacy rates. Another basic 
intervention would be ensuring that providers speak the language of their patients, or 
requiring the availability of trained interpreters in clinics where international doctors and 
nurses are providing care. Being able to speak to clinicians, ask questions, and provide 
feedback is foundational in building broader citizen capabilities.  
 Undertaking a capabilities approach also means acknowledging that citizens’ 
interests may not align with those of funders or NGOs, and in particular, that they may 
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prioritize other needs above HIV interventions. On one hand, it is essential that we pay 
attention to citizen priorities, especially given the tendency of HIV programs to 
overshadow other issues and rights in places like Lesotho. Ultimately, if citizens do not see 
the value of yet another HIV prevention campaign, it is unlikely to have any great impact. 
But on the other hand, public health policymaking tends to involve a fair measure of 
paternalism—enacting policies that are good for society but may not be in the interest of 
certain individuals. Public health policies like motorcycle helmet laws and indoor smoking 
bans limit individual freedoms in order to promote population health, and they can 
provoke the anger of interest groups and citizens. Over time, they tend to gain broader 
public acceptance. Crafting balanced policies like this is always difficult, but implementing 
paternalist policies at the behest of global institutions or to meet obligations from funders is 
sure to alienate citizens and patients. Increasing public discourse and deliberative 
democracy to set policies and balance individual and collective rights is crucial, and likely 
to create better public health outcomes in the long-term.  
 Finally, new technologies are emerging that promise to change citizen participation 
in public discourse, allowing citizens to engage more easily and through mobile platforms 
and crowd-sourcing technologies (Zambrano & Seward, 2013). UNAIDS recently began 
using crowd-sourcing technologies to influence its policies on youth and HIV/AIDS, and 
recognizing the need for new strategies of participation and engagement (Sidibé, Piot, & 
Dybul, 2012). While the proportion of people in Lesotho with access to mobile phones is 
increasing, many lack the funds to pay for data or air time in order to participate, and only 
1.3% of the population reported access to the internet in 2009 (MOHSW, 2010). As a 
result, new technologies may create new forms of disenfranchisement and inequality. They 




may contribute to rather than diminish existing democratic deficits. Nevertheless, such 
strategies remain a promising area for future research, and hold the potential for much 
greater information exchange between citizens and the state.  
 Activist movements in countries like Brazil and South Africa have shown that 
confronting HIV can also provide an opportunity to destabilize hierarchies, articulate 
rights, and reenergize citizens. Despite the global emphasis on community empowerment 
and patient participation in many HIV initiatives, however, citizens in countries like 
Lesotho have not shared these experiences. More than anything else, citizens need more 
recognition from the government and its partners that they can be meaningful participants 
in new global health processes, not just bodies to be treated, or recipients to be handed 
goods. If we fail to recognize the dramatic political impacts of global health programs, or 
the distrust and invisibility felt by citizens, we risk destabilizing political futures in states 
with an already tenuous relationship with democracy. Democracy itself is no perfect 
solution, either—and it faces considerable challenges in Africa, and in the current global 
era. But enabling citizens to act as agents in their own futures and to engage in public and 
meaningful deliberation about what those futures should look like is far from impossible. 
We should not leave those like the support group described at the beginning of this 
chapter—whose houses and communities bear the scars of AIDS, and who labor so 
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Appendix A. Timeline of Political Shifts and Party Rule in Lesotho, 1950-2012 
	  
1950-1960: Nearing the end of colonial rule 
 
The Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) emerges, calling for self-determination and the end of 
colonialism in Lesotho. Efforts to reduce the power of the colonial-backed system of chieftaincy.  
 
BCP led by Ntsu Mokhehle. 
 
 
1961 – 1965: Constitutional development 
 
King Moshoeshoe II appoints the Constitutional review Commission to develop plans for an 
independent state. 
 
1963: the council submits its report, supporting a Westminster style constitution with a lower and 
upper house. The lower house is to be appointed through elections by universal adult suffrage, 
and the upper will consist of chiefs and some members nominated by the monarch. The 
constitution greatly constrains the king’s power.  
1965: In Lesotho’s first elections, the Basotho National Party (BNP) wins an unexpected 
majority.  
BNP led by Leabua Jonathan, enjoys support from South African government. 
 
4 October 1966: Independence Day 
Lesotho gains independence. 
 
 
1970 – 1985: BNP’s authoritarianism 
 
1970: In the country’s second elections, the BCP takes back a majority, drawing on 
disappointment from rural areas with the BNP’s performance. But the BNP refuses to hand over 
power, with support from the South African government.  
 
BNP continues to be led by Leabua Jonathan. He shifts alliances towards anti-apartheid forces.  
 
BCP leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, remains in exile.  
 
1985: BNP pressured into holding elections, threatens all other parties so severely that there is 
little competition, and declares an “overwhelming victory” for itself.  
 
 
1986 – 1997: A decade of coups and chaos 
 
1986: Major General Lekhanya, with support from the South African government, leads a 
successful coup against Leabua Jonathan. South Africa blockades the border, angry at the 





1989 – 1990: King Moshoeshoe II then challenges Lekhanya, and is given executive powers. 
Lekhanya then deposes the King, and the King abdicates to his son, King Letsie III.  
 
1991: Colonel Ramaema topples Lekhanya in another coup.  
Civilian anger boils over, with rioting and factory strikes in Maseru and other towns.  
Ramaema agrees to a revision of the constitution, which takes two years.  
 
1993: New elections take place; Ntsu Mokhehle, the long exiled BCP leader, wins a landslide 
victory.  
 
1993 – 1994: More instability follows the elections.  
The army threatens to overthrow Mokhehle, and much violence follows.  
King Letsie III, angry at his limited political powers in the new constitution, suspends the 
government in a coup. He receives little support from Lesotho’s neighbors, and the coup is soon 
over.  
Moshoeshoe II reinstalled as king 
 
1996: King Moshoeshoe II dies in a car accident. His son is reinstated as King Letsie III 
 
1997: lead up to the general elections is marked by infighting in the BCP. Facing criticism, 
Mokhehle abandons his party and starts the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD).  
 
 
1998-2012: Attempts at democracy 
 
1998: LCD, led by Mokhehle, wins a landslide victory 
Pakalitha Mosisili (LCD) appointed prime minister due to Mokhehle’s failing health.  
Rioting breaks out, as opposition parties claim unfair elections. South Africa restores order.  
 
1999: Interim Political Authority established to review electoral laws. Electoral system revised to 
ensure more proportional representation of opposition parties.  
 
2002: LCD, led by Mosisili, maintains a considerable majority in elections.  
 
2006: All-Basotho Convention, a new party led by Tom Thabane, is formed, having broken away 
from the LCD.  
 
2007: Mosisili and the LCD still hold onto power in the elections.  
 
2011: Mosisili perceived to have more and more authoritarian inclinations, but is losing support 
within his own party. Facing a no-confidence vote, Mosisili abandons his party and forms the 
Democratic Congress (DC) party.  
 
2012: Prime Minister Mosisili finally overturned at the poll, as the ABC wins a slight majority in 




Appendix B. Timeline of HIV-related events in Lesotho, 1986-2012 
 
1986 
o 1st HIV case identified in LS 
1987 
o National AIDS Prevention and Control Program (NAPCP) established within the 






o AIDS Committees established in districts 
1993 
1994 
o GoL Medium Term Plan (1994-1999) calls for multi-sectoral work on HIV/AIDS 
activities 
1995 




o Number of people reported with full-blown AIDS quadruples between 1996 and 1997 
1998 
1999 
o UN reports that 11.6% of university students in Lesotho are living with HIV 
o HIV/AIDS policy framework developed 
o National AIDS Strategic Plan (2000-2004) developed and endorsed by government 
2000 
o Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili declares HIV/AIDS a national emergency 
o Irish Aid contributes 2.4 million Maloti for combating HIV/AIDS 
o National Policy on HIV/AIDS Prevention, Control and Management announced 






o Lesotho AIDS Programme Coordinating Committee (LAPCA) established, under Prime 
Minister's office.  
o Principal Secretaries Task Force on HIV/AIDS established, to guide LAPCA 
o National AIDS Committee established to advise LAPCA and NASP 
o Ministries decide to allocate 2% of budgets to HIV/AIDS 
o Multi-sectoral Task Force established as well as District AIDS Task Forces 
2002 
o HIV prevalence rate reaches 23.6% 
o Vice Chancellor of national university addresses community on risks and impact of 
HIV/AIDS 
o Prior to elections, most political parties mention HIV/AIDS in party manifestos 
2003  
o Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili receives gift of Nevirapine from Boeringer Ingelheim 
o Launch of national PMTCT program by Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili 
o Maseru host to SADC Conference on HIV/AIDS 
o Assembly HIV/AIDS committee established to mainstream HIV into government 
activities 
o Cabinet memorandum released, Scaling up the Fight against HIV and AIDS in Lesotho 
2004 
o Plan for ART scale up developed 
o First Global Fund grant received, Round 2, for $29 million  
o World Bank HIV/AIDS Capacity-Building and Technical Assistance Project approved, 
for $5 million 
o Senkatana Clinic, the first ART clinic in the country, opened by Prime Minister in 
partnership with Bristol-Meyers Squibb 
o Turning a Crisis into an Opportunity: Strategies for Scaling Up the National Response to 
the HIV/AIDS Pandemic in Lesotho published after adopted by cabinet as an official 
working document 
2005 
o National referral hospital gets its first CD4 count machine, the third in the country 
o LENEPWHA formed  
o National AIDS Commission Act passed 
o National HIV and AIDS Forum established 
o National AIDS Commission established 
o HIV/AIDS Treatment Centre for Children opened in Maseru in partnership with Baylor 
College of Medicine and Bristol Meyer-Squibb 
o Know Your Status Campaign announced on World AIDS Day 
2006 
o Phase I Round 5 Global Fund Grant approved for scale-up of care and treatment $10 
million 
o Launch of the CHAI-MOH Rural Health Initiative 
o Development and launch of National M&E Framework 
o Passage of the Legal Capacity of Married Persons Act 
o National Blood Transfusion Policy adopted 




o Introduction of high school bursaries for OVCs  
o Launch of National Action Plan on Women, Girls, and HIV/AIDS 
o National Adolescent Health Policy enacted by MOHSW 
o No. 5 Labour Code Amendment Act 2006: to make provisions for HIV and AIDS in the 
workplace 
o Development of National Strategic Plan 2006-2011 
o Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (MOHSW) develops the National HIV and AIDS 
Testing and Counseling Policy 
o National HIV and AIDS Policy drafted and enacted by NAC 
o Institutionalization of the Gateway Approach to decentralize the response to HIV/AIDS 
o Bono visits Lesotho to promote Red campaign and to support the launch of ALAFA 
o Bill Clinton, Bill and Melinda Gates, and Steven Lewis undertake joint visit to Lesotho 
o Launch of the Know Your Status Campaign (KYS) 
2007 
o Phase II of Round 5 Global FUnd Grant begins  for $5.8 million 
o EU grant 11 million Euros received for OVC programmes 
o Signing of World Bank-GoL-Netcare Public-Private Partnership agreement for new 
tertiary referral hospital, worth $113 million.  
o Round 6 Global Fund Grant for $5.5 million approved 
o National consultations convened in preparation for AIDS Bill 
o National Operational Plan 2007-2008 developed and adopted 
o Protection of OVCs against property-grabbing instituted by Master of the Court 
o HIV/AIDS Committees established in National Assembly and the Senate.  
o Education Sector Policy on HIV and AIDS developed by Ministry of Education and 
Training  
o National Coordination Framework adopted 
o National HIV and AIDS Partnership Forum launched  
o Joint review of PMTCT programs, Introduction of plan to scale-up PMTCT programme 
o Institutionalization of umbrella bodies for all civil society organizations 
o Thematic working groups for Programme Management, HIV Prevention, Treatment, Care 
and Support and Impact Mitigation were formed and operationalized 
o 21 Line ministries, departments or agencies trained on HIV/AIDS and developed action 
plans for mainstreaming HIV within their sectors.  
o Ministry of Gender, Youth and Sport launches National Action Plan on Women and Girls 
and HIV/AIDS: Facing the Future Together 
o Launch of Essential Services Package (ESP) and start of 128 community councils 
implementing the ESP on HIV/AIDS at community levels.  
o Church leaders sign Statement of Commitment to focus on HIV and AIDS 
o ALAFA Launched 
2008 
o Round 7 Global Fund grant agreement signed for $18 million 
o Mid-term review and revision of National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 
o Roll-out of life-skills curriculum in primary, secondary schools 
o Modes of Transmission Study completed 
o Launch of Red Ribbon Media Award 
o Launch of the Child Help Line 
o UN launches Joint UN Programme of Support on AIDS in Lesotho: Delivering as One 
2009 
o Approval of Millennium Challenge Account support for $362.6 million over five years 
o GOL-PEPFAR Agreement for support worth $27 million a year for five years 




o Approval of Global Fund Round 9 grant for $8 million 
o Global Fund Round 8 grant for $50 million agreed 
o Global Fund Round 8 grant Phase 1 for $6.8 million agreed, Lesotho Council of NGOs 
appointed as Principal Recipient 
o National Behavior Change Communication strategy developed and launched 
o Passage of Legal Capacity of Married Persons Act 
o District and Community Council AIDS Committees established 
o Training and Capacity Building on HIV/AIDS Competence and Mainstreaming for the 
Private Sector and Civil Society Organizations 
o Initiation of full decentralization of ART and TB treatment to 200 health centres 
2010 
o Global Fund Round 8 agreement to support MDR/XDR-TB and HIV management signed 
for $7.7 million 
o Enactment of Child Protection and Welfare Act 
o Harmonization and development of the workplace policies and strategic plans by public, 
private, civil society actors and implementing partners 
o National Affirmative Action Plan for Gender, HIV and AIDS for Women and Girls 
launched 
o National HIV Prevention Strategy developed 
o Lesotho Output Monitoring System for HIV and AIDS (LOMSHA) developed and rolled 
out to 10 districts 
o KYS evaluation undertaken and completed 
o Second Demographic and Health Survey completed 
o Initiation of National Health Decentralization Plan 
o DFID ends future support to Lesotho for HIV/AIDS programs 
o Internal audit of NAC undertaken, with subsequent cutbacks in funding 
o Global Fund Round 10 proposal rejected, first Global Fund proposal denied 
2011 
o New MOHSW prevention strategy announced 
o Irish Aid announces no longer supporting HIV/AIDS programs in Lesotho 
o NAC National Partnership Forum held to review National HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 
2006-2011 




Appendix C. Community Council HIV Priorities 
 







Objective 1: Prevention Through Change in Sexual Behavior    
Male-focused discussions 29.6 20.8 8 
Facilitation of regular activities for youth such as football, volleyball, 













Building the capacity of traditional community leaders in HIV and AIDS 







Parent involvement in shaping the behavior of children on HIV and 







Registration of initiation schools and facilitating adherence to best 







Building the capacity of church leaders in HIV and AIDS and in 







Facilitating the capacity building of business leaders in HIV and AIDS 







Objective 2: Access to HIV Testing and Health Services    
Support mechanism for critical patients to [access] hospital/health 
facility (council to agree on the mechanisms) 
25.6 27.2 17.6 
Registration of chronically ill patients 24.8 20 14.4 
Facilitate and ensure provision of HBC supplies and gloves and limited 







Registration of home-based care (HBC) support groups 9.6 11.2 11.2 
Facilitate and ensure training of at least one health facility worker per 















Advocacy for provider-initiated testing at health care facilities 0 0.8 4 
Objective 3: Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission    
Provide training to at least on health facility worker per facility to do 















Establish referral system for emergency delivery for mothers 16 29.6 36.8 
Conduct door-to-door / community education campaigns and male 







Objective 4: Orphans and Vulnerable Children    
Registration of orphans and vulnerable children 38.4 17.6 8 
Ensure that registered orphans and OVCs have access to basic services 







Capacitate and empower Councilors, Chiefs and community members 
























Objective 5: Support for People who are HIV+    
Sponsoring HIV+ facilitators to do door-to-door, community gatherings 
and small group meetings /speeches/discussions on living positively with 










Placement of one “expert” or HIV+ patient at each health facility 27.2 14.4 14.4 
Organized transport for patients, treatment supporters and medications 







Training of and sustaining of treatment supporters for PLWHA on ART 16.8 28.8 33.6 
